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ABSTRACT
Young, Harry Roger. PHD. The University of Memphis. December,
2015. Stories of the Trenton Six: Race and the Early Cold War, 1948 – 1953.
Major Professor: Dr. Aram Goudsouzian.
This dissertation reveals the complex post war world, in the emerging Cold
War era, with the intersecting disputed worlds of race and ideology through the
lens of the Trenton Six case. It provides the reader with a glimpse of one city’s
story, but it enveloped the entire nation; as Americans attempted to make sense
of their chaotic and complicated world, prior to the 1960s civil rights movement.
This study explores the problem with race in the criminal justice system. Even as
racial attitudes were liberalizing in the post war world, race still pervaded criminal
justice proceedings in subtle and unsubtle ways. I demonstrate this by
examining how race played out in in the interrogation room, and later in the
courtroom.
This work merges the struggle between civil rights organizations, the role
of black women and Progressive participants in the struggle for equality. The
epic clash between the Civil Rights Congress and the NAACP for control over the
case revealed a complex interplay of liberal and radical forces for racial justice in
the postwar era.
Bessie Mitchell emerged from the margins as she transitioned from a
nonpolitical woman to one who became closely associated with the Radical Left
and Civil Rights Congress, as she became identified with the larger issues in the
struggle for equality. Moreover, this work allows for Progressive members of
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1948, James Imbrie and his Princeton Committee, to be re-centered within the
historical record.
This dissertation integrates the role of black attorneys and the fragile
coalition that eventually developed between the NAACP and the Princeton
Committee in the retrial of the Trenton Six. I show the conflict and challenges for
the NAACP lawyers as they struggled both within the defense team and against
the opposition. The difficult relationship that arose during the trial among the
lawyers was representative of the larger tension and stress that was playing out
amongst liberals trying to engage in the struggle for civil rights.
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INTRODUCTION
Early on the morning of Tuesday, January 27, 1948, seventy-two-year-old
William Horner opened his store for business. He hoped it would be a better day
than the previous one. His customers were not venturing from their homes, as
Trenton was suffering from one of the coldest winters in a long time. Horner and
his common law wife, fifty-nine-year-old Elizabeth McGuire, operated a secondhand furniture business, just a few feet north of Broad and Perry Streets, in a
three-story storefront at 213 North Broad Street. They used the first floor for the
business; inside this small crammed area, old furniture, appliances, tools and
various other items were piled high, leaving only a very narrow aisle through the
store itself.
There was a great deal of activity outside the Horner store that morning.
Three Trenton policemen were in the area. At 10:30 a.m., Patrolman Fred
Sigafoos worked to keep the corner of Broad and Perry clear of automobiles so
that the plows could clear the streets from the freshly fallen snow. While
Sigafoos waited for city trucks to arrive, Patrolman Edward Kelly walked his beat,
passing Broad on Perry and heading in the direction of the Bus Terminal. Traffic
control Officer Arthur Dennis passed the Horner location and continued north
toward the Battle Monument, checking the parked cars along Broad for meter
violations. He decided to stop at one of the businesses to warm up, smoke a
cigarette, and make a telephone call. Cigar salesman Frank Eldracher, arrived a
few minutes past 10:00 a.m. and parked his car directly in front of 213 North
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Broad Street to make his customary rounds. Mrs. Virginia Barclay, who lived a
few yards north of the Horner store, watched from their third story apartment
window as her husband tried to start his car.1
As Eldracher was returning to his car, he noticed two men leaving
Horner’s store. One man was not “overly dark,” and the other fellow was "shorter
and lighter-skinned than the first.” The taller man “leaned back and closed the
door gently” and walked north on Broad Street. It seemed normal for customers
to leave the store, so he did not think about it any longer until the door opened
and a woman with blood streaming down her face cried for help. Eldracher ran
to the corner and summoned Patrolman Sigafoos, who hurried to the store and
asked the woman what had happened. She told him that three African-American
men had come into the store looking to purchase a mattress. While her husband
had taken them into the back to get the mattress, she was showing another
customer a stove. As she bent down to open the stove, she heard a commotion
and she was hit on the head. Sigaffos went into the back of the store and found
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Transcript of 1948 Testimony, State of New Jersey, plaintiff-respondent, vs. Ralph
Cooper, Collis English, McKinley Forrest, John McKenzie, James H. Thorpe and Horace Wilson,
defendants-appellants. On appeal from the Court of Oyer and Terminer of Mercer County. On writ
of error. Joint appendix. (Trenton, Van Buskirk Press, 1948) or Transcript of 1951 Testimony,
State of New Jersey, plaintiff-respondent, vs. Ralph Cooper and Collis English, defendantsappellants, and McKinley Forrest, John MacKenzie, James H. Thorpe and Horace Wilson,
defendants. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Mercer CountyCriminal. (New York, Supreme Printing Co. 1952). All transcripts are located in the Princeton
University Library, Firestone Location, Princeton, New Jersey, [hereafter cited as State of New
Jersey], Fred F. Sigaffos Testimony, Volume 1, 327a - 330a (1948), Volume 1, 309a- 311a
(1951); Edward W. J. Kelly Testimony, Volume 1, 332a – 338a (1948), Volume 2, 455a – 486a
(1951); Arthur Dennis Testimony, Volume 1, 349a – 356a (1948); Fred Eldracher Testimony,
Volume 1, 357a – 366a, Volume 11, 4335a – 4358a (1948), Volume 1, 335a – 368a (1951); Mrs.
Virginia Barclay Testimony Volume 11, 4304a – 4321a (1948), Volume 18, 7117a – 7161a
(1951).
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her husband, lying face down on a mattress, unconscious and dying from a
severe blow to the head.2
That cry for help signaled the beginning of a legal case for the men would
become known as the “Trenton Six.” As the news spread throughout Trenton,
citizens were outraged by this brazen attack. Not only did it occur in the owner’s
place of business, in the middle of the day, and in center city Trenton, but the
perpetuators were black. In the minds of most white merchants and other
citizens, the crime dramatically reaffirmed that they were unsafe in their own
businesses. It also confirmed the city’s serious problems with the large influx of
black migrants during and after the war. Demanding immediate action, the
people of Trenton brought pressure upon an already besieged Trenton Police
Department. The opening salvo started with an editorial in the January 29
edition of the liberal Trenton Times, entitled, "The Idle Death Chair.” It called for
more executions to help stem the lawlessness. The next day, the police
department organized a special “bandit squad” armed with tommy guns and
other “special equipment." It had orders to shoot to kill. Trenton’s Director of
Public Safety justified the action, arguing that “well-meaning people may accuse
me of acting like a Gestapo, but if we can bring in the Horner killers or save one
life, I'm willing to take all their criticisms." After an intensive manhunt and the use
of questionable investigatory tactics, six black men were arrested and charged

2

State of New Jersey, Frank A. Eldracher Testimony, Volume 1, 359a (1948); Fred F.
Sigaffos Testimony, Volume 1, 327a - 330a (1948), Volume 1, 309a- 311a (1951).
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with murder. Their names were Collis English, Ralph Cooper, Horace Wilson,
McKinley Forrest, James Thorp, and John MacKenzie.3
Over the next few days, the six detained men yielded to the pressure.
Five signed statements implicating themselves. They were tried, found guilty,
and sentenced to death. With the help of the sister of one of the defendants, the
Civil Rights Congress entered the case. It appealed to the state supreme court
and they were granted a new trial. But by then, the CRC was removed from the
case. Two other organizations, the NAACP and Princeton Committee, assumed
control of the case. The new aggressive defense team won acquittal for four of
the defendants, while the two remaining defendants appealed and once again
won a new trial. While waiting for the re-trial, one defendant died, leaving the
sole survivor to eventually accept a plea deal that earned him his freedom.
Stories of the Trenton Six: Race and the Early Cold War in America, 1948
– 1953 examines the Trenton Six case as it was transformed from an
insignificant local case into an international cause celebre, with all its
accompanying twists and turns. The case of the Trenton Six is more than a legal
drama, however. It is a powerful lens on post-war American society, revealing
the fissures and contradictions within it. It is also a story that sheds light upon
the complexity of race relations in a northern city in the era prior to the 1960s civil
rights movement.4
Trenton Evening Times, Editorial, “The Idle Death Chair,” January 29, 1948; Trenton
Evening Times, “Bandit Squad Organized For War on Crime,” January 30, 1948.
3

While Stories of the Trenton Six: Race and the Early Cold War, 1948 – 1953, focuses
on a local legal case and ultimately widens onto a larger national level, the work builds on the
ever-growing literature in two broad areas: the Civil Rights Movement and members of the
4

4

The case exposed the city of Trenton as it unsuccessfully struggled to
come to terms with the twin realities of a shrinking industrial base and the
beginning of white flight to suburban neighborhoods. The city’s slogan, “Trenton
Makes, The World Takes,” accurately portrayed the importance of Trenton to the
nation’s economy before World War II. But after the war, Trentonians witnessed

Progressive Party Movement (1948 -1955). First, it can be positioned within the parameters of
what Jacquelyn Dowd Hall has called the “long civil rights movement” and others have named the
“Black Freedom Movement” or “Black Freedom Struggle”. This acknowledgment of a long
movement allows a more nuanced story to develop. As Risa L. Goluboff argues, it was during the
period from 1940 to 1954 that the “world of civil rights was conceptually, doctrinally, and
constitutionally up for grabs.” The Lost Promise of Civil Rights (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2007), 5. One of the noteworthy aspects of this dissertation is that it allows a
wider focus to be placed on the north, apart from the classic narrative in which the region only
becomes important as black militancy emerges in the 1960s. Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, “The Long
Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses of the Past,” Journal of American History 91, no. 4
(Mar., 2005): 1239; The transition began in the early 2000s as scholars such as Beth Tompkins
Bates and Carol Anderson began to shift the traditional beginning time line of the movement from
the 1954 Supreme Court Brown v Board of Education case to much earlier periods of the 1930s
and 1940s. This departure also mirrored the distance scholars began to put between themselves
and earlier academics who had pursued the “Great Man” of history and study of national
organizations, like the NAACP, to examine the movement in a new and reinvigorating
methodology of examining the local level. See Steven F. Lawson’s, “Freedom Then, Freedom
Now: The Historiography of the Civil Rights Movement,” American Historical Review 96 (1991).
Typical “Great Man” books dealt with Martin Luther King, Jr. Examples of these are Stephen B.
Oates, Let the Trumpet Sound: The Life of Martin Luther King, Jr. (New York: Harper & Row,
Publishers, 1982); David J. Garrow, Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Southern
Christian Leadership Conference. New York: Vintage Books, 1986); Beth Tompkins Bates,
Pullman Porters and the Rise of Protest Politics in Black America, 1925 - 1945 (Chapel Hill, NC:
University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Carol Anderson, Eyes Off the Prize: The United
Nations and the African American Struggle for Human Rights, 1944 – 1955 (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2003), However, not all scholars agree on these shifts in the
literature. See Sundiata Keita Cha-Jua and Clarence Lang in “The ‘Long Movement’ as Vampire:
Temporal and Spatial Fallacies in Recent Black Freedom Studies,” Journal of African American
History 92, no. 2 (Spring, 2007): 265 - 288. They argue that the Long Movement’s major flaw is
in its “ahistorical totalizing perspective. By this we mean the tendency to flatten chronological,
conceptual, and geographic differences” (269). Additionally, the two scholars content that by
expanding the conventional dates of the CRM from 1954 – 1965 to earlier and later dates and
centering the Black Power Movement within the same chronological period as well as erasing the
traditional division between the North and South by focusing on the local movements in the North
with their emphasis on education, employment and housing, historians have actually
accomplished the inverse by clouding the Black Freedom Movement.
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the closing of factories that had been the bedrock of the city’s industrial
economy.5
At the same time, people were still moving into Trenton searching for
better opportunities, thereby, placing more stress on the job market. Many of
these newcomers were blacks from the rural South, who competed for manual
jobs and inexpensive housing. Forrest, Mackenzie, Wilson, and Cooper all
moved to Trenton during this period. As the city underwent both a post war
reconversion and an influx of blacks moving into the city, many Trentonians
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Civil rights scholars have also moved northward, focusing their work on major cities
such as New York, Detroit, Philadelphia, and Oakland. In 2008, Thomas Sugrue’s classic, Sweet
Land of Liberty: The Forgotten Struggle for Civil Rights in the North synthesized the struggle for
civil rights in northern cities. Common themes in these works include an examination of the
systemic racism found in housing, employment, education, as well as in the policing practices that
confronted African Americans in these cities and the broader Popular Front type of coalitions
formed to combat them. See Robert O. Self, American Babylon Race and the Struggle for
Postwar Oakland (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003); Martha Biondi, To Stand and
Fight: The Struggle for Civil Rights in Postwar New York City (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2004); Megan Taylor Shocley, “We Too Are Americans”: African Americans in
Detroit and Richmond, 1940 – 1954 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2004); Matthew J.
Countryman, Up South: Civil Rights and Black Power in Philadelphia (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2005); Thomas J. Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and
Inequality in Post War Detroit (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); Angela D. Dilllard,
Faith in the City: Preaching Radical Social Change in Detroit (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press, 2007). In 2009, Patrick Jones’ in The Selma of the North: Civil Rights Insurgency in
Milwaukee helped expand the literature to include smaller northern cities, such as Milwaukee.
Other works quickly followed, adding to the growing northern movement literature. In 2014,
Jason Sokol’s, All Eyes Are Upon Us Work challenged the narrative of the continuities found in
northern and southern racism with a more nuanced approach of visualizing the Northeast as a
place where there were “simultaneously beacons of interracial democracy and strongholds of
racial segregation.” Sokol’s, All Eyes are Upon Us: Race and Politics from Boston to Brooklyn,
The Conflicted Soul of the Northeast (New York: Basic Books, 2014), x. Although it was true
many northerners were similar to their southern cousins in their attitudes and actions toward
blacks, there were variations in how it played out, as well as in the way northerners viewed
themselves as different from those south of the Mason-Dixon Line. By emphasizing on local
movements, women, and the national nature of black oppression that Stories of the Trenton Six
contributes to the literature of the Black Freedom Movement. See Lisa Levenstein, A Movement
Without Marches: African American Women and the Politics of Poverty in Postwar Philadelphia
(Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2009); Steve Babson, Dave Riddle, and
David Elsila, The Color of Law: Ernie Goodman, Detroit and the Struggle for Labor and Civil
Rights (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2010); Matthew D. Lassiter and Joseph Crespino,
editors, The Myth of Southern Exceptionalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Jason
Sokol. All Eyes are Upon Us: Race and Politics from Boston to Brooklyn, The Conflicted Soul of
the Northeast (New York: Basic Books, 2014), x.
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turned to their ethnic communities for support and defense. Although some
neighborhoods retained their ethnic distinctiveness, many other neighborhoods
did not. Overcrowding forced black residents to move into the outer perimeters
of customarily restricted areas of the city, creating racial tensions and resulting in
increased white flight. More blacks then moved in, pressuring the ever shrinking
white neighborhoods.6
As Trenton experienced a major crime wave in 1946 and 1947, many
residents, and particularly the police, believed Trenton’s location between New
York City and Philadelphia only intensified the problem, since a criminal could
commit a crime in one city and head to the other city. Whether moving north or
south, all roads led through Trenton. Therefore, they believed that as criminals
passed through Trenton, some would commit crimes before moving on. At the
same time, the local newspapers limited their coverage of the black community
by focusing exclusively on black criminality, reinforcing white stereotypes and
exasperating the already troublesome racial dynamic. By 1948, Trentonians
perceived that they were losing control of their economic future. The industries
that had been a staple of Trenton’s economy were relocating and they were not

6 Scholars of Trenton history have primarily focused on the issues confronting the city
following World War II. Judith Fiorello Kovisar, Obituary for a Hometown: Urban Renewal in
Trenton, New Jersey (Stillwater, Okla., Thales Microuniversity Press, 1974); Judith F. Kovisars,
“Trenton Up Against It: The Prescription for Urban Renewal in the 1950s and 1960s” in Cities of
the Garden State: Essays in the Urban and Suburban History of New Jersey, Joel Schwartz and
Daniel Prosser, editors (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 1977); Peter A.
Peroni, The Burg: An Italian-American Community at Bay in Trenton (Washington, D.C.:
University Press of America, 1979); Dennis J. Starr, History of Ethnic and Racial Groups in
Trenton, New Jersey: 1900 – 1960 (Trenton: Trenton Public Library, 1986); John T. Cumbler, A
Social History of Economic Decline: Business, Politics, and Work in Trenton (New Brunswick:
Rutgers University Press, 1989).
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coming back. The city’s residents were losing control of their economic future,
due to forces outside of their city.
The growing black population was a scapegoat, a simplistic answer to
seemingly insurmountable post war problems. Struggling white working class
families in Trenton developed a "siege mentality.” The city’s dysfunctional
relationship between political and police leaders contributed to the problem, as
they often resorted to tactics that fueled the tense atmosphere in Trenton.
In this atmosphere, the Trenton Six case took shape. When African
Americans assaulted William Horner in broad daylight at his own shop, white
citizens demanded immediate arrests from their local law enforcement agency,
regardless of the cost to civil liberties. The fear caused by a combination of this
mentality, a fear of violence, and racial paranoia promoted a mind-set in which
the public valued safety above civil liberties. The Trenton police succumbed to
this pressure and organized a "Crime Buster" squad to patrol their city and to
pick up any African American males on the streets after 5:00 p.m.
Thus, the crime at the Horner’s store led to the inflammatory newspaper
editorials and subsequent overreach by the police. It began when twenty-three
year old Collis English was arrested for a minor motor vehicle violation and then
suddenly faced a murder charge. The police then arrested and charged five
other innocent men with murder. The Trenton Six case revealed how class
paranoia and racial prejudice influenced the decisions made by public officials.
Even though the case of the Trenton Six included all men, their case
further sheds light on the contribution made by black women in the black freedom
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struggle. Bessie Mitchell emerged from the margins. She was radicalized upon
the arrest and conviction of her brother, and she believed it was a travesty of
justice. As she matured into a civil rights activist, Mitchell traveled across the
country to speak, becoming identified with larger issues in the struggle for
equality. Class perception factored into Mitchell’s mistrust of the defense
counsel and the local NAACP. She rejected the advice and methods of the
NAACP and was subsequently the most responsible for the role of the Civil
Rights Congress in the case.7
The Trenton Six case is particularly notable for the epic struggle between
the CRC and the NAACP over the case, which revealed a complex interplay of
liberal and radical forces for racial justice in the postwar era. The CRC
fundamentally changed the dynamics and trajectory of the case, which became
politicized as CRC Executive Secretary, William Patterson used his longtime
political connections in the United States and Europe, exposing the case to the
light of public opinion. The success of the early CRC campaign put the NAACP
and the ACLU on the defensive, forcing them to publicly join in the defense of the

7 Recent scholarship on the contribution of radical black women and the larger freedom
struggle has offered a new interpretation of the Black Freedom Movement, by re-centering black
women, moving them from a marginalized role to a more prominent one “as critical organizers,
strategists, and leaders in a host of movements and mobilizations. See Dayo F. Gore, Jeanne
Theoharis, and Komozi Woodard, eds., Want to Start A Revolution? : Radical Women in the
Black Freedom Struggle (New York: New York University Press, 2009), 11. See Kate Weigand,
Red Feminism: American Communism and the Making of Women's Liberation (MD, 2002); Dayo
F. Gore, Radicalism at the Crossroads: African American Women Activists in the Cold War (New
York, 2011); Erik S. McDuffie, Sojourning For Freedom: Black Women, American Communism,
and the Making of Black Left Feminism (Durham, 2011); Jeanne Theoharis, The Rebellious Life
of Mrs. Rosa Parks (Boston, 2014); Bettye Collier-Thomas, Sisters in the Struggle: AfricanAmerican Women in the Civil Rights-Black Power Movement (New York, 2001).
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Six. But the fate of the accused black men was also jeopardized by the struggle
for control of the case between liberals and radicals.8
Because the Trenton Six case occurred during the darkest days of the
Cold War, it provides another lens into the anti-communist judicial crusade. In
December 1949, Judge Hutchinson removed the CRC lawyers, thrusting the
issue of anti-Communist hysteria into the mix. The participants who waged this
war were the members of the court themselves, from judges to state and national
attorney generals.9
The Trenton Six case also enriches the history of the Progressive Party.
Much of the research on this period has focused on Henry Wallace’s presidential
8

See Wilson Record, Race and Radicalism: The NAACP and the Communist Party in
Conflict (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1964); James Goodman, Stories of Scottsboro (New
York: Vintage Books, 1994); Earl Ofari Hutchinson, Blacks and Red: Race and Class in Conflict
1919 - 1990 (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1995); Robin D.G. Kelley, Hammer
and Hoe: Alabama Communists During the Great Depression, (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina); Josh Sides, “You Understand My Condition”, The Civil Rights Congress in the Los
Angeles African-American Community, 1946 – 1952,” Pacific Historic Review 67, no. 2, (May,
1998); Theodore Hamm, "Wesley Robert Wells and the Civil Rights Congress Campaign." Souls:
A Critical Journal of Black Politics, Culture, and Society 2, no. 1 (2009); Robert Justin Goldstein.
American Blacklist: The Attorney General’s List of Subversive Organizations (Lawrence:
University of Kansas, 2008).
9

The historiography of anti-Communism is vast. For a helpful review of the literature
dealing with American anti-communism see Marc J. Selverstone’s, “A Literature So Immense:
The Historiography of Anti-Communism,” OAH Magazine of History, October 2010; Richard M.
Fried, Nightmare in Red: The McCarthy Era in Perspective (New York 1990); Ellen Schrecker,
Many Are the Crimes: McCarthyism in America (Princeton, 1998); Ted Morgan, Reds:
McCarthyism in Twentieth-Century America (New York, 2003); Richard Gid Powers, Not Without
Honor: The History of American Anticommunism (New Haven, 1998); Scott Martelle, The Fear
Within: Spies, Commies, and American Democracy on Trial (New Brunswick, 2011); Gerald
Meyer, Vito Marcantonio: Radical Politician 1902 – 1954 (Albany, 1989); Victor Navasky, Naming
Names (New York, 1980). For an emphasis on anti-communist influence in the American
judiciary see Sarah Hart Brown, Standing Against Dragons: Three Southern Lawyers in an Era of
Fear (Baton Rogue, 1998); Steve Babson, Dave Riddle, and David Elsila, The Color of Law: Ernie
Goodman, Detroit, and the Struggle for Labor and Civil Rights (Detroit, 2010); Robert M.
Lichtman, The Supreme Court and McCarthy-Era Repression: One Hundred Decisions (Urbana,
2012); Milnor Alexander, “The Right to Counsel for the Politically Unpopular,” Law in Transition 19
(1962 – 1963); Phillip Deery, McCarthyism, Dr. Barsky and the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Committee,” American Communist History 8, no. 2, (2009).
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bid in 1948, with little on the individuals who comprised the movement. The
Trenton Six case created an opportunity for party members, such as James
Imbrie, to transition from the political arena to joining with other members of the
Left to support social justice. His Princeton Committee provided the avenue to
become involved in the defense of the Six. Imbrie was among those on the Left
who attempted to cooperate with Communists, while not being one himself.
Such complex participants in the Long Civil Rights Movement deserve closer
examination and study.10
Lastly, the Trenton Six case sheds light on the importance of black
attorneys in the 1950s in the northern civil rights movement. At that time, there
was still considerable doubt as to whether black lawyers could be placed in
prominent positions on the defense team at the time of this trial. The ultimate
victory achieved by Raymond Pace Alexander and the other black lawyers

10

The growing scholarship of the postwar Progressive Movement has focused on
Progressive groups and individuals. Jacqueline Castledine examines Progressive Party women
such as Susan B. Anthony II, Mary van Kleeck, and Anna Lena Phillips and arguing that these
“women helped shape the most signifıcant social movements of the twentieth century by placing
peace at the center of their activism.” Jacqueline Castledine, Cold War Progressives: Women’s
Interracial Organizing for Peace and Freedom (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2012), 4. As
Castledine and others have shown, although the Cold War continued to destroy the fragile
Popular Front-type organizations, this was one way activists attempted to pursue their goals of
justice and equality despite the political limitations of the 1950s Cold War. See current works on
Wallace and the campaign include Thomas W. Devine, Henry Wallace’s 1948 Presidential
Campaign and the Future of Postwar Liberalism (Chapel Hill, 2013); Richard Lingeman, The Noir
Forties: The American People from Victory to Cold War (New York, 2012); Robert E. Hartley,
Battleground 1948: Truman, Stevenson, Douglas and the Most Surprising Election in Illinois
History (Carbondale, IL, 2003). Lesser work has been done on Progressive activists. Such work
includes Sarah Hart Brown, “Pensacola Progressive: John Moreno Coe and the Campaign of
1948,” Florida Historical Quarterly 68, no. 1 (Jul., 1989); Sayoko Uesugi, “Gender, Race, and the
Cold War: Mary Price and the Progressive Party in North Carolina, 1945 – 1948,” North Carolina
Historical Review 77, no. 3 (July 2000); Steve Babson, Dave Riddle, and David Elsila, The Color
of Law: Ernie Goodman, Detroit and the Struggle for Labor and Civil Rights (Detroit: Wayne State
University Press, 2010); Sarah Hart Brown, Standing Against Dragons: Three Southern Lawyers
in an Era of Fear (Baton Rouge, 1998).
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emphatically answered that question. But at the same time, this case also
exposed the fragile interracial coalition between the NAACP and the Princeton
Committee that defended the six men in the 1951 retrial. The difficult relationship
that arose during the trial between the lawyers was representative of the larger
tension and stress that was playing out amongst liberals trying to engage in the
struggle for civil rights.11

11

Another significant historiographical shift has occurred in what Risa Goluboff has called
the “new legal history of civil rights.” Legal scholars had typically mirrored a larger narrative by
focusing either on the NAACP’s path to the 1954 Brown case or the Supreme Court’s role in it.
Other scholars emphasize local participants and their campaigns in the movement. This shift
decenters the courts and focuses on “what happens before, behind, after, in front of, and with
little relationship to the Court.” See Risa Goluboff, “Lawyers, Law, and the New Civil Rights
History,” Harvard Law Review 126, no. 8 (June 2013): 2317, 2319. This history is less concerned
with a linear narrative and much more concerned with all the actors (lawyer, client, and others)
and institutions within a certain legal setting, examining it with complexity and agency, across
race, class, and time. These scholars view lawyers as mediators, and connected with their
clients. Yet as this dissertation proves, these civil rights lawyers operated within their own
personal interests and limitations, but they were also required to interact with other actors to bring
about change. For earlier legal civil rights works, see Richard Kluger, Simple Justice (New York,
1976); Dennis J. Hutchinson, "Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the Supreme
Court, 1948-1958,” Georgetown Law Journal 68, no. 1 (1980); Genna Rae McNeil, Groundwork:
Charles Hamilton Houston and the Struggle for Civil Rights (Philadelphia, 1983); Mark V.
Tushnet, The NAACP’s Legal Strategy Against Segregated Education, 1925 – 1950 (Chapel Hill,
NC, 1987); Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?
(Chicago, 1991); Mark V. Tushnet, Making Civil Rights Law: Thurgood Marshall and the Supreme
Court, 1936-1961 (Oxford, 1994). These are examples of the second type of earlier legal history:
William H. Chafe, Civilities and Civil Rights: Greensboro, North Carolina, and the Black Struggle
for Freedom New York, 1980); Robert J. Norrell, Reaping the Whirlwind: The Civil Rights
Movement in Tuskegee (New York, 1985); Charles M. Payne, editor, I’ve Got the Light of
Freedom: The Organizing Tradition and the Mississippi Freedom Struggle (Berkeley, CA, 1995);
John Dittmer, Local People: The Struggle for Civil Rights in Mississippi (Urbana, 1994); Sarah
Hart Brown, Standing Against Dragons: Three Southern Lawyers in an Era of Fear (Baton
Rouge, 1998); Kenneth Mack’s Representing the Race is illustrative of this new history, which he
characterizes as "bringing the law back in to the history of the civil rights movement.” Although
his work is biographical in nature, Stories of the Trenton Six seeks to move beyond a biographical
approach. It focuses on one moment in Alexander’s legal career and argues that there was much
on the line for Alexander and by extension, other black attorneys, in the struggle for justice. The
Trenton Six case is a major and forgotten northern civil rights legal battle that has never been
examined though scholars have examined southern legal cases such as those of the Scottsboro
Boys, Willie McGee, and the Martinsville Seven. Recent scholarship by Sarah Burns on the New
York Central Park Five rape case and James Miller’s cultural work on Scottsboro focus on the
volatile nature of race and rape. Kenneth W. Mack, “Bringing the Law Back into the History of
the Civil Rights Movement,” Law and History Review 27, no. 3 (Fall 2009): 657; See Kenneth W.
Mack’s Law and Mass Politics in the Making of the Civil Rights Lawyer, 1931-1941,” Journal of
American History 93, no. 1 (Jun., 2006), Kenneth W. Mack, “Rethinking Civil Rights Lawyering
and Politics in the Era Before Brown,” Yale Law Journal 115. (2005). Examples of this new legal
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Chapter Summaries
Chapter One, “No One Is Safe In This City,” focuses on the city’s
challenges in the post war world. In 1948, Trenton was reeling from the dual
effects of de-industrialization and failure of new investment coming into the city.
The city witnessed a slow but steady number of blacks settling into the city. At
the same time Trenton, like many other eastern seaboard cities, experienced a
grim increase in crime. The problem was exasperated by the dysfunctional
relationship between the Commissioner of Public Safety Andrew J. Duch and
Chief of Police William A. Dooling. Their inability to cooperate led to a perceived
sense of powerlessness and a willingness to blame their troubles on the new
arrivals.
Although some Trentonians attempted to bring about reform and be more
inclusive, progress was painfully slow. The New Jersey Supreme Court ordered
Trenton schools to integrate in 1944. Trenton dragged its feet in fully

civil rights history are David A. Canton, Raymond Pace Alexander: A New Negro Lawyer Fights
For Civil Rights in Philadelphia (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2010); Steve Babson,
Dave Riddle, and David Elsila, The Color of Law: Ernie Goodman, Detroit and the Struggle for
Labor and Civil Rights (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2010); Kenneth W. Mack,
Representing the Race: The Creation of the Civil Rights Lawyer (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2012); Sarah Hart Brown, “Redressing Southern 'Subversion': The Case of
Senator Eastland and the Louisiana Lawyer,” Louisiana History: The Journal of the Louisiana
Historical Association 43, no. 3 (Summer, 2002); Classic works on Scottsboro include James
Goodman, Stories of Scottsboro (New York, 1995) and Dan Carter’s, Scottsboro: A Tragedy of
the American South (Baton Rouge, 1969); Gail Williams O’Brien, The Color of the Law: Race,
Violence, and Justice in the Post-World II South (Chapel Hill, 1999). See Edward J. Littlejohn,
“The Henderson Case: Southern ‘Justice’ in a Michigan Court,” Michigan Bar Journal, (May
2015); Alan H. Levy, The Political Life of Bella Abzug, 1976-1998: Electoral Failures and the
Vagaries of Identity Politics (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013); Craig Zaim, 2003, Trial
by Ordeal: Willie McGee and the Struggle Between the US Supreme Court and State Courts in
the Era of Jim Crow." MA Theses. San Francisco State University; James A. Miller,
Remembering Scottsboro: The Legacy of an Infamous Trial (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2009), N. Jeremi Duru, “The Central Park Five, the Scottsboro Boys, and the Myth of the
Bestial Black Man,” Cardozo Law Review, 25, (2004); Sarah Burns, The Central Park Five: The
Untold Story Behind One of New York’s City’s Most Infamous Crimes (New York: Random
House, 2011).
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implementing the court order. Even after the new state constitution was adopted
that outlawed segregation in 1947, the New York Times reported that some
schools located south of the Raritan River, including those in Trenton, “where
customs are influenced by the South,” had not fully complied with the new law.
This “foot-dragging” reflected black people’s perspective that Trenton was a
“rebbish town.” And in spite of numerous petitions and meetings from the
NAACP and the Trenton Unity Committee calling for better policing and training,
no progress was seen on that front in Trenton.12
It was in this environment that on January 27, 1948, William Horner and
his common law wife were assaulted in their store by several blacks. Later that
afternoon, Mr. Horner died. Trentonians were outraged and demanded the
police find the killers. The manhunt was on. For the next two weeks, law
enforcement employed a number of questionable tactics to find the men, but to
no avail. It was not until Mr. George English summoned the police and filed a
complaint charging his son was driving his automobile without his permission that
ultimately led to the arrest and charging of the six men.
Chapter Two, “There Was Some Bungling in the Horner Case,” chronicles
the arrest and interrogation of the six men. Collis English was arrested on
Friday, February 6. Ralph Cooper and Horace Wilson were arrested early the
next morning. Later that day, McKinley Forrest and James Thorpe were arrested
as well. All throughout that weekend the interrogations continued and finally, late

12 Raritan River is approximately twenty five miles north of Trenton. New York Times
“Racial Fairness Widens in Jersey,” June 19, 1949; “Negro Heads Trenton, N.J. School Board,
Pittsburgh Courier, February 15, 1958; Helen Jackson Lee, Nigger in the Window (New York,
N.Y: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1978), 132.
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into the night on Tuesday, February 10, four of the five signed statements. Early
the next morning, John MacKenzie was the last to be arrested and interrogated.
He signed a statement as well.
The chapter explores the larger question of race and the criminal justice
system as it deconstructs the police narrative of what happened during the
defendant’s detention. Race permeated every level of the process. The police
were operating under an important fundamental assumption during the
interrogation. Although some in the police department were overt racists, there
were others who at least subconsciously assumed black criminality. In the minds
of the interrogators, the black men must have been involved in something. The
only task for the police was to discover it. This chapter will demonstrate that the
racism and the actions of the police did not have to flow from an intentional or
conscious desire to be discriminatory, but rather were the consequence of
intensely entrenched social ideas and stereotypes. Thus, the ideas of racial
difference and black criminality tainted their handling of the case.
Chapter 3, “Who Are You Going to Believe—Those People or the
Police?”, introduces Bessie Mitchell, sister to Collis English, into the legal drama.
She was summoned to Trenton by her mother because the family had not
received any communication from Collis since his arrest. Mitchell realized from
her own investigation that what had happened to her brother did not line up with
the newspaper coverage. This began her intense involvement in the case. She
found it extremely difficult to find support for defense of the six men because of
the negative pre-trial publicity. The coverage was extensive in the local
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newspapers and even in crime magazines. The result was that it solidified the
notion of the men’s guilt in the minds of the potential jury pool. Additionally, the
prosecutor’s questionable tactic of inviting several physicians, including a local
black physician, to witness and later certify the voluntary nature of the statements
hurt Mitchell’s efforts. Once the news media reported on the physicians’ account
of the signing, it served to prevent any potential outcry or protest for the men.
On June 7, 1948, one of the longest trials in New Jersey history began.
The defense team was composed of four experienced and competent attorneys
who fought hard to win acquittals for all six men. The prosecution was led by a
politically ambitious man who had aspirations for higher office. According to
many in Trenton, he possessed a questionable record when it came to racial
relations. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty and
the judge imposed death upon all six men. The city was surprised by the verdict,
since there were so many inconsistent facts and problems with witnesses. Most
observers believed that some of the group would be found guilty, but not all of
them.
Again, race played a significant role in the trial. This chapter will examine
the tactics used by the prosecution to empanel a middle class, mostly elderly,
and all-white jury with little or no connection to the poor, uneducated, and racially
marginalized black defendants. The prosecutor sought to take advantage by
pressing his arguments or posing questions to reinforce negative stereotypes
and feelings throughout the trial. The defense called family, friends, and coworkers who were black (and in some cases, Jewish employers) to provide alibis
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or character witnesses. The prosecutor, in his closing, attacked these witnesses
as he appealed to the covert racism and fear in the jury when he framed the
question of credibility for each side’s witnesses.
Chapter 4, “Then I heard about the Civil Rights Congress,” examines the
entry of the CRC into the case. It transformed a local unknown legal case into a
cause célèbre within a few short months. The black community was not only
surprised but outraged by the jury verdict. They were also tired of the tactics of
police in their neighborhoods, as many of their young people were arrested and
pressured to sign false confessions, with those statements used against them in
the trials. Out of this outrage, Bessie Mitchell continued to press organizations
for help in the appeals process to the New Jersey State Supreme Court. She
approached the NAACP several times and was told the situation was being
monitored through the defense attorneys. Then she stumbled upon the Civil
Rights Congress. The process not only changed the trajectory of the case, but
radicalized Mitchell as well. She was transformed from a working class,
nonpolitical woman into a fiery and articulate spokesperson for the defense. She
traveled across the county, recounting the hopelessness of the case until the
involvement of the CRC.
This chapter also examines the ideological and tactical differences
between the NAACP and the CRC. Once the CRC was able to gain partial
control over the case, the NAACP came under serious criticism for its perceived
inaction. This began the monumental and bitter struggle over the next three
years between the two civil rights groups for control. In spite of the intense
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struggle, both groups were able to cooperate and brought the appeal to the New
Jersey Supreme Court. It was successful and a new trial was ordered.
Chapter 5, “A militant, forthright and fearless fight,” details the growing
influence of the anti-communist judicial crusade in 1949 as the Cold War
intensified between the United States and the Soviet Union. The success of the
CRC brought additional unwanted scrutiny and charges of communism. In a
stunning decision, the presiding judge removed the CRC’s attorneys, charging
them, amongst other things, with raising funds for the six defendants, but actually
diverting the monies to help the defense of eleven Communist Party leaders who
were facing trial in New York. The CRC fought to remain in control of the case.
The chapter also introduces Progressive leader James Imbrie, highlighting
the significant role he played in the re-trial. Imbrie was concerned that the new
trial would be significantly delayed as the legal struggle between the CRC and
New Jersey’s attorney general continued to delay the trial throughout 1950.
Imbrie was able to convince the CRC to drop its objections and voluntarily
withdraw from the case. Once the CRC attorneys removed themselves the
NAACP had an opportunity to have a larger role in the defense. Yet, Imbrie’s
committee provided a rallying point for CRC members, progressive activists, and
others who were not politically and ideologically comfortable with the NAACP.
Chapter 6, “The Eyes Of The World Are On This Case,” recounts the
events of the Trenton Six re-trial. The chapter highlights the advances that black
lawyers made to the Trenton Six defense, reflecting their significance to the
larger struggle for civil rights. Lead defense attorney Raymond Pace Alexander
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was at the center of this high profile trial. His techniques, both in and out of the
courtroom, contributed to the acquittal of the men that he represented.
The chapter also examines the fragile and often times difficult partnership
between the NAACP and the Princeton Committee during the 1951 retrial. These
difficulties were played out not only in the courtroom, but also behind closed
doors, among the attorneys themselves. This chapter explores the volatile
relationship between the NAACP’s Alexander and the Princeton Committee’s
George Pellettieri. The difficult relationship between the two men was
representative of the larger tension amongst liberals trying to engage in the
struggle for civil rights.
In spite of the trying and stormy relationship between the defense counsel,
Horace Wilson, McKinley Forrest, James Thorp, and John MacKenzie were
acquitted. Collis English and Ralph Cooper were convicted and sentenced to life
imprisonment. Again the defense successfully appealed the convictions to the
state supreme court. But before the re-trial, English died from heart problems.
Following a plea deal, Cooper pleaded no contest and was sentenced to six to
ten years. As a result of the time served since he his arrest, Cooper was
released in November of that year.
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CHAPTER 1
“AFTER WHAT HAPPENED TO HORNER, NO ONE IS SAFE IN THIS CITY”:
TRENTON, NEW JERSEY IN THE POST WAR WORLD
“Well-meaning people may accuse me of
acting like a Gestapo, but if we can bring
in the Horner killers or save one life, I'm
willing to take all their criticisms."1
Public Safety Commissioner, Andrew J. Duch

William Horner and Elizabeth McGuire first met in 1916, and on this day,
January 27, 1948, they had been together for thirty two years. The couple had
been restless, first moving to the Midwest, living in Toledo and then Detroit
before returning to Trenton in 1930. They found various odd jobs until Horner
began a second hand business in 1940. He was successful at it, and two years
later they moved their small business to the Five Points section of Trenton, within
sight of the Trenton Battle Monument. There they served the lower working class
black citizens who could not afford to shop in the finer stores in the city. Horner
was known to carry large amounts of money on him. In fact, both kept their
savings on their persons since they lost their entire savings during the early days
of the 1929 Crash.2

1

Trenton Evening Times, “Bandit Squad Organized For War on Crime,” January 30,

1948.
State of New Jersey, Elizabeth Horner Testimony, Volume 1, 224a – 275a (1948);
Elizabeth Horner Testimony, Volume 2, 493a – 494a, (1951); The Trenton Battle Monument,
located on Broad Street, commemorates the First Battle of Trenton between Americans, led by
George Washington and Hessians on December 26, 1776. The monument is located where
American artillery was placed at North Broad Street, Warren Street, Brunswick, Pennington, and
Princeton Avenue or Five Points, Trenton. The monument was designed by “John H. Duncan,
architect of President Grant's Tomb. It is a triumphal column of granite 148 feet high. Considered
2
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At approximately 10:30 a.m., Mrs. Horner went to get potatoes from the
basement. Mr. Horner offered to go and get them for her. She remained in the
store while he went into the cellar. Moments later, two black men walked in.
They told her that they wanted to buy a mattress. She replied that the “boss
would be up in a minute.” Mr. Horner emerged from the cellar with the basket of
potatoes, another black man came in. Mrs. Horner told her husband that the
men were interested in buying a mattress, so he led them to the backroom where
the mattresses were stored. Mrs. Horner asked if the men were all together. No,
replied the third man, he was not with them. Rather, he wanted to buy a stove.
She began to point out the various stoves that were available. None of the
stoves seemed to appeal to him, and he continued to scan the store. He walked
toward the back and noticed a four-burner stove. "What is that stove over
there?" he asked Mrs. Horner. Always alert for a sale, she told him that he could
use the stove for cooking and for heating. The customer commented that his
mother would like a stove like that. She continued her sales pitch by telling him
how this model worked well and that she had one just like it upstairs. "What
about the grates in the stove?’ the customer inquired. Mrs. Horner bent down to
take the lid off to show him the grates.3

to be an early example of the Beaux Arts style, it is a Roman Doric column with a large base John
H. Duncan decorated with acanthus leaves. The capital has a ring of stars crowned by an
observation platform with a railing. Above the platform is a circle of 13 electric lights,
representing the 13 original colonies.” New York Times, “Battle Monument Unveiling:
Preparations Nearly Completed for the Ceremony,” October 15, 1893.
3

State of New Jersey, Elizabeth Horner Testimony, Volume 1, 248a (1948).
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Suddenly, she felt a terrible crash on her head. Thinking that something
had either fallen from the ceiling or fallen from the refrigerator, since Mr. Horner
always piled so many things on top of each other, she began to raise her head.
As she straightened up, another powerful blow was delivered to the side of her
face.4
Meanwhile, a cigar salesman, Frank Eldracher, was returning to his car for
additional supplies. While crossing the street, he saw "two colored fellows come
out of the store." One of the men was "about my height and the other a little
taller. The first was not overly dark, and kind of light complected." They left the
store in a casual way, quietly closing the door and walking north on Broad in the
direction of the War Monument. He did not think anything was wrong. A minute
later he heard a cry for help. Eldracher looked up and saw a woman "lying with
her face covered with blood" in the doorway of Horner's store. Then it dawned
on him that some type of robbery had just happened. He instinctively dropped his
supplies and went to the corner of Broad and Perry to get help from an officer
that he had seen earlier.5
Officer Fred Sigafoos hurried to the store and heard Mrs. Horner’s story.
He went into the back of the store and found Mr. Horner, lying face down on a
mattress, unconscious and dying from a severe blow to the head. He quickly
walked back to Perry and Broad to get help by using the police call boxes. While

4

State of New Jersey, Elizabeth Horner Testimony, Volume 1, 252a (1948).

5

State of New Jersey, Frank A. Eldracher Testimony, Volume 1, 359a (1948).
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he was there, he noticed that an ambulance was stopped, waiting for the red light
to change. He went over and asked the driver if they were on call. They were
not, so he asked them to go to 213 North Broad Street.6
While Sigafoos was calling for assistance, Mr. Bowker and his wife,
Gussie, who lived on the second floor as tenants of Mr. Horner, heard a
commotion. Mr. Bowker looked out his front window and asked his wife, "what's
going on now, there's a crowd out front." Mrs. Bowker ran downstairs and saw
Mrs. Horner "setting by the door slumped over." She saw the blood running
down her face, turned, and raced upstairs to get a washcloth to help her friend.
By the time Mrs. Bowker got back downstairs, Sigafoos and the ambulance crew
had arrived. As the crew placed Mrs. Horner on the stretcher to transport her to
McKinley Hospital in Trenton, Patrolman Arthur Dennis, who had had been
walking his beat in the vicinity, noticed the ambulance and the crowd on the
street and decided to investigate the situation. Mrs. Horner had sustained
multiple lacerations on the face and side of her head, as well as two larger
gashes in the back of the head which required thirteen sutures. Her left eye was
completely closed and the right was partially opened. In her stockings, she had
hid $900.7

6

State of New Jersey, Fred F. Sigaffos Testimony, Volume 1, 327a - 330a (1948),
Volume 1, 309a - 311a (1951).
7 State of New Jersey, Gussie Bowker Testimony, Volume 1, 320 (1948); Arthur Dennis
Testimony, Volume 1, 350a (1948), Volume 1, 543a (1951); Edmund R. Cytowic Testimony,
Volume 2, 385a – 386a, (1948).
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At the Trenton Police Department, the first emergency call came in at
10:58 a.m. Dispatcher Francis Parr was about to send four cars to the scene for
an investigation, but another call came into the dispatch stating, "Send some help
to 214 North Broad Street, there is a hold-up." With this call, Edgar Leip and
Hugh Smyth were dispatched with an ambulance to the scene. Officers Dennis,
Smyth, and Leip went into the back of the store and saw Mr. Horner lying across
a mattress. Edgar Leip described the scene in which Mr. Horner was "lying in
amongst the blood and mattress, furniture and stoves, which seemed to be piled
around him." They could not get the stretcher into the back room because of all
the furniture crammed together, so they carried him to the front of the store and
placed him on the stretcher. He first was taken to McKinley Hospital, but the
hospital had no room in the emergency ward and he was transferred to Mercer
Hospital.8
The doctors examined him and discovered Horner sustained a major skull
fracture. The injury was “so terrible it was easy for me to feel it as I moved my
fingers across the top of his head.” The attack was so severe that it knocked
one of his upper teeth out of its socket. Mr. Horner was in very critical condition.
When the Acting Captain of the First District, Andrew Delate, arrived at the
hospital, Horner was “unconscious and breathing very heavily.” The attending
nurse and Delate searched his pockets looking for a religious identification card

8 Even though this was the first distress call, it is important to note that the address was
incorrect. This address was across the street from 213 North Broad. State of New Jersey,
Francis T. Parr Testimony, Volume 1, 372a (1948), Volume 2, 434a (1951); Edar Leip Testimony,
Volume 1, 343a - 344a (1948); Hugh Smyth Testimony, Volume 2, 551a - 553a (1951).
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so that a clergyman might be called. They did not find that, but in his left-hand
trouser pocket they found a roll of bills amounting to $890. In the rear hip backpocket was $680 and in the right-hand trouser pocket was $72, one diamond
cufflink, and thirty-eight cents. The total was $1642.38. Mr. Horner never
regained consciousness and died at 4:45 p.m. The autopsy confirmed that he
died from the skull fracture.9
At 11:00 a.m., Detective Donald Toft and Lieutenant William Stanley,
waiting in the police garage for a spark plug to be changed in their vehicle, were
also called out. They arrived at the scene just as Mr. Horner was being placed
into the ambulance. Detective Toft remained outside, mingling through the crowd
looking for witnesses, as Lieutenant Stanley entered the store. Toft, after
questioning Frank Eldracher, authorized the first radio alarm at 11:13 a.m. to be
sent to all units of the Trenton Police Department. It read, "Two colored men.
No. 1: 5 feet 9 inches, Age 25; 140 pounds, wearing a cap and tan short coat.
No. 2: 5 feet 6; age 25; medium skin, wearing a short coat; assaulted a man and
his wife at Klein's Jewelry Store, 215 North Broad Street, at about 11:00 a.m.;
January 27, 1948." Once Lieutenant Stanley went in the store, he was informed
that they had found a green 'Step-Up' soda bottle and the top of a broken brown
'Step-Up' bottle with two or three hairs attached to it.10

9

State of New Jersey, Alfred S. Cook, Jr. Testimony, Volume 1, 195a (1948); Andrew F.
Delate Testimony, Volume 7, 2375a – 2377a (1948); David Eckstein Testimony, Volume 1, 164a
– 165a (1948); Alfred S. Cook Testimony, Volume 1, 193a – 196a (1948).
10 Again an error in identification. The crime did not take place at Klein's Jewelry Store.
Klein’s was next door to Horner’s; State of New Jersey, Donald T. Toft Testimony, Volume 1,
374a – 375a (1948), Volume 2, 631a - 632a (1951); William T. Stanley Testimony, Volume 2,
404a - 415a; Louis F. Neese Testimony, Volume 2, 514a – 519a (1951).
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Stanley and Toft drove to the McKinley Hospital to interview Mrs. Horner.
Following their conversation, at 11:51 a.m., Toft authorized an additional alarm to
be sent. It added a third person: "No. 3, 5 feet 11, wearing double-breasted
overcoat, had a pencil mustache; 162- 170 pounds; one of the men wore
glasses; all cleanly dressed, brass knuckles were used in the assault." Both
officers then returned to the Horner store. As a result of the conversation with
Mrs. Horner, they went upstairs to the Horner apartment and found a receipt on a
nail over the kitchen table. Mrs. Horner claimed that one of the persons, who
came into the store that morning, had come in about a week earlier and had put
down a two-dollar deposit on the mattress. Later, that same person had returned
and demanded their money back. Mr. Horner refunded his customer, but Mrs.
Horner insisted that they sign a receipt. Mrs. Horner claimed that the paper
hanging on a nail was one and the same. The signature on the receipt read
“Jessom” or “Jessup.” Toft began to try to track down this lead.11
Sergeant Lawrence Bloking was also assisting the investigation. He first
dispatched officers to scour the neighborhood businesses, looking for merchants
that sold "Step-Up" soda. Then he sent officers to knock on the doors of
businesses and residents seeking witnesses who either saw or heard something.
Blocking found Mrs. Virginia Barclay, who happened to be looking out her
window that morning, watching her husband trying to start their car. She stated
that there was a "bluish-green color car” parked on Broad Street with a black

11 State of New Jersey, Donald T. Toft Testimony, Volume 2, 633a (1951); Donald T. Toft
Testimony, Volume 1, 378a – 380a (1948), Volume 2, 634a - 638a (1951).
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driver. As she continued to watch, "three fellows crossed the street and two got
in the car from this side of the street and one from the sidewalk, then they drove
off with the right rear door open." Virginia Barclay's eyewitness account led the
police department to update their next alarm at 3:32 p.m.: "Occupants of a 19361937 Plymouth sedan, four door, bluish-green, dull finish, trunk on rear, New
Jersey registration; three-four colored men in same; driver wearing dark green
overcoat.” This alarm was additionally sent over teletype to the New Jersey
State Police who transmitted it to eight states. The last teletype message was
sent on January 29. It stated that "Trenton police are definitely certain" that the
car was a bluish-green, dull colored Plymouth four-door sedan. With this
information, the Trenton police prepared to swing into full gear.12
The initial efforts of the Trenton Police Department failed. Within minutes
of the first alarm, the police picked up Nelson Johnson "running on the sideway in
the vicinity of Perry and Southard Streets." He was stopped and searched, and
police found a knife with an eight-inch blade. Detectives brought him to the
Mercer Hospital where Mrs. Horner indicated that he was not one of the
suspects.13
With banner headlines that read, "Elderly Couple Beaten In Holdup By 3
Thugs At Second-Hand Store," the Trenton Times announced the crime to a city
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already trying to cope with a building, deadly crime wave. This story emphasized
the uneasy feeling among Trentonians that crime was spinning out of control,
since the attackers were able to successfully elude capture. This anxiety was
heightened when it was announced that Mr. Horner never regained
consciousness from the assault and died shortly before 5:00 p.m. The next day,
the Times reported, "Victim Dies of Beating, Four Sought." It stated that both
Mr. and Mrs. Horner had been beaten over the head with soda bottles. As the
news spread throughout Trenton, both merchants and citizens were outraged by
this brazen attack. The assault seemed different this time. People focused on
how the two men left the store—slowly, carefully, normally. One of the men,
upon closing the door, actually turned around and looked to see that it was
closed correctly. They did not run out of the store or down the street, but walked
casually, providing no indication that a crime had just been committed. The
attackers seemed to be calculating, callous, and cruel. Also the attack occurred
in Horner's own place of business, in the middle of the day, and near one of the
busiest intersections of center city Trenton.14
Lastly, the perpetuators were black. The implications of this crime were
quite clear to the white merchants and citizens. It confirmed that they were
unsafe in their own businesses, and it reaffirmed the serious problems that their
city had with the large number of African-Americans who had entered the city
during and after the war. It was time to demand swift, immediate action to stop
any further activity of this kind. The good people of Trenton had to regain control
14
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of their city. The pressure was brought to bear upon already besieged city
officials and a troubled police department.

African Americans In Trenton
African Americans have always been a part of Trenton’s history. The first
mention of their presence was in two slave owners wills in 1686. Although there
was a small group of freed African Americans living in Trenton in the nineteenth
century, the majority were still slaves. Even after emancipation, the population
remained relatively small. During the second half of the nineteenth century, the
city developed into an important commercial and manufacturing center on the
Eastern seaboard. The bustling economy was a factor that encouraged more
migration into the city. This extraordinary growth attracted African Americans to
migrate to Trenton, causing the black population to "more than double between
1900 and 1920.” This was the time of the Great Migration—when African
Americans, for the first time, moved to northern cities in large numbers.15
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World War I shut down the pipeline of European immigrants that had
provided much of the labor that allowed Trenton to become an important
manufacturing city. This decline in immigration offered a new opportunity by
creating a demand for replacements. This was just the message that
industrialists utilized in their recruitment of African Americans. The narrative of
the Great Migration recounts how recruiters for the large northern business
interests offered free one way tickets to Chicago and Detroit. But agents from
Trenton were involved with this practice as well, encouraging them to “try your
luck where money was plentiful” and move northward. And for many African
Americans there was the hope that this demand would continue after the war
ended as well.16
Once blacks migrated to the city of Trenton, they quickly discovered the
reality. Racism and discrimination in employment was clearly evident. Most of
the manufacturing jobs were in the rubber, steel, iron, and pottery industries and
those jobs primarily went to white Trentonians. A little “over one hundred black
males by 1920” were employed in those positions, while “78 percent of African
Americans were employed in unskilled or semi-skilled [jobs].” Indeed, many
blacks found jobs as janitors or sweepers inside or outside the city as potato
pickers, chicken pluckers, or part time day laborers. Moreover, they did not fare
much better in the unions. The local branch of the Committee for Industrial
Organization (CIO) did encourage that all workers be represented in a national
organization. The local American Federation of Labor (AFL) chapter distributed a
Trenton Evening Times, “War Benefit to Northern Negroes,” July 28, 1916; Trenton
Evening Times, “More Homes Greatest Need Of Negroes Here With Colored Policemen Urged
AS Best Way Of Controlling Lawless Ones of Newcomers,” August 26, 1917.
16

30

flyer that stated, "We are an American organization and will not allow any
Negroes, aliens, or any other foreign elements to hold office in the AFL 17
In 1940s, Helen Jackson Lee wrote of Trenton’s employment opportunities
for blacks:
Trenton was an industrial city with many potteries, steel mills,
Factories and a large auto plant, but the production lines were
almost solidly white. Black men swept the floors, moved heavy
equipment and shipping crates, and performed other burdensome
tasks. In the business sections, they were almost invisible except
as window cleaners, janitors, or elevator operators. There were no
black salespeople in the stores, banks, or business offices They
were hired as maids, package wrappers, or seamstresses, Even
the five-and-ten-cent stores refused to hire blacks except to sweep,
dust, or move stock.
This type of employment guaranteed no financial stability nor provided a realistic
future for an individual, for this kind of employment was the one that no one really
wanted, but were forced to accept.18
Trenton's African-American community was spread across fifteen separate
neighborhoods in a pattern the Trenton Council on Human Relations
characterized as "rigid racial exclusiveness." In the early twentieth century, the
usual entry point for African Americans into the city was through Allen and
Feeder Streets. This area, known as the "Swamp," was the oldest, poorest, and
crime-ridden neighborhood. The new arrivals found themselves in depressed
areas filled with deplorable and inadequate housing. The TCHR described the
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conditions of these homes as old and out of repair, lacking proper sanitary
facilities, and their rents were higher than for any other groups. The reality was
that African Americans “occupied substandard housing four times more often
than whites and that overcrowding occurred three times more for African
Americans than for whites.”19
It was not much better for most second-generation African-Americans who
were able to move from the “Swamp” into the Coalport and Five Points sections
of the city. Likewise, this area was associated with economic blight. In the late
1940s, the Trenton Council of Social Agencies characterized these two
neighborhoods as “crowded and unstable by the very nature of their
development, as well as physically dangerous and hazardous to physical and
moral health due to fire, disease, and crime. Alcoholism and petty crime
presented a serious social problem for the black community.20
The majority of African Americans in Trenton were not homeowners.
Even in the blighted neighborhoods of Five Points and Coalport, their houses
were owned by white slumlords. Only 15.3 percent of black families owned their
homes, while the median price for these homes for blacks were $3,602, whereas

19 Dennis J. Starr, History of Ethnic and Racial Groups in Trenton, New Jersey: 1900 1960 (Trenton: Trenton Public Library, 1986), 8, 19; The Trenton Committee on Human Relations
conducted a survey of 259 African-American residents living in these type of homes and reported,
"22 families without running water, 155 with no bath tubs, 109 with toilets located in yards, 105
without gas and 55 without electricity. About 65 per cent of the dwellings badly needed one or
more repairs.” Charles S. Johnson, "Survey of the Negro Population of Trenton, N.J."
(Unpublished paper for the Trenton Inter-Racial Committee, Trentoniana Collection, Trenton Free
Library), p. 70.

20 Trenton Council of Social Agencies. A Study of Northeast Trenton: Population,
Housing, Economic, Social and Physical Aspects of the Area (Trenton: The Council, 1958), 2, 3.
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it was $6,840 for whites. The housing problem was further compounded by the
continuing migration of African Americans into the city. Consequently, the
delicate balance that had been maintained since the first era's migration was
beginning to buckle under the housing crisis. The African American response to
overcrowding was to try to push beyond their racially segregated neighborhoods
to alleviate the situation.21
During the 1930s, the city witnessed the emergence of a middle class
composed of small business owners and professionals such as lawyers,
physicians, dentists, and school principals, who catered to the segregated black
community. This small group brought homes and operated their businesses in
an enclave on Spring Street between Calhoun and Willow Streets. These middle
class blacks established political and cultural associations in an attempt to
maneuver in the segregated world of Trenton. Several black entrepreneurs
established the Trenton Realty and Investment Company to assist the
newcomers find housing. Others formed a segregated branch of the Y.M.C.A.,
the Carver Center and local American Legion Post. And still others became
prominent members of the Colored Democratic Party in Mercer County.22
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Stresses In Post-War Trenton
After World War II, Trenton found itself in the midst of a growing crisis of
deindustrialization, suburbanization, and issues involving race. Although other
cities encountered similar challenges, every city was distinctive in the ways its
citizens confronted and formulated solutions to deal with those problems. For
example, in Chicago, when indirect action failed to stop black encroachment in
white neighborhoods, some whites used direct action that involved “fire and
bombs as their main weapons and gang and mob harassment as their supporting
tactics.” In the white Chambersburg section of Trenton, residents responded
differently. They established a perimeter around their neighborhood and greeted
any black who happened to cross the line with various types of intimidation that
ranged from cold stares to verbal abuse to violent attacks. In other areas of
Trenton, broken windows and other forms of vandalism greeted the first black
homeowner in a white neighborhood.23
Trenton’s geographical location—along the Delaware River and the last
overland stop on the stage coach road to New Brunswick and Perth Amboy—
contributed to its early success by enabling it to thrive from the river and inland
trade. During the city’s “Golden Age of Industrialization,” Trenton became a
multi-industrial center exporting so many products worldwide that the slogan
became “Trenton Makes, the World Takes." But in the early twentieth century,

23 Paul Kleppner, Chicago Divided: The Making of a Black Mayor (DeKalb, Illinois:
Northern Illinois University Press, 1985), 34; See Thomas J. Sugrue’s The Origins of the Urban
Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996) for a
thorough examination of race in the northern cities after World War II.
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there were troubling signs. Trenton's economic decline began as the pottery and
ceramic factories companies closed. Mechanization and new techniques
replaced hundreds of workers. Trenton's work force grew older, adding to the
already weakening economic situation. Although World War II brought
prosperity, it was a mirage, since the economy was being propped up by
government spending in the military and private sectors.24
In 1944, urban sociologist Louis Wirth warned American city officials, “The
seemingly limitless growth of your cities have come to an abrupt end.” Trenton
was one of those cities. There were two major concerns. First, the demographic
change was a cause of alarm to city officials. In 1940, whites composed 92.5
percent of Trenton’s total population, but that figure fell to 88.6 percent in 1950.
As whites moved from the city, blacks were moving into it. The black population
of Trenton was a mere 6.5 percent in 1930, with a slight increase to 7.5 percent
in 1940, but jumped to 11.3 percent in 1950.25

24 For a complete analysis of Trenton’s decline see John T. Cumbler, A Social History of
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As a result of the increase in black population, the city actually posted
small gains in growth. The population increased from 124,697 in 1940 to
128,009 in 1950. But more importantly, whites were not moving into the city as in
earlier decades. In 1920, Trenton was ranked 55th out of 100 cities in the United
States. In 1930 the city dropped to 65th. The decline continued as the city fell to
67th in 1940 and 80th in 1950. This sharp decline did not impact other cities in
New Jersey. Newark, for example, did not witness this sharp drop. Many white
Trentonians thus worried about the declining population of the city and the race
of the majority who were moving in.26
Rayford W. Logan once described the northern mindset of whites: “the
‘belligerent’ Irishman, the ‘tight-fisted’ Scotsman, the ‘dumb’ Swede were
inherently less objectionable than the lazy, improvident, child-like, irresponsible,
chicken-stealing, policy-making, razor-toting, immoral, and criminal’ Negro.”
James Clarke adds that amongst white immigrants in the city, “it was as though
blacks gave other contentious immigrant groups like the Poles, the Irish, and the

1950. William Dwyer, This Is The Task. Findings of the Trenton, New Jersey Human Relations
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Italians something that could unite them, for if they could agree on little else, they
were united in their contempt for ‘niggers.’”27
Thomas Sugrue argues that many whites believed that blacks were
psychologically better suited for certain types of work and maintained stereotypes
about black criminality, sexual promiscuity, laziness, and dependence. This
perception was not a Trenton phenomenon alone, for historians have
demonstrated this was a central tenet in how whites viewed blackness. These
white perceptions of blacks were formed on both the national and local levels.
Nationally, the images of black inferiority was conveyed through radio programs
such as Amos ‘n’ Andy and through stereotyped images in advertising products
such as Uncle Ben or Aunt Jemima. On the local level, second and third
generations of Hungarian, Italian, and other eastern European immigrants, who
crowded into Trenton’s ethnic neighborhoods, had similar ideas identified with
whiteness. For them, being white meant Americanism, hard work, sexual
restraint, and independence—everything blackness was not. These assumptions
and ideas of race shaped the contours of interracial contact.28
White fears of potential invasion into their communities was fueled by
reports in the media of blight and slums. In 1948, Guy Greer of American
Magazine described a post war city in rather vivid detail as:
The central business district is likely to be surrounded by a
27
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zone of blight, characterized by growing business shacks,
congestion of people, dilapidated building, junk yards,
vacant lost covered with ciders, disease, once impressive
mansions that have been converted into funeral parlors or
tenements, or cheap rooming homes.
William Horner’s second hand shop was in such a place, a business shack, a
dilapidated building surrounded by blight. Many white Trentonians might have
agreed with John Gunther’s comment in 1947 that the “most gravid, cancerous
and pressing of all American problems is that of the Negro” as they witnessed the
changing conditions of their city. These views were reinforced as local residents
witnessed more poor southern blacks moving into their city.29
Another major concern for Trenton residents that contributed to racial
problems was housing and tax ratables (property taxes). Scholars have long
noted the correlation between property ownership and racial animosity. Matthew
Edel, Elliott D. Sclar, and Daniel Luria’s Shaky Places analyze homeownership in
Boston, demonstrating how it can become viewed as a trap that ultimately
exacerbates racial tensions. Homeowners are deeply involved with their financial
commitment in purchasing and maintaining their homes. But at the same time,
they are collectively dependent upon each neighbor to maintain their property or
not to be the first to sell to a minority. One Bostonian described the trap he found
himself in when he was nearing the end of his mortgage and heard that public
housing was to be built in the vacant lots nearby. His immediate concern was
the impact upon property values for himself and his block. The trap for city home

29 Guy Greer, “Is Your Town Fit To Live In,” American Magazine 146 (July 1948): 50.
Greer was reporting on the study done by Columbia University’s E.L Thorndike of 310 cities
across the nation.
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owners then was the “fear of declining property values” in understanding “the
backlash against minority advancement.” Of course, it was not just decreasing
property values that caused an increase in taxes. The perception amongst white
residents was that blacks “would require additional social and educational
services which would have to be supported by tax revenues.”30
The pressure for housing was a major problem. Trenton, much like other
northern cities was residentially segregated. Karl and Alma Taeuber’s Negroes
in Cities assigned an index of residential segregation of 207 cities based on US
census data. Each city was ranked with a number 1, being the lowest, to 100,
the highest. The index represented the number of non-whites that were required
to move into neighborhood blocks to produce an equal distribution. Trenton in
1940 ranked 81.9 out of 100 and jumped to 83.0 in 1950.31
The age and availability of housing was another important issue. Trenton
occupies a mere 7.2 square miles, making it one of smallest geographical cities

30 Matthew Edel, Elliott D. Sclar, and Daniel Luria, Shaky Places: Homeownership and
Social Mobility in Boston’s Suburbanization (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), 6, 11;
Judith Fiorello Kovisars, Planned Change in a Changing Urban Environment: A Social History of
Urban Renewal in Trenton, New Jersey (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1970),
43.
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Segregation and Neighborhood Change (New York: Atheneum, 1972), 30. Newark, on the hand
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with a population of over 100,000 in the United States. Trenton was one of the
most density populated cities in 1950, with 17,700 people per square mile.
Compounding the overcrowding were the age and type of the homes available to
potential home owners. Trenton’s housing was old. The majority of the homes
were built during Trenton’s golden age, for “over 40.3 percent of Trenton’s
housing was over forty Trenton’s housing was old, and 98.2 percent was older
than twenty years, but only 66.1 percent of the nation’s was older than twenty
years.” Most working class residents owned a duplex or row home. Few had the
opportunity to purchase a single family home. This was in contrast to the larger
nation, for “while 37.6 percent of the nation’s housing in 1950 was single family,
only 18.2 percent” in Trenton was single home. .32
Although Trenton was a segregated city, the pressure in housing
eventually overwhelmed white resistance. Blacks comprised 11.4 percent of the
population in 1950, yet only occupied only about “2,500 dwelling units or 7.7 per
cent of the city’s housing supply.” In many cases the expensive middle and
upper class suburban homes were out of range for urban blacks. This created
additional pressure upon an already precarious situation. Overcrowding forced
black residents to move into the outer perimeters of customarily restricted areas
of the city, creating racial tensions and resulting in increased white flight.
Beginning in the 1940s, whites watched with apprehension as blacks surged

32 John T. Cumbler, A Social History of Economic Decline: Business, Politics, and Work
in Trenton (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1989), 162 – 163. See his work for a
complete description of the extraordinary housing problems in Trenton and its effects; In Newark,
N.J., whites found a “vastly improved infrastructure” with accompanying newer and additional
housing available to them. Kevin Mumford, Newark: A History of Race, Rights, and Riots in
America (New York: New York University Press, 2007), 53.
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from the Five Points district into North Trenton which had been predominately
Sicilian. In a few years, the black population increased by “42 percent while the
white population fell to 4 percent.” At first, just a few homes on the block were
owned by blacks. A buffer zone appeared between the new black presence and
the entrenched whites. Then as whites fled, additional homes opened up and the
process continued block by block. More blacks then moved in, pressuring the
ever-shrinking white neighborhoods.33
Trenton was the state capital, as well as the county seat. he state and
county did not contribute anything for city services. Net tax valuations declined in
the city from a high of $206.6 million in 1930 to 155.7 million to $164.9 million in
1950, while the tax rate rose 46 percent from 1920 to 1946. In real terms the tax
assessment per 1000 increased 4.74 in 1940 to 5.53 in 1948 and 5.80 in 1949.
At the same time, a large amount of real estate was tax exempt in Trenton. Over
42 percent of property, which included state, county, and local government
buildings, churches, and schools, was tax exempt. Thus the burden for the city
fell primarily upon 57.2 percent of property owners at a time when the demand of
public services continued to soar.34
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New Jersey’s tax system also contributed to Trenton’s woes, since at that
time there was no sales or state income tax to provide relief for the city. The
majority of revenue came from property taxes. This situation contributed to a no
win situation for Trenton homeowners. As property values declined, city officials
were required to rise the property tax. Those unable or unwilling to keep up with
the increases left the city. Those who remained, often postponed repairs on their
homes, since improvements meant a higher rate. The dual effort caused lower
property values and rising tax increases. In reality, property devaluation was
caused by many factors, such as the economy and deindustrialization, and not
by black migration into the city. But for much of the white population that
crowded into the Chambersburg section of the city, blacks deserved blame for
the declining conditions of the city.35
In spite of the threat of black advance, not all whites opted to leave the
city. In some cases, many wished to move, but could not afford it. Others
wished to remain due to cultural, social, or nostalgic connections to their
purchased for residential use) was by tax-exempt institutions. Judith F. Kovisars, “Trenton Up
Against It: The Prescription for Urban Renewal in the 1950s and 1960s” in Cities of the Garden
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Prosser, editors (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 1977), 162.
35 John T. Cumber in A Social History of Economic Decline: Business, Politics, and Work
in Trenton (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1989) indicates Trenton was 5th with cities
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1979) for views of Chambersburg residents on the condition of their city.
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neighborhood. Although historians and others have maintained that
suburbanization created a weakened sense of community, Kenneth Durr argues
conversely that “the exodus left a deeper appreciation of neighborhood among
those who stayed.” As the city dealt with the twin reality of post war reconversion
and lowering of property values, many Trentonians turned to their ethnic
communities for mutual support and resistance, in what John Crumbler describes
as a neighborhood “fortress of defense.” They utilized various tactics in an
attempt to maintain all-white neighborhoods. In Trenton, ethnic communities
were “knit together by parish churches, athletic clubs, and corner drinking taps.”
The result of these activities created a retrenchment in Trenton as the
“neighborhoods closed around a memory of a better past . . . [and] increased
ethnic consciousness.” This consciousness was seen as early as 1947 when
Italians, like the Irish before them, began to politically mobilize to establish their
presence in city hall. The spoils were political patronage and opportunities to
influence public policy in areas such as zoning. 36
Thus, Trenton was in a unique and perilous situation in 1948. As John
Cumbler and other Trenton historians argue, most whites believed that "Trenton's

36 See Kenneth T. Jackson’s, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United
States (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 272 – 274. Kenneth D. Durr, Behind the
Backlash: White Working-Class Politics in Baltimore, 1940 – 1980 (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 2003), 69; In other cities such as Chicago, whites participated in property
associations to defend their neighborhoods. See Paul Kleppner’s, Chicago Divided: The Making
of a Black Mayor (DeKalb, Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press, 1985) for a discussion on
white participation in property associations; Judith F. Kovisars, “Trenton Up Against It: The
Prescription for Urban Renewal in the 1950s and 1960s” in Cities of the Garden State: Essays in
the Urban and Suburban History of New Jersey, Joel Schwartz and Daniel Prosser, editors
(Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 1977), 167; John T. Cumbler, A Social
History of Economic Decline: Business, Politics, and Work in Trenton (New Brunswick: Rutgers
University Press, 1989), 147, 148.
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problems became defined in terms of the growth of its black population.” The
seemingly insurmountable problems in Trenton required a scapegoat. The files
of the Trenton Committee on Unity support this conclusion. In report of a survey
by Trenton residents, the TCU noted, “Negroes [are] blamed for things going
wrong.”37
The white community adopted a "siege mentality,” which entrenched and
reaffirmed the continual use of racial discrimination to remain in control. In the
working class communities of Trenton postwar racism would be practiced with
more fervor and zeal, even as the State of New Jersey had begun to pass
legislation to do away with Jim Crow.
White resistance in Trenton was a nuanced and multilayered experience
that involved economic self-interest and cultural expectations for the home
owners and the personal achievement of realizing the American Dream. But
there is little doubt that the intersection of deindustrialization and black migration
into Trenton brought race to the forefront. Within this contested terrain, whites
were required to construct ideologies that allowed them a method not only to
confront the problem, but also provide them with choices.
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John T. Cumbler, A Social History of Economic Decline: Business, Politics, and Work
in Trenton (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1989), 156.; Judith F. Kovisars, “Trenton
Up Against It: The Prescription for Urban Renewal in the 1950s and 1960s” in Cities of the
Garden State: Essays in the Urban and Suburban History of New Jersey, Joel Schwartz and
Daniel Prosser, editors (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 1977), 162;
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There was not much politically that blacks were able to do to fight against
the white reaction. Blacks in Trenton in 1948 had not achieved a critical political
mass. Although Newark saw its first black elected to the city council in 1954, in
Trenton the process was painfully slow. Frank H. Wimberley became the first
black appointed to the school board in 1952 after seven years of lobbying the
mayor from blacks and liberals. The first black elected to Trenton’s city council
was Rev. S. Howard Woodson in 1962.38

Dooling And Duch Feud
Another key factor that led to the arrest and prosecution of the “Trenton
Six” was the feud between Trenton Police Department Chief, William A. Dooling,
and the Commissioner of Public Safety, Andrew J. Duch. It severely hindered
the ability of the department to fight crime in the city. Dooling was born in 1888
and joined the police force on July 30, 1915. He joined the Army in 1917 and
fought in Europe during World War I. He returned to Trenton in 1919 and was
promoted to supervisor of the police training school in September 1920. He
became the commander of the First Precinct and eventually was appointed chief
of police in 1937. Trentonians had established a commission form of government
in 1939. Supporters of this system argue “commissioners are placed in charge of
a definite department or branch of the city government. Each one makes himself

38 Kevin Mumford, Newark: A History of Race, Rights, and Riots in America (New York:
New York University Press, 2007), 68; Trenton Evening Times, “Four Members Appointed to
Trenton School Board,” January 20, 1952; Trenton Evening Times, “New Council To Map Future
of Trenton,” June 13, 1962.
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responsible to the electorate for its proper and intelligent management.”
Because a politician was personally responsible for his department, he was more
susceptible to public opinion, whether it came directly through personal contact
with the voters or indirectly through the media.39
Andrew J. Duch was born in 1895, graduated from Trenton High School in
1914, and received a law degree from the University of Pennsylvania Law School
in 1917. He also served in World War I between 1917 and 1919. Following
discharge, he returned to Trenton, became a law clerk, and later joined the New
Jersey Bar. In 1924, Duch was appointed clerk of Trenton Police Court and
became the judge of the court a few years later. He was selected in 1937 as the
Mercer County Prosecutor and served until 1942. Duch declared his candidacy
for a position on the city commission in 1943, claiming that it was more important
“to be respected than elected.” He received 14,063 votes—the largest number of
votes in a field of seventeen candidates and was chosen as mayor, as custom
dictated for the first place finisher. Owing to his experience in the police court
and as prosecutor, he became the Commissioner of Public Safety.40
The feud began soon after Duch was elected in 1943. Shortly after his
election, Duch felt the political heat to declare war on gambling. The Trenton

Trenton Evening Times, “Chief Dooling Dies; Had Suffered Stroke,” August 26, 1958;
Eleanore Nolan Shuman, The Trenton Story (Trenton, N.J.: MacCrellish and Quigley Company,
1958), 102 - 103. Under this system in Trenton, “partisan politics played a much less important
part in city elections. Each commissioner is the head of one of five departments and is solely
responsible for the efficient management of his department. The departments are: Public Affairs,
Public Safety, Public Works, Revenue and Finance, and Parks and Public Property,” Shuman,
102 – 103.
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Evening Times was front and center in the campaign to rid Trenton of the vice.
Duch believed Dooling lacked the determination and willingness to fight crime
and corruption in Trenton. It seems that Dooling did not want to believe the city
“was a wide-open gambling town.” Ultimately, the Chief dragged his feet and
resisted any attempts by Duch to enlist the police department in the campaign to
eradicate gambling. To Duch, these actions represented a laxity, if not a passive
acceptance of the criminal activity. The charge that he was soft on fighting
gambling plagued Duch throughout his term in office and nearly cost him his seat
on the Board of Commissioners in the 1947 election. He had polled first in 1943
and last in 1947, remaining in office by only by 139 votes. Duch never forgot
who was responsible for the dramatic turnabout.41
The Mercer County Grand Jury Report in 1949 exposed the inability of
Trenton police to combat crime because of the feud: “For both practical and
psychological reasons, the influence of such rifts at the top do percolate down,
with detrimental effect on morale, and efficiency within the ranks.” It further
concluded that “honest and conscientious police officers are sometimes
discouraged, if not deliberately impeded and blocked in the full performance of
their sworn duties, by superiors, both within and above police departments.”
These conditions caused a divide among the members of the force and a
subsequent struggle for turf. Both attempted to put in place men who would be
loyal to them. For example, in 1943, Dooling replaced the chief of the detective
41 Trenton Evening Times, “What, No Gambling?,” June 3, 1943; Trenton Evening Times,
“How They Ran,” May 14, 1947; Duch accused Dooling of lacking professionalism, allowing
police officials to solicit contributions for political candidates, and ticket fixing for important people,
Trenton Evening Times, “Police Political Activities Must Stop, Mayor Warns,” July 1, 1943;
Trenton Evening Times, “Auto-Ticket Fixing Hit By Mayor,” February 27, 1944.
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bureau with his man, Captain John J. Ryan, an officer who had been the chief of
the traffic division since 1935.42
Communication between the two men was non-existent. Duch issued
official memos and released announcements to the press indicating what
measures he wanted the chief to carry out. The Grand Jury remarked, “the
director of public safety and the chief of police do not speak to each other . . .
The door between their offices is kept locked.” Meetings conducted between the
two men merely served as photo opportunities for Duch to demonstrate that he
was in control of the situation, which served only to further alienate Dooling.
When in 1947 and early 1948, Trenton began to experience a serious crime
wave, they were unable to successfully deal with it because of this dysfunction.
Furthermore, Dooling might have modified some of the dramatic actions
undertaken by the Commissioner.43
Duch had a history of ignoring civil liberties in an attempt to solve a crime.
When he was prosecutor in 1939, Mercer County residents were confronted by a
serial killer stalking local lover’s lanes, known as the “Duck Island killer” and the
“spooner slayer.” Police were baffled, as the body count kept mounting. The
only solid lead was a palm print found on a car and a limited identification from
the first victim before she died—the killer was black and he drove away in a car.
Trenton Evening Times. “Jury Raps Police Chiefs, Hits Duch, Dooling Feud,” April 11,
1949; Trenton Evening Times, “Ryan Named To Detective Bureau Post,” October 17, 1943.
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By 1940, six people had been killed. In early 1941, Duch ordered every Mercer
County African American who had a driver’s license to report to Trenton to be
questioned and fingerprinted. Once it became known what the prosecutor was
doing, people began to protest the “mass grilling” that “constituted a special
persecution of the Negro people of Mercer County.” Others threatened to ask
the New Jersey Attorney General to intervene if Duch did not stop. Duch replied,
“I invite these persons to carry out these threats because we are making an
honest and sincere effort to solve these crimes.” In other words, the ends
justified the means. Few clues and no leads led to this over-the-top reaction.44
The Trenton Evening Times heightened anxieties through its zealous,
continuous coverage of Trenton’s crime wave. Its call for action was the catalyst
for what would become a miscarriage of justice. The Kerney family owned the
newspaper. Upon the death of his father, James Kerney Jr. became the editor
and publisher. He served as president of the Trenton Committee for Unity, was
state co-chairman of the National Conference of Christians and Jews, and was a
member of the New Jersey Constitution Revision Commission, which drafted a
new constitution in 1947. Because of the ambiguity in the document, Governor
Alfred E. Driscoll ordered a new Committee on Civil Liberties in 1948, and
Kerney served on this committee as well. One of the basic civil rights that the
committee illuminated was freedom of speech. It wrote:

44 Jon Blackwell, Notorious New Jersey: 100 Tales of Murders and Mobsters, Scandals
and Scoundrels (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rivergate Books—An Imprint of Rutgers University Press,
2008), 312 -316. Trenton Evening Times, Protest Won’t Halt Slaying Checkup,” February 27,
1941.
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Freedom of speech and assembly are absolutely basic to
any civilization which aspires to call itself a democracy. . .
There have been recent incidents in our State where the
enjoyment of the rights of free speech and assembly are
claimed to have been denied to communist and other
minority groups. We may not shrug off the consequences
of such denials, nor justify them on the ground that the public
interest was served by preventing the dissemination of
seditious utterances.45
One year earlier, a Trenton Times editorial called “The Right to
Citizenship” argued that as “long as we deny equal citizenship with all its
privileges to some of our citizens, we put all our freedoms in danger.”
Regrettably, Kerney’s editorials and actions did not back up his rhetoric or his
service on the commission. When events demanded, he found wiggle room. For
example, in 1941, the Communist Party of Mercer County protested the order
that all African Americans report to be questioned and fingerprinted during the
search for the “Duck Island killer.” A Times editorial implied that Communists
were merely “trying to drum up grievances for the purpose of making some
organization capital.” The newspaper attempted to justify the actions of the
prosecutor because of the severity of the crime, arguing that “it is hard to believe
that the county authorities deliberately would bear down upon one group of

45 The 1947 New Jersey Constitution Bill of Rights clause states that ““No person shall be
denied the enjoyment of any civil or military right, not be discriminated against in the exercise of
any civil or military right, nor be segregated in the militia or in the public schools because of
religious principles, race, color, ancestry or national origin,” Article 1, Section 5, Robert F.
Williams, The New Jersey State Constitution: A Reference Guide ( Westport, CT: Greenwood
Press, Inc., 1990), 14. Committee on Civil Liberties, Civil Liberties in New Jersey: A Report
Submitted to The Honorable Alfred E. Driscoll, Governor of New Jersey, April 22, 1948 (Trenton,
N.J.) v, 4. Rutgers University Library--Archibald S. Alexander Library, New Brunswick, New
Jersey; William Starr Myers, Editor, Prominent Families of New Jersey (Clearfield, Utah:
Clearfield Publishing Company, 2010), 601.
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citizens without at least some evidence warranting widespread and intensive
inquiry.”46
This pattern repeated itself with the hunt for the killer of Mr. Horner. This
time, the calls for police action were even more pronounced. The opening salvo
was fired the day after the announcement that Mr. Horner died. In the January 29
edition of the Trenton Times, an editorial was entitled, "The Idle Death Chair":
The brutal murder of an aged man, killed by thugs while
defending his small possessions, and the attack upon his wife
bring to a climax a crime situation in Trenton which has steadily
been growing more serious. Trenton has recently been the
scene of an increasing number of crimes of violence, including
muggings, hold-ups, attacks upon women and finally the murder
of William Horner, 73 year old secondhand store proprietor of
North Broad Street. There are a number of reasons for the
increasing boldness and viciousness of the criminal elements of
Trenton and of New Jersey. One of them is inadequate
punishment, as reflected in the fact that although murders
are fairly common occurrences in the State there has been
no execution since December 11, 1945.47
The local newspapers focused on black criminality, reinforcing white
stereotypes and exasperating the already troublesome racial dynamic. They
noted the unsolved hold-up shooting of a fifty-year widow in her saloon in
November of 1947, the beating and assault of a soldier’s wife on January 25, the
attempted hold-up of theater employees making a bank deposit on the 26th, a
number of burglaries of department stores, many hold-ups of local businesses,
and beatings and robberies of citizens reported nightly from the various parts of
Trenton Evening Times, “Primer For Democracy: The Right to Citizenship,” December
18, 1947; Trenton Evening Times, “Law Enforcement The Answer,” February 27, 1941.
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the city. Most of these were unsolved. And now a robbery had claimed a victim.
Crime seemed to be taking over Trenton.48
The editorial served to galvanize the police into action. That day, Public
Safety Commissioner Duch called an emergency meeting to deal with the
unraveling situation. Once again, Duch found himself at the center of a murder
investigation with few clues and conflicting witness identifications. Much like in
the “Duck Island” murders, he ordered the establishment of “a heavily armed
motorized night bandit squad” that would “sweep the city’s streets clear of
loiterers and criminal suspects.” This fifteen-man unit was created by calling
non-essential personnel such as city inspectors and city garage mechanics into
this new squad. These men were to stop and question “all men found on the
streets without good reason.” Men out at night without sufficient reason would be
regarded as suspects and forced to give an adequate explanation. Known
criminals would be picked up on sight. Even though Duch presented the crime
squad as a unit that would patrol all sections of Trenton, in fact it only would
operate in black neighborhoods. A local NAACP officer noting the effectiveness
of the patrols commented, “Trenton police were snatching colored fellows right
and left around colored districts after the crime was committed.” The
Commissioner believed by presenting this aggressive approach to fighting crime

Trentonian, “Fried Oysters Foil Holdup But Thug Shoots Woman,” November 8, 1947;
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would alleviate some of the pressure brought upon the police department by the
public outcry.49
The intention was to use the squad only in African American
neighborhoods since all eye witnesses agreed on the race of the men. The unit
was equipped with "tommy guns and other special equipment" and “had orders to
shoot to kill.” Duch defended this extraordinary use of force, since “Trenton is in
the middle of its biggest crime wave in years,” requiring “drastic action.” He
stated, “After what happened to Horner, no one is safe in this city. We're forming
a special motorized bandit squad to patrol the city and they will shoot to kill.
Well-meaning people may accuse me of acting like a Gestapo, but if we can
bring in the Horner killers or save one life, I'm willing to take all their criticisms."
A politician in charge of the city’s public safety, besieged by events spinning out
of control, with the never ending stories and editorials of the Trenton Evening
Times adding to the pressure, Duch took cover behind these “extra-legal”
means.50
On the same day of the “Idle Death Chair” editorial, the Trenton Times
reported that Mercer County judges were imposing stiffer penalties. "Judge

49 Trenton Evening Times, “Bandit Squad Organized For War on Crime,” January 30,
1948; Reuben manuscript; William A. Reuben Papers; Trenton Six Manuscript, 19f., Tamiment
289, Series II. Subject Files, 1923-2003; box 14; folder 5; Tamiment Library/Robert F. Wagner
Labor Archives, Elmer Holmes Bobst Library, 70 Washington Square South, New York, NY
10012, New York University Libraries, [herein referred to as Reuben Manuscript].
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Charles P. Hutchison today in Mercer Court cracked down in defendants charged
with burglaries ... The sentences were taken as an indication the court is ready to
invoke severe penalties to curb the wave of burglaries." The Times clearly
wanted stricter punishments for criminals, and it looked for leadership from the
police department.51
A few days after Duch’s announcement of the special crime squad, he
was visited by a delegation, headed by the president of the Patrolman’s Union,
Nicholas Lichtfuss, and informed that the police were “willing to work overtime to
combat the current crime wave without pay.” The offer was more than a gesture
of support for a besieged commissioner; it signaled how much pressure the
police department was under. The Horner crime needed to be solved, no matter
how. 52
The Trenton Times reported that the 'bandit squad' officially began its
patrol on the evening of February 2. Duch briefed them and encouraged them to
"do everything possible to break up the crime wave." On February 3, the Times
kept up the pressure with another editorial entitled "Crime in Mercer County,"
reporting that Mercer County in 1947 had seen a 70 percent increase in crime.
"One of the most alarming aspects was the frequency of crimes involving the use
of weapons, robberies, which like the tragedy on North Broad Street, could easily

Trenton Evening Times, “Judges Crack Down,” January 29, 1948. Judge Hutchinson
would preside over the first trial of the Trenton Six;
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52 Trenton Evening Times, “Duch Praises Overtime Duty Offer by PBA,” February 2,
1948. Lichtfuss will be the patrolmen who will get “admissions” from Collis English that will lead
the police to “solve” the Horner murder.
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have resulted in murder." The editorial acknowledged that Duch and Dooling
“have acted to meet the challenge of criminal forces” and encouraged them to
fight “relentlessly and without mercy . . . through one means or another.”53
At that very point in time, the Trenton Evening Times editor, James
Kerney Jr., was serving on the Committee on Civil Liberties. Its report to the
governor indicated that there was “a real concern for the observance of all civil
rights” because of the “threatening mass hysteria of a war-weary world is
aggravated by those who would serve their own purposes.” The gulf between his
work on the Committee and the strident editorials was rather striking. Once
again, as far as Duch and Kerney were concerned, the result justified the
methods.54
On February 4, it was reported that in addition to the special bandit squad,
"at least a score of suspects have been rounded up for questioning by extra
detectives and patrolmen assigned to the murder case.” All of the suspects were
black men.55

53 Trenton Evening Times, “Crime in Mercer County,” February 3, 1948; Trenton Evening
Times, “Crime Squad Starts Patrol,” February 3, 1948.
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The Arrest Of Collis English
Weeks before the Horner murder, on the evening of January 6, George
English returned home from working at nearby Fort Dix, New Jersey, and began
to prepare his dinner. While he was doing that, his wife, Rubie English, went to
visit a sick neighbor who lived across the street. While she was there, they heard
screaming. They opened the door and saw her eleven year old daughter, Myrtis
Fields, running down the street with George chasing her. Her sister, Melrose
Diggs, and her friend, Ralph Cooper, heard the screaming and ran out into the
street as well. Eventually, George, Rubie, and Myrtis returned to their home.
George commenced beating both Rubie and Myrtis. Once again, Myrtis ran to
one of the neighbors’ homes. This time, the police were called. All three of them
were taken to the police station. It was revealed during the questioning that
George had attempted to sexually assault his stepdaughter. He was charged that
night with carnal abuse upon his daughter.
This was not the first such charge against English. He had been
convicted on April 8, 1926, for the same crime against another step daughter,
eight-year-old Bessie Mitchell, and served one year of a three year term in state
prison. That January night, he was committed to Mercer County Jail to await his
trial.56
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George sent for his twenty-three year old son, Collis English, and gave
him the keys to the car on January 12, 1948. He wanted Collis to go to Fort Dix
and get his pay check so that he could make bail. Collis returned to the police
station with the check. While he was there, George told him to keep the keys and
use them to take care of Rubie by getting coal for the furnace, groceries, or
anything else they would need while he was in jail. George eventually made bail
on February 6 and returned home in mid-morning. The car was nowhere to be
found. He became incensed, believing that Collis was merely joyriding with his
car. George called the police and wanted to file a complaint against his son for
taking the car without permission. In fact, Collis had stopped at the house that
morning, inquiring if Rubie needed anything. Finding out that everything was
fine, he asked his step-mother for her permission to use the car that day, and she
gave it.57
When Collis returned in the evening with the car, George came out of the
house, furious that his son had been driving the car around Trenton. He began
yelling at Collis. George refused to listen to any of Collis’s explanations. As
George got louder, Rubie nudged both of them into the house so that the
neighbors would not witness another problem at the English household. Collis
tried to excuse himself from his father’s ranting so he could leave for his own
home at 247 Church Street, but his father persisted. Finally Collis reached into
his pocket, without looking, and gave his father one of the two sets of keys that

57 State of New Jersey, Rubie English Testimony, Volume 13, 5017a – 5135a (1951);
George English Testimony, Volume 11, 4047a – 4229a (1951).
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were in his pocket and left. His father’s threats that he had already called the
police and intended to press charges against him were still ringing in his ears as
he walked home.58
At his home, Collis reached into his pocket and to his surprise and dread,
realized that he had given his father the wrong set of keys. He had to go back.
Collis prepared for the return trip by putting on his leggings, for the night was
very cold. As he was doing that, his mother, Emma English, told him not to go
anywhere, because earlier that day, two Trenton police had come looking for
him. She told them to come back later and promised he would be there waiting
for them when they returned. And so he sat down at the dining table with his
mother and waited for the police to return. This action would ultimately set in
motion a series of tragic circumstances that led to the story of the Trenton Six.59
The knock on the door came at 8:30 p.m. on Friday, February 6. The
same police officers that had come to the house earlier had returned. One of the
officers came into the home and told Collis “to empty his pockets of everything,
except his cigarettes, get his coat and let’s go.” McKinley Forrest, or “Mac,”
asked the officer if they were going to keep Collis overnight, because if they were
not and he had to walk back, then he was going to get his galoshes for the return
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trip home. He left with the officers for the trip to police headquarters. Collis was
arrested without a warrant and never was told why he was taken.60
Gunnar Myrdal once reflected on the meaning of a white police officer
entering a black neighborhood. He wrote that the police were “backed by all the
authority of white society—[they are] now sent to be the white law . . . He is an
outsider.” The police represent white supremacy and white privilege. They are
for the most part the only contact that most African Americans will have with the
criminal justice system:
He is the personification of white authority in the Negro community.
There he is ‘the law’ with badge and revolver; his word is final; he
Is the state’s witness in court, and as defined by the police system
and the white community, his word must be accepted.61
For politically minded blacks, a major concern was the proper role and conduct of
police, whether they were patrolling in black neighborhoods, making an arrest, or
interrogating subjects. Thus one key element of their program was a call to
reform the criminal justice system in the areas of unreasonable search and
seizure, as well as, importantly, in coerced confessions.62
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W.E.B. DuBois, writing in The Crisis, wrote that: “Nothing in the world is
easier in the United States than to accuse a black man of a crime.” The Trenton
Council on Human Relations (TCHR) records reveal the problem with police
misconduct. In meeting after meeting under the title, “Police Problem,” the TCHR
attempted to deal with the “rough treatment of Negroes by police.” Police usually
denied the charges by claiming the accused was at fault. For example, Robert B.
Murphy was arrested at his home for a minor traffic violation by two Trenton
officers. Murphy claimed that he was struck twice on the way to the station.
When he was released, his family took him to Robert Queen, a prominent black
attorney in Trenton. Queen immediately sent him to the hospital where Dr.
James Granger indicated the “entire right side of patients face was swollen,
tender, and discolored. The right eye was swollen almost closed.” When Public
Safety Commissioner Andrew J. Duch was asked about the incident, he indicated
that Murphy “did not ask for medical aid,” nor did the officer who booked him into
the station “observe any visible signs on him of being beaten.” In other words,
Duch wanted Trentonians to believe Murphy’s injuries occurred outside of police

Blackness: Race, Crime, and the Making of Modern Urban America (Cambridge, MA, 2010); Karl
E. Johnson, “Police-Black Community Relations in Postwar Philadelphia: Race and
Criminalization in Urban Social Spaces, 1945 – 1960,” Journal of African American History, 89,
no. 2, (Spring, 2004); Robert C. Weaver, “Whither Northern Race Relations Committees?”
Phylon 5, no. 3 (Third Quarter, 1944): 215; In 1947, G. Gordon Brown published a study of race
relations in the Philadelphia Police Department that had parallels in Trenton. As with any
institution, there were varying racial opinions among its members. Yet the police officer is a
“product of the community, they often reflect the prejudices” of their environment. Thus,
comments such as, “You don’t have too much trouble with the Negroes if you keep them in their
place” were far more common to be heard by those officials interacting directly with African
Americans. This attitude impacted the reaction of blacks toward the police.; G. Gordon Brown,
Law Administration and Negro-White Relations in Philadelphia (Philadelphia: Bureau of Municipal
Research of Philadelphia, 1949), 100, 103 – 104;
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custody. This denial meant nothing to the African American community; it merely
reinforced their perception of how the police department treated black people. 63
In another instance of a beating that occurred during an arrest, the police
claimed the victim “fell against the police station resisting arrest.” After one
blatant case in which the police officer filed a false report to conceal misconduct,
the investigator for TCHR wrote:
The latest situation was a perfect example of how police officers
will falsify reports in order to hide misconduct. It was fortunate that
the committee was able to see the original reports and point out to
Chief Dilouie discrepancies in the officer’s report. This situation
only points up the fact that reputable citizens, when Negroes, are
as much subject to possible abusive treatment as those without
ability to secure immediate legal protection.64
One of the demands of the TCHR that went unheeded until 1951 was the
call for “training in interracial relations,” which was to be included in the police
training school curriculum. Beginning in 1945, the call was made and rejected by
then-Mayor and future Commissioner of Public Safety Andrew J. Duch. It would
take the shooting and killing of an unarmed African American, Robert Kelly, and
an assault on his mother in November 1951 to force Duch to change his racist
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The Trenton Council on Human Relations began in 1945 as the Trenton Committee on
Unity. Their purpose was “to develop ways and means of fostering understanding among all
groups and to obtain their cooperation in the building of a truly democratic community in which
each shall share in the responsibilities and benefits.” Trenton Council on Human Relations
Papers, “Box 1, folder, “Bylaws.”. In 1949, they changed their name to the Trenton Council on
Human Relations; W.E.B. DuBois, Courts and Jails,” Crisis, April 1932, 39; Trenton Council on
Human Relations Papers, “Complaints Folder: Memorandum- Trenton Police, Robert B. Murphy
Case,” May 17, 1949, Box 6, folder, “Administrative Committee Minutes, Reports.”
64 Trenton Council on Human Relations Papers, “Letter from Andrew J. Duch,” April 9,
1949,” box 6, folder, “Administrative Committee Minutes, Reports.”; “Memorandum—Trenton
Police, Charles Williams Case,” May 17, 1949, box 6, folder, “Administrative Committee Minutes,
Reports.”
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mindset. The community had reached the end of its patience with such
outrageous events. The TCHR minutes of November 28, 1951, indicated “their
willingness to cooperate with us in our endeavor to promote better relations
between Department and minority groups . . . Through proved complaints were
presented to the police department in the past, no action was taken [by the
police] to eliminate the prejudiced feelings of policeman in general.” These
findings only mirror what Julius Lester later expressed: “the American black man
has never known law and order except as an instrument of oppression.”65
This context shaped the mindset of Collis English as he was taken from
his home on February 6 and driven to a place where he knew only trouble
awaited him. English was born and reared in Trenton. He attended segregated
schools in Trenton and dropped out in tenth grade, later joining the Navy in 1943.
While stationed in the Seattle area, he contracted rheumatic fever which
ultimately damaged his heart. This condition plagued him for the rest of his life.
Following discharge, Collis spent a month in the Fort Dix veteran’s hospital for
his bad heart. He was unable to work at heavy industrial jobs, so he helped his
mother with her washing business. English was the only one of the six who had
a minor criminal record. He was arrested twice; his first arrest was for petty
larceny, on the charge of stealing a chicken. The court sentenced him to one
year probation. The second arrest occurred in 1940 when he was charged with
fornication after 15-year-old Vera Mackenzie had given birth to an illegitimate

65 Trenton Council on Human Relations Papers. “Minutes of November 28, 1951, box 5,
folder, “Executive Board Meetings 1949 – 1951; Julius Lester, Look Out, Whitey: Black Power’s
Gon’ Get Your Mama (New York: Grove Press Inc., 1968), 23.

62

child. Collis signed a statement admitting that he had engaged in a sexual
relationship with her over the course of a year. The judge ordered him placed on
probation for one year.66
English arrived at the police station and was on the docket for
“investigation” at approximately 8:45 p.m. Just as he was going to be placed in a
cell, Nicholas Lichtfuhs, who had earlier talked to George and issued the pick-up
call for Collis, arrived at the station and asked for permission to talk to him. The
patrolman took Collis across the hall into the police courtroom, where he
instructed him to sit at a long conference table. Lichtfuhs asked him if he knew
why he had been brought down to the station. English replied that it was most
likely because he had been using his father's car without permission. Well, that
is partly true, the officer said, but the main reason was that he did not have a
driver's license. Collis agreed that he did not have one. The patrolman
continued by asking him what he had been doing with the car for the past three
weeks. English told him that he had been using the car while his father was in
jail. Collis indicated that he and Ralph Cooper had been in the car and they had
made two or three trips to a farm in Robbinsville, New Jersey. Each time they
travelled to the farm, Ralph would leave the car, disappear down a country road,
and return carrying bags. According to Lichtfuhs, English eventually told him that
he and Cooper had wood or potatoes in the bag and they would sell them in

66 State of New Jersey, Collis English Testimony, Volume 4, 1220a – 1268a, Volume 9,
3317, 3320a – 3321a (1948). “Report of the Burtchaell Research Service, Report E, March 15 &
16, 1951,” Raymond Pace Alexander Papers, box 36, folder 16, University of Pennsylvania,
University Archives and Records Center. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, [hereafter cited as
Raymond Alexander Papers].
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Trenton. He continued to ask what other things he did with the car. English did
not offer any other explanation, but merely asked Lichtfuhs for a cigarette.67
At approximately 9:20 p.m. Lichtfuhs’s partner, patrolman Louis Ammann,
came into the room and asked what English had told him. He replied he had said
some things, but that Lichtfuhs did not believe most of it. Amman turned to
English and said, “You know me, I know your mother and father.” He agreed the
family was acquainted with him. Then just as suddenly, “out of a clear sky, I just
said to him, you are the one that hit that woman on the head on North Broad
Street, aren’t you?"

English replied, "I didn't hit no woman." The patrolman

"Then you must have hit the man." And again English repeated, "I didn't hit
nobody." Ammann wanted to know where he had parked the car that morning.
English said across the street. Lichtfuhs interrupted his partner and asked
English, “Do you know what you are saying? I hope it is the truth.” Ammann
asked what his role in the crime and who was with him. English told him that he
had not parked the car that morning because Ralph Cooper was driving. Cooper
had parked the car on North Broad Street and asked him to go into a jewelry
store to pick up a watch. When he came out of the store, he saw someone
unknown to him behind the wheel and Ralph Cooper, Spud Green, and Buddy
Wilson running out of the store, and one of them had blood on his white shirt.
They pushed him away and drove off. Lichtfuhs again stopped English and
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State of New Jersey, Nicholas Lichtfuhs Testimony, Volume 2, 466a (1948), Volume 2,
515a – 545a, Volume 6, 2043a (1948); Nicholas Lichtfuhs Testimony, Volume 2, 750a (1951).
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suggested to his partner that they inform their superiors. This had become much
bigger than a motor violation investigation.68

68 State of New Jersey, Nicholas Lichtfuhs Testimony, Volume 2, 468a, 469a, Volume 2,
551a – 538a, Volume 6, 2043a (1948); Louis Ammann Testimony, Volume 2, 551a – 553a, 545a,
Volume 6, 2064a – 2066a (1948).
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CHAPTER 2
“THERE WAS SOME BUNGLING IN THE HORNER CASE”: RACE AND THE
INTERROGATION ROOM
“Race is present in every institution,
every relationship, every individual.”1
Michael Omi and Howard Winant

What really happened when Collis English was brought to the First
Precinct and questioned by Patrolman Lichtfuss? Was it similar to the image that
most people conjecture up of a suspect seated in a chair, with a single dangling
light overhead, and a group of balding, overweight detectives hurdled around the
accused, threatening, cursing, and pounding on the table, with their fists and
rubber hoses at the ready? Or was the reality something entirely different? An
environment infused with assumptions, stereotypes, and perspectives that drove
the interrogation ultimately to a devastating consequence for six men? 2

1 Michael Omi and Howard Winant, Racial Formation in the United States: From the
1960s to the 1990s, 2nd edition (New York: Routledge), 158.

2

There will be no attempt to determine the guilt or innocence of the men. Rather, this
chapter will focus on the larger questions of race and the criminal justice system. Historian
Barbara Fields argues that “race is not an element of human biology . . . Race is not an idea but
an ideology.” Barbara Jeanne Fields, “Slavery, Race, and Ideology in the United States of
America,” New Left Review, 181 (May – June, 1990): 101. And as such, society must give that
creed life. Ideologies need individuals to give it significance, for they provide the meaning of
those daily encounter and help explain actions that impact us. If one were to generalize race
relations during the 1940s, the picture most often conjectured up would be that northern racism
primarily focused on voluntary de facto segregation, where blacks only encountered
discrimination in housing and public accommodations, while at the same time, they could vote
and to a certain extent find some type of gainful employment. While in the South, they were
disfranchised, subjected to de jure segregation, enforced by violence, and for the most part,
endured oppression and lived in crushing poverty. But the reality is much more complex than that
for this scenario fails to consider how racism is practiced by individuals, institutionally, or
systemically. Michael Omi and Howard Winant argue “race is present in every institution, every
relationship, every individual. This is the case not only for the way society is organized—
spatially, culturally, in terms of stratification, etc.—but also for our perceptions and
understandings of personal experience.” Michael Omi and Howard Winant, Racial Formation in
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Even as racial attitudes were liberalizing in New Jersey, race still
pervaded criminal justice proceedings in subtle and not so subtle ways,
profoundly changing the narrative of what happened that day. Unconscious ideas
about race and racial difference, alongside interrogation techniques that
magnified the inequalities between white police officers and black defendants,
came together to create a version of events that left the six accused men with
little recourse to challenge their arrests.3
Much of the groundwork for shifting racial attitudes was prepared by local
committees on interracial unity and mayor’s race relations committees in most
northern cities. The motivation for these groups was to ease the racial tension
that had been simmering as African-Americans continued to migrate into these
cities. As Trenton’s Committee on Unity defined their mission, “We must awaken
the community to the problems of minority groups and the need for our
the United States: From the 1960s to the 1990s, 2nd edition, New York: Routledge, 158. Indeed,
race permeates all aspects of our everyday experiences. But racism can appear in many forms,
ranging from the most caustic overt type of racism to a covert one that is hidden in assumptions
and mistaken attitudes.
3

There is evidence that attitudes were changing as a result of World War II. Important
changes were taking place in the post war world as overt racism was falling into disfavor and
viewed as passé. Northerners, in particular, viewed bigotry akin to something of an old relic, a
perspective from the time of days gone by, and for a number of reasons desired to be seen as
more up-to-date, fashionable, and modernistic with a larger, expanding, and diverse world view.
And yet, this modification did not occur immediately, for any change comes slowly. For those
who were seeking to be viewed in a better light required one to discard, put away, or revise their
attitudes. Likewise, the rhetoric associated with the war encouraged this phenomenon. As early
as 1942, Republican leader Wendell Willkie echoed this theme, “Our very proclamations of what
we are fighting for have rendered our own inequities self-evident. When we talk of freedom and
opportunity for all nations the mocking paradoxes in our own society become so clear they can no
longer be ignored.” New York Times, “Willkie Says War Liberates Negro,” July 20, 1942; Gunnar
Myrdal reiterated much of the same view when he wrote of the impact of the war upon
northerners, as they were “gradually waking up and seeing what he is doing to the Negro and is
seeing also the consequences of his democratic Creed for his relations with the Negro.” Gunnar
Myrdal, An American Dilemma: Volume Two, The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy, (New
Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1996), 1010.
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committee.” They provided for interracial clinics, gave speeches, and researched
and reported the problems to the citizens. These groups would be merely only
one line of attack as northerners dealt with the discrimination and racism found in
the cities.4
The State of New Jersey adopted a new state constitution in 1947 that
prohibited discrimination in public accommodations. In 1948, Governor Alfred
Driscoll established the Committee on Civil Liberties insisting that the Garden
State had to change when it came to treatment of African-Americans. So without
question, policy makers and others were signaling a change was coming.
Popular opinion was reflecting this shift was well.5
George Edmund Haynes, “Clinical Methods in Interracial and Intercultural Relations”
Journal of Educational Sociology 19, no. 5, (January, 1946): 324; Government officials were
moving in this direction as well. For example, President Harry Truman established a Committee
on Civil Rights in December of 1946 and spoke to the national NAACP convention at the Lincoln
Memorial in 1947, becoming the first President to do so. Truman’s motives may be questionable
since he was facing a political challenge from his left, but the much larger issue was the effect it
had upon the American public as they heard one of the first serious commitments for civil rights
from the chief executive. And other prominent Americans, such as Albert Einstein were vocal in
their call for the country to recognize that “race prejudice has unfortunately become an American
tradition which is uncritically handed down from one generation to the next. The only remedies
are enlightenment and education.” Fred Jerome and Rodger Taylor, Einstein on Race and
Racism, quote from Cheyney Record interview, (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press,
2005), 148 - 149.
4

5

For example the National Opinion Research Center polled Americans as to whether
they thought “Negroes should have as good a chance as white people to get any kind of job?” In
1944, only 42% of the nation responded in the affirmative, while in 1946, the number had grown
to 47%. National Opinion Research Center “The Quarter’s Polls,” The Public Opinion Quarterly
10, no. 4 (Winter, 1946 - 1947): 623. In 1944, they were asked if they believed that “Negroes are
as intelligent as white people” and in 1944, 44% thought they were, whereas in 1946, the number
who agreed rose to 53%. National Opinion Research Center, “The Quarter’s Polls,” The Public
Opinion Quarterly 10, no. 4 (Winter, 1946 - 1947): 623. And yet, we must consider that as
attitudes were changing, not everyone agreed with this new direction. Some remained and would
remain entrenched in their belief systems. Just because institutions or organizations shift from
overt racist language and symbols, does not necessarily mean that everyone in that organization
will arrive at the same conclusion. For example, in the police department, although political and
civic pressure was placed upon the agency to adopt a more tolerant and equitable way of dealing
with minorities, it did not then necessarily mean those ideas trickled down to the patrolman on the
beat or the detective in the interrogation room. They might modify their conduct and words,
cloaking their racist behavior, but some of the underlying sentiment remained. And yet at the
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Political opinion polls reflected how overt racist attitudes and
discrimination were now under siege among some areas in the United States.
White Americans may have been pleased with themselves for adopting a new,
more inclusive view for blacks. However, research has demonstrated that
although the public may have accepted this new line of thinking, racial
assumptions and attitudes did not die quickly.6
We will never know actually what was done and said during the time of the
Trenton Six interrogation, but we are able to gain a picture from the court
transcripts. Consider the differences between the courtroom and the police
station. In the trial, there is a stenographer who records everything that is said,
while in the station, in 1948, there was no objective record of what the police did
or the suspects said. In the courtroom there is a presumption of innocence,
whereas in the police station, the interrogation session begins with an
accusation: “you are guilty, talk to us, and it will be easier for you.” Therefore,
same time, as attitudes were changing, the larger question remained as to how white Americans
would demonstrate it. For example in 1945, the American Institute of Public Opinion found that
only 5% of the people surveyed believed racial tolerance was the largest issue facing the country,
American Institute of Public Opinion, “The Quarter’s Polls,” The Public Opinion Quarterly 9, no. 2
(Summer, 1945): 228. And again in 1946, the National Opinion Research Center found that
nearly 66% of white Americans believed blacks were being treated fairly, while only 25% believed
they were receiving unfair treatment, National Opinion Research Center, “The Quarter’s Polls,”
The Public Opinion Quarterly 10, no. 3 (Autumn, 1946): 422.
6 Rather, what may happen is that they reveal a different appearance, potentially, just as
toxic and dangerous as ever. Quite clearly then, it is one thing to believe that one is becoming
more tolerant, and quite another to actually being tolerance. In other words, if overt racism was
indeed passé, it does not necessarily mean that all racism will be gone. Or to put in another way,
is it as simple as that to rid one’s self of racist thinking? This presents an interesting dilemma.
The poll numbers indicated a far more serious issue, a failure or a clavier approach by the public
to understand how racism plays out in everyday life and the ultimate implications for black
Americans. Surely, racism is not experienced in an abstract sense, but individuals interacting
with each other, whether it be on a daily basis, or assumptions made by the police in an
interrogation room.

69

the careful crafted narrative of the police in the Trenton Six case deserves a
deeper analysis.
English was arrested and booked for investigation because of a complaint
that he was driving his father’s car without permission. He eventually implicated
four of the five defendants, so the questioning and his statements are critical to
understand what happened. Once he was in custody, the police had forty-eight
hours in which to grill their suspect and to engage in a fishing expedition. We
know that the “bandit squad’ arrested young black men who were loiterers and
criminal suspects, held them for a time, and interrogated them as to their
whereabouts and potential involvement in the Horner murder. Because English
had used his father’s automobile, he became another catch in the dragnet.7
According to the police, English was going to be placed in a cell and
Patrolman Nicholas Lichtfuhs, who had earlier talked to his father and issued the
7

New Jersey law in 1948 did not require the police to notify a suspect they were entitled
to have counsel present, rather they were only entitled to help them in their defense and, “is not
entitled to the aid of counsel to save him from his own voluntary acts.” The State of New Jersey,
Defendant in Error v George Cole and George Hicks, Plaintiffs in Error, the Court of Errors and
Appeals of New Jersey, 136 N.J.L. 606; 1948 N.J. Lexis 278; State of New Jersey, Discussion
between Court and Counsel, Volume 2, 569a, (1948). Ed Cray in The Big Blue Line: Police
Power vs. Human Rights (New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1967), provides the framework for
the modus operandi of the police in the days before the Miranda decision. Arresting suspects
for “investigation” and delaying in bringing them to a magistrate were mainly the keys used by the
police. The technique of “investigation” was to arrest a person on the slightest provocation, book
them by recording in the police blotter their arrest for “investigation”, hold them incommunicado,
and begin the questioning. Once the police have a suspect whom they believe is guilty, and they
have no supporting evidence, interrogation with the intent of obtaining a confession becomes the
most desirable avenue to pursue. If the interrogation is successful, then the blotter is changed to
the crime the person has confessed to. Additionally, more time may be needed so the police will
delay in having the suspect officially charged before a judge. The magistrate informs the arrestee
of the charge, the right to remain silent, obtain a lawyer, and to bail if permissible. It becomes
quite clear why the police would delay, for once a lawyer becomes involved the situation will
change. Cray argues “whenever they do delay arraigning the suspect, the police themselves are
breaking the law.” [Italics his] Ed Cray, The Big Blue Line: Police Power vs. Human Rights (New
York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1967), 64. New Jersey law required the police to bring a suspect
arrested without a warrant before a magistrate “without unnecessary delay,” but within forty-eight
hours. In the meantime however, the police had wide latitude to question the suspect.
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pick-up call for him, arrived at the station and asked for permission to talk to him.
Lichtfuhs took English across the hall, into the police courtroom, and began to
question him. The patrolman asked him if he knew why he had been brought
down to the station. He replied that it was most likely because he had been
using his father's car without permission. Well, that is partly true, the officer
said, but the main reason was that he did not have a driver's license. English
agreed that he did not have one.8
Lichtfuhs and Ammann claimed they never suspected English of any
involvement in the Horner case and the eventual admissions came as a surprise
to them. But is that true? Was it just luck? Or were other factors at work that
evening? Careful examination of the narrative reveals a much more complicated
story. If we accept the policemen’s testimony that they did not think English was
involved in the Horner case, then what did they believe he had done? Ammann
testified that he asked the question because “there were a few holdups and
things like that” and Lichtfuhs believed that English was involved along with two
other black young men with a robbery attempt and assault upon the bartender at
“Scrappy” Manning’s Tavern. The officer never provided any evidence to
connect him to that incident.9
English had been arrested twice on minor charges, once in 1940 and in
1942. He joined the navy in 1943, was discharged in 1946, and had no further
8

State of New Jersey, Nicholas Lichtfuhs Testimony, Volume 1, 466a (1948), Volume 2,
515a – 545a, Volume 6, 2043a (1948); Nicholas Lichtfuhs Testimony, Volume 2, 750a (1951).
9 State of New Jersey, Louis Ammann Testimony, Volume 3, 867a (1951).Nicholas
Lichtfuhs Testimony, Volume 6, 2611a (1951).
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problems with the police. So why did the patrolmen make a very big jump from
petty crimes to assault and robbery? And certainly, there was no justification for
Ammann to accuse him of striking Mr. or Mrs. Horner. So what was in the minds
of the policemen?10
There were many layers at work that night. True, English was black, and
the witnesses near of the Horner assault reported seeing young black men leave
the property. But the witnesses saw light skinned men, and English was dark
skinned. Shaped by their prejudices, the police were looking for a black body—it
seemed that any young black man would do.
But it is difficult to put away assumptions and stereotypes that run deep in
the subconscious. Lu-in Wang, in Discrimination by Default, helps us
understand the racism and the actions that flow from it are not the result of an
intention or conscious desire to be discriminatory, but rather are the
consequences of intensely entrenched social ideas and stereotypes.
Discrimination can become the “default by becoming “the expected, the
accepted, the standard. Once it becomes the standard, we take it for granted and
fail to recognize the extent to which it influences how we operate in the world.”11
10

State of New Jersey, Collis English Testimony, Volume 4, 1224a (1948); Anthony H.
Raywood Testimony, Volume 5, 1739 (1948).Collis English Testimony, Volume 4,1272a (1948);
Collis English Testimony, Volume 14, 5283a (1951).
11

Lu-in Wang, Discrimination by Default: How Racism Becomes Routine (New York: New
York University Press, 2006), 8. The effects of this racism remain fundamentally hidden from
those engaging in that discrimination. For example, most police believed that most black men
were criminals or at the very least, prone to it. This produced a “default” by which the commonly
held view of Black criminality caused the police to think or act in a racist matter without even
realizing it produce the results that we will see in this chapter. Thus, the interrogator will
continue to press in their questioning until something is admitted; literally, a self-filling prophecy,
since in the police mind, they must have done something. This was especially true for Patrolman
Lichtfuss. He testified that he did not suspect Collis of involvement in the Horner crime, but he
did believe he was implicated in something else. Quite simply, there was no evidence that he
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In other words, the “default” works much like a setting in a computer. The
settings do not change until the operator makes a conscious decision to change
them. This, she argues, becomes the mode of operation for the average person.
Additionally, Andrew E. Taslitz argues that “stereotypes have more clout when
cognitive resources are limited, such as by time or social pressure, and where a
theory is held in great confidence.”

Finally, Cynthia J. Najdowski examines the

“stereotype threat” to black suspects when confronted by the police who are
operating under a stereotype, as in this case, that black men are criminals. She
argues that when a black male believes the police are in fact working under that
assumption and are afraid of being viewed through this lens, they attempt to
“control their demeanor to counter stereotypes and appear truthful.”12
offered to substantiate the belief, merely the ‘default’ that Collis must have been involved in
something, and thus the questioning will continue.
12

Andrew E. Taslitz, “Wrongly Accused: Is Race a Factor in Convicting the Innocent?”
Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 4, issue 1 (2006 – 2007): 131. If the police are indeed under
intense pressure to solve the crime, stereotypes provides a mechanism in which to operate with
less attention to additional evidence collection and further reliance on evidence that supports their
assumptions. This results in poor police work and as the research indicates a greater likelihood
of procuring a false confession; Cynthia J. Najdowski, “Stereotype Threat in Criminal
Interrogations: Why Innocent Black Suspect Are at Risk for Confessing Falsely,” Psychology,
Public Policy, and Law 17, no. 4, (November, 2011): 566. The outcome is just the opposite of
what the suspect wants to occur. They engage in “specific non-verbal behavior” such as eye
blinkering, nervous facial expressions, or appears to be anxious or nervous and gives the
impression they are thinking hard, all of which are viewed as the arrestee is endeavoring to
mislead them. These behaviors result in the police continue harder in the questioning to get to
the truth. This will be seen as well in the interrogation of the men. See also Joseph R. Feagin’s
Racist America provides an ideological or conceptual framework to help explain the psychological
aspect of the men in what he labels, the “white racial frame” as a means to “rationalize and
legitimates racial oppression.” Racist America: Roots, Current Realities, and Future Reparations
(New York: Routledge, 2010), 19. The police did not comprehend the white racist framework they
were operating in and certainly did not comprehend what it meant to be a black suspect. And see
Glenn C. Loury, The Anatomy of Racial Inequality (Cambridge, MA, 2002); Katheryn RussellBrown, The Color of Crime, Second Edition (New York: New York University Press, 2009). It is
important to note as well that although covert forms of racism were discernible as we have noted,
at the same time, there were still vestiges of overt racism and that was found in the way the
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Another important change that occurred in the 1940s was in the
interrogation room.13 The tactics fundamentally shifted from the “third degree” to
a psychological approach in the decade.14 In 1941, W. R. Kidd published the

police officials addressed the men with the word, “boy” as well as when they described them in
the courtroom later. The insulting, denigrating, racist signifier definitely meant to convey the idea
of an inferior status and subjugation. Even years after the arrest of the Trenton Six, the usage
had not significantly decreased, as Dr. Martin Luther King in his “Letter from Birmingham Jail”
passionately wrote, “when your first name becomes “nigger,” your middle name becomes “boy”
(however old you are) and your last name becomes “John.” “Letter from a Birmingham Jail,” in
Liberating Faith: Religious Voices for Justice, Peace, and Ecological Wisdom, edited by Roger S.
Gottlieb (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, Inc., 2003), 180; The 1948 and 1951 court
transcripts are full of the word “boy” when the police are recounting what happened. Thus, it
would not be much of a leap to argue the term was used quite frequently in their encounters with
the men.
13

For a thorough and helpful review of the literature, see G. Daniel Lassiter and Christian
A. Meissner, Editors, Police Interrogations and False Confessions: Current Research, Practice,
and Policy Recommendations (Washington, D.C., 2010); Saul M. Kassin, “The Psychology of
Confession Evidence,” American Psychologist 52, no.3, (March, 1997); Saul M. Kassin and Gisli
H. Gudjonsson, “The Psychology of Confessions: A Review of the Literature and Issues,”
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The use of either physical force or mental anguish to extract information was a very
real possibility throughout much of American policing history. Suspects were “beaten, burned
with fire or acid, tear gasses, water-boarded, subject to painful electric shocks, stripped and
subjected to extreme cold, and generally tortured, sometimes to the point of hospitalized or
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first police interrogation manual in the United States. He condemned “third
degree” methods as “vicious and useless” and called for interrogations to be
conducted differently. Research has indicated that although in most departments
the use of “third degree” interrogation procedures had dwindled, “abusive police
methods had not altogether disappeared by the 1950s and 1960s.” William
Westley’s study of an Indiana police department in 1953 found that in spite of
upper level officials attempting to transform the strong arm methods, there was
resistance to change by detectives and patrolman. The officers believed that
some groups, especially blacks, would only “respond to fear and rough
treatment.” Race remained an important element to justify the treatment against
suspects. One officer defended the use of force by commenting, “You can’t ask
them a question and get an answer that is not a lie.” In other words, the only way
to get an honest response was to use force. In Trenton, there was a hybrid
approach of psychological coercion and the “third degree.”15
In the interrogation room, a veil of secrecy descends upon both the
suspect and police. Chief Justice Earl Warren, writing the majority opinion in the
1966 Supreme Court case, Miranda v Arizona, commented, “Interrogation still
takes place in privacy. Privacy results in secrecy and this in turn results in a gap
recommendations in the policies concerning law enforcement. From their investigation into police
interrogation policies, the Committee issued the “Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement”
that detailed the use of “third degree” methods. Eventually, the Committee and reports became
known as the Wickersham Commission named after the former attorney general, George
Wickersham and chair of the committee.
15 Richard Leo, Police Interrogation and American Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2008),107; Richard A. Leo, “The Impact of "Miranda" Revisited,” Journal of
Criminal Law and Criminology 86, no. 3 (Spring, 1996): 668; William A. Westley, “Violence and
the Police,” American Journal of Sociology 59, no. 1 (July 1953): 40.
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in our knowledge as to what in fact goes on in the interrogation rooms.”

This

secrecy serves two purposes. First, it allows the interrogators to remain in the
shadows as to what was said and done during the questioning, for if there is a
dispute as to what happened, it becomes a contest between a ‘confessed
criminal’ and a police officer. Second, it provides a way for the police to
construct a narrative as to the circumstances behind the statement. If there is a
confession, the police can recreate what was said and done during the
admissibility hearing.16
Since there are no records of what was said, only those things that will
help prove the theory of the police will be “remembered” by the testifying official.
Of course, any denials and attempted explanations will be minimized. Then once
the narrative has been reconstructed, the burden shifts to the defendant to refute
the official story. One of the basic components of the Trenton Six police
narrative was that they just stumbled “purely by a stroke of luck” into solving the
baffling Horner murder.17
Lastly, Richard A. Leo sheds light on the myth of psychological
interrogation. The police worldview prevented them from understanding why
these men would ‘admit’ they were at the scene if they were not. What
happened to the Trenton Six could happen to arrestees, who saw the potential
for being beaten, verbally attacked, and detained in the county jail. They might
believe it was in their best interests to admit their involvement to stop the
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questioning. But black suspects further confronted a racist framework, white
privilege, and racial stereotypes. The police did not comprehend what it meant to
be a black suspect and understood even less what was happening in the minds
of their black suspects.
The police then were working under Leo’s “myth of psychological
interrogation,” by which a person would not admit to a crime unless they
committed it. Operating on that unconscious level, they believed what English
told them, even though he continued to change the story as they pressed him to
clear up the inconsistencies. But none of what English told them matched the
evidence they had in the case. The policemen’s presumption clouded their
perspective of reality.
English must have been involved in something, in the minds of the
patrolmen. The only task for the police was to discover it. So from that point,
beginning with the patrolmen who questioned English, to the detectives, and
finally the prosecutors who developed the case against them, race lay at the
heart of the case. The police later tried to maintain that they had no ulterior racist
notions in their continual questioning and treatment of the six, but the evidence
does not support that claim. They might not have engaged in overt racial hatred,
but ideas of racial difference and black criminality suffused their handling of the
case.
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Friday, February 6, 1948
When a white man faces a black man,
especially if the black man is helpless,
terrible things are often revealed.”18

When the interrogation began, English did not think that he had to hide
anything. But Lichtfuhs soon placed him in a rather uncomfortable situation. He
began to fidget in his chair, admitting that he did not have a driver’s license. It
was not the real reason why Lichtfuhs was interrogating him, but it put English on
the defensive. So, as the officer recalled, he moved the questioning toward the
criminal activity. He asked English, “Do you really believe that is what we
brought you in here for? And he said, yes. And I said, Well, I don’t think so.
What we brought you in here for is, we want to find out and I want you to tell us
just how long you have been using that car?”

The tone changed. English

answered that he had been using his father’s car for a period of two to three
weeks while his father was being detained in the County Jail, and he was using it
with Ralph Cooper. Lichtfuhs replied:
You are not telling me everything. I want to know, and there is
only you and I here, you can tell me what you want to, or you
don’t have to tell me a thing, you can suit yourself, but, “I says:
“I would advise you to tell me anything you want to tell me, or
just stop lying about anything.19
The pattern was established. English told the officer something, and the
patrolman accused him of not being truthful, and so the questioning continued.
18 James Baldwin, The Price of the Ticket: Collected Nonfiction, 1948-1985 (New York:
St. Martin’s Press, 1985), 355.
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Thus, English felt the pressure to come up with something that the officer
accepted, since it was clear that he was not satisfied with the explanation
offered. But at the same time, English faced a dilemma: if he changed his story,
then he would be confirming the officer’s suspicions that he was lying.
English changed his story. He said the car was being used an average of
two or three nights a week, and sometimes when they travelled to Robbinsville,
Cooper parked the car and walked down to a barn, returning with bags.
Lichtfuhs asked what was in them. He replied that he thought it was wood or
potatoes, but he was not certain. They brought the items to Trenton; Ralph sold
them and gave him part of the money. English told a story that he believed
satisfied his interrogator, but in doing so, he gave the police the ammunition of a
new criminal element—theft.
In the story English was a passive participant, merely present during the
activity. He pointed out that Cooper drove, walked to the barn, brought the items
back, and sold them. It was Cooper as the prime mover, the motivating and
acting force behind it all.
There are two elements at work when suspects are confronted with the
powerlessness of their situation. First, they realize they are not believed and
something has to be admitted. Their statements often consist of an admission of
being present, but only a witness to what happened. Amongst the five
admissions in this case, four followed that model. Only McKinley Forrest
admitted to hitting Mr. Horner, but quickly qualified it, indicating that he did not kill
him. Second, they are naïve about criminal law. The men will admit some
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culpability, never realizing the legal consequences of that decision, for in the
State of New Jersey, if one is present during a burglary and the victim dies, all
the participants are eligible for the death penalty, whether they actually assaulted
the victim or not. For instance, James Thorpe, one of the Six, believed incorrectly
that he would only get a few months in jail.
By the time Lichtfuhs’s partner came into the room, English had a very
serious problem. Now, instead of fielding questions about bags of potatoes and
wood, he was accused of assaulting someone. Now English began to perspire
heavily and fidgeted in his chair, further confirming that he must be hiding
something from the two patrolmen. What were his options? He could continue
to deny any involvement. He must have, but for how long?
English changed the story, again, moving it outside of the Horner store.
He admitted when he came out of Klein’s, he saw someone unknown to him
behind the wheel. Ralph Cooper, Spud Green, and Buddy Wilson were running
out of the store, and one of them had blood on his white shirt.
English now blended what he learned from the questioning into the new
story. He now mentioned another man sitting in the car. This corresponded with
Mrs. Horner’s account of three men in the store and Mrs. Virginia Barclay’s eyewitness of the fourth man as the driver of the getaway vehicle. It is important up
to this point that the police narrative had only four men involved, since the eye
witnesses accounted for only four. But why did English’s story have three
coming out of the store? Why not two or four? Now, he placed himself in a very
serious situation.

At this point, Lichtfuhs told English “anything you say now, I
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am going to mark down. Because you have told us enough stuff, and I am going
to mark it down.”20
Similar patterns emerged in English’s new story. English was the one who
witnessed it all, merely reporting what he saw, which allowed him to be the
outsider. He was not the one driving. Rather, he was being driven. He was the
one who was sent into the jewelry store to get a watch, far enough from the crime
scene, and when he exited, the group left him standing on the sidewalk. The
story provided him an opportunity to be viewed as being cooperative. He was
merely reporting what he saw and heard.
Lichtfuhs left the courtroom and informed the sergeant on duty, James E.
Creeden, about the surprising statements that English had just made to him
about the Horner case. Creeden followed the officer back into the room and told
English that he was going to question him about the murder on North Broad
Street.

Again, English repeated the story, but this time providing more details.

Cooper parked the car that morning in front of the Alps Restaurant, across from
Horner’s store. He asked English to go into Klein’s Jewelry Store and pick up a
watch he had left there for repairs. English insisted that he needed a ticket, but
Cooper replied his watch was there and he wanted it. So he went into Klein’s to
retrieve the watch. Mr. Klein told him there was no watch in his store and there
was no name in his register for a Cooper. As English left Klein’s, he noticed the
car had been moved and was now in front of Horner’s, with the motor running,
and an unknown man with a green coat behind the wheel. At the same time,
three men rushed out of the second hand furniture store, brushed by him, jumped
20
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into the car, and left him standing there. English embellished his story by telling
them that one of the men had blood on his white shirt as he ran past him, and
after he returned to his father’s home, realizing the car had been returned, looked
inside, and saw a handkerchief with a little blood on it. He knew the three men.
They were Ralph Cooper, Buddy Wilson, and Spud Green.21
Creeden immediately ordered George English’s car impounded, since the
car was now linked to the Horner case. He called the detectives to the police
station to officially question the cooperative arrestee. But the police narrative had
two major inconsistencies—the description of the witnesses indicating the men
were light-skinned, and the car. Virginia Barclay’s testimony had led to the
bulletin that Trenton police were certain the car was a bluish-green, dull colored
Plymouth four-door sedan. English was driving a black, two door Ford sedan.22
The police now officially held English because of his involvement in driving
the car. The police blotter was changed from “investigation” to “investigation in
the Horner murder.” At 11:00 p.m., Detectives Charles H. Dawson and Frank W.
Fagan arrived and questioned him further. During the thirty-five minute
interrogation, English gave them three different stories. The first story was
similar to the one given to Creeden, except the car was gone when he came out
of Klein’s. Lichtfuss then injected that he had told them the three men rushed by
him and left him standing on the street. Dawson, somewhat skeptical, asked
him why the others would leave him there. He asked English, “Are you sure you
21
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are right on this story?” This time the story was slightly modified to being pushed
and pulled into the car and they all sped away. Again, the detective questioned
this version and began to wonder if English really knew anything about the case.
Dawson again asked, “What did happen?” For the third story, English now
became the driver of the car, because it was his father’s car and he insisted in
driving the vehicle. This scenario was just as unlikely, for it seemed rather
improbable for desperate men attempting a getaway to be discussing whether
English or the unidentified man would drive the car.23
Dawson later testified that he doubted whether English really knew
anything about the Horner case, but “was glad to get something that was in the
Horner case and this man was volunteering information.” If Dawson’s testimony
was true, then was all of English’s testimony unreliable? What remained
unchanged throughout the three stories were the three men. These were leads
worth pursuing. Dawson called Chief of Mercer County Detectives Frank A.
Naples of the prosecutor’s office to come to the station. While they waited for
Naples’s arrival, Dawson took English to the Identification Room to see if he
could identify pictures of the suspects. Dawson asked if he knew where the men
might be living. He told him Wilson and Green lived near Flock’s Farm, in a small
camp, a few miles outside the city, near Robbinsville, New Jersey. Cooper lived
in Trenton. He also informed them that Cooper left the city earlier in the evening

23
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and had asked him to bring his clothes to Robbinsville the next day. English said
that Cooper warned him to remain quiet about his whereabouts, something which
made the detectives even more suspicious. Dawson and Naples decided to go
to Robbinsville immediately. They asked English if he could direct them to the
location and identify the men. He agreed. Dawson testified that English went as
far as stating that “he would like to see Cooper apprehended.” 24
But the police narrative could be misleading. Dawson might have
attempted to reinforce the importance of English, since it was his statements that
were guiding the police in their investigation. Moreover, English may have been
attempted to give the impression that he was cooperative, so as to deflect any
possible suspicion off him.
Around 12:30 a.m., four marked cars drove out into a bitter cold night.
The caravan stopped at 18 Sheridan Avenue to check if Cooper had returned to
Trenton. He had not and so the group drove out of the city. As they did, the
weather conditions quickly deteriorated. They soon found themselves in a near
blizzard situation. Heavy winds blew the snow into “white-out” conditions of low
visibility. They inched their way along the neighboring icy roads. The cars
became separated. One of the radios failed to operate and the group ended up
going around in circles. In spite of the weather, Naples ordered Captain Ryan to
take English and knock on two doors searching for the men. But it was not to be.
As Dawson recalled the scene, “it was so dark that you couldn’t see your hand in

24 State of New Jersey, Charles H. Dawson Testimony, Volume 2, 572a – 596a, 653a,
Volume 7, 2107a (1948), Volume 3, 960a – 973a, 988a (1951).

84

front of you.” Eventually, they all returned to Trenton by 2:30 a.m. The decision
was made to wait for daybreak when the storm might be over and daylight would
make it easier for them to follow the directions to the farm. English was placed in
a detention cell since he was considered an “informer.” These 16 x 8 cells with a
bed, pillow, and blankets were different from the “boards,” 8 x 5 cells in the
cellblock with a cement floor, plank board for a bed, and no pillow or blankets for
those who had been arrested.25
The second trip to Robbinsville began at 5:30 a.m. and consisted of eight
law enforcement officials in three cars. They decided to stop, have breakfast,
and wait for sufficient daylight. After they ate and were on their way,
interestingly, English actually directed them away from Wilson’s home,
approximately a quarter of a mile further north. He may have been attempting to
retain some control of what was happening to him; he did not want to lead the
police to his friend, Ralph. He was quite willing to try to sabotage the very thing
he had agreed to do. There were other ways, too, that English attempted to
establish some sense of agency. Dawson, during his testimony, attempted to
portray English and himself as engaged in mere conversation. However, English
cast it as an interrogation; when he testified, “I didn’t talk with him, he talked with
me.” Later on the way to Robbinsville, when they stopped for breakfast,
Prosecutor Volpe asked English if he ate with the officers, and he replied, “I didn’t
eat with them, I ate there.” These simple statements by English reveal his
25 State of New Jersey, Charles H. Dawson Testimony, Volume 2, 577a (1948); John
Donahue’s testimony, Volume 7, 2463a – 2472a (1951); Frank A. Naples Testimony, Volume 2,
672a (1948).
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feelings about the situation. There was no mutual respect here, since he had
received no respect.26
English’s actions did not hinder the police, for they found two men outside
who remembered seeing the English car earlier and directed them to a concrete
brick house. The police caravan finally arrived at 7:00 a.m. in an AfricanAmerican migrant area consisting of fifteen or twenty “shacks.” As Sergeant
Creeden described them, “they looked more like drygood box cases” or packing
crates. The eight officials fanned in every direction, knocking on doors. English
later described the scene when they reached the two story concrete block house:
“First, they were around, two or three men went around the side way, around the
building of the house and then Naples and Dawson went upstairs.”27
Chief of Mercer County Detectives Frank A. Naples, Detective Charles
Dawson, and Patrolman Louis Ammann approached a door and knocked.
Evelyn Smith was up and wondered who was knocking so early in the morning.
The officers identified themselves and she opened the door. They asked her if
Wilson and Cooper were in the home. She replied they were. The three officers
formed a line and began a search of the house for the men.28
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Thirty-seven-year-old Horace Wilson was asleep in his bed when the
police knocked on his door. He was born in South Carolina and was unable to
read or write. He could write his own name, however. In 1939, Wilson left the
South and settled in the Trenton area. In early January 1948, he moved to
Flock's Farm with Lena Turner and her friend Evelyn Smith. The hardworking
Wilson had good reason to be proud of his small success, since he was
permitted to move into the only block home for the workers, an approving signal
that his work ethic was appreciated and rewarded by his boss. The twentythree-year-old Cooper had arrived at the home just a few hours before the police
arrived, seeking help from Wilson to help get a job on the farm. Cooper was born
in Georgia. He was able to read and "write a little" since he went as far as grade
six in school. Cooper moved to Trenton in July of 1947. He had been in the area
for a mere six months before his nightmare began.29
Naples noticed that on the right hand side of the room, there was a
woman lying there and two children behind her. He stooped down and pulled the
blanket off her, and saw a man lying there. Naples asked him if he was Buddy
Wilson. No, was the reply, he was Horace Wilson. Naples disagreed and told
him, “Yes, you are the man, Buddy Wilson, get up and get dressed and give me
the pistol you got.” Wilson replied, “I ain’t got no pistol.”

At the same time,

Patrolman Ammann yelled out and indicated he had found Cooper on a cot in a
corner of the same room. They got up, dressed, and were handcuffed to each

29 State of New Jersey, Horace Wilson Testimony, Volume 7, 2934 – 2936, Volume 8,
2968a (1948); Ralph Cooper Testimony, Volume 4, 1440 - 1442 (1948).
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other. Both men asked why there were being arrested, but were ignored. The
two were led to the top of the landing where English could identify them. Dawson
went to the car and asked him if these were the men they were seeking. He
replied “That is Cooper, but Wilson looks a little older.” With that, Cooper and
Wilson were both arrested and brought back to Trenton.30
According to the narrative, Green could not be found. But on the first floor
of the Wilson home lived a “seventy-five or eighty year old man” named Green.
English clearly did not know the first name of Wilson and Green. He called them
Buddy and Spud. Green was never arrested, because, as Naples testified,
“there was no description of him being implicated in the crime.” But was that
true? Certainly, English mentioned a Spud Green, but there were no witnesses
who ever mentioned an elderly man. Why did the police believe English when it
came to Ralph and Horace, but not Spud Green? It seems that as long as
English implicated a black suspect and he “fit” the original witnesses, the police
would arrest him.31
English was returned to the detention cell, while Wilson and Cooper were
placed on the “boards” in the cellblock. Sometime during the long night, English
finally broke and gave the fourth and last story. He admitted he was inside the
store and told the detectives that although he was inside the store with the rest,

State of New Jersey, Horace Wilson Testimony, Volume 8, 2974a – 2975a (1948);
Charles H. Dawson Testimony, Volume 8, 2862a (1951).
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he did not hit anyone. The racial “default” premise of Lichtfuhs and Ammann
seemed to be correct, because English had committed a crime after all. 32

Saturday, February 7, 1948
Emma English was concerned because she had not heard from her son.
Believing Collis had been arrested for using the car without permission, she
asked her son-in-law, McKinley Forrest, to take the car keys to him and find out
what out what happened to him. Thirty-five-year-old Forrest was born in
Richland, Georgia. He attended only the first year of school and was not able to
write or read. He had spent his early years working in the cotton fields. When he
was fourteen years old, he left the South, moved to Trenton, and married a sister
of Collis English. She died in 1947, leaving him with one daughter. He had a
severe stuttering problem, especially when he was nervous or under stress.33
McKinley arrived at approximately 9:15 a.m. The station was busy that
morning since police court was in session. Sergeant Mostrangelli was directing
the people coming into the First Precinct for court and asked him if he needed
help. He replied he wanted to see his brother-in-law, Collis English, because he
had the keys for his automobile and he wanted to return them. He was told to
have a seat and the sergeant went to the office of Acting Captain of the First
District, Andrew Delate, to inform him. Delate asked him to bring Forrest to his

32 State of New Jersey, Nicholas Lichtfuhs Testimony, Volume 2, 521 - 523 (1948); Frank
W. Fagan Testimony, Volume 2, 666a (1948).
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office. Everything was “normal up until they asked him his name. Then his name
never did come out of his lips. His lips quivered, but nothing came out, and he
seemed to shake all over.” Then Delate asked why he wanted to see English
and who told him that he had been locked up. He had a key that he wanted to
give to English. It was then the detectives turned the situation into something
unbelievable, for they started calling him Chancey. He showed them his Social
Security card and insisted that his name was McKinley Forrest and that he did
not know anyone with that particular name. Possessing the keys of a car
connected to a crime and denying his nickname made the captain suspicious.
Delate noticed the beads of perspiration on Forrest’s forehead. He was “very
nervous, he was highly nervous and shaking. So I told Mostrangelli to place him
on the docket for investigation.” The police now had four men in their custody.34
After police court was over, eight detectives and members of the Mercer
County Prosecutor’s office gathered in Delate’s office to continue their
investigation and interrogation. First, Delate ordered English, Cooper, and
Wilson to his office. English was brought in first. A few minutes later, Cooper
arrived. The captain asked English if he knew him. He replied, “Yes that is
Ralph Cooper, the man that hit the old lady.” Without anything further, Cooper
was returned to his cell. Next, Wilson was escorted into the area. Again, English

34 State of New Jersey, Albert Mostrangelli Testimony, Volume 6, 2344 (1951); McKinley
Forrest Testimony, Volume 4, 1394 - 1396 (1948); Andrew F. Delate Testimony, Volume 8, 2384
(1948).
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was asked the same question. His answer was “that is Horace Wilson, not the
Buddy Wilson, I mean.” He was led out as well.35
The accused men were not allowed to see or speak to anyone. Forrest
remained confined until Monday morning. He believed it had to do with
something with the car. However, on that morning he finally heard the word
‘murder’ and realized the charge was being directed at him. Twenty-five years
after the event, Forrest gave his first public interview and was asked to explain
how he felt when he was first arrested. He stated, “It was like your walking down
the street and somebody says, ‘He’s the guy’ and you're arrested, and you don’t
know what for.” He had a type of psychological breakdown.36
Delate told English that based on the admissions from the previous night,
he wanted to take a statement. English again stated he met Cooper, Wilson,
Green, and a man called Shorty at Broad and Perry to buy some furniture.
Green was driving. The four went into the store, leaving English outside. After a
few minutes, he decided to go in and see if they needed help carrying out the
furniture. He heard a woman scream and looked in the window. Green was
holding the door and when he saw him, he allowed him to go into the store.
Once inside, English saw a "lady lying on the floor, all covered with blood” and
looked into the back room and the man was “curled up.” At this time, "he heard
someone go through the back door." Delate told him he was lying because you
35
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could not see the back room from the front of the store and that the doors were
fastened securely in the back of the store. He ordered English to be brought
back to his cell until he wanted to tell him the truth.37
The police narrative was complete, but with one problem: there is no
Chancey (Forrest) in the story. Was that because English did not know of his
brother-in-law’s arrest? There were now six men: Wilson, Cooper, Green,
Shorty, Forrest, and English. And, what about Green? In his earlier story,
English did not know who was driving the car. He changed it so Green was the
driver and the one holding the door and watching. The police found a Green in
Robbinsville, but did not arrest him. English insisted throughout that he was
outside when the crime occurred and then went inside, but this contradicts the
eyewitness account of a driver sitting waiting in the car and the three men
crossing the street. That allowed for four men involved, not the five that English
now indicated. Again, the police dismissed the evidence.
The investigation continued throughout the afternoon with a flurry of
activity. First, English returned to Delate’s office at 2:00 p.m. to be questioned
about Shorty. The description of Shorty was that “he carried one shoulder higher
than the other, hung around Palaschak’s saloon.” This information was passed
out to the patrolmen reporting for the evening shift. As other officers were
finishing their day stint, Patrolman Hartpence indicated that the individual was
James Thorpe, who had his right arm amputated on January 8, 1948, and was
released on the 19th of that month. Twenty-four-year-old Thorpe was born in
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North Carolina. His mother abandoned him at age three, and he had lived with
his grandparents since that time. In 1939, the family left the South and settled in
Trenton. He only went to the second grade because of ankyloglossia, a
condition that impacted his speech. As he was sitting in Palaschak’s saloon on
Saturday, February 7, an officer came in and asked him if he was Shorty. He
replied he was not. What about “Long John?” Again, no, was the response.
Thorpe pulled out his driver’s license and showed him the officer. “Come along,
anyway, the captain wants to see you.”38
Thorpe was the fifth man to be arrested within twenty four hours. Cooper
was brought back to Delate’s office for a second time that day, and yet again
confronted by English. Once more, he denied any involvement in the crime. He
was returned to his cell. Between 3:00 p.m. and 4:00 p.m., Detective Toft
suggested to Delate that Mrs. Horner be brought to the station to possibly identify
the men. She arrived shortly after that and was instructed to look through the
glass door of the detective bureau. While she peered through the opening in the
door, each of the men were brought out of their cells and told to look outside into
the street as Toft spoke to them. She was unable to positively identify them. It
was a problematic attempt at a police identification.39
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State of New Jersey, Defense Exhibit D-49—Medical Records of James Thorpe,
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Sunday, February 8, 1948
Delate arrived early to his office to continue the investigation. He had two
problems that day. All he had were the statements made by English that Cooper,
Wilson, and Shorty were in the car and that Cooper had hit the old woman. Each
of them denied any involvement. Also, where did Forrest fit into this story?
There were too many loose ends. Furthermore, Green still could not be found.
He sent for English, but the suspect did not provide anything substantially new in
any area. Cooper was brought into the captain’s office. Once again, he denied
any connection in the crime. Delate asked Cooper: since they had been good
friends, why would English have accused him of being in the store and of hitting
Mrs. Horner if he had not been there? Cooper thought for a minute. Then he
stood up, raised his hand above his head, and said that he would tell the truth.40
The “confessions’ are a serious problem because they are so
contradictory. The official narrative that emerged ultimately placed Forrest and
English in the backroom discussing a purchase of a mattress with Mr. Horner,
with Forrest as the one who struck him with a soda bottle wrapped in a sock.
Wilson and Cooper were in the front, with Mrs. Horner showing Wilson a stove. It
was Wilson who hit Mrs. Horner, as Thorpe was the lookout at the door and
MacKenzie was the lookout on the corner of Broad and Perry. The prosecutor
later claimed that these issues proved the police did not intimidate or coerce the
men into confessing. However, another interpretation for the serious differences
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was that when it came to recounting as to what part each individual played in the
crime, they were not able to do it, because they were not there.41
Cooper related how he called English early that morning to meet him
downtown and go with him to a loan office so that he could pay his room rent.
He told Delate, “I left my house in George English’s car.” After meeting, English
became the new driver. Why would Cooper have the car? At Broad and Perry
they picked up McKinley Forrest, James Thorpe, and Horace Wilson. They
parked in front of the Horner store. (Cigar salesman Frank Eldracher stated he
had parked in that location). They all exited the car, with Cooper as the last one,
and entered the store. Cooper claimed that Collis, Forrest, and Thorpe were
talking to the old man about a stove and Mrs. Horner about a mattress. As
English was talking to the old man, he gave Wilson “the wink,” the signal for the
assault to begin. Forrest and English went to the backroom. Meanwhile, Cooper
was behind Wilson as he spoke to the woman. In Cooper’s handwritten
statement, Mrs. Horner “bent over” and in the signed statement, “she turned
around” when she was struck. She too was hit with either a brick or a bottle
enclosed in a sock. Cooper stated that when Thorpe entered the store, he
walked down the aisle to the back room, came back out, and stood by the front
door. Mrs. Horner never claimed a one-armed man passed by her and went into
the back room. In fact, she never said anything about such a man.42
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State of New Jersey, Summation by Mr. Volpe, Volume 16, 5735a, (1948).

42 State of New Jersey, Ralph Cooper’s Statement. Cooper gave the police a
handwritten version as well as the typed signed statement on the night and early morning of
February 11, 1948. Both are found in Volume 16, the handwritten copy is found on pages 5924a
– 5925a and the signed typed statement is found on pages 5946a – 5954a (1948).
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Later, Miller testified that after Cooper “confessed, he appeared to me that
he had gotten a lot off his mind, right at that time.” From the police’s perspective
Cooper was guilty, and as they listened to his denials, they saw he was troubled
because he would not come clear. But once he confessed and told them what
they already knew, he appeared to be at peace. Cooper could have just been
relieved that the pressure placed on him for those forty-eight hours was now
over.43
What was more problematic in Cooper’s statement was the scene
immediately after Mrs. Horner was attacked. Cooper stated, “Then I walked out
of the store. I heard the man in the back room like sort of struggle. Chancy
Forrest had hit the man and then I went out and got in the car.” He claimed he
walked out of the store. Then, in the next breath, he was back in the story and
heard something in the back room. Did the police suggest to him that he had left
Forrest out of the statement as the one who had struck Mr. Horner? Also, he
mentioned socks being used over the bottles. Two bottles were found, with no
socks anywhere near them. Were the socks included because there were no
fingerprints on the bottles? The police had first thought that Mrs. Horner had
been attacked by brass knuckles.44
Yet Delate had the break he needed. He asked Cooper if he would
identify the men since he had only provided their nicknames. Picking up a
newspaper as though he was reading it, the signal was a nod as each man was
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brought into the office. At that time, Cooper learned their real names. Again the
“myth of psychological interrogation” was at work as the police took first English
and then Cooper’s version. Mrs. Horner never mentioned a one-armed man in
the store that day, nor did she say there were five men in the store as Cooper
maintained. How were they able to balance the account of five men against Mrs.
Horner’s three? Mrs. Horner possibly had a problem with the identification of the
men, since there is debate as to the reliability of eyewitness identification. But
can there be doubt as to whether she knew how many men came into the store
and attacked her? 45

Monday, February 9, 1948
Ralph Cooper refused to let the police accept English’s story and be the
fall guy, so he offered a new story that put Collis in the back room and himself
behind Wilson, who struck Mrs. Horner. Cooper’s version turned the tables on
English. He placed him in the backroom, where Mr. Horner had been attacked
from the beginning. Delate brought English to his office and confronted him with
this new development. English agreed he was there and quickly added that
Forrest was in the back room with him as well. Now the narrative of the positions
of the five men inside the store was complete. Additionally, English told Delate
that Forrest had hit Mr. Horner with a beer bottle. This contradicted Cooper’s
assertion it was a brick or a soda wrapped in a sock. The prosecution attempted
to argue in the trial that the weapons were two soda bottles purchased earlier

State of New Jersey, Andrew F. Delate Testimony, Volume 3, 1170a – 1190a, (1951);
Henry W. Miller Testimony, 691a – 693a (1948).
45
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that morning at a local restaurant. There was inconsistency in the testimony
about the weapon, but with the corroboration from English, the participants were
now set, and the official version was slightly changed to Wilson striking Mrs.
Horner while she was showing him a stove and Forrest attacking Mr. Horner as
he was showing them a mattress.46
Assistant Prosecutor Lawton wanted English to demonstrate how he took
the money out of Mr. Horner’s pocket. The prosecutor laid on the floor and
English complied and went in his front right-hand pocket and “showed” him how
he took the money. Lawton wanted to take English to the store and recreate the
crime. Delate, as well, wanted to take English to Klein’s to see if he could
confirm English’s story and completely take away the version of him being in the
jewelry store during the crime. As they were coming out of the store, Delate
asked English where the car was parked. He pointed further up and across the
street to a parking lot curb. That was different from what English had told
Lichtfuhs and Ammann. During the initial interrogation, English told them that the
car was parked across the street from Horner’s store in front of the Alp’s
Restaurant. But now English pointed to where Mrs. Barclay said the car was
parked that morning. This suggests that the police were attempting to connect all
the loose ends into one easy story.47

State of New Jersey, Andrew Delate Testimony, Volume 3, 1071 – 1073 (1951); Henry
W, Miller Testimony, Volume 2, 704, (1948).
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Once they returned to the station, Forrest was brought into the office and
confronted by both Cooper and English. He said, "I didn't kill anybody, I hit the
old man with the bottle." Following Forrest, James Thorpe was brought in and
initially denied the accusations. Thorpe was returning to his cell, Delate stepped
out of his office, and Thorpe told him, “Captain, those men in there are trying to
frame me.” A few minutes later, he returned to the office, and confessed he was
there as the watcher at the door.48
Wilson was the next to be confronted by Cooper. Wilson claimed he was
working on the farm during the crime. He asked Delate to call his employer.
Cooper asked Delate, “Ask him if has any twins?” Wilson replied, “Mercy, God
have mercy on my soul. I wouldn’t kill no white man. He then asked his
accuser, “Do you know what you are doing when you say that I was there?”
Cooper replied that he did. Surely this had to be a devastating moment for
Wilson since Cooper had come to his home asking for a job, slept his in home,
and brought all this trouble into his life. In spite of Cooper and others who
claimed and urged him to confess, he remained steadfast. 49

Tuesday, February 10, 1948
The investigation ended on this day. The narrative was almost complete.
Delate and the others finished taking the statements from the suspects. Thorpe
was the first to be brought in and his statement was typed out, but not signed.
48

State of New Jersey, Andrew Delate Testimony, Volume 3, 1071 – 1073 (1951).
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Next came Forrest, who had reached nervous exhaustion. Delate ordered him
to be seated and informed him he was going to take a statement from him.
Forrest replied, “Nobody was with me, blame it all on me, let the other boys go.”
He got up from his chair, saw children returning home from school, and began
sobbing, “My daughter is out there and I will never see her again.” He bolted for
the window, so quickly that Delate believed he was going to try to jump out of it.
His crying became more uncontrollable and Delate sent for the police surgeon.
Doctor William Moore examined him, but could not anything physically wrong
with him; he left a capsule to be administered if needed. Eventually, the police
had Forrest’s and Cooper’s statements. 50
As the afternoon continued, Prosecutor Volpe asked Naples to prepare for
the night marathon signing of the confessions by calling several doctors,
including a black physician, Dr. James M. Sullivan, and asking them to come to
the police station that evening. He wanted to be able to claim to the newspapers
and ultimately the court that the men had not been mistreated. Naples wanted
“reputable citizens” to witness the signed “confessions,” so he could avoid any
groundswell of popular opinion for the men. The strategy worked for Robert
Queen, attorney for some of the men in the first trial, who wrote later, “the
prosecutor himself invited a couple of prominent colored citizens to the First
Police Precinct to witness the signing of the confessions, thus no doubt existed in
the minds of reasonable men at that time that these men were guilty of the
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crimes.” The plan worked perfectly, for indeed no one came forward to assist
these poor, black, marginalized men during the first trial.51
Wilson was the last one to be brought in. Despite English’s and Cooper’s
insistence that he was there during the crime, Wilson kept denying it. He
pounded on the table and eventually signed a statement that he was not there.
There was one loose thread in the narrative: Spud Green. English stated that
Green was actually Jack MacKenzie, a 25-year-old who was born in Georgia and
was brought north with his uncle, McKinley Forrest, and moved in with the
English household. English told Delate he was the lookout at the corner of Perry
and Broad on the day of the crime. The Captain ordered his arrest.

The

narrative was now complete with six men. One wonders why MacKenzie would
have stayed at home after hearing of English’s and Forrest’s arrest. He certainly
did not act like a man who participated in such a serious crime.52
The doctors arrived at 11:00 p.m. Dr. Sullivan called a friend, “Scrappy”
Manning, and asked to him accompany him to the station. The signing of the
confessions commenced, each suspect either reading or having his statement
read to him, and finally signing it. Then Sullivan took it on himself to ask each
man if they had committed the offense. He asked how each was treated and
51 State of New Jersey, Frank A. Naples Testimony, Volume 10, 3930 (1951); Robert
Queen, “The NAACP in the Case of the ‘Trenton Six,” Papers of the NAACP, Selected Branch
Files, 1940 – 1945, Series B: The Northeast, reel 4, box C, National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People. Papers of the NAACP (microfilm). Frederick, MD: University
Publications of America, 1982, [hereafter cited as NAACP Papers]. Interestingly Naples utilized
this technique in another very high profile crime, the Duck Island case. This very public case was
discussed in the last chapter, in which a black suspect “confessed” after enduring third degree
techniques for a number of murders.
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whether they received enough food, cigarettes, and rest. Sullivan observed that
Thorpe was afraid. He asked if he was the watcher, and Thorpe replied no. The
doctor said, “Then you know you don't have to sign this, if you aren't guilty of it.”
Then English came into the room and someone asked English if Thorpe was
there and he said yes. Then Thorpe said, "Well, I'll sign it." Sullivan replied,
"Well, you don't have to sign this if you aren't guilty of it, because you'll get the
chair." Thorpe said, "Oh, I'll sign it. There's nothing else I can do, I'm afraid. I'll
get a few days and serve them out."53
Cooper looked "looked drowsy and lazy.” Sullivan asked him “if he had
been smoking reefers.” Forrest’s “whole body was shaking . . . He was shaking
so much that he could not remove his clothes.” Finally, each man was required
to strip and be examined by the doctors to verify that indeed they had not been
physically mistreated. This ordeal continued until approximately 2:00 a.m. This
late night group confession signing may have occurred because the police knew
they had violated the forty-eight hour rule and wanted to get the suspects to a
magistrate as quickly as possible.54
Thorpe, who shared the cell next to Forrest, stated that he kept shouting
“they were going to shoot me, they’re coming to get me.” He tore off his clothes
and shrieked all night as the weight of what had happened to him sunk in. He
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had just signed a confession admitting he was the one who struck Mr. Horner.
Now was facing the death penalty.55
Early in the morning, there was another knock on the door at 247 Church
Street. The police were there to arrest MacKenzie. He was arrested between
5:00 and 6:30 a.m. Two officers appeared at his house and asked if his name
was Jack Martin or Jack Kelly. He told them his name and showed them his
identification. Once again, it made no difference. They told him the Captain
wanted to speak to him and he, like the others, was taken to the police station,
not knowing the reason. When he arrived, he was placed in a cell. Delate had
English brought to his cell. The captain asked each if they knew each other.
Both replied they did. Then Delate asked English if he was the man. Again,
English said he was. Mackenzie asked English what he was talking about.
Delate told him he was now accused of being the man who was the lookout. And
just like that, English and Delate left, leaving Mackenzie to ponder what had just
happened to him. Shortly after 9:00 a.m., he and the others were arraigned for
capital murder on Wednesday, February 11.56
Five of the men were transferred to the Mercer County Jail that morning to
begin another long leg of their journey, while MacKenzie remained at the police
station. No statement had been procured from him. The next day, February 11,
while he was giving his statement that denied any involvement, he saw Mrs.
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Horner come into the station to talk to one of the detectives. Later that night, he
asked to see Delate. The captain arrived at the station around 9:00 p.m. and
MacKenzie informed him he wanted to change his statement. He had been
thinking all the day “what she [Mrs. Horner] was going to accuse me of?”

With

that he “confessed” he was the lookout on the corner. He gave a new statement,
read it, and signed it. Dr. Sullivan was again called with other doctors and other
witnesses to verify that he had not been mistreated while he was at the station.
The next day, he, too, was transferred to the County Jail. 57
As far as the Trenton Police were concerned, this case was closed. On
February 8, the Trenton Times first reported a break was near in the baffling
case. Quoting Volpe that “we’re on the trail,” he announced the arrest of four
suspects. On February 10, the Trenton Times published with banner headlines:
"Five Confess to Brutal Killing of Merchant" and a large picture of the five shellshocked men in court after being arraigned.

In this story only five of the six

were listed: Collis English, Ralph Cooper, James Thorpe, Horace Wilson, and
McKinley Forrest. The story was incorrect because Wilson did not sign a
confession. The newspaper reported on February 13 that MacKenzie
“confessed” that he was the lookout in the case. And finally, in an editorial
entitled, “Competent Police Work,” the newspaper praised the department for

57 State of New Jersey, Andrew F. Delate, Volume 3, 1107a (1951); on that same day,
Collis turned twenty-three. He would never leave a jail again alive.
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“police work of an exceptional character and the superior officers and patrolmen
who worked on this case are entitled to generous commendation.”58
But on May 7, 1948, just a few weeks before the opening of the Trenton
Six trial, Andrew Duch issued a directive to reshuffle the police department, citing
“some bungling in the Horner case.”59
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CHAPTER 3
“WHO ARE YOU GOING TO BELIEVE—THOSE PEOPLE OR THE POLICE?”:
RACE AND THE COURTROOM

Justice is often painted with bandaged eyes. She
is described in forensic eloquence, as utterly blind
to wealth or poverty, high or low, white or black, but
a mask of iron, however thick, could never blind
American justice, when a black man happens to be
on trial. . . . The reasonable doubt which is usually
interposed to save the life and liberty of a white man
charged with crime, seldom has any force or effect
when a colored man is accused of crime. 1
Frederick Douglass

The families of the six men during that fateful weekend had no idea what
was happening to their loved ones. Mrs. Emma English was at home when her
son was arrested and quite puzzled the next morning when she had neither
heard from him nor received any news about him. She asked McKinley Forrest
to take the car keys to her son at the police station and he, too, had not come
home either. Late that evening, Mrs. English called her daughter in New York
City, and said, “You’d better come down here, there’s something wrong. Collis
was arrested Friday and he hasn’t come home yet, and then this morning Mac
went down to see what happened to Collis and he hasn’t come back neither.”

Frederick Douglass, “The United States Cannot Remain Half-Slave and Half-Free,
Speech on the Occasion of the Twenty-First Anniversary of Emancipation in the District of
Columbia, delivered in the Congregational Church, Washington, D.C. (April 16, 1883),” in The Life
and Writings of Frederick Douglass, Reconstruction and After, Volume 4, Philip S. Foner (New
York: International Publishers, 1975), 357.
1
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Mitchell told her mother she would be there in the morning. Forrest’s brother,
Robert Forrest, of Newark, New Jersey was notified as well. 2
At noon, Sunday, February 8, Mitchell, along with Mr. and Mrs. Robert
Forrest, went to the police station. She asked the officer at the front desk if she
could see her brother, Collis English. There was no reply. The officer merely
looked at her and said nothing. So she asked to see her brother-in-law,
McKinley Forrest. She was told to come back at 2:00 p.m. when Acting Captain
Delate would be there to make that decision. The group returned at the
appointed time, along with Vera Strauss, John MacKenzie’s twenty-two year old
sister and niece of Forrest McKinley. Again, Mrs. Mitchell asked if she could see
English, with the same result as before. Then she tried another approach,
requesting to see McKinley so that she could get money from him for his child,
since he had left the house to buy food and never returned home. Of course,
she knew this was not the reason why he had left the house. But the ploy
worked. The officer left his station and asked Delate for permission for her to see
him. She was the only one of the group permitted to speak to Forrest. During
those three to four minutes allowed, she attempted to find out what was going on
with her brother and brother-in-law. Forrest’s reply, over and over again to her
questions, was that he had no idea what was happening to him, nor why English
was there. She returned to her mother with no explanation as to why the two

2 Reuben manuscript, 15; State of New Jersey, Bessie English Mitchell Testimony,
Volume 10, 3810a, (1948).
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men were in the city jail. Later that day, as she boarded the train home to New
York City, the uncertainty overwhelmed her, just as it had her mother.3
They would finally discover what was happening on Tuesday, when the
Trenton Times announced in big bold headlines, “Five Confess Brutal Killing of
Merchant.” Accompanying the article was a large picture of the five charged in
the crime. Mrs. Emma English realized in horror that two of the men in the
picture were her son and son-in-law. Once again, she called her daughter,
pleading, “Come down right away, Bessie, there’s trouble.” Once again, Mitchell
made arrangements to travel to Trenton and arrived several hours later. She
found the house crowded with neighbors, who had heard the news and had
come to offer support to her sobbing and totally dazed mother. The news was
absolutely unbelievable. How did a complaint about using his father’s car without
permission turn into a murder charge? And how did Mac fit into all this?4
Mitchell’s first impulse was to tell her mother, “Mama, you might as well
stop your crying right now. If our men had anything to do with this, they’ll have to
pay for it, that’s all.” But as she read the article again there were certain points in
the story that she found troubling. For example, the article indicated the first
break in the case occurred when her brother was stopped and arrested by the
police on Perry Street. She knew that was not true. And then some of the

3

State of New Jersey, Bessie English Mitchell Testimony, Volume 10, 3810a, (1948);
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neighbors told her that English, on the day of the crime, was helping his mother
with the weekly laundry. She decided to stay the night in Trenton.5
The shocks for the English household continued, for early the next
morning, on February 10, the police knocked on the door again and arrested
John MacKenzie. It was difficult to understand what was happening to the family.
All the men in the home had been arrested. Bessie began to worry about her
husband coming to Trenton to help her. Would he be taken as well? So she
called him and the other male members in the family, warning them to stay away.
Later in the day, she heard MacKenzie was also charged with murder.
Something bothered her. Why would a man who had been involved in a murder,
after knowing that two of his accomplices had been arrested, remain in the same
house for five days? She went to the public library and found the newspapers for
the past week. She read the descriptions given by the witnesses who described
the suspects as “light skinned.” English and Forrest were dark-skinned. She
remembered the article about her brother’s arrest and knew it differed from what
actually happened. With this information, she called Vera Strauss and they went
to the police station to speak with Captain Delate, believing that he would want to
know about these discrepancies. But it became very clear that was not the case.

Reuben manuscript, 17, 18; Trenton Evening Times, “Five Confess Brutal Killing of
Merchant,” February 10, 1948. The Times reported in that edition that Collis English was
arrested when “Patrolmen Lichtfuss and Ammann, together with Sergeant Creeden stopped a
motor vehicle violator on Perry Street.” This initial story persisted and became part of the public
narrative of this case. The Times never retracted this part of the story and continued to include in
its reporting. The story continued and is included in an important published article in another
national magazine that is widely circulated in Trenton, just weeks before the trial.
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He told them, “Those boys were well treated, they had plenty of food and
cigarettes. The police don’t have no more to do with that case.”6
On Friday, February 13, Robert Forrest returned to Trenton with his
Newark lawyer, Judge Harold Simandl, and Trenton attorney, Arthur Salvatore, to
visit his brother in the Mercer County Jail. They discovered that McKinley had
been transferred to a segregated cell because he had been making “considerably
unnecessary noise, accompanied with more or less unintelligible mutterings,”
which caused problems within the tier. The sight of Forrest shocked the group.
Robert testified that he saw his brother “barefooted. And he had vomit all over
him, like a pig. . . He looked to me like a man who going to the crazy house.”
As they brought him out of the cell, he looked dazed and was mumbling things
that no one in the group understood. Robert was shocked that his brother did not
recognize him until McKinley drew close to him and began to pat his face and his
body, as Judge Simandl repeatedly told him that it was his brother. One of the
attorneys offered him a cigarette, and McKinley Forrest took it, smelled it, and
threw it down. He said, “This cigarette got something in it. I don’t want it.”7
The defense later claimed that the police laced the cigarettes that they
gave to the men with drugs during the interrogation sessions. Forrest and others
would claim they put sodium amytal tablets in the cups of water in order to place
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them in more of a suggestive state and thereby gain admissions of guilt that
would not have happened under normal conditions.
On March 1, the six men were indicted on the grounds that they “willfully,
feloniously, and of their malice aforethought, did kill and murder” William Horner
on January 27, 1948. Meanwhile, Mrs. Bessie Mitchell spent the weeks
attempting to find competent legal representation for her brother. Her first
thought was to join with the other families and pool their meager funds to retain a
good defense lawyer. However, when she met with them, she realized this was
going to be an impossible feat, since many of them blamed Collis English for
implicating their loved ones in the first place. This view was best summarized by
Irving Lewis, attorney for Mr. George English, when he told Mrs. Mitchell, “That
Collis is no damn good, he’s guilty as hell. He’s as good as in the chair, there’s
nothing to do but pull the switch.” Lewis represented the father, and the
relationship between father and son was never good. But his comment indicated
a deeper, more serious problem for Mrs. Mitchell: the widespread acceptance of
the men’s guilt.8
It did not help the situation that the prosecutor had invited a black
physician, among others, to witness the signing of the statements. The result was
quite detrimental for the men, for as Robert Queen, the Chairman of the local
NAACP legal redress committee, acknowledged, “I had considerable opportunity

8

State of New Jersey, Indictment, Volume 1, 8a (1948); Reuben manuscript, 28; W.E.B.
DuBois echoed this type of indifference when he castigated the apparent classism and the
“attitude of the better class of Negroes . . . that the Negro who is arrested is guilty of crime and
deserving of no sympathy from his more fortunate fellows. ““Criminals,” Crisis, January, 1931.
Just one year later, he wrote that they have “joined with the bloodhounds in anathematizing every
Negro in jail.” He further added, “Nothing in the world is easier in the United States than to
accuse a black man of crime.” “Courts and Jails,” Crisis, April, 1932.
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to test the public reaction and I found no sympathy among whites or colored
citizens for the prisoners.” Even Mr. Robert Forrest believed that his brother
would have never been involved in this situation if it had not been for Collis
English.9
This reality confronted Mrs. Mitchell time and time again. She approached
the Trenton branch of the NAACP and spoke to Dr. Charles Broadus. She went
to Trenton’s black churches in a desperate attempt to find help. She received a
promise that they would pray for the indicted men, but little else. And far too
often, when she pushed too hard, Mrs. Mitchell heard, “these men wouldn’t be
down there if they weren’t guilty.” She was only able to collect twenty-five dollars
from her mother’s church. Her total funds, most of which came from her
husband’s military savings, were a mere $300. She tried the Veterans
Administration, believing that maybe her brother’s military benefits might include
legal counsel. Again and again, that search was unfruitful.10
Meanwhile, on March 5, the case was assigned to Judge Charles P.
Hutchinson of the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County. Hutchinson spent
his life in Trenton. He was born in 1887, graduated from Princeton University,
attended New York Law School, and was admitted to the bar in 1912.
Hutchinson served in France during World War I, was named as Assistant United
9

Robert Queen, “The NAACP in the Case of the ‘Trenton Six,” NAACP Papers, reel 4,

box C.
10 Mrs. Mitchell repeated said that Dr. Broadus listened politely and compassionately, but
in the end told her there was nothing he could do. This version was highly contested by the
Trenton branch of the NAACP. The role of Mrs. Mitchell and the debate will be discussed in
much more detail in Chapter 4; Reuben manuscript, 31.
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States Attorney and Special Assistant to the United States Attorney, and in 1927,
was elected County Clerk of Mercer County, serving three years. In 1945, he
was appointed as the Mercer County judge. Hutchinson also served as a
delegate to the state constitutional convention in 1947 that included an antidiscrimination provision which banned segregation in public schools, one of the
first states in the union to do so. He also served for a time as a director of the
Trenton Council of Human Relations, a committee devoted to promoting racial
tolerance and acceptance in the city. One Trenton Times reporter described
Hutchinson as a “patient man. He is sympathetic to the ills and shortcomings of
humans, but he can grow stern and severe when the occasion demands. His
court is always a model of dignity and decorum. He allows no personal
squabbling between counsel.”11
But more often than not, Hutchinson was a pro-prosecution judge.
Frequently, he gave the maximum penalty when sentencing defendants. He
became a polarizing figure, after the first trial. During the crime wave in 1948,
the Trenton Times reported, "Judge Charles P. Hutchison today in Mercer Court
cracked down in defendants charged with burglaries ... The sentences were
taken as an indication the court is ready to invoke severe penalties to curb the
wave of burglaries.” Once the trial began, it became apparent that the stern,
severe side of the judge was the norm.12

11 Trenton Evening Times, “Two Judges Needed in Mercer County To Relieve Burden on
its Lone Jurist,” August 22, 1948. Biographical information on Hutchinson from Trenton Evening
Times, “Former Mercer Judge Is Dead of Pneumonia,” December 15, 1957.

12

Trenton Evening Times, “Stiff Penalties Are Imposed On Burglars,” January 30, 1948.
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On March 16, 1948, the Trenton Times reported on two stories related to
the case. First, Hutchinson appointed four lawyers to defend the men after an
investigation revealed they were without funds to retain competent counsel.
Second, English’s father, George English also appeared in court and changed
his plea on the morals charge to guilty. He was being held in the same jail as his
son. A few weeks later he was sentenced by Hutchinson to three to five years.
More important, the article continued to misrepresent Collis English’s arrest by
repeating the earlier story that “While checking vehicles the Trenton police
spotted the English car, being driven by the son.” This story was an important
element in the evolution of the public narrative and solidified the eventual
perception of what supposedly happened.13
Hutchinson appointed Frank S. Katzenbach III to represent McKinley
Forrest and James S. Turp, James A. Waldon, and Robert Queen to represent
Ralph Cooper, Collis English, John MacKenzie, James Thorpe, and Horace
Wilson. Queen, a New Jersey prominent civil rights lawyer and activist, was the
oldest at 64. He was the only African American to serve on the defense team.14

Trenton Evening Times, “Murder Defendant’s Father Faces Court,” March 16, 1948;
Trenton Evening Times, “English Gets 3 to 5 Years,” April 13, 1948; Trenton Evening Times,
“Four Lawyers To Defend Six In Death Case,” March 16, 1948.
13

State of New Jersey, “Order Assigning Counsel for Defendant McKinley Forrest,
Volume 1, 16a – 17a, (1948); “Order Assigning Counsel for Defendants Ralph Cooper, Collis
English, John MacKenzie James H. Thorpe, and Horace Wilson,” Volume 1, 14a – 15a, (1948).
Katzenbach was from one of the prominent legal families in Mercer County. His father was a
New Jersey Supreme Court justice and his uncle was a trial lawyer as well. He graduated from
Princeton University and received his law degree from Harvard. Katzenbach was elected to the
New Jersey State Assembly and was the Democratic Chairman of Mercer County in 1936 – 1940.
He was appointed Mercer County Judge in 1940 and served until 1945, when upon his
retirement, he entered private practice. Trenton Evening Times, “Frank Katzenbach, Former
Judge Dies,” January 5, 1964; William Starr Myers, Editor, Prominent Families of New Jersey,
Volume 1 (Baltimore: Clearfield Publishing Company, 2000), 1223. His first cousin, Nicholas
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Queen was born in Washington, D.C. to an elite family. Following high
school graduation, he moved to Bloomfield, New Jersey, in 1902. He enrolled in
business school at night and in 1909 became a clerk and stenographer at Alfredo
B. Cosey’s Newark law firm. Cosey was active in one of the first national civil
rights organizations, the National Afro-American Council. Later he joined the
National Colored Democratic League that was organized to persuade other
African Americans to support the Democratic Party, rather than remain with the
Republican Party. In this role he was instrumental in rallying local blacks to
Woodrow Wilson’s candidacy when he became head of the New Jersey Negro
Democrats in 1912. Queen’s involvement with Cosey was an important step in
the evolution of his political activism, for Queen would “cut his political teeth”
while he was in Newark, ultimately becoming one of the strongest activists in
early twentieth century Trenton. Queen moved to Trenton in 1912, became the
first black attorney in that city, and quickly became active in the civil rights

Katzenbach was serving in the Kennedy Justice Department and was confronted by Governor
George Wallace in the doorway as he attempted to block the first black students seeking
admission at the University of Alabama in June, 1963. Later he became Attorney General of the
United States in the Johnson Administration and was instrumental in drafting of the Voting Rights
Act in 1965. Turp received his law degree from George Washington University in 1920, served
during World War I, returned home, served briefly as mayor of the neighboring Highstown, and
was eventually appointed as Judge of the Court of Common Pleas and served form 1935 – 1940.
Later, he severed as a U.S. District Attorney before beginning his own law practice. He became
the leader of the defense team of the five men. Waldron, the youngest of the team received his
law degree from Temple University, worked in the FBI for a short time, served in Wand World
War II, and began practicing law upon his return. Trenton Evening Times, “James S. Turp, 86,
Former Judge, Mayor,” July 31, 1980; William Starr Myers, Editor, Prominent Families of New
Jersey, Volume 1 (Baltimore: Clearfield Publishing Company, 2000), 353 – 354; Trenton Evening
Times, “James A. Waldron, Partner in Historic Trenton Law Firm,” February 5, 1995.
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struggle. On February 2, 1913, he helped organized the Trenton chapter of the
NAACP and was elected treasurer.15
Queen also felt the sting of discrimination. Only a few months after his
arrival in Trenton, he was ejected from the theater for attempting to sit on the first
floor. In 1932, he successfully argued that the practice of limiting the number of
days that African-Americans could use the high school swimming pool was
discriminatory. The New Jersey State Supreme Court struck down the rule and
ordered the pool integrated. In 1943, he filed suit against the Board of Education
for requiring students to attend segregated schools in Trenton. Again, the State
Supreme Court ruled that public boards of education could not segregate based
on color. The Hedgepeth and Williams v. Board of Education, Trenton, N. J.,

15 J. Clay Smith, Emancipation: The Making of the Black Lawyer 1844 – 1944
(Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995), 151; Afro-American, “Robert Queen,
Noted Attorney is Buried,” September 10, 1960; Trenton Evening Times, Obituary. “Noted Negro
Lawyer Dies,” September 1, 1960; Trenton Evening Times, “Negroes Organize For
Advancement, February 3, 1913. See Alfredo B. Cosey’s, The Negro From A to Z (Washington,
D.C.: Pendleton Press, 1897). Its purpose was to “advance the race” or to discount the
commonly held view of Black inferiority by demonstrating the long and productive history of
African Americans in United States history. In 1914, he wrote one of the first legal books of its
kind published by an African American lawyer, American and English Law of Title of Record,
1535 – 1911; See Benjamin R. Justesen’s, Broken Brotherhood: The Rise and Fall of the
National Afro-American Council (Carbondale, Illinois, 2008); Emma Lou Thornbough, “National
Afro-American League: 1887 – 1908,” Journal of Southern History, 27, no 4, (Nov., 1861);
Benjamin R, Justesen, In His Own Words: The Writings, Speech, and Letters of George Henry
White (Lincoln, Nebraska: iUniverse, Inc., 2004), 91; Advertisement by the National Colored
Democratic League in The Crisis, “Subject: Make Friends of Their Enemies,” October, 1912, p.
184. On the shift from the Republican Party to the Democratic Party in 1912, see Cleveland M
Green, “Prejudices and Empty Promises: Woodrow Wilson’s Betrayal of the Negro 1910 – 1919,”
The Crisis, November, 1980; John Milton Cooper, Jr., Editor, Reconsidering Woodrow Wilson:
Progressivism, Internationalism, War and Peace, “Race and Nation in the Thoughts and Politics
of Woodrow Wilson” by Gary Gerstle (Washington, D.C., 2008).
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was one of the cases later cited in the Supreme Court’s 1954 decision in Brown v
Board of Education.16
Trenton historian Jack Washington argued that Queen "championed the
quest for civil rights in Trenton and, indeed, was the guiding legal mind behind
the strategy." In 1944, he was one of the defense counsels for Clarence Hill,
accused in the “Duck Island” murders. The prosecution sought the death
penalty. However, the jury recommended mercy and gave him life imprisonment
instead. Queen was seen as wining a moral victory, since Hill’s life was saved.
In 1948, Queen was serving as the Legal Redress Committee of the Trenton
Branch of the NAACP, as well as maintaining a very active legal practice, when
he was appointed to the defense team.17
Mercer County Prosecutor Mario H. Volpe led the prosecution. The
prosecution team also included Assistant Prosecutor Frank H. Lawton and Legal
Assistant to the Prosecutor Arthur S Lane. Volpe graduated from Rutgers
University’s New Jersey Law School in 1935. He served in the New Jersey
Assembly from 1938 until 1940, and he served with great distinction in World
War II as an officer in the Office of Strategic Services (O.S.S.). He was given the
Jack Washington, The Quest for Equality-- Trenton's Black Community: 1890 – 1965
(Trenton: Africa World Press, Inc., 1993) 102. Background on Queen’s ejection from the theater
can be found in Trenton Evening Times, “Negroes Cause of Theatre Turmoil,” November 2, 1912.
16

17

In 1943, Hill was drafted into the United States Army and suspicion fell upon him. The
Army brought him to Fort Dix, New Jersey where he was held for thirty days in a situation which
has been labelled as near torture. He was “stand naked day and night under a light bulb.
Periodically, an MP showed up to punch him in the head and ribs. All his suffering would go
away, he was told, if he confessed to the Duck Island killings . . . He gave up, “I did those
murders,” he sighed.” Jon Blackwell, Notorious New Jersey: 100 True Tales of Murders and
Mobsters, Scandals, and Scoundrels (New Brunswick: N.J., University of Rugters Press, 2008),
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Bronze Star and Croix de Guerre with palm by France for his role in the southern
invasion of France. But the ambitious Volpe found time to think about political life
back home, for he was well aware that many of his letters were being published
to the voters back home in the Trenton Times. The link with the newspaper was
strong, since Volpe had won the Trenton Times Scholar Award in his senior year.
While stationed in North Africa, and waiting for the impending invasion of Europe,
Volpe wrote, “I trust that those in power at home will be prepared to propose
plans for a future world . . . We have a right to demand it because the sacrifices
have been great and will continue so to be.” Clearly he was thinking of the postwar world and the possibility of himself as one of those in power in the future. In
1945, while Volpe was visiting Rome, he was granted a fifteen minute private
audience with Pope Pius XII. The Trenton Times printed Volpe’s letter detailing
the event. While he was waiting to be ushered in, he met the legendary war
correspondent, Lowell Thomas.18
Volpe’s heroism and political savvy were an advantage for him, for while
he was still on active duty in Europe, he was appointed District Court Judge in
Trenton. Following his discharge a few months later, he was sworn in, replacing
Democrat George Pellettieri. His star continued in rise in Republican politics. In
1947, he was appointed prosecutor of Mercer County by Governor Alfred E.

Trenton Evening Times, “Plenty of Fight Left in Enemy, Volpe Says,” January 31, 1944.
Background for Mario H. Volpe was from William Starr Myers, Editor, Prominent Families of New
Jersey, Volume 1 (Baltimore: Clearfield Publishing Company, 2000), pp. 587; Trenton Evening
Times, “Jobs’ Switch Seen Factor in Judgeship,” October 11, 1945; Trenton Evening Times,
“Volpe May Be Confirmed As Judge on December 5,” September 25, 1946; Donald P. Delany,
Obituary, “City Lawyer Volpe Dies of Heart Attack,” Trenton Evening Times, March 7, 1975;
Trenton Evening Times, “Talks with Pope,” May 27, 1945.
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Driscoll. It was whispered that he had his sights on the governor’s mansion. He
was a war hero, a tough law-and-order prosecutor in a time of rising crime rates,
and a man who maintained his civic responsibilities. He joined the Trenton
Committee for Unity in 1946, became a member of the Executive Committee,
and in 1947 was named of the Chairman of the Membership Drive. 19
One potential problem for Volpe was with the black community’s
perception of him. On December 17, 1945, Leslie A. Hayling and Samuel M.
Dorsey, two black servicemen, entered the Lenox Restaurant and were refused
service. The men retained Robert Queen to institute suit against the
establishment. The case was eventually heard before Judge Volpe, who ruled
that there was no discrimination. Queen accused Volpe of wiggling around the
law. This decision was the beginning of the antagonism between the black
community and Volpe.20
There was also a perception that Volpe was delaying in prosecuting the
murder of a black nineteen-year-old army veteran, Harvey Hoagland, by a white
man, James Roberts, in neighboring Princeton, New Jersey on June 10, 1947.

Trenton Evening Times, “Volpe Boomed to Take Office as Prosecutor,” December 6,
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This delay brought about a reaction from the Princeton branch of the NAACP and
the Princeton chapter of the American Veterans Committee (AVC). A petition,
signed by 1300 Princeton residents, requested a speedy and impartial trial. After
Roberts was eventually indicted for murder, at the beginning of the trial, Volpe
had urged the Court to accept a lesser charge of manslaughter, arguing that the
“State had no specific evidence to sustain a charge that Roberts directed his fire
at Hoagland.” This statement flew in the face of the report by Donald H. Riddle,
which stated that Hoagland was killed in cold blood. Thus, the black community
had reservations about Volpe when the Horner murder trial commenced.21
A bigger problem for Prosecutor Volpe was that he lost his first big case
just a few months before the opening of the Horner Case. He had managed to
indict Trenton’s mayor, Donal Connolly, for accepting bribes when he was the
secretary of the State Beauty Culture Board. Volpe possibly may have
overreached in the case. He was attempting to convict a very popular young
mayor who had the wherewithal to secure excellent representation; Volpe only
had a weak government witness. It was a recipe for disaster. When the smoke
had cleared, it was not good for the young prosecutor. The jury took only three
hours and ten minutes to reach their verdict on the mayor and the other
defendants. The initial vote was 10 – 2 for acquittal on the first vote. The two
lone dissenters were not holding out for a conviction, but merely wanted further

21 Trenton Evening Times, “Prison Term is Imposed in Picnic Slaying,” October 21, 1947.
Details of the case can be found in Trenton Evening Times articles: Trenton Evening Times,
“Shotgun Slaying Climaxes Picnic At Carnegie Lake,” June 10, 1947; Trenton Evening Times,
“Speedy Trial Demanded in Picnic Killing,” July 10, 1947 and Roberts indictment for murder,
Trenton Evening Times, “Two Indicted in Gambling Inquiry Here: Murder Charges Also in Mercer
Grand Jury Report,” July 15, 1947.
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clarification on the law before they decided the mayor’s fate. The news
contributed to the belief that Volpe overreached and never should have
attempted the prosecution. The damage to his reputation had been done. The
upcoming Horner Case offered an occasion to turn his fortunes around.22
As the Horner murder trial grew near, Volpe’s case was in a relatively
good position for a number of reasons. His office possessed greater financial
resources and had at his disposal more manpower than a normal defense team.
Additionally, as prosecutor he was the one to decide the nature of the charges
and which of the suspects would be charged. As Supreme Court Justice Robert
Jackson stated, any prosecutor “has more control over life, liberty, and reputation
than any other person in America.” Volpe was often viewed as the “good guy,”
as he represented the state against the accused murderers. And he was going
into the trial with five of the six men’s statements that implicated them in the
crime. But at the same time, Volpe, as with other prosecutors, operated in a
seemingly contradictory world. The Supreme Court established the ground rules
for prosecutors in 1935. Since they were a representative of the state, they were
to operate within certain parameters. Prosecutors were to prosecute with
“earnestness and vigor.” Although they should “strike hard blows,” they were
“not at liberty to strike foul ones.” In other words, the court that “justice shall be
done.”23
Trenton Evening Times, “Mayor of Trenton, 2 Others Indicted,” November 24, 1947;
Trenton Evening Times, Mayor Connolly to Resume City Hall Duties; Friends Cheer Acquittal,”
April 11, 1948; Trentonian, “Acquit Connolly, Gift By Jury,” April 10, 1948.
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The challenge for Volpe was how to be both an advocate and a manager
at the same time. Where was the middle ground between these two
contradicting ideas? How was one supposed to interpret a rather abstruse
concept of seeking justice? Prominent early twentieth century defense attorney
Clarence Darrow commented “in reality, there is no such thing as justice, either in
or out of court.” But he added even if we were able to define justice, ultimately,
“the lawyer's idea of justice is a verdict for his client, and really this is the sole
end for which he aims.” This would undoubtedly be applicable for the prosecutor
as well. And possibly more importantly than those questions was the political
reality that the prosecutor had to win, especially the high profile cases such as
the Horner murder. And successful prosecution meant more political
opportunities for ambitious prosecutors such as Volpe.24
The defense team confronted other issues as it prepared for trial. In a city
beset with a crime wave as Trenton, the attorneys may very well have borne the
blunt of resentment by some jurors. Albert W. Alschuler has commented that as
the defense lawyer “suffers from association with his client, a prosecutor usually
benefits from his association.” To a juror, the prosecutor often seemed the one
most responsible for holding back the criminal tidal wave and the defense lawyer
General, and Supreme Court Justice; U.S. Supreme Court, Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78
(1935), Argued March 7, 1935, Decided April 15, 1935, 295.
Clarence Darrow, “Attorney for the Defense” Esquire Magazine, May 1936, p. 37. For
an examination and questions dealing with the role of prosecutors, see Abbe Smith, “Can You Be
a Good Person and a Good Prosecutor?” Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 355, no. 14 (20002001); Bruce A. Green, “Prosecuting Means More Than Locking Up Bad Guys,” Litigation 32, no.
1 (2005-2006); Bruce A. Green, “Why Should Prosecutors Seek Justice?” Fordham Urban Law
Journal, 26 (1999).
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was responsible of getting criminals off on some legal technicality. As one
defense attorney noted, “it is sometimes hard for the public to distinguish
defenders from the ‘scum’ we represent. We are often seen as our clients'
accomplices' or, at best, their apologists.”25
On March 29, the six men appeared before Judge Hutchinson and were
formally arraigned. They entered pleas of not guilty. The judge set the trial to
begin on May 17, though it was postponed until June 7.26

Race And The Criminal Justice System
Racism is like being in the Mississippi river;
if you are not actively struggling against the
current, you are drifting along with it.27

The six defendants faced the grim reality of joining the growing number of
blacks who were being convicted and incarcerated in New Jersey. The Garden
State was all too similar to other states in sentencing larger number of blacks to
prison. In 1940, New Jersey had a black population of 226,973, composing
about 5 percent of the state’s total population of 4,160,165. Blacks represented

Abbe Smith, “Can You Be a Good Person and a Good Prosecutor?” Georgetown
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approximately one of every two inmates jailed in New Jersey. In 1947, 40,601
persons were admitted to state prisons across the nation. 68 percent of that
number were white and 31 percent were black. During that decade, the black
population in the United States constituted approximately 11 percent of the total
population. In 1946, New Jersey admitted a total of 1,354 sentenced prisoners to
the state and federal prisons. Out of the number, 825 were white and 529 were
black. In the 1940s, New Jersey executed 14 men. Out of that number 6 were
white and 8 were nonwhite.28
W.E.B. DuBois commented in The Souls of Black Folks on the seeming
double-standard of the justice system in the North and South when the “double
system of justice which erred on the white side by undue leniency and the
practical immunity of red-handed criminals and erred on the black side by undue
severity injustice and lack of discrimination.” More recently George Kendall
argued “race and the administration of the death penalty have been like peas in a

28 New Jersey 1940 population is from Division of Labor Market and Demographic
Research, New Jersey Population Trends 1790 to 2000 (Trenton, NJ: New Jersey State Data
Center, August 2001), Table 1, p. 11; Patrick A. Langan, Ph.D., Race of Prisoners Admitted to
State and Federal Institutions, 1926-1986, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office
of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, May 1991), Table 7, p. 35; The report
commented on the trend of black incarnation as the number of black prisoners in “1986 was
nearly 9 times larger than the number recorded in 1926 (80,814 in 1986 versus 9,292 in 1926).
The recorded number of white prisoners was 3 times larger (100,874 in 1986 versus 33,626 in
1926). . . The black population accounted for 23% of recorded state prison admissions in 1926
and 46% in 1986 . . . In 1926 an estimated 45% of all persons admitted to State prisons in the
South were black, compared to 18% in the North Central, 14% in the Northeast, and 5% in the
West. By 1986 the situation had changed: Blacks were an estimated 51% of all admissions to
State prisons in the South. Blacks accounted for 56% of the admissions in the Northeast and 43%
of the admissions in the North Central.” p. 6 -8; The 1940 census date is from Giles R. Wright,
Afro-Americans in New Jersey: A Short History (Trenton, NJ: New Jersey Historical Commission,
Department of State, 1988), p. 70; New Jersey 1940 execution date from Margaret Werner
Cahalan with the assistance of Lee Anne Parson, Historical Corrections Statistics in the United
States, 1850- 1984, U.S. Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics (Rockville, MD:
Westat, Inc., December 1986), Appendix B, 220.
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pod . . . Racial discrimination continues to play a very large role in determining
who is charged with a capital offense and who ultimately receives that
sentence.”29
There had been a great deal of pre-trial publicity associated with the
Horner case. The local newspapers had published frequent stories of the crime
and manhunt. After the arrest of the men, it devoted large sections to retelling
the police narrative of the crime. A few weeks before the trial a pulp magazine,
Official Detective, published an article, “One Mustache from the Chair,” that
comprised over six full pages. It contained large pictures of the individuals
associated with the case and an extremely detailed account of the arrest and
subsequent accounts that led to the statements. There were reports that Trenton
police officer Henry W. Miller, who was present throughout the interrogations and
typed the statements from the men, supplied many key elements of the story that
had not been released to the public. The result was that when the magazine hit
the streets of Trenton a few weeks before the opening of the trial, it “tended to
solidly public opinion as to the guilt” of the six men.30

29 W.E.B. DuBois, The Souls of Black Folks (Rockville, MD: Arc Manor Publishing, 2008),
p. 74; George Kendall, “Racism and Capital Punishment,” in Racializing Justice, Disenfranchising
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and Keesha Middlemass (New York: Palgrave MacMillian, 2007), p. 54, 55.

30 Chester Apy, Jr., The Trenton Six (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University, 1954), p. 82.
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Race And Jury Selection
The longest trial in Mercer County's history began on Monday, June 7,
1948. Jury selection was expected to take only a few days, but instead lasted
six days. The defense strategy in voir dire centered around two key points: the
potential juror’s racial views and the possibility of an innocent person being
coerced into providing a false confession. These were not simple tasks. The
court had originally selected a pool of forty-eight prospective jurors and was
quickly exhausted. A panel of 100 prospective jurors was brought in and only six
jurors were selected from that group. The court called another 100 to be
examined. Before the fourteen-member jury could be seated, 251 prospective
jurors had to be examined or excused, making this an "all-time high in the history
of Mercer County." The pools were quickly depleted due to the state and
defense challenges, as well as the prospective jurors themselves seeking to be
excused because of medical or financial hardships or their opposition to the
death penalty, since this was a capital case. So many prospective jurors sought
to be excused because of medical problems that Judge Hutchinson quipped, "I
never realized until this trial began what an unhealthy community that one is." It
was clear that there was hesitation to serve on this trial due to sequestration and
the projected trial length of five to six weeks. In fact, the trial lasted nine weeks.31
Volpe possessed several key advantages in ensuring that an all-white jury
would be impaneled. First, whites dominated Trenton demographically. As a
31 Trenton Evening Times, “14th Horner Case Juror Is Sought,” June 15, 1948; Trenton
Evening Times, “11th Seated on Murder Jury Here,” June 14, 1948; State of New Jersey, Ibid.,
“Examination of Jurors on their Voir Dire, Volume 1, 57a, (1948).
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result the number of whites emerging from potential strikes from the defense
would be high. Second, blacks were underrepresented on the jury list that was
created from Mercer County’s voter registration rolls, which guaranteed that few
blacks would be available to serve. There were fifteen blacks who were on the
overall jury panel. Lastly, Volpe’s intention in seeking the death penalty
dramatically reduced the number of whites and the few blacks that potentially
would have made into the jury pool (venires). It was difficult to select a “death
qualified” jury since many potential jurors were against the death penalty.
Therefore, if any blacks made it to their voir dire, Volpe utilized peremptory
challenges to exclude them from juries. Such challenges “became the technique
of choice for removing racial minorities” who possibly made it to the jury pool.
Thus by “both circumstance and design, jury venires across the United States
[were] overwhelmingly white and middle-class.”32
The deliberate use of peremptory challenges was not the only visible signs
of institutional racism evidenced throughout the trial. The eminent jurist, A. Leon
Higginbotham, Jr. reminds us of the problem when a black citizen enters the
judicial system:
Courts do not dispense justice in sterile isolation, unaffected by
32 Reuben Papers, “William A. Reuben to William L. Patterson,” August 17, 1949, box 1,
folder, Communities; There are legal devices to exclude a person from a jury. The first is “Strike
for Cause” in which an attorney discovers some type of bias or connection to the case and seeks
for the judge to dismiss the person based on “cause.” The other is the peremptory challenges in
which attorneys exclude potential jurors without a justification or cause. Tanya E. Coke, “Lady
Justice May Be Blind, But Is She A Soul Sister? Race-Neutrality and the Ideal of Representative
Juries,” New York University Law Review 69, issue 2 (May 1994): 334, 345. For a historical
examination of the preemptory challenges see Randall Kennedy, Race, Crime, and the Law (New
York: Vintage Publishing, 1998); Frederick L. Brown, Frank T. McGuire, and Mary S. Winters,
“The Peremptory Challenge as a Manipulative Device in Criminal Trials: Traditional Use or
Abuse,” New England Law Review 14, no. 2, May 1994). The Supreme Court would not begin to
address the concern of legal scholars over these type of challenges until the 1960s,
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the prevailing political, social, and moral attitudes and currents of
the broader society in which they operate. Judges, prosecutors,
and other lawyers are not immune to the unconscious influence
of—indeed they may even consciously subscribe to—the group
of negative stigmatizing assumptions.
This tendency is applicable to jurors, as well. They are often “exposed to racelinked thinking about violent crime, especially from the popular media where the
black criminal is often cast as an incorrigible and dangerous predator.” Certainly
the newspapers and their emotional charged editorials only heightened and
added to these suppositions based on race. There is ample literature
demonstrating the connection between the stereotype of blackness and
criminality. As such, white jurors might very well “carry into the jury box and the
jury room this cultural baggage of the dangerous black male predator and the
need for punitiveness.”33
But at the same, Mark Peffley and Jon Hurwitz argue white jurors
potentially are “increasingly likely to incorporate distributive justice evaluations in
their overall beliefs of the criminal justice system.” In order words, white jurors
would not generally connect in their minds the disproportionate black
incarceration rate. They would see “no evidence of procedural injustice,” but
instead view blacks as more apt to commit crimes, be more violent, and be less
respectful of authority. These collective experiences of ideas, attitudes, and
perceptions about “the other” allowed white Americans to ascribe meaning to

33

A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Shades of Freedom: Racial Politics and Presumptions of
the American Legal Process (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 130. Higginbotham
was born on February 25, 1928 in Georgia and a native of Georgia served as a United States
District Judge and later appointed to the Court of Appeals; William. Bowers, Benjamin D. Steiner,
and Maria Sandys, “Death Sentencing in Black and White: An Empirical Analysis of the role of
Jurors’ Race and Jury Racial Composition,” Journal of Constitutional Law (Volume 3, Number 1,
February, 2001), p. 179, 180.
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these perceived differences without consciously realizing their attitudes were
racist.34
Jim Crow in 1948 was still very much the rule rather the exception.
Studies have demonstrated that a child does not have to be told that blacks are
inferior; they merely learn the behavior by watching the actions of others.
Trenton was segregated. Many whites thought of blacks as living in overcrowded slums who were able to shop in downtown stores, but unable to get a
job at the same store.35
To whites, blackness represented second class citizenship, inferiority, and
separation. As Dale Broefer commented:
One cannot expect miracles of tolerance and impartiality in a jury
trial when the window of the restaurant next door bears a sign
saying ‘We reserve the right to refuse service to anyone.’ None
of us is able to cast off completely the deeply ingrained prejudices
of a lifetime for even a short while. Taking an oath to do so can
at best help only insignificantly. Racial intolerance is not so easily
put to one side.
Thus, as the white jury took their oath, there was little awareness on their part of
these direct and indirect symbols of racism that unconsciously confirmed their
perception of blackness and indirectly contributed to their unconscious racism.
Yet Volpe, like other prosecutors, sought to take advantage of this cultural
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Mark Peffley and Jon Hurwitz, Justice in America: The Separate Realities of Blacks
and Whites (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 76.
See Charles R. Lawrence III, “The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism,” Stanford Law Review 39, no. 2 (January 1987), for an excellent analysis of
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phenomenon. He pressed his arguments or posed questions to reinforce
negative stereotypes and feelings throughout the trial.36
Through the use of peremptory challenges, Volpe was able to select an
all-white, middle class jury, composed of eleven women and three men. A
majority were elderly. They were sworn in on June 15, 1948. Most if not all of
the jury members never interacted with blacks since Trenton had been
segregated through much of their lives. Schools, churches, and recreational
activities were defined by Jim Crow. The only knowledge most of them had of
blacks was through movie stereotypes and the press.

The jury foreman, Robert

Burroughs, Jr., commented after the trial that the jury composition “was really a
cross section of Trenton.” How was it possible for him to believe it was a cross
section when no blacks or minorities were on the jury? Blacks represented 10
percent of the population. The statement mirrors the world view many whites
maintained that blacks were not part of their world and thus were not considered.
The prospect of all white, elderly middle class jury did cause fear in the black

Dale W. Broeder, “The Negro in Court,” Duke Law Journal 14, no. 1, (1965): 21;
Charles R. Lawrence III, “The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism,” Stanford Law Review 39, no. 2, (January 1987): 322. For a helpful summary of the
research concerning blacks and the courtroom, see Sheri Lynn Johnson, “Black Innocence and
the White Jury,” Michigan Law Review, 83, no. 7 (Jun., 1985),; Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Paul G.
Davies, Valerie J. Purdie-Vaughns, and Sheri Lynn Johnson, Looking Deathworthy: Perceived
Stereotypicality of Black Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing Outcomes,” Cornell Law
School, Cornell Law School research paper No. 06-012, published in Psychological Science, 17,
no. 5 (2006); Paul Finkelman, “The Crime of Color,” Tulane Law Review, 67 (1992-1993);
Andrew C. Helman, “Racism, Juries, and Justice: Addressing Post-Verdict Juror Testimony of
Racial Prejudice during Deliberations,” Maine Law Review, 62, no. 1 (2010). For an excellent
article on prosecutors and “tunnel vision,” see Susan Bandes, “Loyalty to One's Convictions: The
Prosecutor and Tunnel Vision,” Howard Law Journal, 49 (2005 – 2006).
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defendants. As Jack MacKenzie told Bill Rueben, “I knew we were cooked when
I seen that jury.”37

The Trial Begins: June 15, 1948
The state’s case hinged on the admissibility of the statements, since the
supposed murder weapon had only non-identifiable smudge marks on it. The
identification of the defendants by Mrs. Horner was problematic at best. After her
release from the hospital when she was brought to the police station, the police
did not use a standard 'line-up' for identification. Mrs. Horner was behind a “oneway” glass as each one was individually brought up to the glass. Yet she was
still unable to positively identify any of the men. Before the trial, Volpe's staff
sent her photographs of the defendants. Only then was she able to identify
them.
The defense strategy had two important objectives. The first was to
challenge the admissibility of the confessions on the grounds that they were
obtained by coercion and promises of light sentences. The second was to prove
the men’s innocence with alibi witnesses that either saw or had contact with the
defendants that day.
On June 15, 1948, Volpe gave his opening statement. He warned the jury
that they would hear evidence about “one of the most vicious, brutal murders
ever committed in this County.” The prosecutor then provided a brief review of
the facts in the case, confidently proclaiming “We will prove” as he reiterated the
37 William A. Reuben Papers, “Outline For Chapter on Jury,” The Jury,” box 1, Rueben
suggested one way to visualize the women on the jury was to look at Grant Wood’s, “Daughters
of the Revolution” painting. He wrote, “You don’t need to know much more than that; they would
frighten you just to look at them.”
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basic facts of the State’s narrative. He claimed that the motive for the robbery
was based on the knowledge that Horner carried large amounts of money with
him. In fact, Volpe loudly stated, “We will further prove to you . . .[they] met at
local tavern [the day before] for the purpose of making plans to commit this
robbery,” but they eventually called it off when they noticed a police officer at the
corner directing traffic. As Volpe recounted the state's version of events from
January 27th, he moved toward the defense table and dramatically pointed to
each defendant as he told how Cooper picked up English, Wilson, Thorpe,
MacKenzie, and Forrest in English’s father’s car.

In the car, they “talked over

the crime while proceeding around the town for about a half hour to an hour.”38
Then Volpe said, John MacKenzie got out of the car and went to the
corner to be a lookout. Forrest and English were into the backroom with Mr.
Horner, while Cooper, Wilson, and Thorpe were in the front with Mrs. Horner.
Then, surprisingly, Volpe backtracked in the story. He told the jury where the
state contended the murder weapon came from--the New Life Restaurant. The
state’s theory was that two bottles of Step-Up soda, enclosed in socks, were the
weapons. Resuming the story, Volpe said that Wilson hit Mrs. Horner in the
head with the bottle, while Forrest hit Mr. Horner. With Mr. Horner unconscious,
English went through his pockets and "grabbed a handful of bills."39

State of New Jersey, State’s Opening, Volume 1, 82a – 85a (1948); “Volpe to Seek
Death Penalty,” The Trentonian, June 16, 1948. Again, contradictions in the State’s case for why
would they drive around the city talking about the crime, when they supposedly had done that the
day before?
38
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Another problem with the narrative. On the day of the crime, John MacKenzie, as the
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Patrolman Fred Sigafoos was at the corner directing traffic away from the corner so snow crews
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Volpe told the jury that the arrest of the defendants was "by a stroke of
luck and by the excellent work of the Police Department." Once they were
arrested, he charged they willingly implicated themselves in the crime, placed the
others at the scene of the crime, and voluntarily signed statements attesting to it,
with the exception for Wilson, who was implicated by the five. Furthermore,
Volpe thundered, "We will prove to you that no group of men charged with crime
have got as good treatment as they men received while they were in the custody
of the police." In an attempt to prepare the jury for the weakness in Mrs. Horner’s
identification, he advised them it was going to be “very difficult, even in the
daytime, to see or discern faces” due to the furniture piled so high and the very
poor lighting in the store. Concluding his statement, Volpe demanded the death
penalty for each one of them.40
Attorney Frank Katzenbach, representing McKinley Forrest, began by
telling the jury that on the morning of the crime, Forrest was at work and was
asked by his employer to go the bank and make a Christmas Club payment.
Katzenbach insisted that when Forrest signed his confession with a mark, "that it
is the work of a man that didn't know what he was doing, what he was implicated

could clean the street. But the State never answered why the defendants postponed the robbery
on the 26th and then the next day, procedure with it on the very reasons why they delayed it in
the first place. Initially, the police claimed it was brass knuckles. Once the narrative was
developed, the weapon were two Step-Up bottles, wrapped in socks. Two bottles were found,
one broken with a few hairs attached to it and in the backroom where Horner was found, one
intact bottle. But no socks were ever found. Was the explanation for the socks a way to explain
the lack of fingerprints on the bottles? That is what the defense will content. State of New Jersey,
State’s Opening, Volume 1, 88a (1948).
40 State of New Jersey, State’s Opening, Volume 1, 89a (1948); “Volpe to Seek Death
Penalty,” The Trentonian, June 16, 1948.
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in, and was so scared of what all was going on that he was completely without
his reason."41
The other defense attorneys followed the same course. James Turp,
speaking for the other defendants, told the jury that Collis English had been
helping his mother with the laundry that morning. Around 10:30 a.m., he had left
to cash an unemployment check that had just arrived in the mail. Ralph Cooper
was at his girlfriend's home at the time of the murder. It was around this time that
the mailman arrived with a C.O.D. package. James Thorpe was watching his
father work on his brother's car in the yard that morning. Both John MacKenzie
and Horace Wilson were working. Turp informed the jury "all and each of the
defendants deny any participation in or any knowledge of this alleged crime, and
some of the defendants did not even know others of the defendants until after
their arrest."42
The next day, Volpe called the engineer who prepared the diagram of the
store for the court. Next, he called the physicians and technicians who had cared
for Mr. Horner. Then, the long awaited eyewitness to the crime was called to
testify. Mrs. Horner, dressed in a "black and white dress and a pert hat," related
how she first saw Ralph Cooper around the middle of January in the store. He
was inquiring about a mattress. About one week later, Mrs. Horner claimed,
Collis English and McKinley Forrest had also come into the store. At that time,
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Forrest gave her a deposit for a mattress. On January 26, they both returned
and demanded their money back. Mrs. Horner testified that she required Forrest
sign a receipt for the returned deposit. The prosecutor asked her if she saw any
of the defendants in the store on the morning of the 27th. She replied that she
had. He asked her to step down and place her hand on the shoulder of the man
she first saw. She stepped down from the witness stand and walked quickly over
to where English was seated. She pointed to him and said, “That's one. Then she
walked around the table to McKinley Forrest, explaining, that's one. She
hesitated for a minute as she scanned the face of the other defendants and then
walked over to a second table where she pointed to Horace Wilson, And this one
here, she said in a clear voice.”43
The weakness of the State's case regarding Mrs. Horner's identification
became apparent under cross-examination. Turp inquired as to how she was
able to positively identify the defendants now, but was unable to do so at the
police station on the evening of February 7. Mrs. Horner explained that she
"could not recognize them, because my eyes were puffed up." This was a
questionable explanation, since earlier suspects were brought to her hospital
room and she was asked to identify them. “But you didn't really identify them;
you said you couldn't very well” asked Defense Counsel Katzenbach. Horner
replied:
No, when I came home they all came in front of my mind. Q:
43 Trenton Times, “Widow Puts 3 At Scene Of Murder, “June 17, 1948; State of New
Jersey, Elizabeth Horner Testimony, Volume 1, 236a - 247a (1948); Trenton Times, June 17,
1948.
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How many pictures were given to you? A: Well, I couldn't say.
Q. Did they say: This one is McKinley Forest, and this one is
Collis English, and this one is so and so, and tell us which ones
you saw? A: They showed me the picture and asked me to
identify them, and I pointed out the men that I remembered.
Q. Well, how many pictures did they show you? A. It must have
been about six.
Additionally, Horner also had a problem identifying the receipt that she claimed
Forrest signed in return of the mattress deposit. It may be recalled that Forrest
was unable to read, write, or even write his name. The defense produced his
application for a marriage license and voting record that indicated that he
“signed” his name with a 'X' mark. 44
On the day of the attack Mrs. Horner provided only generic descriptions of
the assailants such as “one was light-skinned colored man, and one of them had
sort of a high cheekbones, the other one had sort of slanty eyes.” But
interestingly, if the men who she claimed had happened to be in the store, there
were strong identifiable characteristics that she could have given to help in the
initial investigation. For example, Leanna Cooper, who had known Ralph Cooper
since the summer of 1947, told defense investigators that Cooper “always had
his hair brushed up.” James Thorpe had only one arm.45
Researchers since the beginning of the twentieth century have called into
question the reliance upon eye-witness testimony and the relationship to
wrongful convictions. Edwin M. Borchard argues there are several reasons for
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this situation. First, jurors place an extraordinary weight in deliberations on eyewitness testimony, no matter how much opposing evidence there might be. At
the same time, the victim, after enduring the ordeal becomes so convinced of
their identification they are able to testify empathically and identify their attacker.
But Borchard warns of the danger of placing so much credibility on such
testimony because the eyewitness’s “powers of perception become distorted and
his identification is frequently most untrustworthy.” In other words, experiencing
the attack alters the ability of the person to reliably to identify the attacker. Once
the victim fixes in their mind that their identification is correct, they then become
determined “to exact vengeance upon the person believed guilty.” More recent
research has analyzed other factors such as “stereotyping and prejudice” that
contributes to the victim’s conviction they can positively identify the assailant.46
Although defense lawyers Turp and Katzenbach succeeded, in part, in
casting doubt upon credibility the of Mrs. Horner’s identification, there was a
significant moment in which the defense could have struck a near fatal blow to
her testimony.

On May 27, 1948, a few weeks before the start of the trial,

defense investigator Joseph L. Burtchaell visited Mrs. Horner. He asked her if
she was now able to positively identify any of the six men as being at the store
46 Edwin M. Borchard, with the Collaboration of E. Russell Lutz, Convicting The Innocent:
Sixty-Five Errors of Criminal Justice (Garden City, NY: Garden City Publishing Company Inc.,
1932), 367. It was Borchard who is credited most since 1900 with the research on wrongful
convictions. See Jon B. Gould and Richard A. Leo, “One Hundred Years Later: Wrongful
Convictions after a Century of Research,” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 100, issue 3,
(Summer 2010); John P. Rutledge, “They All Look Alike: The Inaccuracy of Cross-Racial
Identifications,” American Journal of Criminal Law 28, issue 2 (2000 – 2001): 208. For additional
research on eye witness identification dealing with cross racial crimes see, Elizabeth F. Loftus,
Eyewitness Testimony (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); Michael J. Saks and
Reid Hastie, Social Psychology in Court (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1979).
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on January 27, 1948 since she had been unable to do so. Horner replied she
had not been asked by the police to identify them since the time she was brought
to the police station in February. Burtchaell offered to make arrangements for
her to be able to do so at the county jail. She replied was “Well, no, it will be a
waste of time, a waste of time. The store was dark and everything happened so
fast I couldn’t identity anybody. Colored men, they all look alike to me.” 47
For Stuart Hall, skin color or race:
Works like a language. And signifiers refer to the systems and
concepts of the classification of a culture to it making meaning
practice. And those things gain their meaning, not because of
what they contain in their essence, but in the shifting relations
of difference, which they establish with other concepts and ideas
in a signifying field.
Hall argues a culture through the use of the “discursive position” (language,
stories, and symbols) explains or provides meaning to difference. Thus when
Mrs. Horner merely saw black bodies it meant “the other,” with certain
associative characteristics such as inferiority, illiterate, and lawlessness. Frantz
Fanon encapsulated that emotion well in Black Skin, White Masks: “I am a slave
not to the ‘idea’ others have of me, but to my appearance.” This encounter
clearly demonstrated Borchard’s research on the problematic nature of eyewitness identification. Horner’s statement reveals how race and perception plays
out in this drama. All Mrs. Horner knew was that three black men came into the
store. The identification became much easier when the police provided her with
six pictures and told her they had already confessed to the crime. Her doubts
47 Raymond Alexander Papers “Investigative Report of Burtchaell Research Service,
Testimony of Joseph L. Burtchaell,” box 36, folder 9.
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could fade, and her confidence could grow in believing these men were the
criminals.48
The defense lawyers missed an opportunity to seriously challenge her
credibility when Mrs. Horner on cross examination denied telling defense
investigator Burtchaell that she was unable to identify any of the six men. When
the defense called Burtchaell they merely asked him if there was a meeting with
Horner and did not ask about any of her comments.49
The defense was also losing the public relations war outside of the
courtroom. The Trenton newspapers never reported on the intense defense
struggle during cross examination to expose the inconsistencies and problems
with Mrs. Horner’s identification. The Trentonian merely provided a cursory
account of Horner’s testimony. The Trenton Times provided much more of her
direct testimony, describing in dramatic fashion how Mrs. Horner left the witness
stand and placed her hand on the shoulder of the three men she identified. Only
a few lines were dedicated to the defense. For the courtroom spectators, her
testimony raised more questions than were answered. But for those Trentonians

Stuart Hall, “New Ethnicities,” in Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies, edited by David
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reading either of the two newspapers, it merely confirmed their belief this was
nothing but an open and shut case.50
The Admissibility Hearing: June 18 – July 2, 1948
Once the trial moved to the initial arrest of English, the jury was excused,
as Judge Hutchinson was required to hold an admissibility hearing. This was the
critical phase for both the prosecution and defense. The State had to prove these
statements were voluntary, whereas the defense had to prove the arrests and
detention without indictment were illegal and the statements had been obtained
involuntarily. Thus a parade of Trenton police officers were called to the stand to
give testimony as to what transpired to the point that the defendants implicated
themselves in the crime.
The defense believed the state’s case was vulnerable, since the men were
held well beyond the time required by law, and that the time was used to wrestle
the false statements. They would also contest the failure of the police to tell
them they had a right to counsel and to remain quiet. The police also displayed a
potential show of force upon the defendants with their guns and night-sticks.
One illuminating exchange was representative of the debate among the defense,
the court, and the prosecutor. It occurred early in the hearing. Waldron was
cross-examining Creeden and asked him if he had told English of his right to a
lawyer. Volpe quickly objected and Hutchinson attempted to instruct the defense
counsel on one of the recent New Jersey Court of Appeal cases, State v Cole,

Trentonian, “Widow Put on Stand in Murder Trial,” June 17, 1948; “Widow Puts 3 At
Scene of Murder,” Trenton Evening Times, June 17, 1948.
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which found that “a prisoner is only entitled to counsel to aid in his defense, he is
not entitled to the aid of counsel to save him from his own voluntary acts.” 51
When Waldron reminded the judge of the Fifth Amendment and the
protection of the right to counsel, Hutchinson quickly qualified, “to aid him in his
defense, but not to save him from his own voluntary statements.” A few minutes
later, the judge instructed Waldron that during the recess, “If you are not familiar
with the case, you read it.” In spite of the judge’s comment to Waldron, the
defense continued to challenge every aspect of the police story. The judge was
becoming agitated since Waldron continued to ask the same Fifth Amendment
question in different ways. Again and again, Hutchinson came back to State v
Cole to defend his rulings. As Waldron’s grilling continued, Hutchinson
interrupted and asked, “You might along that same line and in connection with
that same question, there might conceivably be a telephone in the room, would
you say that it was necessary that the defendant be told there is a telephone, go
call up anybody you want?”52
Waldron continued to enter into the record the failure of the police to
inform the men of their right to counsel. Each time, Volpe objected. Finally, with
some research provided by Clifford Moore, Waldron called to Hutchinson’s
attention a recent U.S. Supreme Court Case, Haley v State of Ohio (1948),
dealing with the right to counsel. The high court overturned the conviction of a
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fifteen year old black youth who had been arrested and questioned in relays of
one to two police officers for five hours until a confession was signed. He was
finally informed of his constitutional rights that a counsel be present just before
the police took his statement. Even after he signed the confession, the police
kept him incommunicado and was not taken to a magistrate to be formally
charged until three days later. Waldron was attempting to show the similarities to
the Trenton case, particularly being held incommunicado, with no advising of the
right of counsel, and a typed question and answer confession prepared by the
police. The court was not familiar with it, so it was decided they would discuss it
after the recess.53
Once court resumed, the judge told Waldron that the Haley v Ohio
decision was “very different than we have presented here.” Hutchison rejected
the relevance of that case to this one primarily because the suspect was still a
53

Moore was member of the legal staff of the New Jersey Conference of NAACP
branches was made available through Queen and unpaid provided extensive research. Queen
wrote that Moore “kept us supplied with the latest decisions pertaining to confessions and
admissions and prepared elaborate briefs on all of these questions based on prior NAACP
victories in confession cases.” Robert Queen, “The NAACP in the Case of the ‘Trenton Six,”
Papers of the NAACP, Selected Branch Files, 1940 – 1945, Series B: The Northeast, reel 4, box
C. Again, the role of NAACP will be hotly debated later in the case; Haley v State of Ohio, 332
U.S. 596 (68 S.Ct. 302, 92 L.Ed. 224). U.S. Supreme Court case overturning the conviction of a
fifteen year old black youth, convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. The facts of the case
as determined by the court was that there were no friends or counsel present during questioning,
which lasted about five hours until a confession was signed. The confession consisted of
question and answer style prepared by the police. The challenge by the defense was that the
young man’s constitutional rights were violated, namely, the 14th Amendment, due process.
Chief Justice Douglas wrote in the decision that overturned the verdict that should “make us
pause for careful inquiry if a mature man were involved. And when, as here, a mere child —an
easy victim of the law—is before us, special care in scrutinizing the record must be used. The age
of petitioner, the hours when he was grilled, the duration of his quizzing, the fact that he had no
friend or counsel to advise him, the callous attitude of the police towards his rights combine to
convince us that this was a confession wrung from a child by means which the law should not
sanction. Neither man nor child can be allowed to stand condemned by methods which flout
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police from using the private, secret custody of either man or child as a device for wringing
confessions from them.”
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youth when questioned by the police. The judge reminded Waldron even when
the court overturned the young man’s conviction they were mindful that the
Supreme Court “must give the freest possible scope to States in the choice of
their methods of criminal procedure. But these procedures cannot include
methods that may fairly be deemed to be in conflict with deeply rooted feelings of
the community.” Although Hutchinson agreed that the high court overturned “a
very extreme case” of a young man who had not been given his constitutional
earnings, the judge believed the decision reached no further than the case of one
youth. The defendants before him were men. But Waldron countered that the
court had not restricted it only to a youth, but to men as well. Waldron quoted
from the opinion:
Legislation throughout the country reflects a similar belief that
detention for purposes of eliciting confessions through secret,
persistent, long continued interrogation violates sentiments deeply
embedded in the feelings of our people . . . The Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits the police from using the private, secret
custody of either man or child as a device for wringing confessions
from them.
Hutchinson put an end to the discussion when he reaffirmed his original idea that
“we are dealing with a different situation; and I believe there is no duty to apprise
the defendant of his right to counsel.”54
The admissibility hearings remained tense as the defense lawyers sparred
with Volpe. Katzenbach questioned Detective Dawson about the many changing
stories English provided during his interrogation. Dawson explained that from the

54 State of New Jersey, Discussion, Volume 2, 624a – 627a (1948); Haley v State of Ohio
, 332 U.S. 596 (68 S.Ct. 302, 92 L.Ed. 224)
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beginning of the case until that very moment, he had no idea where English fit in
it. Katzenbach replied, “Yes, and neither do we.” Volpe immediately objected
and asked that the attorney’s remarks be stricken. Hutchinson agreed they were
totally inappropriate and warned Katzenbach that if the jury had been present,
further action would have been taken. Meanwhile, as the defense lawyers were
fighting for their clients, the Trenton Times reported on the cost of the trial thus
far and the need to appropriate $50,000 more with bold headlines, “Murder Trial
is Financial Headache for Freeholders.55
Once Volpe was finished with the police officers, the defendants who had
signed statements were called to the stand. The five defendants retracted their
statements and attempted to explain why they had given them in the first place.
English testified that he was afraid of being beaten. He testified the police
threatened him by telling him they were going to send him upstairs to the
detective’s office. English claimed he had been sent upstairs following his arrest
in 1943. Volpe challenged English’s story. He had all the officers associated
with the present case and the officers from 1943 come into the courtroom. He
told English to point them out. English then pointed to Dawson and Patrolman
Raywood.

Thorpe testified that he feared that the police were going to beat him

on his recently amputated stump. Forrest, Cooper, and MacKenize claimed that
they were given drugs, either by a pill or tainted cigarettes. Dr. Sullivan, a state’s
witness, testified that he asked Cooper if he had been smoking marijuana. The

55 “State of New Jersey, James E, Creeden Testimony, Volume 2, 594a (1948); “Murder
Trial Is Financial Headache For Freeholders,” Trenton Evening Times, June 23, 1948.
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problem for Hutchinson was the testimony concerning Forrest and Thorpe and
the voluntary statement. Clearly, Forrest’s behavior could be explained as
caused by either being under some kind of influence or fear or mental
exhaustion. Was Cooper drowsiness, laziness, and reddened eyes the result of
being recently awaken by a lack of sleep, or smoking a marijuana cigarette? 56
Once the defendants testified, their attorneys made their appeal that the
statements be discarded, arguing there was enough evidence of coercion and
legal precedent for Hutchinson to throw out the statements. Additionally, the
police failed to bring the suspects to a magistrate within forty-eight hours as
required by state law. The police also denied due process in procuring the
statements, which were inconsistent, contradictory, and presented in a question
and answer form typed by the police. Volpe countered this argument by
admitting that the suspects were brought to court in a time “perhaps somewhat
State of New Jersey, Collis English Testimony , Volume 4, 1223a – 1225a, 1351a –
1354a (1948); James H. Thorpe Testimony, Volume 4, p. 1524a, (1948); State witness Doctor
William Moore testified that he examined McKinley Forrest at the police station when called
because of Forrest’s erratic behavior and left one pill of sodium amytal for him; State of New
Jersey, William J. Moore Testimony, Volume 5, 1863a, (1948); Sodium amytal had two purposes-as a sedative and "truth serum." The use of sodium amytal was developed in 1940 as an
alternative to third degree methods of interrogation. The subjects who are under the influence of
sodium amytal are more "suggestible than they are in their normal waking states; this renders
them vulnerable to leading questions and to other contaminating influences of the interviewer."
August Piper Jr., "Amytal Interviews," Issues In Child Abuse Accusations, Journal Published by
the Institute for Psychological Therapies, 9, no. 1, (1994): 39. Doctor Moore told Delate that this
drug "would influence his thinking." Additionally, Forrest testified that he was given a cup of
water and he saw a "pill in the cup." State of New Jersey, McKinley Forrest Testimony, Volume
4, 1404a, (1948). Cooper testified that “The only thing I know I remember smoking a cigarette
and the cigarette made me feel very sleepish, drunkish, so I don’t know what happened after
that.” State of New Jersey, Ralph Cooper Testimony, Volume 4, 1453a, (1948). And finally,
MacKenzie testified that when he asked for cigarettes they refused to give him any, until
Thursday afternoon, when they brought them to him. After he smoked the cigarettes, “I don’t
know, it seems as though somebody was trying to shoot me all the time.” State of New Jersey,
John MacKenzie Testimony, Volume 5, 1609a, (1948). From that point, he did not remember
anything. When he was transferred to the Mercer County Jail, he too was sent to the segregated
cell because of his behavior. State of New Jersey, John MacKenzie Testimony, Volume 5, 1610a,
(1948).
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longer” than forty-eight hours, but argued there was a legitimate reason for the
delay. The suspects were arrested during the weekend, when court was closed,
and it took time to check the stories of six men. Volpe indicated if there were
only one or two, it would have been easier for the police to stay within the law. 57
Next Volpe cited state law and early New Jersey court decisions, as well
as State v Cole, to assert that the defendant did not have a right to counsel at the
time of his arrest, only for his defense. Finally, he explained to the judge that he
used mostly New Jersey cases in his argument, whereas the defense used
mostly federal, noting they used “very, very few.” The judge announced he
would announce his ruling when court resumed on July 5. 58
On July 5, Volpe and defense counsel spent an hour in Hutchinson’s
chambers and was informed of the judge’s decision concerning the admissibility
of the statements. During that time, English became ill and was taken to the
prison infirmary for treatment. The Trenton Times called it an attack of malaria.
Hutchinson took to the bench and began reading his decision. Beginning with
English, he said, “the nature of the story told and in the manner in which he told it
on the witness stand are anything but convincing.” He continued, “all of the
officers who dealt with English testified generally that no threats, violence or
force were used, and no promised were made to induce him.” The judge
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remarked that each police officer “denied specifically the charges that English
made against them.”59
Cooper and MacKenzie testimony’s was challenged as well, for “these
alleged blackouts or blankouts it should be noted that none of these defendants
who claim to have had them on these occasions ever had one or since.” The
judge believed Forrest was trying to “avoid the effects of his statements” by
claiming he was in a state of mental exhaustion and therefore did not know what
he was doing. Yet there was no doubt there was a problem, for both state and
defense witnesses testified to his condition. Hutchinson admitted, “It is difficult to
account for his actions,” yet threading a legal hole, he continued, “The fact
appears to me that at the time of making these statements, he was in full
possession of his mental faculties.” Lastly, Hutchinson dealt with Thorpe’s
statement. He agreed with Dr. Sullivan’s testimony that Thorpe had denied any
involvement and was afraid of the other defendants on the night of the statement
signing, but added, “There is ample evidence to establish the voluntary character
of this statement when it was first made.” He allowed all of them to enter into
evidence. Hutchinson rejected the defense arguments by returning to State v
Cole and rejecting any applicability to this case with Haley v Ohio. He rejected
the idea that the police kept the men to wring any confession from them. As for
the statements being contradictory and in question and answer form, he stated

Trenton Evening Times, “Confessions Are Upheld As Evidence,” July 6, 1948; State of
New Jersey, Discussion, Volume 5, 1955a (1948).
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that they “have a ring of truth to them, which is far more convincing to the Court
than the testimony of the defendants to controvert them.”60
Hutchinson concluded:
The public at large too is deeply interested in the administration
of criminal justice, and is entitled to be protected against the
commission of criminal acts, particularly acts of violence. So
what might be considered the lawful rights of normal individuals
must give way to some reasonable extent in proper cases to the
public interest.

The prosecution had won a huge victory, for all of the statements would be
admitted. Now, the only hope for the men was that the jury would see it
differently. The trial was now able to resume. 61
The Trial Resumes: July 6 – August 6, 1948
Volpe recalled the same witnesses from the admissibility hearing. In
reality, this was the same hearing, but now for the jury. The defense again
challenged the notion the statements were voluntary. The state rested on July
14. When the Trenton Times announced the State resting, it commented how
few people were attending the trial, even though the trial had been moved to the
only air conditioned courtroom available. The article related that the public
gallery for the most part, “relatives and friends of the accused are just about the
only spectators.”62

60

State of New Jersey, Discussion, Volume 5, 1956a – 1959a, 1961a (1948).

61

State of New Jersey, Discussion, Volume 5, 1967a (1948).

62

Trenton Evening Times, “State Rests in Trial of Death Case,” July 14, 194

148

Now the defense had a chance to present evidence and alibi witnesses.
The defense called Horace Wilson as its first witness. Wilson had not testified in
the admissibility hearing because he had never given a statement. Wilson
explained that he was working on the morning of January 27 "at Ed Dilatush's."
He was there from 8:30 a.m. until 12:30 p.m. loading potatoes. John Murphy,
foreman of Dilatush's, testified that Wilson was working that day and produced a
time book indicating the number of hours worked each day. The time book
indicated that Wilson had indeed worked four hours on January 27. But the book
never indicated whether it was morning or afternoon.63
Volpe used signals to trigger racial assumptions during the trial. For
example, during his cross-examination of Wilson, Volpe suddenly asked a
representative from the Mercer County Probation Department to stand. Volpe
asked, “Horace, have you ever seen this man?” Wilson answered that he did not
recognize him. Then Volpe told the jury he was Mr. Marshall. A few minutes
Volpe again attempted to connect Wilson to previous criminal activity. He asked
Wilson about Judge Albert Cooper, the judge who presided at the arraignment in
February. “Q. You knew him. A. I know him to see him. Q. Had you seen him
before?” Defense lawyer Turp objected to this questionable tactic of Volpe.64

63

State of New Jersey, Horace Wilson Testimony, Volume 8, 2950a - 2952a (1948); John
M. Murphy Testimony, Volume 8, 3159a, 3167a - 3171a (1948).
64 Federal judge A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. commented that a racial oriented comment
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If Volpe intended to impeach Wilson with a criminal record, he merely
could have asked him directly. Wilson would have answered that he did not have
a criminal record. Thus the question about knowing Marshall and Judge Cooper
was intended for another reason. This racial reference required the jurors to
provide the implication meaning. In other words, this was an attempt to connect
blackness to crime to the minds of the jurors. Hutchinson overruled the
objection, claiming Volpe was merely “trying to find out if the witness know the
man before whom he appeared.”65
Volpe also made statements to the defendants before he asked a
question, such as, “I want you to think hard,” to “think hard,” and “think a little bit.”
Finally during the cross examination of English, defense attorney Waldron
objected to the prosecutor’s tactic, since it implied the men were lying. Judge
Hutchinson overruled the objection and stated that “it is an admonition to the
witness that I think it is proper.” Leon Higginbotham argues that when a judge
overrules the defense objections of prosecutorial questions or comments that
contain racial overtones in them, “the court symbolically were affirming the racist
myths and stereotypes of black untrustworthiness, [and] dishonestly.” 66
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As the defense put various alibi witnesses on the stand, the prosecution
attempted to neutralize them or to cast some doubt in their testimony. McKinley
Forrest testified that on that morning he had breakfast with his niece, Vera
Strouse. After breakfast, he went to work at Community Slaughterhouse. While
Forrest was there, John MacKenzie also came to work. Lee Guinyard testified
that both Forrest and MacKenzie were at work that morning. After he was
finished plucking chickens, Forrest stopped at Liberty Meat Market. He had
worked there on and off since 1941. Isaac Katzeff testified that Forrest had
arrived before lunch. Katzeff was busy that morning, so he asked Forrest to go
to the bank and make his wife's Christmas Club payment. According to Katzeff,
Forrest went to the bank and returned before he went to lunch at 1:00 p.m. He
produced the Christmas Club book, which indicated the day the payment was
made.67
However, the other three defendants had to rely on family members and
friends to establish their whereabouts that day. The defense brought neighbors
and family to testify that they saw James Thorpe watching his father work on his
uncle's car. Mrs. Rubie English and Melrose Diggs testified Cooper was at their
home that morning. Diggs was the daughter of Rubie and George English and
the girlfriend of Cooper at the time of his arrest. Following Diggs’s testimony, she
was arrested for sending threatening letters to Mrs. Horner. Queen agreed to
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defend her as well. Defense witnesses were called to testify that they saw
English helping his mother with the weekday laundry. 68
The strain was becoming unbearable for English, for after two full days of
grilling by Volpe, during a recess, he sent word to the defense that he had “pains
in his head and over his heart.” Later that day, cigar salesman Frank Eldracher
was called to testify that he could not identify any of the defendants as the ones
that left the Horner store on January 27. Mrs. Virginia Barclay, who had been
watching her husband trying to start the car that morning, caused a stir in the
courtroom as the “surprised spectators leaned forward” to hear her describe how
she saw three black young men “in their teens” running across the street, and get
into a “blue-green” car. She testified the driver of the car pulled away so quickly
that the back door was still open as the men sped away. She was given a
photograph of Collis English’s black car that the State claimed was used in the
crime and she testified it was not the same car she saw that morning. 69
One last major struggle between the prosecution and defense occurred
when the defense attempted to subpoena all reports, police blotters, and police
communications between January 27 and the day English was first arrested, as
well as fingerprint reports taken when analyzed by the police technicians. Volpe
objected, asking Hutchinson to quash the subpoenas since it was a mere fishing
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expedition and burdensome for the police department to comply. Furthermore,
the prosecutor argued the defense was not entitled to private communications
among the police. Hutchinson agreed by telling the defense, “I incline to the
belief that the administration of justice and the detection and the punishment of
crime surrounds interdepartmental reports of investigations and examinations
with a certain amount of privilege.” With that, he quashed the subpoenas.70
The defense ended on a strong note. Their last witness was a handwriting
expert, J. Howard Haring, called to refute Mrs. Horner, who claimed that Forrest
had been the one who signed the receipt for the $2.00 refund a few days before
January 27. The defense earlier had established that Forrest could not read or
write. They entered into evidence Forrest’s voting record, marriage license, and
other official documents, all of which had been signed with a “X.” The expert
was shown the receipt and asked if the signature was Forrest’s. He replied that it
was his expert opinion that the name “was not written by McKinley Forrest. Was
not, and could not have been written by him.” The defense rested.71
On August 4, the defense began their summations. Turp, Waldron, and
Queen attempted to show the defendants’ humanity and tried to explain to the
all-white jury what it meant for young black men to be to be caught up in this
situation. They tried to show that the men did not understand how the
investigation quickly was turning into a murder charge. However, an element of
racism was present even in the defense comments. For, Katzenbach while
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attempting to explain to white jurors the fears of black men, “Men of this type
have inbred in them, by heredity, natural fear. They are men of a minority race . .
. whose great-great-grandfathers were brought as wild men from Africa.” Turp
told the jury to look and see “how pathetically ignorant and simple-minded
practically all of these defendants.” It was likely the defense lawyers were
attempting to appeal to the jury’s emotions, yet it was nevertheless, racist. But
one can argue it had the opposite effect upon the jury by confirming the negative
stereotypes of blacks.”72
Katzenbach summarized the serious problems with this case. How was it
possible for the state to claim that five men were in the store, when their own
eye-witness, Mrs. Horner, testified that only three were in the store?
Furthermore, both Eldracher and Barclay said the men they saw were younger
than the defendants. Katzenbach believed the reason why Eldracher only saw
two men leave the store was because the one that been in the front of the store
with Mrs. Horner had left first and the two that he saw were in the back.
Additionally, Eldracher stated that of the two men, one was light skinned, while
the other was darker. Nothing was mentioned of a one-armed man. And what
about the car? Mrs. Barclay clearly indicated that the car was "bluish green, four
door car" and the impounded car was a black, two-door automobile. As
Katzenbach neared the end of his close, he articulated the fundamental question
for the jury. In order to find the men guilty, they would have to “throw out the

72 State of New Jersey, Closing of Frank S. Katzenbach III, Volume 15, 5668a (1948);
Closing of James S. Turp, Volume 15, 5602a (1948).
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testimony of all the witnesses” such as Eldracher and Barclay, along with the alibi
witnesses.73
Volpe had opened his case by confidently proclaiming “We will prove.” By
his closing, something had changed. Anthony Amsterdam has commented:
When a prosecutor makes racist comments in closing arguments
to a jury, more is going on in the trial than those specific comments . . .
Unless a case has already been infected with racial prejudice, the
prosecutor would never venture to make the racist comments in the
first place. Prosecutors do not make arguments that they do not
expect the jury to buy. . . the prosecutor would have to be pretty
confident that the argument will fall on fertile ground. Thus, the very
fact that a racist pitch is made in closing argument almost always
means the prosecutor has read the jury. . .
Now, Volpe wrapped his closing in the secure mantle of the police department.
He remarked:
They have tried to discredit an honorable Police Department. They,
in their attempt to justify this crime, because they can't explain it,
they have attempted to revile honorable men who have given their
lives to police work. Men like Captain Delate. Yes, are you going
to believe him, or are you going to believe those men? Are you
going to believe men like Chief Naples or believe those men?
The question to the jury was quite simple: Whom do you believe, the police or
the defendants and their alibi witnesses? Most of the witnesses for the defense
were black and poor. Volpe pushed the right buttons, neutralizing the black alibi
witnesses by connecting them to black criminality, alcohol consumption, and
idleness. These characteristics could to inflame the white middle class
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sensibilities of the jury. It would then become much easier to associate these
behaviors with the defendants.74
Lee Guinyard’s testimony was an excellent example of how Volpe
exploited stereotypes. During his direct examination, Guinyard testified he saw
both Forrest and MacKenzie on January 27. However, during cross examination,
the prosecutor asked what he had been drinking. Guinyard replied they were
drinking “wine, whiskey, might have been had a beer.” He then informed the jury
it was a cold day and that it was customary for one of the workers to bring a
bottle to work at the slaughter house for all the workers. The prosecutor asked,
“You were all drinking out of the same bottle? A. Certainly.” When asked how
many bottles of whiskey or wine he consumed, Guinyard responded, “Couldn’t
tell that. Sometimes when I put the garbage out I be surprised myself.” Finally,
he was asked whether he had a criminal record. Guinyard did have a record of
fighting and carrying a concealed knife.75
In his closing, Volpe called Guinyard a “comical individual” and told the
jury he was not going to “comment on this testimony.” The association with
alcohol allowed Volpe to present a dismissive attitude toward Guinyard and
thereby marginalize his testimony. Then he asked, “Is that the type of testimony
that is presented by a defendant who is on trial for his life?” Volpe reinforced
74
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white and black stereotypes, but this was the world of the six poor men. These
alibi witnesses were the men and women that the defendants interacted with in
their daily life. This was their domain, even if it looked unseemly to the white
middle class jury.76
The witnesses who had testified for the defendants were blacks and Jews,
such as family, friends, and co-workers, with names that included Isaac and Jean
Katzeff, Harry Stern, Anna Binder, and Phillip Wiener. Volpe implied that the jury
should rely on the word of decent, honest citizens like themselves—Christian and
white, instead of those people. He challenged the defense’s contention that the
men were afraid of the police, arguing, “If you are a law-abiding citizen, there is
no fear of the police.” Volpe concluded by calling upon the jury to “Remove and
destroy this cancer upon the City. . . These people have no right under the
constitution, or otherwise, to be let loose in society. . . You owe it to the Police
Department, you owe it to your conscience, to bring in a verdict of guilty.” 77
The jury received the case at 4:32 p.m. on August 5, 1948. Most trial
observers believed three or four of the men would be convicted. Ruth Rabtsein,
a local attorney, said she believed only a few would be found guilty. When she
met a Volpe staff member the next day and indicated her surprise at all six being
convicted, he replied, “Yes, that’s so, but we were unable to tell which four were
the ones involved so we determined to put the whole thing before the jury and let
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them decide which four were the ones.” Attorney Queen wrote that Katzenbach
had believed Forrest would be acquitted and Turp thought Wilson would be
released.

The jury deliberated for seven and one half hours, returning at 12:58

a.m. on August 6. The defendants were asleep when the jury returned. The
court clerk asked the foreman of the jury, Robert Burroughs, if the panel had
reached a verdict. The clerk asked him to read that verdict as to the six
defendants. He answered "in a moderate tone and without a tremor in his voice,
Guilty!" A single gasp went up in the crowded courtroom. Two women jurors
were on the verge of breaking down and were given medication. The defense
attorneys asked that each of the jurors be polled individually as to their verdict.
Volpe’s strategy at closing had work very well indeed. Ruth Rabtsein Pelleteri
noted that "in those days that if you put a police uniform and hat on anyone and
put them on the stand, the jury would believe them."78
The six condemned men were grouped before Judge Hutchinson to be
sentenced immediately. The judge asked each if they had anything to say before
the sentence was imposed. Each defendant shook his head and replied, “No
sir.” Hutchinson spoke in a slow, even tone and pronounced their sentence—

78 Ruth Rabstein Pellettieri, unpublished manuscript on her life, 142 – 143. Given to the
author by the family, April 2012, [hereafter cited as Ruth Rabsein Pellettieri Manuscript]. This
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Selected Branch Files, 1940 – 1945, Series B: The Northeast, reel 4, box C. He wrote somewhat
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stories on the verdict. August 6, 1948; Interview with Ruth Rabstein Pellettieri, Princeton, New
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death. As he spoke, Bessie Mitchell, screamed, "Kill me-you have taken
everything we ever had!" She was promptly removed from the courtroom. The
Trenton Times described the reaction of the six men: “The defendants received
the sentence without emotion. They showed neither surprise, fear nor contempt.
Each stared straight ahead and made no attempt to talk." The judge thanked the
jury for their service and adjourned the court, closing this first trial of the Trenton
Six. The defendants were shackled and taken back to county jail. 79
What happened on August 6, 1948? Some jurors fell back on the familiar
racist explanation to justify their vote to convict the men. Mrs. Eva Hutchinson
told a reporter, “We’ve got to protect our own kind” since they have “thick skulls
and wind up becoming criminals.” Mrs. Christina Leedom stated she believed all
six men were “bad characters with prison records, we had their records right
there to look at.” Both women in their interviews referred to the men as “niggers.”
On the other hand, other jurors could have insisted that racism had nothing to do
with their decision and possibly been offended at the suggestion. David Cole
argues, prosecutors and juries tend to revert to racism to avoid dealing with the
“hard questions about competing interests,” since “it is human nature to avoid
hard questions.” For Volpe, the police, and the jury, the fundamental problem
facing Trenton in 1948 was much greater than the murder of William Horner.
Underneath the murder lay the larger and overwhelming problems of inequality,
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institutional racism, poverty, and policing. The jurors fell into their comfort zone
of racial assumptions.80
Reaction to the verdict was varied, but mostly confined to the region. The
New York Times carried its only story about the first trial with an account of the
conviction of the six. The Communist Party of Mercer County in a printed
statement denounced the verdict. The Trenton Times reported "the jury decision
without recommendation of mercy, seemed to have stunned the entire city.”
Joseph H. Collins of the Mercer County Progressive Party, called a press
conference and said the verdict shocked him. He asked, “How 12 Americans
could condemn to death six young men in a case with so much conflicting
evidence, without even a recommendation of mercy for any of the accused, is
beyond my comprehension.” Even the prosecutor’s staff privately indicated, “it
was surprise to us too that they convicted all six.” 81
However, not all were shocked. The Trenton Times, in an editorial
entitled, "Justice,” stated:
The verdict of guilty, returned early this morning in the Horner
murder case, brings to a close one of the longest criminal trials
in the history of Mercer County. And few observers will be inclined
to challenge the fact that justice has been done. Every opportunity
was given the accused to establish their innocence. Judge
Hutchinson made scrupulous provision for fairness toward the
defense. The very length of the trial gives evidence of that.
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In spite of this congratulatory editorial, the people of Trenton discovered that their
community was not going to be able to return to normalcy. Rather, to their
dismay, they had become the focus of national and international attention over
the very nature of what they now were celebrating--justice.82
The newspapers noted that the six guilty men were moved to the death
house to await their execution. The prison officials reported "the six convicted
killers of William Horner seemed in excellent spirits and have entered willingly
into the prison routine." The article stated that “the men are buoyed apparently,
by the belief that no more than two or three of their number will go eventually to
the electric chair." Under New Jersey law, an automatic appeal was granted
after one was found guilty in a murder case.83
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CHAPTER 4
“THEN I HEARD ABOUT THE CIVIL RIGHTS CONGRESS”: THE CRC
ENTERS THE CASE
“Their fate is not in the hands of the court
alone. Their fate is in our hands too. Only
a tremendous protest movement of the people
can save these men."1
William Lawrence

The day after the verdict, on August 6, 1948, the six condemned men
were transported to Trenton State Prison’s death row. The Trenton Times
reported this was the first time in New Jersey history in which “six men were
sentenced to death for one crime.” The sentence was a major victory for the
prosecutor and improved Volpe’s reputation after the debacle of a few months
earlier, when the Mayor was acquitted of corruption charges.2
There was a scurry of activity that weekend. Joseph Collins, Vice-chair of
the Trenton’s local NAACP and Chairman of the Trenton Chapter of the
Progressive Party, along with a number of activists, met at Rev. Harry R. Pine’s
home to discuss the letter that Collins intended to send to the local newspapers
questioning the verdict. They also panned to discuss the next step for them to

1 Statement by William Lawrence, Executive Secretary of the New York Civil Rights
Congress Chapters ““Memorandum from William Lawrence to all N.Y. Chapters February 21,
1949, reel 20, box 40, Civil Rights Congress (microfilm). Frederick, MD: University Publications
of America, 1988, [hereafter cited as Civil Rights Congress]; Rhonda Buxbaum was Executive
Secretary of the New Jersey Chapters of the CRC. Rhonda Buxbaum, “Memorandum from
Rhonda Buxbaum to all N.J. Civil Rights Congress Chapters, March 14, 1949, reel 20, box 40,
Civil Rights Congress.

2
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undertake. James Imbrie, a state-wide Progressive leader and current
gubernatorial candidate, attended as well. No consensus developed, since some
were concerned the New Jersey Progressive Party might be over-extended as it
was heavily involved in the presidential, state-wide, and local elections of 1948.
However, others thought they should take the case to the New Jersey
Progressive Executive Board. No decision was made that evening. Rather, they
decided to meet again the following week. When they did reconvene, they were
still at an impasse and decided nothing. Some of the members were not satisfied
and approached the state executive board with the details of the case, and they
in turn forwarded it to the state legal redress committee. The Trenton
Progressives also circulated petitions asking Governor Driscoll to review the case
and sought clemency for the six condemned men.3
On Sunday, Attorney Robert Queen was at home discussing the case with
Clifford Moore. Something had been troubling Queen since Friday morning,
when the defendants were sentenced: the manner in which Judge Hutchinson
had imposed the death penalty. When the jury returned with their guilty verdict,
they had merely stated their verdict was “guilty” and did not specify whether it
was in the first degree or not. He asked Moore to go into his library and search
the state statutes. Within a few minutes, Moore was back. Queen’s instinct was
right. New Jersey law mandates that even if the jury had found them guilty of
murder in the first degree, it did not automatically mean a death sentence, for the
3 The letter was published in the Trenton Evening Times. Trenton Evening Times,
“Horner Verdict Shocks Collins,” August 10, 1948; Chester Apy, Jr., “The Trenton Six” (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University, 1954), 79.
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jury could possibly recommend mercy, in which case the defendants were then to
receive life imprisonment. Thus, the jury had to decide the degree and the
punishment. In this situation, they decided neither. Hutchinson heard the guilty
verdict, but never ascertained from them the crime’s degree and the punishment.
He sentenced them to death instead. Queen called the remainder of the defense
team. They all agreed that Hutchinson had erred in pronouncing death and this
was a major argument for getting the verdict overturned.4
Additionally, there was some movement in Trenton’s black churches.
Most black Trentonians were outraged at the verdict. Many questioned the
police’s interrogation techniques that led to the five confessions that were so
instrumental in convicting the men. Rev. E. M. Owens of Mt. Zion AME Church
and Elder E. E. Jones organized a meeting for August 18, 1948, a few weeks
after the verdict, to protest a consistent occurrence in the community—black men
arrested and the questionable “confessions” that became the state’s key
evidence against them. On a hot and humid night, concerned citizens crowded
into the Asbury Methodist Church to fight the unacceptable conditions in Trenton.
Drawing up a list of grievances against the Trenton Police, they charged that the
“abuses of authority and these highly questionable methods of enforcing and
prosecuting the law constitute a menace not only to the Negro citizens, but also
to the civil rights of all other citizens.” The assembly adopted a resolution to be

4

The State of New Jersey, Defendant in Error v Antonio Turco, Plaintiff in Error, New
Jersey Supreme Court, 98 N.J.L. 61; 118 A. 579; 1922 N.J. Sup. Ct. Lexis 33; June 8, 1922,
Argued October 6, 1922, Decided--This was the court case that Moore found for Queen. Robert
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presented to Prosecutor Volpe, Director of Public Safety Andrew Duch, and Chief
of Police William Dooling. The meeting failed to galvanize the populace into any
further activism, but it was a first step. Months later, others entering the case
would set in motion what the church leaders had first attempted. More
importantly, Bessie Mitchell began to question why the local NAACP had failed to
rally the public to support the convicted men.5

The Radicalization Of Bessie Mitchell
Within a ten-month span, Mitchell was radicalized by the arrest and
conviction of her brother and the others. She believed it was a sham and
travesty of justice. In the process she rejected the advice and methodology of
the NAACP, as she refused to wait for the appellate process to unfold. She
transitioned from a nonpolitical woman to one who became closely identified with
the Radical Left and the Civil Rights Congress. She was demonized as a result.
Her contribution propelled the case from the shadows into the limelight, as she
galvanized support while she traveling across the United States.6

5

Civil Rights Congress Papers, “Resolution” August 18, 1948, reel 47, box 81.

6 Bessie Mitchell she matured into a civil rights activist, Mitchell moved from merely
speaking about the case to a larger role as she spoke and became identified with the larger
issues in the struggle for equality. Recent scholarship dealing with radicalism amongst black
women and the contribution they made in the struggle against Jim Crow, criminal defense cases,
and the larger freedom struggle is applicable in this case. These scholars have offered a new
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Mitchell was born in Trenton in 1913. She attended the local schools and
was forced to drop out of school in the tenth grade due to her mother’s stroke,
which required her to find full time work. Not having much of an education and
few jobs available, she began working in white homes as a domestic worker.
She married James Mitchell in 1924 and they moved to New York City. Mitchell
attempted to improve her economic condition by enrolling in a night course at the
Apex Beauty Culture School in Newark. She graduated from the course, but was
unable to afford the forty-four dollars for the state-required license. Eventually
Mitchell was able to secure a better paying job as a seamstress, turning collars
and cuffs in the city’s garment district. She took part of her salary in her first
week and joined the International Ladies Garment Workers Union.7
William Reuben, investigative reporter for the National Guardian, spent a
great deal of time with her and interviewed close friends and family. He
described her as having “a steel-like stubbornness to which the concept of
compromise was completely foreign.” Mitchell herself described, “If I felt I was
right about something, I just made up my mind and stuck to it, no matter what
happened.”

One example of her early resistance to racist behavior and her own

sense of agency occurred during the summer of 1936 when she was working for
Rosa Parks (Boston, 2014); Bettye Collier-Thomas, Sisters in the Struggle : African-American
Women in the Civil Rights-Black Power Movement (New York, 2001). The criminal defense trials
which would be so prominent in this period were Willie McGee in Mississippi, a black man
sentenced to death for raping a white woman in 1945; Martinsville Seven, in Virginia, seven black
men were charged and found convict of raping a white woman in 1949, and the Rosa Lee Ingram
case, black woman who was convicted of killing a white man in Georgia in the 1947. The
sentence was eventually modified to life imprisonment with a decade long attempt to get her freed
brought a heightened awareness of her case to many activists throughout this time.
7
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a white family at the New Jersey shore. Mitchell was questioned by the wife as
to whether she had been bathing in the family’s facilities. She replied that she
had. The wife told her in the future, “You take a towel and soap and go out to the
ocean for your bath.” Mitchell went to her room, packed her suitcase, put on her
best dress, and announced to the wife, who by this time had welcomed ten
visitors for Sunday dinner, “No bath, no work.” In spite of the promises and
eventual threats from the family, she walked out and returned to Trenton. It was
this sense of morality and fairness that drove her during those ten life-changing
months.8
Although very little was accomplished after the public meeting in August
1948, it marked a turning point for Mitchell. First, it raised an uncomfortable
question for her. Why was this meeting organized by another group rather than
the local branch of the NAACP? Why was the organization so silent on this
miscarriage of justice? She had sat in the courtroom daily and witnessed the
proceedings with deep concern. In her eyes the defense counsel was putting up
a halfhearted attempt to defend the men, with the apparent complicity of local
black leaders. The verdict merely confirmed this to her. But her strategy for
finding justice also had changed. Before the trial, her energy and time were
devoted to searching for effective legal representation. Now, after the verdict,
she was interested in doing more than what the court- appointed attorneys and
the NAACP were suggesting to her.
It seems that she never trusted the court appointed defense team and the
NAACP. As Robin D. G. Kelley has written, the working class often "accused
8
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upper-class persons (the 'big shots,' the 'Big Negroes') of snobbishness, color
preference, extreme selfishness, disloyalty in caste leadership, ('sellin' out to
white folks'), and economic exploitation of their patients and customers." One of
the big problems for Mitchell was with the testimony of two state witnesses, Dr. J.
Minor Sullivan and Scrappy Manning, both of whom were African American.
These men were called by Volpe to be “disinterested witnesses” to the men
signing their statements. Their purpose was to provide evidence that the men
were not beaten, but had been well treated and were signing voluntarily. They
were not just witnesses called upon by the police to help carry out justice, but
rather men closely connected to power. Both were “local Negro Democratic bigwigs.” In January 1948, Dr. Sullivan had been appointed to be Trenton’s
assistant serologist. He “owed his job” to local politics. Manning was a local
businessman and heavily involved in the local Democratic Party. 9
When Mitchell learned they would be testifying in the first trial, she
approached them and they told her something very different from what they
testified in the courtroom. In fact, Attorney Clifford Moore, who served on
Trenton’s NAACP Redress Committee, confirmed that Sullivan had told another
black doctor that the “men evidenced use of drugs,” something the doctor
definitely later played down in his testimony. Moore challenged Sullivan as to
why he did not inform Attorney Robert Queen of his observation since Sullivan

9 Robin D.G. Kelley, Race Rebels: Culture, Politics, and the Black Working Class (New
York: The Free Press, 1994), 39; “Clifford R. Moore to Thurgood Marshall, December 21, 1949,
NAACP Papers, Part 26: Selected Branch Files, 1940–1955, Series B, reel 14.
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was serving on Trenton’s NAACP Executive Board. Sullivan’s reply, according to
Moore, was that the “NAACP could no nothing” about it. 10
When Mrs. Mitchell questioned Manning about the case, he warned her,
“Listen, girlie, if you know what’s good for you, you’ll get on the first train back to
New York. You’re going to get yourself in trouble if you stay around here asking
questions.” Moore was also taken aback when Manning, in an NAACP meeting
shortly after the men were arrested, stated, “I had the pleasure of being present
when those rats confessed.” After the trial, Mrs. Mitchell learned his reputation in
the city was not stellar. She heard comments such as, “That Scrappy ain’t no
damn good, he’d sell his own mother down the country.” She also discovered
the director of the local NAACP was close friends with Sullivan and Manning.11
She approached Rev. A. S. Grayson of the Union Baptist Church and told
him how Sullivan and Manning’s testimony was at odds with what they had told
her. He replied that “we mustn’t tear apart our leadership” and cautioned her not
to publicly criticize their role. To Mitchell, it seemed that educated and well to do
blacks were joining forces against the men, so as not to disrupt the delicate
accommodation the black bourgeoisie had created with Trenton’s white powerful
elites. Working class blacks perceived that Sullivan and Manning would be

“Clifford R. Moore to Thurgood Marshall,” December 21, 1949, NAACP Papers, Part
26: Selected Branch Files, 1940–1955, Series B, reel 1.
10

11 Reuben Manuscript, 526 - 527; “Clifford R. Moore to Thurgood Marshall, December 21,
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willing to sacrifice members of their own community to ensure their own
position.12
Mitchell eventually contacted the American Civil Liberties Union and spoke
to staff counsel Clifford Forster. He reviewed the newspaper clippings and
several volumes of the court transcript. Forster told her there was no “indication
of racial discrimination or of an abrogation of the men’s civil liberties.”
Consequently, the organization could not help her. Desperate for assistance
from and in spite of her mistrust of the NAACP, she approached the NAACP
again in early September. This time, she was there to request more than just
legal representation. Clifford Moore told Mitchell at this time the NAACP was
monitoring the situation by being in close contact with the court- appointed team.
Moore indicated during the conversation that “Bessie Mitchell was like a wild
woman and no amount of argument could convince her that the long tedious
appeal process had to be followed.”13
Moore was telling her to trust the NAACP’s legalistic approach, but
Mitchell was ready for mass pressure and meetings to influence public opinion.
Her thinking had evolved from just seeking competent representation to
something much bigger. Mitchell had attended the August mass meeting and
had talked with the local Communist Party. She was now at odds with the
NAACP.

12
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Moore had called her a “wild woman.” The comment was written well after
the NAACP came under severe criticism for their conduct in the case, due to the
public statements of Mitchell. Moore was also marginalizing her with the
stereotype of the “angry black woman,” questioning her womanhood and
femininity because of her determination and refusal to accept the advice of those
who believed they knew better than she did.14

The Civil Rights Congress Enters The Case
With all hope nearly exhausted, Mitchell was heading back to New York in
early September 1948. She noticed a leaflet lying on the sidewalk. She noticed
in large bold words, “CIVIL RIGHTS” and was introduced to the Civil Rights
Congress. Only a postal box number was provided. That night, she wrote a
letter to the address. Two days later she received a telephone call from her
mother informing her that someone wanted to talk to her about the case. Mitchell
returned to Trenton the next night and met with Arthur Brown, New Jersey
Director of the Civil Rights Congress (CRC). A week later Brown and Milly
Salwen, a member of the Mercer County Communist Party, met with her. This

14 See Prudence Cumberbatch’s “What ‘the Cause’ Needs Is a ‘Brainy and Energetic
Woman’: A Study of Female Charismatic Leadership in Baltimore,” Dayo F. Gore, Jeanne
Theoharis, and Komozi Woodard, eds., Want to Start A Revolution? : Radical Women in the
Black Freedom Struggle (New York, 2009) in which she discusses Juanita Jackson and her ability
to overcome the conventional of “maintaining respectability as a ‘lady’ . . . used her cultural and
social status and dominant society’s notion of ‘womanhood’ to bridge class differences” p. 48;
Melissa V. Harris-Perry, Sister Citizen: Shame, Stereotypes, and Black Women in America (New
Haven, Yale University Press, 2011). Perry examines the most enduring stereotype of black
women. For example, Jezebel's sexual lasciviousness, Mammy's devotion, and Sapphire's
outspoken anger—as a means of marginalizing them.
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meeting’s participants reflected the strong relationship between the CRC and the
Communist Party.15
In November 1948, several family members of the convicted men
gathered in the home of Emma English to meet with William L. Patterson, the
Executive Secretary of the CRC. Patterson was born in 1891 in San Francisco,
California. His mother was born a slave in Virginia and his father was born in the
Caribbean. Patterson’s father became prosperous smuggling Chinese into
California after the Chinese Exclusion Act. This enabled him to provide his family
with a comfortable existence. When young Patterson was five years old, his
father became a committed Seventh Day Adventist. Soon after his conversion,
he sold the family’s home and their possessions, and he donated the proceeds to
the church. He left his family shortly thereafter and served as a missionary in
various posts throughout the world, leaving his wife to support and care for the
three children. The abandoned family now faced poverty and hardship for the
first time, since Mrs. Patterson was never able to earn enough money to care for
the improvised household. The situation became so dire that the family was
evicted on three separate occasions. The experience of having the sheriff come
to their home and place their meager belongings on the street traumatized young
Patterson.16
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Patterson did well in school, graduated from high school, and intended to
study mining engineering at the University of California, but the costs and fees
associated with the program were more than he had or could raise, so he
enrolled in the university’s Hastings College of Law. He worked at a local hotel
as a night clerk and elevator operator which enabled him to pay for his education.
While attending the law school, he was first introduced to Marxism at a local
progressive bookstore. He soon met other left leaning activists. Patterson was
arrested when he publicly spoke against World War I, calling it a “white man’s
war.” He was charged with violation of the Sedition Act. He escaped a lengthy
prison term with the NAACP’s legal assistance. He eventually graduated from
law school and passed the bar exam. In 1919, a wave of racial violence swept
across the nation, convincing Patterson to leave the United States for Africa.
With $120 in his pocket, he struck out for a new homeland. He worked briefly as
a cook on a merchant ship as he travelled to Mexico, Portugal, and England. In
England he met other activists, who challenged him to return to America and
become involved in the equality struggle. 17
Patterson settled in Harlem, meeting Paul Robeson and other activists.
He joined the leading black law firm in New York City, married, and ultimately
became a successful and prosperous black attorney. His ideological circle grew
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as he met activists such as Richard B. Moore and Cyril Briggs. His turning point
away from the NAACP and toward Communism was the Sacco and Vanzetti
case, in which two Italian immigrants and anarchists were convicted of murdering
two men in a robbery in 1920. The case became a cause célèbre for those on
the Left and one that captured the imagination and notice of Patterson as well. In
1926, he became a member of the Communist Party. Leaving his office in 1927
to protest the day of the double execution, Patterson was beaten, arrested, and
jailed for his part in the protest. He was fined ten dollars. Radicalized, Patterson
returned to New York and resigned from his lucrative law firm, determined to
commit his life for the struggle.18
By the time Patterson stood before the small group assembly at 247
Church Street, he was a veteran of many civil rights struggles. Patterson began
the meeting by introducing himself to the small group and then recalled how he
had stood before another such gathering seventeen years earlier as he
addressed the families of the Scottsboro Nine. Connecting the past with the
present, he said, “The future for those boys looked as grim and as hopeless as it
now does for yours.”

He recounted how the obscure case quickly became

known throughout the world and that the subsequent public pressure eventually
prevented their execution and ultimate release from prison. Patterson
confidently added, “We’ve prepared to do the same thing with your boys.”19
Time Magazine, “Radicals: Sacco Aftermath,” September 5, 1927; Gerald Horne,
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But as confidence was rising in the hearts of the group, he brought them
back to reality. The seasoned warrior of so many struggles knew what was to
come if they requested his assistance. He warned “ministers, prominent
Negroes, police and city officials” would call him a Communist to frighten the
families by telling them the men were sure to be executed once the Civil Rights
Congress became involved in the case. Patterson finally told the group that once
they had decided to join with him, everyone had to be united and nothing could
be allowed to come between them. He sat down and waited for a response from
the group. Mrs. Emma English, mother to both Collis and Bessie, stood up and
announced she intended to sign the necessary papers. James Thorpe Sr., father
of the convicted James Thorpe Jr., was the next to sign the papers.20

The Ideological Divide Between The NAACP And CRC
The CRC and the NAACP were jockeying not only for control of the case,
but also for the narrative. The Trenton Six case vividly illustrated the ideological
and tactical differences within the African-American community. The divisions
focused not just on methodology for achieving racial equality, but on intellectual
orientation. Those on the Left such as Patterson had rejected capitalism and
believed that a socialist state was a better way to secure the promise of America.
The majority in the political center believed that capitalism, if given enough time,
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would enable African Americans to achieve equal opportunity. Although these
divisions remained, there were times, most notably during the Popular Front of
the 1930s, when the schism between them was minimized. But by the time of
the Cold War, the rift had re-emerged, making it nearly impossible for the groups
to work together.21
The NAACP was established in 1910. They were committed to securing
equality for blacks. Its membership was composed primarily of northern, urban
African-American middle class members with a small contingent of white liberals.
The leadership was relatively unrepresentative of its membership, as elites
controlled the top levels of the organization. The NAACP's agenda was to
secure equality for African Americans. It would “publicize discrimination
whenever and wherever it occurred, lobby legislatures and Congress for civil
rights legislation, and file law suits grounded in constitutional law." However, the
NAACP did not represent the complete ideological spectrum of the AfricanAmerican community. For example, A. Philip Randolph, editor of the Messenger
in the 1920s, believed that the NAACP "had sold out to bourgeois interests and
were not all concerned with the problems facing the black working class." Harry
Haywood, echoed the frustration that there was no voice for the AfricanAmerican working class in which to "challenge the assimilationist leadership of
the NAACP." Patterson himself concluded, "It became crystal-clear to me that
The Popular Front (1935 – 1939) was an alliance between Communists and Socialists,
with coalitions with Progressives, anti-fascist writer and intellectuals, as well with liberals and
middle class elements. See Mark Solomon’s, The Cry was Unity: Communists and African
Americans, 1917 – 1936 (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1998) for detailed account of
cooperation between those in the Communist Party and the NAACP.
21
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the horrors of color persecution and poverty could only be fully grappled within a
struggle against the economic and social forces that had spawned them."
Clearly the struggle was more than just a contest over tactics.22
The Communist Party in the United States grasped this sentiment and
actively campaigned for African-American support in the 1930s. With the
Communist pursuit for racial equality underway, the NAACP leadership found
that it was pitted in a struggle for the hearts and minds of African Americans.
The cases of the Scottsboro Boys and Angelo Herndon, were reflective of this
struggle. In 1931 on a freight train traveling through Scottsboro, Alabama, a fight
broke out between the black and white young men. Some of the white men were
thrown from the train and they informed the authorities. Nine black men were
initially charged with assault, but then two white women accused the nine of
rape. Within a few weeks, the men were tried, convicted, and sentenced to
death. Then in 1932 Angelo Herndon, a nineteen-year-old black Communist,
began organizing an unemployed council in Atlanta to help the jobless cope with
the deepening depression. Herndon led a peaceful demonstration of
unemployed black and whites demanding employment or government relief. The
local officials responded by authorizing an emergency appropriation to deal with
the potential threat of further unrest, but at the same time complained to the
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police officials that something had to be done to stop the communist-inspired
activity. Herndon was quickly arrested and booked on "suspicion." He was
eventually charged with attempting to incite insurrection against the state of
Georgia. He was tried, convicted, and sentenced to eighteen to twenty years at
hard labor on a chain gang.23
The International Labor Defense (ILD) was involved in both cases. The
ILD was organized in June 1925 as a legal defense organization with a
membership that consisted of both Communists and non-Communists. However,
Communists dominated the ILD leadership. The goal was to defend what they
considered to be “class war prisoners.” Once William Patterson became
Executive Secretary it became known as the most outspoken defender of
African-American rights. The ILD perceived the Scottsboro and Henderon case
not only to be examples of political prosecution, but of “lynch justice” as well.
Patterson equated the rising number of lynchings that were occurring in the
countryside in 1930 to what happened when a black defendant entered the
courtroom. The ILD developed the strategy of mass pressure or mass defense
because they believed prosecutions were politically motivated and the court
structure was controlled by the ruling class. Thus, there were two parts in
attempting to receive justice from a capitalistic courtroom. First, it was absolutely
essential to secure the best defense team available and then to conduct the most
aggressive defense by utilizing every possible legal maneuver in the courtroom.

23 Charles Martin, "Communists and Blacks: The ILD and the Angelo Herndon Case."
Journal of Negro History 64, issue 2 (Spring, 1979): 131 - 132.
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Secondly, a mass movement mobilized on the outside that would bring public
opinion to bear, thereby offering for the best possible outcome. As Patterson
argued, “The courtrooms of the working class are the streets and the determining
factor in the class struggle.”

Failure to bring the proper outside pressure would

be disastrous for the defendant. Patterson brought to this strategy another
important element—an international dimension, for the “lesson in internationalism
that must be learned.” The goal was to not only organize mass protests across
America, but across the world.24
The NAACP charged that this tactic of interposing politics into the legal
arena unnecessarily "charged and poisoned the environment accompanied by a
possible backlash against the defendant resulting in a conviction." Ridiculing the
NAACP’s naive view on the fairness of the courts, an editorial in the New Masses
argued, “The NAACP insists that courts are ‘fair,’ that ‘gentlemanly conduct’ will
get you further than ‘rowdy’ demonstration.” Moreover, the NAACP charged that
the Communists had an ulterior motive for their involvement in these sensational
cases: to enhance their own reputation within the African-American community.
Regardless of the charges leveled by the NAACP, the two Herndon and
Scottsboro cases, "boosted the prestige of the [Communist] Party enormously
24 Charles Martin, The Angelo Herndon Case and Southern Justice (Barton Rouge:
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among blacks nationally.” The stated aim of the ILD represented a serious
problem for the NAACP. Wilson Record argued the NAACP had considered the
area of legal defense as "more or less as its exclusive domain." As a result of
the ILD’s presence, a turf war developed between these two organizations,
especially during the Scottsboro case.25
By 1946, a new leftist civil rights organization, the Civil Rights Congress,
was established. It was formed by merging the National Negro Congress, the
ILD, and the National Federation for Constitutional Liberties. All three of these
groups had worked on African-American equality, labor issues, and civil liberties.
William Patterson became the National Executive Secretary in 1948 and was
determined to "make the CRC a fighter for Black Liberation." Within that year,
United States Attorney General Tom Clark placed the organization on the
subversive list. But what was the CRC's relationship with the Communist Party?
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, historians argued that the CRC was a 'front' of
the Communist Party. For example, Wilson Record contended that the group
was established "to defend Communists and their sympathizers before
investigating committees, administrative agencies, and courts." However,
scholars of African-American radicalism and Communism have detailed a more
complex relationship that existed between the Communist Party and the CRC.
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Gerald Horne has argued that the CRC was not a front, but a legitimate
organization in its own right. The problem arose because the Communist Party
and the CRC maintained a strong working relationship that resulted in "bitterness
and distortion and misinformation" about their association.26
Patterson, in a keynote address to the National Leadership Conference,
stated, "In our work our desire is to stimulate greater mass activities and concern
for the involvement of masses in what has been for them so long a purely
legalistic approach to civil rights." This was similar to the tactic adopted by the
ILD. For the CRC, it was important to demonstrate that “the courts are not
neutral” and that with an organized public pressure campaign raised in the name
of injustice, affirmative court opinions were very possible. Or simply as Patterson
put it: "I had learned that the best defense is an offense.”27

26 Gerald Horne, Communist Front? The Civil Rights Congress, 1946 - 1956 (Rutherford:
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The Formation Of The Mitchell Narrative
In Trenton, the struggle between the NAACP and CRC was not only for
control over the case, but also for the opportunity to highlight differences
between the two organizations. Which organization best deserved support,
volunteerism, and financial contributions, from the community in the struggle for
equal justice? Which group earned the right to speak as a united voice to the
nation?
The CRC claimed that once the men were arrested, Bessie Mitchell began
a search for competent counsel. She went to local attorneys, black churches in
Trenton, the local and national NAACP, Veterans Administration, FBI, the PM
newspaper, and the New York Times. She sent letters to editors of the Trenton
Times, governor, and Supreme Court of New Jersey. All to no avail. After the
verdict, she resumed her search for assistance. But again, there was no help for
her. Only in September, as she was returning home, dejected, did she notice a
leaflet on the street that introduced the CRC to her. Following several meetings
with them, they officially entered the case. And then everything changed.
Undoubtedly there was much truth to the “Mitchell Narrative,” in which the
CRC became the heroic organization that organized, fought, and saved the men
from a certain death—much like the Scottsboro case—while the NAACP was
unwilling or unable to help the doomed men. But does it hold up to historical
examination? This story is perhaps more complicated.
Even before the CRC had officially entered the case, William Reuben of
the newly formed Progressive newspaper, the National Guardian, arrived in
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Trenton in early October of 1948. His reports that appeared in the fall and winter
of 1949 were significant in exposing the case to the world outside of Trenton, but
more importantly, in the construction of the Mitchell Narrative. Reuben, a hardhitting investigative reporter with an overt political opinion, arrived in Trenton
attempting to discover the truth behind the case. He was limited in his original
search for the facts to two people, Robert Forrest (McKinley Forrest’s brother)
and Bessie Mitchell. Forrest did not cooperate with him, leaving only Mitchell as
his source. 28
Reuben acknowledged “it was mainly through several interviews” and the
newspaper clippings that Mitchell had saved about the case that he formulated
the background for his first story, “Is There a ‘Scottsboro Case’ in Trenton, N.
J.?” In this first story, he briefly reported on the crime and status of the case,
criticized the major newspapers for creating a “news black-out,” and informed his
readers that the CRC and the local Progressive Party had joined in the defense
of the men. Although Reuben was cautious in concluding that two of the
defendants were absolutely innocent and that a reasonable doubt existed for the

28 The National Guardian was founded by Cedric Belfrage, James Aronson, and John T.
McManus. The Guardian utilized the pioneering techniques first adopted by the PM newspaper
of “use of photography, presenting clearer and more vivid pictures. . . It pioneered the use of
color, aesthetically pleasing layouts, and creative use of drawn art and graphics.” An excellent
examination of the PM. See Paul Milkman’s, PM: A New Deal in Journalism, 1940 – 1948 (New
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1997), 1. The graphics in the Guardian were extraordinary.
Rueben had been hired to write a series of civil liberties cases that he would locate, investigate
and report in the National Guardian. While he was in New Jersey investigating on several civil
right cases, he talked to Arthur Brown of the N.J. Civil Rights Congress who was representing
another case and was told about the Horner case. Rueben was told that the Civil Rights
Congress was investigating the case and that a decision would be made in the next few weeks as
to whether they were going to be enter the case.
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others, he did plant in his reader’s mind the loaded words of “Scottsboro” and
“frame-up.”29
It was true that there had been a news blackout since the trial. The local
newspapers had covered the trial, but reported very little after the verdict. A
small black newspaper in Newark, the New Jersey Herald-News, reported on the
trial and tried to raise public awareness as to what was happening in Trenton, but
to no avail. So, how did the CRC become involved in the case? Elwood Dean,
the Educational Director for the Communist Party of New Jersey, reported that
Mitchell “appealed to the Communist Party of Mercer County” and not to the CRC
originally.

Clifford Moore agreed with this assessment. He reported on

Mitchell’s last visit to the Trenton NAACP, when he told her that everything was
proceeding in the appeal process that she threatened and did go to the “Civil
Right Congress, the address having supplied by Ruth Rabstein.” Rabstein, who
was on the NAACP board, was married to Manuel Cantor, the Chairman of the
Communist Party of Mercer County. Additionally, Claire Neikind wrote that
during the conversation with the NAACP, Mitchell said, “All right, then I’ll go to
the Communists. God knows we couldn’t be no worse off than we are.”
some point, Mitchell sent a letter sent to the CRC.

At

How did Mitchell get the

address? Was it provided as Moore alleges, by Rabstein? Or the leaflet on the
sidewalk?30

29 Reuben Manuscript, 547; William A. Reuben, “Is There a ‘Scottsboro Case’ in Trenton,
N. J.?” National Guardian, October 25, 1948.
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Milly Salwen, a member of the Mercer County Communist Party, wrote the
first story that appeared in the New Jersey edition of the Worker. Eventually
three articles appeared in the Communist newspaper during September. Thus,
there is evidence that casts some doubt upon the leaflet story. However, the
Mitchell Narrative dramatizes the story of a desperate woman searching for help
and finding none until the CRC entered the case.31
Where had the CRC and Mercer County Communist Party been
throughout the late summer? They certainly condemned the verdict. Some
Progressives at the county level wanted to take this to the national party. Did the
Progressive presidential candidate Henry Wallace’s campaign in 1948 so occupy
Progressive and Communist groups in Mercer County that it prevented them
from making this case their own? It was indeed possible. What was the purpose
of the CRC leafleting in Trenton when there had been serious questions raised
about the Horner case, namely by the New Jersey Herald-News, as well as after
the verdict, the Communist Party of Mercer County? Clearly, a case that raised
serious legal and civil right questions was literally at the CRC’s doorstep. But it
must be remembered that it took Bessie Mitchell’s determination and rejection of
the NAACP’s tactics to force the CRC to comprehend the case in front on them.

26: Selected Branch Files, 1940–1955, Series B, reel 14; Claire Neikind, "The Case of the
Trenton Six-I: How a Murder Trial Became A Political Circus," The Reporter, May 1, 1951, 32.
31 Millen Salwen confirmed a letter being sent to the CRC. Salwen writing in Masses and
Mainstream, recounted the first meeting with Mitchell. She wrote, “A letter comes to us. It says, ‘I
want to see you. There are lots of things in the case I want to talk to you about. . .’ It is a guarded
letter. An appointment is arranged.” Milly Salwen, “Trenton Close-Up,” Masses and Mainstream 3,
no. 23 (March, 1950), 15.
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The Mitchell Narrative indicated that the NAACP would not help the men.
In fact, it did not refuse to help, but it had to conduct the case within its operating
procedures and not with mass pressure. And Mitchell refused that offer. This is
much different than refusing to help at all, as Mitchell alleged. Additionally, the
NAACP had been indirectly involved in the case. Official involvement meant
paying all the legal fees associated with it: $14,000 for the legal representation
and $10,000 for printing the official court record for the appeal as well as for
future legal fees. So clearly there were reasons why the NAACP opted to allow
the State to shoulder the financial responsibility, especially when it was apparent
that the legal team was highly qualified. After the verdict, the defense team
prepared the appeal with assistance from Clifford Moore. The NAACP and the
attorneys limited the legal issues to the courtroom, but to observers unfamiliar
with the appeal process, it seemed they were headed for another defeat.32
The CRC’s aggressive mass pressure approach seemed like a breath of
fresh air compared to the slow, methodical NAACP. The struggle for which
organization would best defend the interests of the working class was won by the
CRC, even though the evidence indicated the NAACP was assisting with the
appeals as they always had, within the confines of the courtroom. Once the
Mitchell Narrative became the dominant version the NAACP was put on the
defensive.
Once the contact with the Communist Party in New Jersey and with the
CRC was made, events accelerated. In November, the Worker, the Sunday

Trenton Evening Times, “Horner Murder Case Cost County $43,723; Fees Totaling
$14,000 for Lawyers,” October 13, 1948.
32
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edition of the Daily Worker, announced a formation of a statewide committee for
the six. In this article, the term “Trenton Six” was first used. The term remained.
The Pittsburgh Courier a national African-American newspaper, dispatched
William Smith to Trenton to report on the case. Out of his investigation, the
Courier printed three lengthy articles on the case.33
Even before the CRC were able to officially enter the case, Reuben
singlehandedly lifted the news black-out. The small local event became worldwide news, almost overnight. After reading a few of the Guardian articles, an
editor of the English weekly, Reynolds News, requested information from Rueben
about the case. The piece reached England and on December 19, 1948,
Reynolds News ran it under the banner headline, “They Must Die For Being
Black.” The story called Trenton the worst city in the North for police intimidation
for African-Americans. The paper also blamed the press for enticing “the
citizenry into a state bordering on cataleptic hysteria.” The United Press
International news agency picked up the story and sent it across their wires to all
major newspapers. Reuben continued to send his articles to Reynolds News,
which enabled the case to travel across Europe, bringing problems for the United
States government in the midst of the Cold War. For example, India made so
many inquiries to the United States government that the State Department was
required to contact Trenton for detailed information on the case. In England,
Lester Hutchinson, a member of the English Parliament, organized a British

33 Chester Apy, Jr., The Trenton Six (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University, 1954), 86;
Reuben Manuscript, 562.

187

Committee to Save the Trenton Six. Additionally, England's second largest
union, the Manchester and Salford Trade Council, voted to join the defense of
the Trenton Six.34
The news “exploded in Trenton like a V-2 rocket,” as Reuben described it.
On the 20th, the Trentonian began the opening salvo against the Reynolds News
story by claiming “We have known for some time of an undercover Communist
crusade to martyrize the convicted Horner killers, and to turn the Horner killing
into another Scottsboro case.” Suddenly, Trenton was identified with Scottsboro,
suggesting a “frame-up” of innocent men as the police brutalized and coerced
them into signing confessions.35
The reaction was not long in coming. Public Safety Director Andrew Duch
commented “there was absolutely no brutality on the part of the Trenton police.”
Clifford Moore of the NAACP denied the charge as well, adding the press
coverage “was completely fair.”36
On December 22, Dr. Sullivan, whose testimony was harmful to the
defendants, told the Trenton Times that Horace Wilson was innocent and “in no
way involved in the murder of William Horner.” He called it a “miscarriage of
justice.” He elaborated that several people had come to him and “volunteered
34 Trenton Evening Times, “Volpe Says Horner Case Up to the Courts,” December 20,
1948; “Cable from National Guardian to William Patterson,” January 12, 1949, Civil Rights
Congress, box 40, reel 20.
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new evidence that shows that Wilson could not have been implicated in the
crime.” He did not specify what new evidence, merely that he was turning it over
to his lawyers. 37

The Civil Rights Congress Gains Control
The first legal obstacle faced by Patterson was to persuade the Trenton
Six to allow the CRC to represent them in the appeal process. On January 1949,
William Patterson, former United States Attorney O. John Rogge, and Solomon
Golat went to the Death House in Trenton State Prison to talk to the defendants.
McKinley Forrest's brother had earlier retained Frank S. Katzenbach III for the
first trial and intended to remain with him for the appeal process. The scene was
surreal. The court-appointed attorneys for the first trial, relatives of the
defendants, and attorneys from the CRC were taken to Death Row. The
defendants were in adjoining cells. At the end of the hall was the doorway
leading to the death chamber. The court-appointed attorneys for the first trial
were given time by Warden George Page to talk to them first. They told the five
men that they done their best for them, believed in their innocence, and they
would do everything possible to win a new trial for them. Then the Warden
allowed the counsel from the CRC to talk to them. Patterson told them that he
represented an organization that fought to save men who had been framed. He
reminded them of the Scottsboro case and how they were able to rescue nine
African-American boys from certain death. Then pointing toward the electric
chair, he said, "Your lawyers have already brought you this close. If you don't
37
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take our help, you will burn. If you sign with us, we'll all stick together and see
that you walk out of this place." Horace Wilson and John MacKenzie were not
convinced and announced they were staying with their original counsels. James
Thorpe's father, who had accompanied the CRC counsel to the prison that day,
told his son to sign the document. Collis English and Ralph Cooper followed and
signed as well. The CRC was now officially involved in the case.38
The legal team that the CRC had assembled was stellar. O. John Rogge,
William L. Patterson, and Emanuel H. Bloch were all prominent civil liberty
attorneys. Rogge joined the bar in 1925 and served as Assistant United States
Attorney General in charge of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice
from 1939 until 1941. In 1943, he was named Special Assistant Attorney
General of the United States to prosecute fifty defendants charged with sedition.
Rogge served in that capacity until 1946, when he retired to the practice of
private law. Patterson was active in many civil rights cases, such as Scottsboro,
Herndon, and Sacco-Vanzetti. Bloch specialized in civil and criminal cases with
a particular emphasis on civil liberties. He would later gain his most notable
reputation as the defense attorney for Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. 39
The new defense counsel swung into full gear once English, Cooper, and
Thorpe signed the necessary documents. The Trenton Times announced the
38

Milly Salwen, “Trenton Close-Up,” Masses and Mainstream 3, no. 23 (March, 1950), 19

- 20.
39 Trenton Evening Times, “New Lawyers Enter Horner Case Defense,” January 21,
1949; Albert E. Kahn, “The Case of O. John Rogge,” Masses and Mainstream 5, no. 1, January,
(1952), 15 – 21; Ralph Cooper, Collis English, and James H. Thorpe, "Memorandum In Support
of Plaintiffs' Motion For A Temporary Injunction and In Opposition To Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss,” United States District Court, District of New Jersey, Civil Action No.. 1036-49, Located
in the University of Pennsylvania Law Library, Biddle Law Library, Philadelphia, PA.

190

change on January 21, 1949. Patterson's plans were quite simple: issue press
releases, hand out leaflets, and organize mass rallies featuring Trenton Six
relatives and other prominent civil rights leaders. As with the Scottsboro and
Herndon cases, mass attention on the local and international level was
imperative. The entrance of the CRC into the case renewed the struggle with the
NAACP over the conduct of the defense. Even before they had received the
defendants’ consent to represent them, Patterson had sent groups of volunteers
to distribute leaflets of a highly inflammatory and controversial nature entitled
"Lynching Northern Style” in the Trenton area. The front cover page depicted a
white judge holding a gavel with a rope attached to the neck of one of six AfricanAmericans. On page one, a white hand belonging to a police officer was holding
a police baton or billy club ready to hit the black figure in the picture. The second
page was the most revealing. In this drawing, the police officer had a black face,
which represented something sinister, but white hands. The officer was assisting
the woman, clearly Mrs. Horner, by placing one hand on her back as to guide
her, while the other hand held her arm. On page three, the judge was now
illustrated as wearing the hood of the Klan Klux Klan. On the last page of the
leaflet, financial support was sought from the reader so that the "Lynch Rope"
could be cut.40
The CRC planned a protest rally in mid-January with Paul Robeson, the
chairman of the Committee to Free the Trenton Six, a fund raising arm of the

40 Committee to Free the Trenton Six, “Lynching Northern Style,” Civil Rights Congress,
(1948), Special Collections/University Archives, Rutgers University Libraries, New Brunswick, NJ.
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CRC that visibly demonstrated the growing split in the local branch. Participants
at the meeting quickly divided between those who favored the Committeeplanned event on January 28 and those from the NAACP, who opposed it.
Clifford R. Moore, the spokesman for the Trenton chapter of the NAACP,
informed the crowd the Six could be freed only by an orderly process of appeal,
and not by any whipping up of hysteria. He also told the people that U.S.
Attorney General Tom Clark had listed the CRC as a subversive organization.
He warned that if anyone signed a petition, which was circulated by the CRC
about the Trenton Six case, it "would endanger future prospects of obtaining a
position in any public agency of the Federal or local government." It did not deter
the group who supported the mass meeting as they continued to sell tickets
during the meeting.41
Moore continued with the attacks throughout the next few weeks, arguing
that the case should not be settled in the newspapers, but in a court of law. He
further called upon all good Americans to condemn the mass action employed by
the CRC. Those who could not understand the danger behind the activities of
the CRC, according to Moore, had to be dupes of the communists.42
Bruce Bliven, writing in The New Republic, echoed the same line when he
wrote that Communists:
Started a tremendous uproar, designed more to prove that the
American courts are incapable of justice than to get the defendants
Trenton Evening Times, “Plan for Rally, Splits Backers Of Aid For 6 in Horner Death,”
January 14, 1949.
41
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off. They also raised a big defense fund and as usual, outsiders
suspected that part of this money was being diverted to other
purposes. A lot of the 'best people' of New Jersey, already hostile
to the defendants because they were Negroes, were now hostile also
because they had help from the Communists.43
In spite of the criticism, the CRC continued to wage an aggressive campaign to
create public awareness. The January mass protest, which the local NAACP in
Trenton had tried to stop, was conducted on January 28th. More than 800
people gathered in Moose Hall in Trenton to hear Paul Robeson thunder:
I am coming home to fight this case . . It could have been my Paul
in that jail. It could have been me . . . Sure, they ride high as long as
they've got guns and sticks. But they're afraid of what is happening
here tonight!44
On January 19, 1949, the New Jersey Chapter of the CRC traveled to
Washington to speak to their representatives about the Trenton Six case. The
Trenton Times reported that the group was "strong in numbers and wrath" as
they spoke to representatives in the nation's capital. One of the group, Walter
Brown, stated that the arrest "was political and another part of the general
process to keep the Negro in his place." In February 1949, the Trenton Six story
was broadcast nationwide on the ABC radio program, “Let The People Speak,”
sponsored by the United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of America.
The thirty-minute program told the story in a question and answer format with
Arthur Gaeth, a leading commentator with the Mutual Radio Network, as the
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moderator. His guests were Bessie Mitchell, the sister of Collis English, and O.
John Rogge. Additionally, Patterson appeared on WCBS Radio a month later in
attempt to get the New York newspapers and other national newspapers to
report on the Trenton Six case. Patterson noted during the interview "for more
than a year now, there has extended an almost complete blackout by the New
York papers, and not for lack of its being called to their attention, either.”45
The CRC was not only working to build a national and international
awareness of this case through the media, but also building a network of popular
support among the people. Rhoda Buxbaum, Executive Secretary of the New
Jersey Chapter of the CRC, issued a directive instructing each chapter on how to
construct a network to generate popular support. She remarked that the leaflet
"Lynching Northern Style" "has elicited more praise and comment than any other
recent publication of its kind. . . We want to literally snow the State under with
these pamphlets—get them into the hands of thousands of people." Buxbaum
further suggested that each chapter should plan mass meetings to generate
publicity for the case and organize petition drives. Memos from the national
office with chronological fact sheets of the case and additional suggestions were
sent to all chapters throughout the country. It became the top priority of the CRC
national office to energize local chapters so they could in turn mobilize the
masses. William Lawrence, Executive Secretary of the New York Chapter, wrote
Trenton Evening Times, “Civil Rights Group Flays Horner Case,” January 20, 1949;
“Transcript of ABC Radio Program, Let the People Speak,” Civil Rights Congress, box 40, reel
20; Transcript of WCBS Radio Program, "CBS Views the Press #94", March 19, 1949, Civil
Rights Congress, box 40, reel 20. Patterson was right with this assessment of the coverage for
there was little national coverage, outside local coverage or by the Daily Worker, the official
newspaper of the Communist Party.
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"their fate is not in the hands of the court alone. Their fate is in our hands too.
Only a tremendous protest movement of the people can save these men." 46
Leading the way was Bessie Mitchell, who had come a long way from her
first public appearance at a Henry Wallace rally in September 1948 in Newark,
New Jersey, to speaking to thousands in Madison Square Garden. The CRC
sent her on a three month speaking trip across America, helping garner
significant donations at the rallies.47
The CRC was heavily involved in fundraising to finance the appeal to the
State Supreme Court and the mobilization effort. All the literature from the CRC
requested contributions, and the CRC also targeted specific individuals for
contributions. This process involved hand written notes, primarily written by
Bessie Mitchell. Sometimes, other relatives of the Trenton Six wrote letters, too.
In a typical letter, Mitchell related the simple details and then added:
But my brother and the other five men were sentenced to the
electric chair. Then I heard about the Civil Rights Congress, and
I went and told them my story. And now a lot of people know what
the police in Trenton tried to do. Only the people can save my
brother. That's why I am asking you to help. Thank You.48

46 Rhonda Buxbaum, “Memorandum from Rhonda Buxbaum to all N.J. Civil Rights
Congress Chapters, March 14, 1949, Civil Rights Congress, box 40 reel 20, box 40;
““Memorandum from William Lawrence to all N.Y. Chapters February 21, 1949, Civil Rights
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With every meeting, articles, and interviews, the Mitchell Narrative was
told over and over again. The NAACP did not organize a response, and when
the president of the Trenton NAACP Branch sought guidance as to whether it
should cooperate with the CRC in the planned January meeting and other
activities, the national office instructed him "to keep the local branch out of the
Trenton Six case and to shun the Trenton rally." The NAACP did not want to be
seen on the same platform with an organization that had been labeled as
subversive. But this position was becoming untenable. Relatively quickly, the
NAACP and other groups such as the ACLU and the Congress of International
Organizations (CIO) were under intense pressure from their members to get
involved. The pressure upon these organizations intensified the struggle with the
CRC.

On February 28, 1949, it was announced that the New Jersey CIO had

voted to support the defense of the Trenton Six. However, State CIO President
Carl Holderman announced "the CIO would not join in the hysterical appeal by an
organization listed as subversive by the Department of Justice. . . the CIO was
not going to follow the Communist Party line and exploit Negroes for political
purposes."49
For the NAACP, the Trenton case looked very similar to the Scottsboro
case. Popular pressure bore down on them. In March of 1949, Marion Wynn
Perry of the NAACP Defense Fund spoke at a CRC sponsored rally in Newark,
New Jersey. After Perry had finished her speech, Patterson in his remarks,
49 Bob Queen, “Jersey Rambler,” The Telegram, March 6, 1949; Trenton Evening Times,
“NAACP Won’t Join Defense Aid Rally in Horner Case,” Jan 18 1949; Clifford Moore argued that
public demonstration could possible prejudice the case and there was no need for fund raising
since Mercer County was required by law to pay for the appeals; Trenton Evening Times, “CIO
Joins Fight For Doomed 6,” February 28, 1949.
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"ripped to shreds" the NAACP. Perry was outraged and left the theater. She
wrote a letter to Thurgood Marshall informing him of the situation. Marshall
released to the press a copy of the letter that he had sent to Patterson. Marshall
wrote that Perry had gone to the meeting to announce that the NAACP had
decided to file a brief of amicus curiae on behalf of the Horner case. After the
decision was made to file the brief, he had decided that it was in the best interest
of the Trenton Six for harmony between the NAACP and CRC, so Perry was
allowed to address the meeting. Patterson replied to Marshall that he had "only
castigated some of the NAACP leaders," meaning local Trenton NACCP leaders
such as Clifford Moore. Patterson then appealed to the NAACP to help free the
Trenton Six. In the public eye, it looked like the NAACP was out of touch with the
average African-American. The CRC gained another ally when Arthur G. Hayes,
general counsel for ACLU, held a press conference on March 17, 1949, to
another its support of the Trenton Six case.50
In the battle for popular opinion, the CRC clearly had won big. Hugh
Graham, writing in The Nation, summed it up:
Whether the appeal wins or loses, the Communists will make
great capital of the outcome. Yet it cannot be denied that if it
were not for the Communists, and their friends, the case might
have been railroaded through without march of a stir. It was
the Civil Rights Congress, an organization on the Attorney
General's subversive list, which brought Rogge into the defense
and dug out many facts which have since appeared in
non-communist press reports of the affair.51
50 Bob Queen,” Jersey Rambler,” The Telegram, March 6, 1949," Daily Worker, "”NAACP
Counsel Answers CRC Slur," March 8, 1949; Trenton Evening Times “Patterson Appeals to
NAACP To Help Free 6 Trenton Negroes,” March 18, 1949.

51

Hugh Graham, "Due Process in New Jersey" The Nation, March 1949, p. 359.

197

The Appeal To The State Supreme Court Of New Jersey
The CRC kept the pressure up even after its lead attorney, O. John
Rogge, filed the appeal briefs on February 28, 1949. New Jersey Governor
Alfred E. Driscoll found more reporters asking questions about the Trenton Six
case. He insisted, "the defendants were indicted by a grand jury, tried in one of
the longest trials in Mercer County and found guilty. No comment should be
made until the judiciary has completed its work."

Meanwhile, the CRC

organized a “caravan to Trenton” on April 12, 1949. Patterson announced that
the purpose of the trip was to "ask Governor Driscoll to use his power to remove
Prosecutor Volpe, and to order the attorney general to investigate the vicious
frame-up if the Trenton Six." The CRC intended to hand deliver a fourteen-page
petition charging Volpe with misconduct. These accusations against Volpe
included: "the extortion of confessions from innocent peoples; the coaching of the
key witness in the case; the suppression of vital evidence; and appeals to
passion, bigotry and prejudice during the course of the trial." The petition called
upon Driscoll "to remove this blot of shame from the State of New Jersey, to
expunge this prime example to the world of our hypocrisy." This petition against
Volpe occurred at a time when many African-Americans were outraged that
Volpe had been appointed honorary chairman of the Trenton Council on Human
Relations Brotherhood March. 52
On April 12, a group of 500 supporters of the CRC gathered in Trenton.
The demonstrators marched around the state capital maintaining a "two hour
New York Times, Tolerance Award Given to Driscoll,” March 24, 1949; Trenton
Evening Times, “500 Expected In Civil Rights Mass Protest,” April 12, 1949; "Petition to Governor
Alfred E. Driscoll For The Removal of Prosecutor Volpe" Civil Rights Congress, box 40, reel 20.
52
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singing picket line." The demonstrators carried placards with slogans of "Free
the Trenton Six", "Free the Trenton Six and Volpe must Go." and "Legal
Lynching, Jersey Style". They chanted: Governor Driscoll, listen to me.
The Trenton Six must go free. We won't take No! Volpe must go.53
On May 16, 1949, arguments were held in the New Jersey Supreme
Court. Thirteen lawyers either participated in or assisted with the preparation of
the defense briefs. There were three issues that the defense argued before the
Court: the judge did not have the jurisdiction to pronounce the sentence of
death, the charge relating to the jury's function to determine the punishment was
in error, and the request by the Prosecution to quash defense subpoenas to
produce records was in error.54
The Supreme Court ordered a new trial on June 30, 1949. The High Court
ruled that "one cannot be put to death for homicide unless there has been a
verdict . . . establishing in a specific terms his guilt of murder in the first degree."
On August 6, 1948, the foreman of the jury had announced that each of the
defendants were guilty. Judge Hutchinson had then imposed the death penalty,
explaining this was "the only sentence the law provides." The Court also rejected
the State's argument that since murder committed in the perpetration of a
53 Jimmie McGhee, “Hundreds Picket For the Six: Driscoll Refuses to See Delegation,”
New York Age, April 23, 1949.
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Defense Fund submitted a brief prepared by Herbert Tate, Marian Perry, and Thurgood Marshall.
Mario Volpe and Frank Lawton represented the State; "Trenton Evening Times, "High Court
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robbery was murder in the first degree, Judge Hutchinson was correct when he
sentenced them to death without the jury determining the degree. The Justices
also noted that in the original indictment, the defendants were not charged with
murder committed during a commission of a robbery. 55
The High Court noted a second error in the charge to the jury. Hutchinson
had charged the jury:
If you find that this killing was done in the commission or attempted
commission by these defendants or some of them of the robbery of
William Horner as a result of a common purpose . . . the punishment
of the defendant found to be guilty thereof under the law is death
unless the jury shall, by its verdict and as a part thereof . . .
recommend imprisonment at hard labor for life. . . There are no
restrictions or limitations placed on the jury by law as to the reasons
which may prompt such a recommendation.
The Court stated that the charge in this instance was "contradictory" in the
manner Hutchinson explained it to the jury. Hutchinson told the jury "there are no
restrictions" placed on the jury as to the reasons they may decide upon life
imprisonment instead of death. The Justices commented that although there was
not a statutory standard to be used in deciding death or life imprisonment for the
defendants, the jury, nevertheless, had to be governed by "consideration arising
out of the evidence." In the High Court's opinion, the explanation by Hutchinson
made it difficult for the jurors to understand when a jury could recommend life
imprisonment instead of settling upon the death penalty.56
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Supreme Court of New Jersey 1949, State v Cooper, Lexis-Nexis Academic Database
(Legal Records), pp. 547 – 551; State of New Jersey, Motion for Arrest of Judgment, Volume 16,
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Finally, the High Court identified a third error committed by Hutchinson,
the most egregious of all. During the trial, soda bottles had been presented as
the weapons used in the attack upon the Horner’s. The Trenton Police
Department and the State Police Identification Bureau tested the bottles for
fingerprints. However, the State never presented any evidence as to what was
found. Accordingly, the defense subpoenaed Captain Sjostrom of the State
Police ID Bureau, as well as the Trenton Director of Public Safety and other
police department officials. Sjostrom responded to the subpoena and was sworn
as a witness for the defense. The Prosecutor requested an offer of proof from
the defense. Defense attorney Katzenbach responded that the purpose was to
"show the nature and extent of the tests which were made in the laboratory."
Volpe objected and requested that the subpoenas be squashed. Volpe claimed
that the State Police was a "governmental agency" and the record made by the
laboratory was "confidential and not subject to subpoena." Hutchinson agreed
with the prosecutor adding that the "investigation made by the State Police
Bureau has a sort of a privilege."57
The High Court castigated the prosecution for its suppression tactics. It
noted:
There is no privilege known to the law which puts evidence of this
class beyond the reach of the accused. The State is not at liberty to
introduce such finding into evidence when it suits its purposes and
plead privilege when the evidence is sought by the accused. A rule

57 Ibid., Supreme Court of New Jersey 1949, State v Cooper, pp. 553 – 554; Supreme
Court of New Jersey 1949, State v Cooper, Lexis-Nexis Academic Database (Legal Records), p.
554.
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that would exclude such evidence when invoked by the accused
would be contrary to elemental justice and wholly alien to our
Anglo-American tradition . . . there is not a fair trial when evidence
substantially bearing upon the issue is suppressed or put beyond
the reach of the accused.58
The Court did not rule on the admissibility of the confessions, commenting
"our function is to order a new trial when the judgment is tainted with error."
However, they warned the lower court that when the case was retried to follow
the guidelines of the recent 1949 United States Supreme Court decisions
concerning the rules of admissibility, commenting, “to turn the detention of an
accused into a process of wrenching from him evidence which could not be
extorted in open court with all its safeguards, is so grave an abuse of power of
arrest as to offend the procedural standards of due process.” It is also important
to note that not all of the Justices concurred with all three findings of error.
Justice Oliphant dissented with regard to the first two errors, but all were
unanimous in the determination that the trial judge, in granting the motion to
squash the subpoena, had committed judicial error.59
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Reaction to the decision was swift and predictable. The CRC’s lead
attorney commented that the decision was a "major victory for civil liberties."
ACLU general counsel Arthur G. Hays noted that the "ruling was a great triumph
for American justice and fair play. It should also serve as a warning to some
police officials, who in their frenzy to get confessions and convictions, resort to
unfair and unconstitutional methods." Prosecutor Volpe "refrained from any
comment until he had an opportunity to study the opinion." Judge Hutchison
only stated, "I suppose they will be retried sometime in the fall when the new
session of Mercer County Court opens. That's all I can say at this time. I can't
discuss the case further.” The Trenton Six typically remained stoic; they
"accepted the news without comment but with obvious satisfaction. About the
only display of emotion was a wide grin from one. The rest remained silent."60
The printed media had varying reactions to the meaning of the verdict. A
Trenton Times editorial entitled “Democratic Justice” was subdued, but continued
to attack the CRC: “It is unfortunate, of course, that partisans of the convicted
men determined to sensationalize the case through means not only questionable
but unethical and even unscrupulous.” But on a natural level, the media focused
on the larger issue of justice. Time magazine stated:
The State of New Jersey had no reason to feel proud of its solution
of the murder of aged William Horner. For five days in February
1948, the Trenton police turned the heat on six young Negro suspects,
finally got all but one to sign confessions that they were parties to
60 New York Times, "New Trials Ordered for 6 Negroes Under Death Sentence in
Jersey," July 1, 1949; Trenton Evening Times, "Supreme Court Give Trenton 6 New Trial,” June
30, 1949; Harry M. Blitman, “Reactions Vary Over ‘6’ Verdict,” Trentonian July 1, 1949;
Trentonian, “Horner Case Re-Trial Slated in September,” July 1, 1949.

203

robbing old man Horner in his shop, and to beating him to death with
a pop bottle. . . Last week Jersey justice redeemed itself. The New
Jersey Supreme Court found that the Trenton Six had been convicted
without getting their due rights under the law, set aside their sentence
and ordered a new trial.61
The first benefit of the successful appeal for the Trenton Six was the move
from solitary confinement in the death house to the general prison population in
the county jail. On July 13, the men were moved to Mercer County Jail to await
their new trial. The defendants were able to visit with relatives and friends for the
first time in almost a year. The struggle of Bessie Mitchell was now half
complete. 62

61 Trenton Evening Times, Editorial, "Democratic Justice,” July 5, 1949; Time Magazine,
"National Affairs-New Jersey,” July 11, 1949, p. 21.
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CHAPTER 5
“A MILITANT, FORTHRIGHT AND FEARLESS FIGHT”: THE COLD WAR
ENTERS THE CASE
“I had learned that the best defense is an offense”1
William Patterson
Following the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in June, 1949, the
battery of CRC defense attorneys immediately went on the offensive. The case
was reprimanded back to Judge Hutchinson for the retrial. In early July, the
defense immediately made an application for bail for the Trenton Six. Judge
Hutchinson scheduled a formal hearing for July 22 to hear the arguments for bail.
O. John Rogge charged, “We have been through a 44-day trial with 6,000 pages
of testimony and what do we have? Nothing but a bunch of distorted confessions
and suppressed fingerprint evidence . . . These confessions were extorted and
can never be used." Assistant Prosecutor Frank Lawton countered, "I know of
no case in New Jersey where defendants convicted of murder, have been
permitted bail after winning an appeal." Judge Hutchinson reserved his decision
until the following week. It was unlikely the defense truly believed the judge
would grant bail. Rather, this motion was intended to send a message to the
State that these new attorneys were going to aggressively fight for their clients.

1 William L. Patterson, “Statement by William L. Patterson,” Civil Rights Congress, box 81
reel 20, box 81.
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Importantly, the motions also kept the case in the news for the purpose of public
awareness.2
A few days later, on July 26, the defense issued subpoenas to the State
Police Identification Bureau, Trenton Police Chief William Dooling, and Chief of
Mercer County Detectives Frank Naples in an attempt to force the State to
release the suppressed fingerprint evidence. A hearing was sentenced for July
29. Hutchinson rejected the application for bail as the hearing began. Next, the
prosecution produced its records of the soda bottles analysis. The evidence and
subsequent testimony of Lieutenant Elvin Sharpe of the Trenton Police
Department indicated that the bottle lacked fingerprints. Sharpe testified that he
"sprayed the bottle with a silver powder, found no fingerprints, and then wiped
the bottle clean with a rag." Rogge was shocked at the news; he renewed the
application for bail. "I do it on the contention that the state has no case," he
thundered.

Again, Hutchinson denied the motion, saying, "Though the

testimony taken today adds something to your contention, it is not enough to
change my ruling that constitutional law of proof being evident and presumption
great, are evident in this case."3
The reaction to this disclosure was quick and pointed. The Daily Worker
proclaimed "Cop Admits He Erased Evidence in Trenton 6 Case." The article

2

William Patterson, The Man Who Cried Genocide, An Autobiography (New
York: International Publishers Co. Inc., 1971), 166; Harry M. Blitman, “Judge Reserves Deciding
on Bail for ‘Trenton Six,’” Trentonian, July 23, 1949.
3 Harry M. Blitman, “Bail Twice Denied to ‘Six,’” Trentonian, July 30, 1949; “Transcript of
Hearing July 29, 1949”, Civil Rights Congress, box 81 reel 47.
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noted that Judge Hutchinson’s “former calm arrogance seemed thoroughly
shaken by the world-wide protests."

William Patterson charged:

This is another example of a vicious frame-up this case has been.
We demand the immediate removal of the prosecutor and Judge
Hutchinson. The judge has aided and abetted the frame-up. He
has denied our motion to have the fingerprint evidence produced
at the trial, but permitted Volpe to use confessions extorted from
the defendants. Hutchinson also reported the jury verdict of "guilty
of murder in the first degree," when as the Supreme Court showed,
the jury merely said "guilty."
Patterson believed that Hutchinson demonstrated “unspeakable arrogance and
cynicism contained in that sentence of death which was no error of judgment.”
Patterson accused the judge of complicity in the frame-up, charged him with
judicial unfairness, and claimed he had altered court documents. This was the
beginning of the serious problems between the judge and the CRC attorneys. 4
Meanwhile the CRC continued to wage the struggle for public awareness
outside of the courtroom. They expanded their focus onto college campuses and
generated strong support for the Trenton Six among students. In March,
Princeton University professor Joseph Brown heard Bessie Mitchell’s story in
Elihu S. Hicks, “Cop Admits He Erased Evidence in Trenton 6 Case," Daily Worker,
August 1, 1949; “Transcript of Hearing July 29, 1949,” Civil Rights Congress, box 81 reel 47;
Hutchinson pronounced sentence upon the Six commenting, “the jury has found each of you and
all of you guilty of murder in the first degree, without recommendation of life imprisonment.” State
of New Jersey, “Motion for Arrest of Judgment,” Volume 16, 5872a, (1948). The jurors did not
specify as Hutchinson commented, they merely reported guilty. In the N.J. Supreme Court
decision which reversed the judgment and awarded a new trial stated, “The judge did not have
the jurisdiction to pronounce the sentence of death. The verdict was “guilty: merely, and thus
none of the accused was convicted of murder in the first degree. The return to the writ of error
certifies that the accused were “found guilty in manner and form as they stand charged under the
indictment and are guilty of murder in the first degree;” and that on the poll each juror affirmed his
concurrence in that verdict. But, by an order made by the judge in the Mercer County Court on
January 13, 1949, the return was amended to accord with the fact as entered in the clerk’s
minutes, and so the verdict of the jury as to each of the accused is shown to be ‘guilty,” without
more.” Supreme Court of New Jersey 1949, State v Cooper, Lexis-Nexis Academic Database
(Legal Records), pp. 547 – 548; “William Patterson to Editor of the New York Herald Tribune,”
December 20, 1949, Reuben Papers, Civil Rights Congress--Correspondence, box 1, file 1.
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New York City. He returned to campus and organized students into a research
group. They traveled to neighboring Trenton and to New York City to examine
the public record as well as talk with the defense attorneys. Several rallies were
held on campus that month. Brown challenged the students, “this is something
we should get excited about, the people should rumble.” Eventually, the group
attracted the attention of the student newspaper, The Daily Princetonian, and on
March 28, 1949, the campus newspaper began a series of five articles exploring
the facets of the case. On March 30, an editorial informed the readers why The
Daily Princetonian was devoting time to the Trenton Six at all. The editor stated
their articles were not designed to prove the men were innocent, but to argue the
case “should receive a thorough review both by proper judiciary bodies and by
the public at large,” due to the many questions the case had raised.5
This editorial expressed the motivations of many who would ultimately join
the CRC and others in the fragile coalition of the Trenton Six defense. Many
were not convinced all of the men were innocent, but definitely were concerned
about judicial fairness. In response, a Trenton Times editorial asked, “What
Misconduct?” that criticized Professor Brown. The editorial chided the students
for “insist[ing] the trial was marked by injustice,” and belittled Brown’s comment
that “we don’t know if the Negroes are guilty or innocent. All we know is that the

5 David S. North, “Trenton Murder Trial Called Gross Injustice,” Daily Princetonian, March
28, 1949; Daily Princetonian, Editorial, “The Trenton Case,” March 30, 1949.
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trial was improperly conducted.” The editors ridiculed this notion since Brown did
not offer any evidence to support his assertion.6
In March 1949, the Young Progressives of America on the Syracuse
University campus heard about the Trenton Six. They invited one of the CRC
lawyers, O. John Rogge, to speak. Preparations were made to rent a local public
school for the meeting. However, just before the event, members of the
American Legion demanded that the city revoke the permit and the board of
education refuse to allow the meeting held on school property. Less than twentyfour hours before the meeting, the city acquiesced to the Legion’s demands. The
college group had to rent a new hall and resorted to using loud speaking
equipment to let the city know of the change in plans. One group stopped at a
favorite public meeting spot in the city. A university student, Irving Feiner,
mounted the small platform and began comparing the unfairness of the Trenton
Six’s trial to the lack of civil rights in Syracuse. Within a short time, two police
cars arrived. The officers listened for a few minutes, then informed Feiner to be
quiet.

A quarrel broke out between the police and Feiner and the others who

were him. Feiner was arrested and charged with disorderly conduct and using
derogatory language against the city officials. He was tried, found guilty, and
sentenced to thirty days. He appealed. The case ultimately went to the United
States Supreme Court. The court upheld his conviction. Upon serving his

6 Trenton Evening Times, Editorial, “What Misconduct,” April 25, 1949. Part of the
possible hostility was rooted in 1948 Brown was one of the Henry Wallace for President important
campaigners in Mercer County; See Chester Apy, Jr. The Trenton Six (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University, 1954), 99.
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sentence, he received notice from Syracuse University that he was no longer
affiliated with the school.7
On May 23, 1949, college students under the sponsorship of the CRC met
with Eleanor Roosevelt and presented a petition to the United Nations Human
Rights Commission requesting they investigate “the vicious frame-up of six
innocent men and the brutal treatment to which they have been subjected is
clearly a violation of their constitutional rights and of their dignity as human
beings.”8
Another weapon in the CRC arsenal was the use of popular culture to
build popular support. For example, John Wexley's play, a dramatization of the
Scottsboro trial entitled "They Shall Not Die," was performed in many cities. But
the play was banned in Trenton. Safety Commissioner Andrew Duch refused to
issue the permit, arguing it would “incite disorder, might influence possible jurors
. . . and was not the democratic way of assuring justice.” The Trenton Six story
was also told in folk or pop music. The Weavers, a highly successful singing
7 George Sheldrick, “Syracuse ALP Fights Attack on Free Assembly, Daily Worker, March
17, 1949; Youth and Student Division of Civil Rights Congress, “Action Bulletin,” May 13, 1949,
Reuben Papers, Civil Rights Congress—General Correspondence, box 1, file 1; Daily Worker,
“Syracuse ALP Fights Attack on Free Assembly,” March 17, 1949. Feiner v. New York, 340 US
315 (1951); Justice Hugo Black dissented writing, “a young college student has been sentenced
to the penitentiary for the unpopular views he expressed on issues interest while lawfully making
a street corner speech in Syracuse, N.Y. . . Even a partial [340 U.S. 315, 323] abandonment of
this rule marks a dark day for civil liberties in our Nation. But still more has been lost today. Even
accepting every "finding of fact" below, I think this conviction makes a mockery of the free speech
guarantees of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The end result of the affirmance here is to
approve a simple and readily available technique by which cities and states can with impunity
subject all speeches, political or otherwise, on streets or elsewhere, to the supervision and
censorship of the local police. I will have no part or parcel in this holding which I view as a long
step toward totalitarian authority. . . Criticism of public officials will be too dangerous for all but
the most courageous.”

“Statement of the Youth and Student Delegation to the Human Rights Commission of
the United Nations on the Case of the Trenton Six,” May 23, 1949, Civil Rights Congress, box 40,
reel 20.
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group, recorded with Paul Robeson, CRC lawyers, William Patterson, and O.
John Rogge, the “The Trenton Six, Part I and II," a nine minute song and
dialogue recounting of the case.9
In every CRC speech, mailing, and even in the Weaver’s “Trenton Six,”
the appeal was made for the aroused public to write to Governor Driscoll of New
Jersey calling for an investigation. One such letter from Robert and Anita
Bourbonnais of Ann Arbor, Michigan, was reflective of the scores that Driscoll
received. They drew on a common theme of an unfair trial and called upon the
governor to intervene in the case because it “stinks way out here!” They
informed Driscoll that although they live in Ann Arbor, “we are neither
Communists, radicals, nor members of any campus organizations, but merely
American citizens.” The letter was closed with a post script, “We have white
skins.”10
The NAACP was also feeling the impact of the CRC’s aggressive attack.
In December 1949, the NAACP reported a loss of 168,000 members during the
previous eleven months. The list of reasons varied from an increase in the yearly

Trenton Evening Times, “Duch Play Ban Is Hit by Hays,” December 27 1949; "Benefit to
Aid Negroes' Defense,” New York Times, May 31, 1949; The Weavers, “The Trenton Six, Parts I
and II,” Goodnight Irene: The Weavers 1949-1953, The Weavers. Bear Family Records. BCD
15930-4EK. CD, 2000; see also Dave Samuelson and Richard Weize, "The Weavers
Discography 1949 - 1953", Bear Family Records; Soundtrack of "The Trenton Six: Parts 1 & 2,
reissued by Bear Family Records, 1996. The Weavers, much like Bob Dylan or Joan Baez were
folk singers, had made a meteoric rise as the nation experienced a folk music revival in 1949 and
early 1950's. The Weavers rendition of popular hits of "On Top of Old Smoky" and "If I had a
Hammer" rose to the tops of the music charts. The Weavers spectacular rise came to a quick
end with the Cold War mentality. They were black-listed for their "leftist" political affiliations that
caused cancellations of their concerts. By 1953 the group had disbanded.
9

“Letter to Governor Alfred E. Driscoll,” April 18, 1949, Records of the Governor,
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dues to the unfavorable economic conditions. However, buried deeply in the
report were other reasons that were much more dangerous to the stability of the
NAACP, such as internal strife and “the generally unfavorable press which the
organization received at times.” Echoing these sentiments, Mark Hyman of the
Philadelphia Tribune commented, “For many years the NAACP was the colored
man’s Gibraltar. He could feel that he had least one port in the storm. But from
the national office on down, there is something missing. The whole thing is
falling apart.”11

Judge Hutchinson and Judicial Anti-Communism
Throughout the summer and fall of 1949, the CRC continued to wage an
aggressive campaign by challenging the state’s narrative of the case. It
suggested there was a possibility that Mr. Horner was murdered by someone
other than strangers. In September, the defense again made a demand that the
police department explain the whereabouts of Jerry Griswold and produce any
written statements that were taken from him. Griswold worked part time for
William Horner and had been staying in the first-floor store area when the murder
occurred. After the murder, Griswold disappeared. There had always been
rumors circulating around Trenton that Griswold might had something to do with
the killing. The rumor mill even suggested Griswold and Mrs. Horner had been
romantically involved. The defense subpoenaed Volpe for his records

11 Washington Afro-American, “NAACP Loses 168,000 in ’49, Economic Factors, Larger
Fee Blamed,” December 13, 1949; Mark Hyman, “People Are Talking About,” Philadelphia
Tribune, May 24, 1949.
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concerning Griswold. However, there was no need for subpoenas because on
the day of the hearing, the police brought Griswold to Trenton before any
subpoenas could be issued.12
In November, the CRC announced a $1,000 reward for “information
leading to the arrest and conviction of the real murderer of William Horner.” The
money was donated by a national Progressive Party supporter and the daughter
of Cyrus Hall McCormick, Anita McCormick Blaine. Patterson announced this
action because “law enforcement in New Jersey is sitting on its guilt-stained
hands in order to perpetuate its own frame-up of the innocent Trenton Six
Negroes.” Clearly, Patterson was charging that law enforcement, prosecution,
and the court system had erred, for the real killer had evaded capture. This
inflammatory action had immediate consequences in Trenton, as police tore
down the posters that had been posted throughout the city. However, they did
not interfere with Bessie Mitchell as she handed them out on Trenton streets.13
At the same time, CRC defense attorney Rogge wrote a letter to New
Jersey Attorney General Parsons charging that the Trenton Six case “was
racially motivated.” Parsons replied that the allegation was false for "the New
Jersey chapter of the NAACP had concluded that this matter involved legal
issues which provide no basis for mass or public appeal." On December 16, in a
12
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“Letter to the Editor,” Clifford Moore agreed there was no evidence of
discrimination by Hutchinson or Volpe. However, he noted the “NAACP
objections . . . are not to any conduct during the trial of the case, but to the
manner in which police obtained the confessions.” Again, Moore established the
NAACP’s argument in opposition to the CRC’s contention that the case was a
“frame-up” or unfairness in the trial. Moore’s comment could have been read by
the CRC as another attempt of the NAACP to curry favor with the white power
structure in Trenton.14
As 1949 came to a close, the case took a dramatic turn. In December, the
CRC continued its offensive, this time as pre-trial motions were being
considered.

On December 5, defense counsel announced that subpoenas were

to be served upon Public Safety Commissioner Andrew Duch, Trenton
Detectives William Stanley and Donald Toft, and the Trenton Police Department.
Additionally, it intended to seek access to the statements of Mrs. Horner to
Volpe. The hearing was scheduled for December 9, but the judge was ill and
the new date was set for December 16. The defense team also announced that
it intended to renew its application for bail. At the December 16 hearing,
Hutchinson denied the application for bail, as well as the subpoenas for police
reports, commenting that it was only "a fishing expedition."

He also appointed

attorneys for the upcoming trial. Frank Katzenbach remained as counsel for
McKinley Forrest, Robert Queen for Horace Wilson, and James Waldron for John
Mackenzie. The CRC attorneys represented Ralph Cooper, Collis English, and
Clifford Moore, Letter to the Editor, “NAACP Explains,” Trenton Evening Times,
December 19, 1949.
14
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James Thorpe. The judge set January 9, 1950, as the date for the beginning of
the retrial.15
As the hearing concluded and the attorneys were preparing to leave the
courtroom, Hutchinson told them to stay. He had something to tell them. What
followed was a bombshell for the CRC--Hutchinson barred the New York State
based CRC attorneys from the Court. He began by reminding Rogge, Patterson,
and Bloch they had been "admitted to practice in this court . . . as a matter of
courtesy." The judge charged they had violated the Rules Governing the Courts
of New Jersey, primarily Canons 1, 15, 16, 20, 22, 26, and 32. The judge
defended his position by saying, “Your temporary admission to practice in this
court in this case was a pure license and a conditional once subject to revocation
at any time by this court." Hutchinson noted, "almost from the moment you
entered this case . . . your conduct throughout has been consistently in violation
of one or more of some seven canons of professional ethics.” He signaled
Rogge out for a special comment: "almost immediately after your admonition by
the Supreme Court not to publicly discuss the case, that same evening you made
a public address upon the merits of the case and of the appeal." The judge
accused them of inflammatory and reckless comments:
All of your expressions, both verbal and printed, have vehemently
denounced the trial of these defendants as unfair, biased and
prejudiced in varying terms running from a "a travesty of justice"
through the gamut of "an outrage", "a northern Scottsboro case",
to a "lynching". In all of your statements you have deliberately
distorted the facts with a view, among other thing, of stirring up
15 New York Times, “Three New York Lawyers Barred In Jersey for Murder Case
Tactics,” December 17, 1949
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unfavorable public opinion against this court.
He maintained the defendants had a fair trial:
The fact is, as I have been told by those who heard and attended
the trial, as you did not, that it was a manifestly fair one in which
the rights of the defendants were scrupulously and meticulously
safeguarded, as was intended by the court, even to the point of
going beyond legal necessity.
Hutchinson criticized them for a litany of activities: distributing pamphlets,
circulating “Lynching Northern Style” and the “$1000 Reward” posters throughout
the city and state, picketing the State capital before the appeal to high court, and
“slandering the judge and prosecutor and the State witnesses” throughout 1949.
His last accusation concerned the rumor that the CRC collected money for the
Trenton Six, but actually spent it in defense of “another case in another
jurisdiction, the defense of which would have far less popular appeal.” It was
understood he was referring to the trial of the “Communist 11” in New York City.16

16 Rogge indicated that New Jersey Supreme Court Chief Justice Arthur T. Vanderbilt
read a New York Times account of the January 26, 1949 press conference in which Rogge stated
he joined in the Trenton Six case, “because I regard it as the northern Scottsboro case.” Trenton
Evening Times, “Rogge Brands Trenton Trial Scottsboro Case,” January 26, 1949. According to
Rogge, Vanderbilt contacted the New Jersey associates with the CRC in New Jersey, Solomon
Golat and Clarence Talisman of Newark, New Jersey instructing him to contact Rogge to write a
letter of apology the next day or be summoned to New Jersey Supreme Court to explain his
actions. Rogge did send a letter to Vanderbilt, but the Chief Justice did not consider it to be an
acceptable apology, so he order the entire defense team of the CRC to appear. Additionally, it
was reported there was to be a public rally in Trenton that night with Rogge and others scheduled
to speak. Vanderbilt asked Rogge had held the press conference as reported in the newspapers.
Rogge replied he had. Rogge was asked if he had intended that his words were to reflect on the
trial judge, Hutchinson. He said that was so, but told Vanderbilt that he had complete confidence
in the upper court. Vanderbilt then asked Rogge if he understood the custom of the court was not
to utter public statements, but to speak only in court briefs and in open court. Rogge replied if
this was true, that would be violation of his duty as a lawyer to his clients and First Amendment
privileges. Vanderbilt asked him about the upcoming rally. Rogge told him that he was going to
appear and speak at the rally. After Vanderbilt’s exhorted him, “Once an attorney has accepted a
retainer which takes him into court, he assumes special obligations which definitely bar him from
public discussion of the case. . . Judge Vanderbilt concluded by announcing that would leave the
matter of my speaking in Trenton to my sound judgment. He expressed confidence that I would
do nothing to violate the proprieties of the case.” O. John Rogge, Our Vanishing Civil Liberties,
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Hutchinson offered several reasons for his decision. Although his action
raised serious constitutional questions about the right of defendants to maintain
counsel of their own choosing, he claimed he was doing this to preserve “our
democratic and constitutional form of government . . . that the dignity of our court
is secure . . . the rights of the defendants to receive a fair trial by a jury of their
peers is insured . . . and the rights of the public are carefully preserved.”
Hutchinson concluded by stating the court would appoint new lawyers for Collis
English, Ralph Cooper, and James Thorpe once they had decided upon their
new attorneys. But for all practical purposes, the CRC was out of the case.17
What caused this unprecedented decision to bar lawyers of the
defendants’ own choosing? Gerald Horne surmised that perhaps Hutchinson
“recalled how different that Alabama case [Scottsboro] would have been if ILD
had been ousted early on, so he booted out the CRC lawyers." 18 Hutchinson did
realize that this retrial was going to be quite different. The older defense team
had been supplemented by a group of aggressive, top-notch legal minds. But
there is another explanation. Progressive Party leader James Imbrie wrote that

(New York, Gaer Associates, 1949), 263 -267. Rogge appeared at the Trenton meeting that
night;
All quotes from Judge Hutchinson are from “Judge Charles P. Hutchinson
Memorandum to O. John Rogge, Solomon Golat, Emanuel Bloch, and William Patterson,”
December 16, 1949, Civil Rights Congress, box 81 reel 47, box 81; For the full text of
Hutchinson’s Comments see, “Text of Court's Statement Removing Trenton 6 Counsel,” Trenton
Evening Times, December 19, 1949.
17

18 Gerald Horne. Communist Front? The Civil Rights Congress, 1946 - 1956
(Rutherford: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1988), 133.
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Hutchinson’s decision “officially injected the Communist issue into the case.”19
The undercurrent of anti-communism and redbaiting, which had been simmering
below the surface in the early months of 1949, finally emerged.20
Trentonians, like many other Americans, were buying into the antiCommunism crusade. James Imbrie recalled one dramatic event in 1947 that
reflected the changing nature of the nation. In that year, the Communist Party of
Mercer County invited Gerhard Eisler to speak in Trenton. This significant event
polarized the city and widened the divisions. The Trenton Times continually
referred to him in their reporting as the “number 1 Communist of the country.”
Once Mayor Donal Connolly and Commissioner of Public Safety Andrew Duch
found about the planned rally, they attempted to pass a resolution condemning
the scheduled appearance. During the council meeting, Manuel Cantor,
secretary of the Mercer County Communist Party, attempted to speak against the
resolution. When he was finally able to speak, Connolly asked Cantor if he was
a Communist. Cantor replied that he was, but also that he was also “a taxpayer,
a citizen, and a war veteran.” The mayor angrily told Cantor, “We do not
recognize Communists and do not give them the right to be heard here.”

19 James Imbrie. “Maverick From Wall Street,” unpublished autobiography in author’s
possession, 464, [hereafter cited as Imbrie Manuscript].

20

The historiography of anti-Communism is vast. For a review of the historiography, see
Marc J. Selverstone’s, “A Literature So Immense: The Historiography of Anti-Communism,” OAH
Magazine of History, October 2010. For a helpful review of the literature dealing with American
anti-communism, see Richard M. Fried, Nightmare in Red: The McCarthy Era in Perspective
(New York 1990); Ellen Schrecker, Many Are the Crimes: McCarthyism in America (Princeton,
1998); Ted Morgan, Reds: McCarthyism in Twentieth-Century America (New York, 2003);
Richard Gid Powers, Not Without Honor: The History of American Anticommunism (New Haven,
1998); Scott Martelle, The Fear Within: Spies, Commies, and American Democracy on Trial (New
Brunswick, 2011); Gerald Meyer, Vito Marcantonio: Radical Politician 1902 – 1954 (Albany,
1989); Victor Navasky, Naming Names (New York, 1980).
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Connolly ordered the police to “throw him out. . . [two police] carried him with his
feet barely touching the floor out of the commission center and down the corridor.
. . to the sidewalk in front of City Hall.” Furthermore, Duch ordered the police to
stand near the entrances of the hall where Eisler was to speak and arrest anyone
who attempted to enter. The CRC appealed on behalf of the Communist Party.
The court issued an injunction allowing for the meeting. Once the news was
known that the meeting would be held, “veterans’ organizations swung into action
to show their disapproval of the sponsors.” 21
On October 26, a crowd of approximately 5,000 protestors gathered
outside of the hall. Meanwhile, more than 500 of the protestors pushed their way
into the hall and took all available seats, ready to disrupt the meeting, just in case
it was able to begin. Eisler was not brought to the hall for fear of his personal
safety. Each time Cantor attempted to speak, he was drowned out by the din of
boos, shouts, and catcalls.” James Imbrie and his wife had not attended the

21 Ellen Schrecker argues “if Gerhard Eisler hadn’t existed, the Cold War would have had
to invent him. He was the quintessential embodiment of the specter of international Communism,
invariable portrayed as a sinister Central European whose shadowy power was all the more
terrifying because it was so intangible.” Many Are the Crimes: McCarthyism in America
(Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1998), 123. Eisler was a German Communist, who came
to America in the early 1930s as the representative of the Comintern. He travelled to Spain
during the Civil War, and eventually spent a few years in a Nazi concentration camp before he
was given asylum in Mexico. He was required to travel via the United States. He was detained
by the Immigration and Naturalization Service in 1941. He was considered an enemy alien since
he was German and was required to remain in the United States until after the war. He attempted
to return to German, but was refused by the State Department, due to the FBI investigation that
had been going on since 1941. In 1947 he was subpoenaed to appear before the HUAC. Two
days before his appearance, he was arrested as an undesirable alien. At his appearance before
the HUAC, he refused to be sworn in until he was allowed to read a prepared statement. Eisler
was found in contempt of Congress. By the time he was to speak in Trenton, he was branded as
the number one Communist in the country by the FBI, had been found guilty and sentenced to
two years in prison for the contempt charge. He was free on bail pending his appeals; Trenton
Evening Times, “Hectic Session Marks Demand to Bar Eisler,” October 24, 1947; Trenton
Evening Times, “Court orders Hall Opened to Eisler; Injunction Issued,” October 26, 1947.
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rally, but as they drove home, they saw the mob outside the meeting hall. He
parked and they got out of the car. Soon, he heard one of the protestors yell,
“There goes one of them. Get the bitch!” at one of the attendees, an unidentified
woman standing on the street.

She started to run to an open car to escape the

pressing crowd. The angry mob pulled her out and began ripping her clothes. A
man grabbed her shoe and told her, ‘Listen, you! Why don’t you go back to
Russia where you belong?’” Finally, a police officer rescued her from the crowd.
The Trenton Times seemed to blame the Communists for the trouble, arguing
“public sentiment against the appearance of Eisler had been running high.” The
assumption was that if the Communist Party had not pushed to have the rally, the
public outcry would not have occurred. This incident illustrated the hostility,
loathing, and hatred directed to Americans on the Left during the opening years
of the Cold War. 22
In 1947, Life Magazine not only warned Americans about future
Communist infiltration and subversion, but predicted the Communist Party in the
U.S. would continue “to serve Soviet Russia slavishly under Stalin’s direction.
There will be other Eislers.” Most Americans supported the push to find them
and expose them. In March of 1947, President Truman issued Executive Order
9835, designed to root out Communists in the government by investigating
government employees.

But what is also noteworthy is within the order, the

President ordered Attorney General Tom Clark to conduct an investigation of
organizations and prepare a list of these groups that were “totalitarian, fascist,
Trenton Evening Times, “Red Eisler Rally is Broken Up by Indignant Crowd,” October
27, 1947; New York Times, Crowd Prevents Speech by Eisler,” October 26, 1947; Imbrie
Manuscript, 36.
22
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communist or subversive,” in what became known as the Attorney General’s List
of Subversive Organizations. This executive order confirmed the fear and
suspicion of the American people, since the order was an acknowledgment that
there might be Communists within the government.
By 1949, Communists were getting characterized as less than human, as “vermin
breed in filth and dark, so communism breeds behind closed doors.”23
Judge Hutchinson’s decision reflected how the anti-communist crusade
was shaping in the judiciary.24 The participants who waged this war were the
members of the court themselves, from judges to state and national attorney
generals. Their actions and the rhetoric used against them was directed toward
lawyers who represented Communists either or perceived Communists. 25

Hubert Kay, “The Career of Gerhar Eisler as a Comintern Agent,” Life Magazine,
February 17, 1947, p. 99. In the same article, he further questioned the humanity of Gerhard
Eisler by asking “what manner of man is this. . . he is almost a separate species of mankind.”;
Harry Truman, “Executive Order 9835,” March 22, 1947 in The Age of McCarthyism, A Brief
History with Documents, Second Edition, Ellen Schrecker, editor (New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s,
2002), 173 – 174; Gerald Horne explains the reality of being placed on the Attorney General’s
List. For the CRC, the “constant drumbeat of allegations about being a ‘Communist Front”
ensured that suppliers would be reluctant to handle their accounts, halls would be reluctant to
rent to them, their contributors would be harassed.” Communist Front? The Civil Rights
Congress, 1946 - 1956 (Rutherford: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1988), p. 49; Richard E.
Combs, “How Communists Make Stooges Out of Movie Stars,” The American Legion Magazine,
May, 1949, 15.
23

24 For a thorough and helpful review of the literature dealing with judicial anticommunism, see Sarah Hart Brown, Standing Against Dragons: Three Southern Lawyers in an
Era of Fear (Baton Rogue, 1998); Steve Babson, Dave Riddle, and David Elsila, The Color of
Law: Ernie Goodman, Detroit, and the Struggle for Labor and Civil Rights (Detroit, 2010); Robert
M. Lichtman, The Supreme Court and McCarthy-Era Repression: One Hundred Decisions
(Urbana, 2012); Milnor Alexander, “The Right to Counsel for the Politically Unpopular,” Law in
Transition 19 (1962 – 1963; : McCarthyism, Dr. Barsky and the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Committee,” American Communist History 8, no. 2, 2009.

These attorneys were representing what Sarah Hart Brown called the “hated man” in
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Attorney General Tom Clark significantly contributed to the culture of
judicial anti-communism. In August 1949, after being confirmed and waiting to
be sworn in as an associate judge of the United States Supreme Court, Clark
spoke to a Look magazine reporter and discussed the problem of subversion in
the legal community. He argued that “lawyers who are probably not card-carrying
Communists, but who act like Communists and carry out communist missions in
offensives against the dignity and order of our courts, should be scrutinized by
grievance committees of the bar and courts.” Clark indicated he had instituted a
“fitness survey” in the Justice Department and advocated that the federal
government should do the same. This survey was reminiscent of Clark’s
investigating and then identifying groups as the “other” in his 1947 Attorney
General’s List of Subversive Groups. 26
Several highly publicized trials and the subsequent action of the judges
illustrated the spread of anti-communism into the judiciary. In 1949, for nearly a
year, the “Communist 11” trial of top Party leaders filled the front pages of
American newspapers. The men were charged with secretly advocating the
violent overthrow of the United States government. The trial reinforced the
notion of a Communist conspiracy that had to be rooted out of American society.
On October 14, 1949, the jury found the defendants guilty. After dismissing the
jury, Federal Judge Harold Medina found the six-man defense team guilty of
criminal contempt and sentenced them to jail terms from six months to thirty days
for unnecessary delaying tactics, attempting to provoke incidents that would
26

Washington Post, “Reds’ Lawyers Reply to Tom Clark's Attack,” August 22, 1949.
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result in a mistrial, and trying to impair his health, which would result in further
delay. Medina told the attorneys this sentence would serve:
Notice to you and to all who may be tempted to follow your
example that there is power in the judicial system of the United
States under the Constitution and the laws of the United States
to protect and maintain the dignity of the court and the orderly
administrative of justice therein.27
One month later, in November 1949, another important trial took place in San
Francisco, California, that involved many of the same ingredients as the
“Communist 11” trial. Australia-born Harry Bridges was president of the
International Longshore and Warehouse Union and charged with lying in a 1945
naturalization hearing that he never was a member of the Communist Party,
either before or at the time of his application for citizenship. Federal Judge
George B. Harris found Vincent Hallinan, the defense lawyer, guilty of contempt
and sentenced him to six months in prison for his remarks in his opening
statement and courtroom antics. These actions in these two national cases
reflected much of what the House Committee on Un-American Activities reported
on the National Lawyers Guild and its members:
The real nature of the guild’s philosophy comes into sharp focus
during court procedures. Almost without exception, its leading
members, despite their oath as lawyers to uphold the dignity of
the court and respect the constitutional mores of jurisprudence,
seek to bring the courts and its procedures into disrepute. They
substitute insult for argument, resort to intimidation of judges by
27

United States v Foster Court Transcript, Volume 24, pp. 16139-16140; United States
v. Foster, the case was restyled United States v. Dennis (for General Secretary Eugene Dennis)
after Foster was severed prior to trial because of heart trouble; Russell Porter, “Lawyer for Reds
Held in Contempt,” New York Times, September 15, 1949; Russell Porter, “11 Communists
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picket lines, parades, and personal abuse.28
These recent judicial decisions preceded Hutchinson’s barring of the CRC
lawyers in December. But Hutchinson went further. Even in the Scottsboro
Case, the judge never removed northern lawyer Samuel Leibowitz. Hutchinson,
however, took this action because of some behind-the-scenes maneuvering
between New Jersey State Attorney Theodore Parsons and Governor Alfred
Driscoll. One of the reasons why Hutchinson disbarred the CRC lawyers was the
large amount of money that had been raised for the Trenton Six but ultimately
ended up being used to defend the Communist leaders on trial in New York.
Where did Hutchinson get his information about the money? In a 1954 interview,
Attorney General Parsons claimed “the CRC had received over $300,000, but
that only $25,000 of this amount had been spent on the Trenton Six case, the
rest going for the defense of the Communist leaders in New York.” Parsons
indicated his information came from a FBI informant in Trenton, who had been in
Chicago in the fall of 1948 and had attended meetings with top communists there
when the decision was made to become involved in the Trenton Six case. This

28 Lawrence E. Davies, “Judge Accuses Bridges' Lawyer of Trying to Discredit
Witnesses,” New York Times, November 19, 1949; Lawrence E. Davies, “Bridges' Attorney
Adjudged In Contempt,” New York Times, November 23, 1949; In Hallinan’s opening argument
he charged the only reason for the prosecution was to break the strike that Bridges was leading in
May of 1949. He attacked the government’s former Communist witnesses claiming they were
“ready to swear any man’s life away for $100.” See November 19, 1949 New York Times article
above for the quote and story. One of the State’s lawyers characterized Hallinan’s behavior “as
one who had roamed the courtroom like a mad dog.” See November 23, 1949 New York Times
article above; Committee on Un-American Activities, Report on the National Lawyers Guild: Legal
Bulwark of the Communist Party, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C., 8lst Congress, 2d Session, September 21, 1950), 5.
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information that Hutchinson received “was undoubtedly [from] the Office of the
Attorney General.”29
As early as January 1949, newspapers were noting that the CRC was on
the Attorney General List of Subversives as a Communist Front. On April 12,
Governor Driscoll stated that the CRC was listed as a Communist Front. On that
same day, Parsons met with the Chairman of the CRC, George Marshall, and a
few of the demonstrators, who had descended upon the state capital to demand
the removal of Prosecutor Volpe. In the meeting, Parsons told Marshall that he
would not remove Volpe. Parsons was so convinced about the guilt of the Six
and the fairness of the trial, he emphatically stated that even if Volpe resigned,
then he would personally would lead the State’s case to the United States
Supreme Court if necessary.30
Governor Driscoll had problems with this case, as well. He had worked
hard to earn high marks from African-American leaders for his pursuit of racial
equality. In May 1949, Thurgood Marshall told his Trenton NAACP audience
how “fortunate you are in having the Governor you do. Governor Driscoll has
29

Chester Apy, Jr., The Trenton Six (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University, 1954). 112.
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accomplished more for a State than any Governor in the United States.” Claire
Neikind reported that Driscoll “was deeply disturbed by several aspects of the
Horner case, and particularly by Volpe’s conduct.” Driscoll had also been feeling
pressure from the CRC campaign to remove Volpe. But Driscoll needed to walk
a very thin line in handling this problem. The Republican Volpe was chosen for
the post by Republican Driscoll in 1945, and he could not publicly turn against
him. At the same time, he could not be seen as capitulating to the CRC
demands that Volpe be removed.31
Hutchinson had reason to be comfortable with his decision to remove the
CRC. Other judges had already took action against lawyers who represented
Communists. Also, there was evidence that some type of discussion had
occurred between the governor and his attorney general, who then
communicated that information to Hutchinson. This information that Hutchinson
received about CRC fund-raising reinforced his anti-communist view. The three
men thus dealt with the problem of growing public pressure, but also paved a
way for a more “acceptable group,” such as the NAACP, to take over the defense
of the case.

The CRC Fights Back
The CRC response was immediate. Patterson denounced Hutchinson,
arguing that "this attempt to throw us out of the case was made at this time not

31 Trenton Evening Times, “NAACP Aid Lauds Driscoll, Jersey Civil Rights Program,”
May 16, 1949. Driscoll would was invited to speak to the national NAACP convention in Boston,
1951 and was given an award for his work in trying to end discrimination in New Jersey; Claire
Neikind, “The Case of the Trenton Six—1: How a Murder Trial Became a Political Circus,” The
Reporter, May 1, 1951, p. 34.
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only because we have so vigorously defended our clients, but because we have
exposed a vicious frame-up." As for the charge that the CRC diverted most of
the money to the Communist trial, Patterson “categorically denied . . . that
between January 1 and December 1, the organization [Committee to Save the
Trenton Six] had spent $18,723 for the defense, but collected only $15,839,”
which the CRC used to pay the deficit. Rogge spoke directly to the antiCommunist war on the judiciary. He tied the recent decisions against lawyers in
the “Communist 11” and the Harry Bridges cases to Hutchinson’s decision, that
this "action extends the reign of terror imposed on lawyers who defend the
unorthodox and the weak." The barred attorneys vowed to fight their removal.32
Even before the CRC attorneys appealed, the NAACP in Trenton was very
interested in the case. As Gerald Horne as suggested, Thurgood Marshall “was
searching for larger fish than a mere amicus brief.” A flurry of correspondence
between Clifford Moore and Thurgood Marshall occurred during the last weeks of
1949. They did not know how Hutchinson’s actions would play out, but they were
sure the CRC would appeal Hutchinson’s decision. In the meantime, they
developed a plan that would put the NAACP in a good position to take over the
case when the dust finally settled. But their strategy required considerable tact.
Although Hutchison had barred the CRC lawyers, they still were the counsel of
record for English, Cooper, and Thorpe. Moore wrote to Marshall indicating that
“we are trying to wean them away by the indirect approach.” In other words, they
32 New York Times, "Three New York Lawyers Barred In Jersey for Murder Case
Tactics,” December 17, 1949; Philadelphia Tribune, “Trenton 6 Aides Defiant,” December 20,
1949.
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had been talking to family members in an attempt to convince them to accept
NAACP help. Moore reported that it was partially working, since Thorpe’s father
“wants him to accept our counsel.” However, it was not working as well as they
hoped because “the chief difficulty is Bessie Mitchell.” Any steps the NAACP did
take required caution, for as Moore indicated to Marshall, “we’ve got to be careful
in releases not to get caught in the positon of being guilty of prejudicial conduct.”
That did not stop Moore. The next day, he sent Marshall the Rules of Practice for
the Courts of New Jersey. Clearly, the NAACP was moving so when the three
defendants understood the dire circumstances, they would turn to the NAACP. 33
In March 1950, Dr. U.S. Wiggins, president of the New Jersey State
Conference of the NAACP, announced plans for the State Conference to become
officially active in the new trial for the Trenton Six. Privately, Dr. Wiggins told the
national NAACP Board of Directors that the State Conference became involved
due to the criticism they received for not being involved in the first trial. With the
second trial, the State Conference entered the case “in order to regain some of
the prestige it had lost, and to represent two of the defendants.”34
On December 23, the New York Times reported that Hutchinson had met
with former New Jersey Supreme Court justice Joseph B. Perskie and invited him
33 Gerald Horne, Communist Front? The Civil Rights Congress, 1946 - 1956 (Rutherford:
Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1988), p. 147; “Clifford R. Moore to Thurgood Marshall,”
December 21, 1949, Papers of the NAACP, Part 26: Selected Branch Files, 1940–1955, Series
B, reel 14; “Clifford R. Moore to Thurgood Marshall,” December 22, 1949, NAACP Papers, Part
26: Selected Branch Files, 1940–1955, Series B, reel 14.

34 Philadelphia Tribune, “N.J. NAACP Plans Active Part in Defense of the Trenton Six,”
March 11, 1950; “Meeting of the Board of Directors,” National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People, June 11, 1951, NAACP Papers, Supplement to Part I, 1951- 1955., Board of
Director’s Meetings, reel 1.
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to become one of the replacements for the CRC attorneys. Hutchinson was
attempting to set up a team that could offset the CRC attorneys. Meanwhile,
James Imbrie and other Progressives in Mercer County organized a telegram
campaign to Governor Driscoll, requesting he become involved in the recent
developments. One telegram charged that Hutchinson’s action “jeopardized the
defendants and was an infringement of their civil rights.35
Not everyone supported this new anti-communism campaign waged
against lawyers “who act like Communists.” Several labor unions, as well as the
New Jersey and Mercer County Bar Associations, filed amicus curiae briefs
supporting the CRC plaintiffs. For them the issue was whether a defendant had
a constitutional right to have counsel of their own choice. On February 1, Albert
Einstein and fifteen other religious and civic leaders issued a statement
condemning the growing trend of judges meriting out disciplinary action toward
lawyers who defended “political minorities, racial minorities, and labor
organizations.”36
Collis English issued a statement through Bessie Mitchell indicating the
three CRC defendants would “rather die before we take other attorneys. We
want the lawyers who saved our lives.”37 The words were reminiscent of

35
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Clarence Norris, one the Scottsboro Boys: “if it wasn’t for that communist
organization trying to save our lives, we would have went to the chair on the 10th
of July 1931. That for damn sure.”38
On December 23, attorneys for the remaining four defendants requested a
postponement of the retrial. It was granted. The new trial date was set for
February 6. On December 30, the matter became more complicated when
Horace Wilson and John MacKenzie signed documents requesting the CRC
represent them as well. McKinley Forrest was the only one with a non-CRC
attorney. Horace Wilson said, "They're the lawyers who brought us out of that
death house. We are going to stick together till we're all free." The CRC knew it
would be in a stronger position if it could convince Wilson and MacKenzie to join
forces. Robert Queen, who had defended Wilson and MacKenzie, commented,
"Wilson told me only last Friday he had no intention of associating with Rogge's
group." It was highly probable that pressure had been applied to both Wilson and
MacKenzie to sign on with the CRC. Now the CRC had to battle to remain on the
case while guarding its flank to prevent the NAACP from exploiting its
weakness.39
On January 13, 1950, there was a hearing before Judge Hutchinson on
the motion to approve the change in counsel for Wilson and MacKenzie.
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However, Hutchison delayed his ruling until the CRC suit had been settled. The
judge noted for the record that the motion was "impertinent and a borderline
contempt case." The CRC filed suit in federal court seeking an injunction in
order to be reinstated. Three days later the suit, brought by the CRC, was heard
before United States District Court Judge Phillip Forman. But because the court
had not received official notification from Hutchinson or Mercer County Court,
Forman delayed the hearing for seventy-two hours. On January 25, Judge
Hutchinson postponed "indefinitely" the beginning of the retrial for the Trenton
Six due to the proceedings in Federal Court. The retrial had been scheduled to
begin in early February. On January 27, U.S. District Judge Forman ruled "his
court was not authorized under the Civil Rights Act to pass upon such issues"
and dismissed the application for an injunction. He clarified "that Federal district
courts never received authority to serve as appellate or review courts. That was
reserved to the United States Supreme Court and the appellate courts of the
states."40

James Imbrie And The Princeton Committee
As the new year of 1950 arrived, the CRC was losing its control over the
case in other ways, as well. In late January, even before Judge Forman handed
down his decision, James Imbrie was very troubled. Both sides, it seemed, were
settling into a protracted struggle, with neither side willing to concede anything.
40 Trenton Evening Times, “Court Refuses to Hear Rogge Rehiring Appeal,” January 13,
1950; Trenton Evening Times, “Defer Retrial of Trenton 6,” January 25, 1949; New York Times,
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Most observers believed the appeals would end in the United States Supreme
Court. Clearly, if that happened, the process would take many months and
possibly years, which would only add to the delay for the men securing justice.
Indeed, the Six were sitting in a state of legal limbo. For Imbrie, something had
to be done. He was concerned that the Communist issue had been injected into
the case when Hutchinson removed the CRC attorneys. He knew that writers
were warning that the Communists were making it difficult for the men to ever
receive a fair trial. Bruce Bliven of the New Republic had reported “there were
was evidence that many people in New Jersey have a feeling that anybody
defended by the Communists is guilty.” This was a big hurdle to overcome. In
February 1950, Imbrie called approximately thirty academics, clergy, and
government officials to meet in Princeton to discuss what might be able to be
done resolve the impasse. Out of that meeting, a new organization emerged
called the Princeton Committee for Defense of the Trenton Six.41
Imbrie was born into a life of privilege. After his graduation from Princeton
University in 1901 he went to work at William Morris Imbrie and Company, his
father’s Wall Street bond and stock company. Imbrie became successful and
eventually established his own bank. He quickly became a man of means, but
his transformation from a conservative Republican to a liberal Democrat occurred
slowly. Several business trips to England in 1911 and 1912 hastened the
process. One night he was in London and saw a crowd had gathered in
Trafalgar Square. The speaker, a young man, was denouncing capitalism.
41

Bruce Bliven, “The Trenton Murder Case,” The New Republic, May 16, 1949, p. 14.

232

Imbrie stopped, listened, and became angry at what he considered were
inaccuracies in the speech. After the young man finished, he pushed forward
and introduced himself to the young speaker. They talked for a few minutes and
Imbrie invited him to dinner. Imbrie learned the young man was from a wealthy
London family, had graduated from Cambridge, and was working with the poor in
the settlement homes in London. As they were preparing to leave, the young
man invited Imbrie to join him the next morning at the London docks. He
agreed.42
What he saw that morning horrified him. Each morning, men looking for
work would gather at the London docks to be hired for the day. Imbrie saw
between 300 and 400 men waiting for the constable. When the crowd saw the
constable, they surged forward, each man attempting to gain or secure their
position close enough to where the foreman could give them a ticket. Only those
with a ticket were eligible for work that day. After 15 minutes, the foreman
appeared with the tickets. Suddenly a roar burst from the crowd as some men
called his name, others cursed, and still others used their fists in an attempt to
get closer to the foreman.43
After a short stint serving in World War I, Imbrie was discharged in 1919
and went back to Wall Street. But the incident in London never left him and he
became active in the East Side Settlement House in New York City. His
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involvement grew from the director of the Boys’ Club to becoming a member of
the Board of Directors. His work among the poor brought him to the tenements
and the sweat shops. He left these visits with “utter frustration and anger that
there should be such a gulf between this squalor and the fabulous wealth and
luxury of Fifth Avenue.” His thinking evolved as he served the settlement house.
He now believed that humanitarian assistance was not enough. A political
solution was needed to solve the problem. But he was clearly not ready to make
the sacrifice he believed was necessary. His banking responsibilities took most
of his time and energy.44
Then Imbrie suffered a major heart attack in 1935. He spent months
recuperating at his summer home in Bermuda. Following his recovery, he went
back to work. In July 1941, he suffered a second and far more serious heart
attack. The months of his recuperation were also important for the United States,
as serious international events were unfolding in Europe and Asia. Imbrie was
an internationalist and believed America now had a second chance to create a
new League of Nations. Imbrie was also a religious man. He seemingly made a
deal with God, praying that “if only I could get my health back, I would forget my
one passionate desire to make my firm active on Wall Street and live only for
service in the best way that I could.”45
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In 1942 his health began to return. At the end of 1943, Imbrie and his wife
sold their winter home in Bermuda, since he had retired from his Wall Street bank
and turned to fulfilling his promise of becoming involved in politics and justice.
His opportunity came in 1944 when Imbrie believed a fourth term for President
Roosevelt was a “must.” His home state, New Jersey, was considered a
Republican state and it looked in January as every electoral vote for Roosevelt
would be needed. He organized the Independent Voters League for Roosevelt
by establishing clubs in most New Jersey counties. He raised $50,000 to fund
the endeavor. Replying on his Wall Street experience, he was able to provide to
his Committee the two most important elements of politics, organization and
money. In November, Roosevelt won the state by 26,000 votes and Imbrie was
credited with the win.46
After the election, Imbrie believed the Roosevelt League should not be
disbanded, but used to harness activism and move in other directions. Imbrie, as
the executive director of the New Jersey Independent Citizens League (NJICL),
battled discrimination against African Americans in New Jersey. He favored a
strong law prohibiting discrimination in employment, unions, schools, and public
accommodations. This new bill, the Fair Employment Practices Act, passed in
1945, but was so watered down to get it through the state legislature that it
provided only a prohibition against racial discrimination in employment. Imbrie
was disappointed, but also understood it was a beginning. 47
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In April 1945, Roosevelt died and Vice-President Harry Truman became
president. Most liberals feared a reversal of Roosevelt’s policies. James Imbrie
characteristized the dilemma that liberals faced shortly after the traumatic event
of Roosevelt’s death. Alonzo L. Hamby argues that a key to understanding the
crisis that arose after the president’s death is to examine the importance of FDR
as a symbol and myth for many liberals, for Roosevelt’s “personality had given
the liberals unity as well as inspiration; Harry S. Truman could provide neither.”
For Imbrie, Truman was “unfit by knowledge, temperament, training, and
character” to deal with the issues of the post-war world. The issue that caused
him the most consternation was in foreign affairs. Imbrie believed it unwise to
move away from Roosevelt’s policy of peaceful co-existence. As events
escalated after the war in Europe, Truman adopted a “more intractable” posture
toward the Soviet Union. Imbrie believed this strategy would lead to a further
building of tensions between the two superpowers and ultimately lead to a
deepening Cold War.48
Rather than having a simplistic bi-polar world view, Imbrie understood the
reality of two vying world views. He denounced the Soviet Union’s “repression of
civil liberties and the gangster-type cruelties of that regime.” But for him, the
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larger question was whether the Cold War would further divide the world and
create a dangerous arms race. Imbrie condemned the Soviet system, but was
realistic in understanding the place of the Soviet Union in world politics. For him,
it was too simplistic to accept the anti-Communist framework. This variant idea
caused him much trouble in the years to come.49
Imbrie was dismayed by Henry Wallace running for president on a third
party ticket during the election of 1948. Not only had the liberal community been
divided, but the Catholic Church recently had gotten behind Truman’s “get tough
with Russia” policy. Imbrie realized that Wallace’s base would be only a few left
leaning unions, the recently established and unorganized Progressive Party, and
the Communist Party. Imbrie thought that Wallace lacked the “knowledge, intent,
or ability” for political organizing. All these drawbacks caused Imbrie to doubt the
wisdom of such a venture. 50
Imbrie knew Wallace personally and wrote to him in December 1947,
encouraging him not to run in 1948. His suggestion was to wait until the
Progressive Party’s organization could be strengthened and help make a run
49
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credible. However, he told Wallace that if he decided to run, Imbrie and his
supporters in New Jersey would do everything to make it successful. Wallace
did run in 1948. In New Jersey, Imbrie ran for United States Senator under the
Progressive Party, but was unsuccessful.51
By 1949, New Jersey and other states were passing “Loyalty Oath
Legislation,” which required a candidate for potential office to sign an oath of
allegiance to the United States government.

For those who refused, the

notation “Refused Oath of Allegiance” would be printed below their name on the
ballot. Imbrie believed if he ran for governor he would be given a platform to
inform the citizens about the law and provide him “standing before the court” so
he could challenge the law. He announced his candidacy and filed suit in New
Jersey court. On October 19, 1949, just a few weeks before the election, the
lower court declared the law unconstitutional. The State appealed to the New
Jersey State Supreme Court, which affirmed the lower court’s decision. Time
magazine told its readers the challenge was made by “a gaunt, wrinkled, leftwinger.” These characterizations were common in the media when they
described Imbrie. When Imbrie announced his intention to run for senator in
1948, the Trenton Times, called him “a character.” According to the editorial, his
candidacy was dismissed since it “merits little interest, except that it is a national
effort to confuse America.”52
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The CRC Depart the Case
The Princeton Committee for Defense of the Trenton Six was
compromised of men who represented a range of ideological viewpoints. The
chairman was Dr. Edward Corwin, an author of over twenty books and a
renowned Professor Emeritus of Jurisprudence and Politics at Princeton
University. Corwin’s biographer described his activity in the committee “as an
anomaly” since he did not oppose the death penalty, and he “was not an ardent
civil rights proponent.” However, Corwin was motivated to seek justice, since
there were so many questions that had been raised in the case. Nevertheless,
Corwin’s involvement brought criticism from conservatives. One letter harshly
criticized his decision to lead “the movement that you permit your name to be
used for this purpose . . . to this infamous business.” He, too, would be smeared
with the brush of Communism association brush, even though the Princeton
Committee would force the CRC to withdraw from the case. 53
Imbrie, along with other Progressives, maintained a complex relationship
with the Communists. He suffered a similar fate to Henry Wallace, who endured
marginalization during his 1948 presidential campaign. Much of the problem for
Imbrie stemmed from comments he made during his campaigns. For example,
while he was running for senator, a Trenton Times editorial charged that both
Wallace and Imbrie were following the Communist line. Imbrie replied to the
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charge by insisting that the organizations he was associated with, such as the
New Jersey Independent Council were independent entities and not connected to
any political party. If he had closed at that point, that may have been improved
his public standing. But he concluded, “I am not and never have been a
Communist, but I will be proud to accept the support of any citizen who had the
right to vote and who will join us in our fight to achieve the vision of the
brotherhood of man.” Such statements exposed him to the charge he was either
a Communist dupe or a fellow traveler. Imbrie truly believed that it was possible
for an individual to be independent in thought, but at the same time join with
others with differing political opinions. This may have been possible at other
times in history, but not practicable in the days of the 1950s Cold War hysteria.
For that, he paid the price.54
But at the same time, Imbrie was dismayed with the naiveté of the upper
leadership of the Progressive Party. He believed C. B. “Beanie” Baldwin, one of
Wallace’s close advisors, to be “unware of or didn’t care about the menace to
third party movement from the Communist Left.” Imbrie was convinced that
Wallace needed to be surrounded by leaders who “could not be tarred with the
pro-Communist brush.”

He understood the difference between a Communist

and their ideology. He believed that the judiciary should not be subject to
pressure from other government agencies or groups. To Imbrie, democracies
that work best are those whose judiciaries are “removed from the turbulent
political winds which often sweep executive and legislative representatives off
54
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their feet.”

In 1949, at the organization meeting of the National Non-Partisan

Committee to Defend the Rights of the Twelve Communist Leaders, Imbrie
indicated that he disapproved of any attempt by telegraph or mail to “arouse
public clamor or pressure seeking thereby to influence any member of the
judiciary.” In spite of his hesitancy, Imbrie agreed to join the organization. Later,
Chairman Paul Robeson instructed the members to telegraph Judge Medina
requesting that he declare a mistrial due to the judge’s comments during the trial.
At this juncture, Imbrie resigned from the committee, informing Robeson that he
considered “this and any other similar practice as injurious to our Democratic
processes.” He would continue to do all he could do to support the cause, but
there were limits. He was an independent individual, not a dupe and follower of
the Communist line.55
Yet even Bruce Bliven of the New Republic questioned Imbrie. He wrote
about the formation of the Princeton Committee:
I disagree with Mr. Imbrie on several things, one of them his
conviction that in 1951 non-Communist liberals like himself can
55
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still work with Communists for liberal ends, a conviction that has
caused him to cling to the Progressive Party until he is almost the
last lone survivor; but no one can disagree with his passion for
Anglo-Saxon justice and his endless willingness to help it along.
Imbrie was a practical man. In spite of his desire for no recriminations for
working with the Communists, he understood the reality of helping the Trenton
Six. He publicly acknowledged the “Communist Party was hurting the Trenton
Six with the public.” At the same time, he had difficulty understanding the
ramifications of the Cold War hysteria upon the people. After one speech, he
confided to Victor Gold, “wasn’t it too bad that association with Communists
would cause normally fair minded people to become so prejudiced?”56
Meanwhile, the CRC continued its struggle to remain in the case. On May
24, 1950, it appealed Judge Forman’s ruling to the Third United States Circuit
Court of Appeals in Philadelphia. In the meantime, Patterson remained
determined and indignant with the attempts of the NAACP and the new Princeton
Committee to dislodge the CRC. Patterson defiantly wrote to CRC’s New Jersey
Director Lou Moroze, “CRC is not relinquishing this case to any group of
individuals or any organization." Patterson had officially withdrawn from the
Martinsville Seven case, when a group of black men were convicted of raping a
white woman in Martinsville, Virginia. He had done so at the urging of the
NAACP. The NAACP leadership believed the CRC’s presence in the courtroom
would “jeopardize the appeals.” Patterson now believed that decision
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“surrounded our position there in the interest of the defendants and now in each
instance the defendants face the electric chair without anyone in the country
knowing that the cases have been tried or what the status is.” And he had no
intention of making the same mistake in the Trenton Six case.57
On July 21, 1950, the Court of Appeals ruled that Hutchinson was in error
when he barred the CRC attorneys from his courtroom. The CRC had sought an
injunction preventing Hutchinson from taking any further action in the case until it
was allowed back into the courtroom. It further charged that Hutchinson violated
the constitutional rights of the defendants by not allowing them counsel of their
own choosing. Lastly, the CRC lawyers argued that when Hutchinson banned
the lawyers, there had been no hearing and therefore no way to potentially
remedy the situation. The CRC claimed the judge’s action was "summary,
arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable." However, Hutchinson believed that the
out-of-state CRC attorneys had been admitted pro hac vice, and once he
determined they had been involved in misconduct, there was no need for a
hearing.
The Court of Appeals believed otherwise. Hutchinson removed the CRC
attorneys “without hearing, without [proving] misconduct on his part, without
[giving] reason assigned for the action. It seems to us that the error is manifest.”
Its solution was twofold. First, the Court sent the case back to Hutchinson for a
“show cause” hearing in which the CRC lawyers would have an opportunity to
display why they should be permitted to remain in the case. Second, it ordered
“William Patterson to Lou Moroze,” May 23, 1950, Reuben Papers, Civil Rights
Congress--Correspondence, box 1, file 1; Eric W. Rise, The Martinsville Seven: Race, Rape,
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the U.S. District Court to retain jurisdiction in the event the CRC attorneys would
seek an injunction following the hearing in Hutchinson’s court. The Court had
“little doubt that the New Jersey Court would rectify this deprivation of
constitutional rights.”58
The decision meant more delay. Most legal observers predicted
Hutchinson would order the “show cause” hearing and that would again result in
the CRC lawyers being removed. They would then seek an injunction and
whichever side lost that fight would then appeal the decision. It seemed to have
no end. Volpe petitioned the court for the “show cause” on August 8.
Hutchinson scheduled it for September 18.59
Yet events quickly came to a resolution in the fall of 1950. The Princeton
Committee’s strategy was to find a way to move the case forward by attempting
to circumvent the CRC. On October 18, 1950, Dr. Corwin sent a letter to New
Jersey Attorney General Theodore Parsons requesting that he establish an
“impartial commission [that] could be created to sift the evidence, in light of the
State Supreme Court’s decision, to ascertain whether the State has any
reasonable prospect of procuring a conviction of the defendants in a new trial.” If
not, then “the defendants ought to be paroled.” To the Princeton Committee
members, this was a viable compromise. It would serve to break the impasse
between the CRC and the State. But more importantly, as Corwin pointed out to
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Parsons, the case of the Trenton Six would “cease to be a propaganda
ammunition for the common enemy.60
One week later Parsons indicated the suggestion was impossible, since it
would set a dangerous precedent. The case was still before the courts.
Additionally, this compromise would publicly impugn Prosecutor Volpe’s conduct
throughout the entire episode, as well as the right of the State to determine what
lawyers would be able to practice in State courts. Although the proposal by the
Princeton Committee did not succeed, it did allow several members of the
Committee to meet with Parsons. At the meeting, Parsons again enumerated the
reasons why he declined the Committee’s suggestion. Then, according to Imbrie,
Parsons “launched into an attack on the Civil Rights Congress.” It became very
clear to Imbrie that the Attorney General had every intention of seeing the case
go to the U.S. Supreme Court. Frustrated at where this case was going, Imbrie
asked Parsons: if he could convince the CRC to get out of the case, would the
State move for an early trial? Parsons replied that he would, but he seriously
doubted that Imbrie would be able to accomplish the feat.61
Imbrie invited Patterson to his home. Patterson arrived in Lawrenceville,
New Jersey, a few days later. He was less strident than Imbrie had seen before.
In the fall of 1950, events were quickly spinning out of control for Patterson and
threatening to engulf him. In June of 1950, the Korean War broke out, causing
“Dr. Edward Corwin to Honorable Theodore D. Parsons,” October 18, 1951, Corwin
Papers, Series J, Professional Correspondence box 6, folder 3.
60

61 “Theodore D. Parsons to Professor Edward S. Corwin,” October 25, 1951, Corwin
Papers, Series J, Professional Correspondence box 6, folder 3; Imbrie Manuscript, 467.

245

the Cold War hysteria to re-erupt, and one of its targets was William Patterson.
On August 3, 1950, he was subpoenaed to appear before and supply CRC
records to the House Select Committee on Lobbying Activities. He appeared but
refused to provide the records. Patterson knew he would be indicted for
contempt of Congress due to this action.62
Imbrie gingerly approached the subject of the CRC removing itself from
the case. At first, Patterson refused. Imbrie reminded him of the six men in jail
and the endless court delays. Imbrie had a strong case that the CRC’s ongoing
involvement in the case was not tenable. The anti-Communist attack upon the
CRC was wearing down the ability of the organization to maintain its
commitments. By the end of 1950, the face of the CRC was Patterson. And with
another indictment and trial pending, it would be nearly impossible to carry on
this particular fight. Patterson finally indicated to Imbrie that he would not oppose
the CRC departure from the case, but that he needed to discuss it with the
leadership.63
A few days later, Patterson told Imbrie that Leon Josephson was not in
favor of their agreement. Imbrie asked to speak to Josephson, and he employed
the same tactics with Josephson to achieve another agreement. These two key
men of the CRC understood the reality of the times. Josephson told Imbrie that
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he still needed to convince O. John Rogge. Rogge was in Europe at this time,
so Imbrie contacted his law partners, informing them of the threats that Attorney
General Parsons had made while Imbrie was in his office. Parsons told Imbrie
he was encouraging New York officials to begin disciplinary measures against
Rogge. It was unlikely this tactic in itself was what convinced Rogge to agree to
leave the case as well. By 1950, Rogge had become disillusioned with far Left
politics. Phillip Deery argues several key events triggered his move to the Right:
the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia split in 1948, Rogge’s support of the Korean
War in 1950, and his belief in Soviet-inspired spy rings in the United States.
Thus the pieces were in place for the CRC to withdraw from the case. 64
In November, Governor Driscoll suggested to New Jersey Supreme Court
Chief Justice Arthur T. Vanderbilt that he replace Hutchinson with Judge Ralph
Smalley. The governor’s action of replacing the polarizing Hutchinson sent an
important message. The “show cause” hearing, which had been scheduled in
September, had been postponed until November 8. On that day, Rogge officially
requested the court that he be permitted to withdraw from the case. Rogge told
Judge Smalley that the "Mercer County Court and I disagree as to my conduct of
this case. I feel one way; the court feels another. . . I have now apparently
become a road block in the disposition of the case." Smalley granted his
request. Patterson and Emmanuel Bloch requested a continuance on the “show
cause” since Rogge had led the defense team. In reality, Patterson needed time
64 Imbrie Manuscript, 469. Two helpful sources that provide a chronology of Rogge’s
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and was attempting to secure competent counsel for the men the CRC
represented. The judge ordered the new hearing for November 27.65
In mid-November, Patterson met with Raymond Pace Alexander, a
prominent Philadelphia defense attorney, to discuss the possibility of Alexander
joining the defense team. Patterson called Thurgood Marshall and informed him
that he had met with Alexander. They made plans to meet and discuss the
situation fully. There were several days’ delay, as both Alexander and Marshall
were out of the office, prompting Patterson once again to contact Alexander to
insist the details “must be finalized before the 27th of this month.” This
confirmed, as Imbrie had recounted, that Patterson had concurred in leaving the
case. It was clear he was attempting to secure Alexander and the NAACP to
defend the men, something he was under no obligation to do since Hutchinson
had already reappointed the court-appointed attorneys. Additionally, Patterson
heard rumors that the indictment for contempt for Congress would be returned on
November 27. On November 22, Marshall informed Patterson that he had
discussed the matter with the NAACP Board of Directors and Alexander.
Marshall wrote:
There has be no change in the policy of the NAACP in this
organization will not work with the Civil Rights Congress on
this case. This has always been made clear to you and I
want to reemphasize it. I also wish to reemphasize the
position of this organization that the ultimate decision as
to who shall represent these men legally rest solely with
65 “Raymond Pace Alexander to Thurgood Marshall, Henry Moon, Walter White, Dr.
Ulysses Wiggins,” June 21, 1951, Raymond Alexander Papers, box 36, folder 9; “Application of
O. John Rogge For Leave To Withdraw as Counsel”, November 8, 1950, Civil Rights Congress,
box 81, reel 47; New York Times, "Rogge Withdraws in Murder Trial,” November 9, 1950.
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the men themselves, and we can do nothing officially on
their behalf from a legal standpoint other than to appear
as friend of the court unless and until we are required to
do so by the men themselves.66
What was the meaning of this exchange? It seemed that Marshall was
disingenuous in this situation, because it was absurd for Patterson to believe that
the CRC could have retained some type of control over the case. Patterson was
indeed getting out of the case. He had initially approached Marshall, who had
recommended Alexander about coming into the case. Then Patterson informed
Marshall of the progress in the negotiations. Thus it was clear that Patterson had
already accepted the NAACP’s terms. So why was it necessary for Marshall to
reiterate the official NAACP position about the CRC? This letter offers another
glimpse into the hard-fought turf war between the organizations. It was
Marshall’s way of applying additional pressure upon Patterson; all connections
with the CRC in the case had to be severed. It also provided an indication of the
personal animosity that had developed between the two old warriors.
Patterson was indicted on November 27 and the hearing in Trenton was
postponed until November 29. Patterson did not attend the session since he was
in Washington organizing his surrender and bail. In the courtroom, Washington
attorney Ralph Boe first asked Judge Smalley for a short continuance, since
Patterson wanted to personally present the petition to leave the case. The judge
refused and Boe informed the judge of Patterson’s decision. The last CRC

“William Patterson to Raymond P. Alexander, November 16, 1950, Raymond
Alexander Papers, box 36, folder 9; “Thurgood Marshall to William Patterson, November 22,
1950, Raymond Alexander Papers, box 36, folder 9.
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attorney, Emmanuel Bloch, also withdrew from the case. Patterson, true to his
character, was defiant as he wrote in his motion:
For the truth of the matter is I have advanced the cause of
My clients in the best tradition of the legal profession and the
historic struggle . . . A militant, forthright and fearless fight for
the constitutional and human rights of a defendant always
serves the best interests of a trial and impartial judiciary.67
The CRC was now officially out of the case. The fight for control was
over. At this point, the six men had become a type of pawn in the struggle
between the CRC and the NAACP. Both sides were fighting hard to gain an
advantage, not only in the courtroom, but also in the court of popular opinion.
But the tragedy continued for English, Cooper, Wilson, Forrest, Thorpe, and
MacKenzie. Somehow the men had gotten lost in the maze of organizational
struggling. These six men had faced execution, spent time on death row, and
witnessed men going to their deaths, since their cells were next to the death
chamber. In the process to save their lives, they lost their own identity, as they
became “the Trenton Six”. Their families and those whom they trusted urged
them to just sign the proper legal forms. They experienced the euphoria of the
new trial, which brought with it the possibility of a chance to live again. Then they
endured tortuous delay caused by something they probably never really
understood, due to the lack of news.
The Trenton Times announced to the city: “Good Riddance” to the CRC.
Its editorial stated, “O. John Rogge was allowed to withdraw from the case
earlier. Now Emmanuel Bloch and William Patterson have crawled out. It is

“Application of William L. Patterson For Leave To Withdraw as Counsel”, November
24, 1950, Civil Rights Congress, box 81, reel 47.
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good riddance of an element which failed to serve the ends of justice.” The
editorial claimed the main reason why the CRC opted to withdraw was that the
lawyers knew the Attorney General’s office had collected voluminous evidence to
expose them. Assistant State Attorney General John W. Griggs was in court for
both “show cause” hearings to do just that, according to news reports. He told
the court that he had evidence the CRC “was an adjunct of the Communist Party
. . . They had one purpose in main and that was to use the case because of its
popular appeal as a cause célèbre for the benefit of the Communist Party.” The
real reasons why the CRC lawyers left the case was due to the actions of James
Imbrie and Patterson’s indictment. Solid investigative reporting should have
connected the indictment and upcoming trial of Patterson, but it was far easier to
explain the CRC attorney’s actions in paradigm of redbaiting.68
On December 7, Volpe filed a notice of application for a trial date, almost a
year to the day after the CRC attorneys were first barred from the courtroom.
Volpe had also attempted to rehabilitate his image in August 1950 by naming
Samuel M. Dorsey as the first black to the Mercer County Prosecutor’s office as
an investigator. The twenty-four-year-old had worked as a dental assistant,
advertising department, and in a defense depot, a somewhat interesting
preparation for investigation work.69 The move certainly deflected some of the

Trenton Evening Times, Editorial, “Good Riddance,” December 1, 1950; Trenton
Evening Times, “Communist Tag Put on Civil Rights Congress in Horner Case; Plan to Smear
Courts Charged,” November 30, 1950.
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Trenton Evening Times, “Dorsey, Negro, Aid to Volpe,” August 15 1950. It is
interesting to note it was Dorsey that had filed a discrimination suit against Lenox Restaurant in
which the then Judge Volpe ultimately threw out. At the time, this was seen in the black
69
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criticism that Volpe had experienced from the black community. On December
10, it was announced that new trial date was set for January 15, 1951.70
The NAACP secured its place in the case. On December 15, 1950,
Clifford Moore, Trenton's NAACP liaison, made a motion to the court to admit
Thurgood Marshall as counsel for John MacKenzie and Horace Wilson. This
move was intended to hold the counsel spot for the NAACP and ultimately
Alexander. Defense attorneys Waldron and Queen withdrew at that time and
the new trial date was again postponed and rescheduled for February 5, 1951.
On January 5, 1951, the next round of replacements occurred when Solomon
Golat withdrew from the case so that the Princeton Committee’s attorney,
ACLU’s Arthur Garfield Hays, could replace him. Hays held the position until
George Pellettieri, a prominent Trenton attorney, was in place.

On January 12,

Raymond P. Alexander replaced Thurgood Marshall. On January 23, Pellettieri
officially entered the case, representing English, Thorpe, and Cooper in the new
trial. Now the NAACP and Princeton Committee for Defense of the Trenton Six
were in control and would lead the defense in the new trial.71

community as Volpe’s callous attitude and his inability to understand the plight of African
Americans in Trenton. See chapter four.
70

Trenton Evening Times, “Trenton Six Retrial Set for January 15,” December 10, 1950.
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State of New Jersey, Court Minutes, Appellants' Appendix, Volume 22, pp. 8455a,
8456a, 8457a, 8460a, 8462a., (1951).
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CHAPTER 6
“THE EYES OF THE WORLD ARE ON THIS CASE”: THE RETRIAL OF THE
TRENTON
“Truth must not be obscured in this case
and wrong must not triumph.”1
Raymond Pace Alexander
The new year of 1951 brought hope and promise for a new trial for the
Trenton Six. The retrial was scheduled to begin on February 5, 1951. Local
activist Rev. H.S. Charles Woodson commented that “hope is slowly beginning to
burn in the hearts of the people.” By then, some people just wanted to get the
whole Trenton Six episode behind them. One common remark heard from
Trentonians was “I am sick of hearing about the whole mess.” Many whites
blamed the CRC, and by extension the Communists, for making the case as “one
of the pet exhibits of the Kremlin as a sample of American democracy.” They
were upset at how Trenton was portrayed throughout the world, since the case
cast a harsh light upon the city. However, the CRC was now gone, and
Trentonians no longer felt subject to outrageous charges against them.2
Meanwhile, supporters of the Trenton Six were horrified at the news of the
mass execution of the Martinsville Seven. The doomed men had been found
guilty of raping a white woman. The state of Virginia ignored requests of
clemency from around the world. It executed four of the men on Friday, February
“Raymond Pace Alexander to Thurgood Marshall,” May 13, 1951, Raymond Alexander
Papers, box 36, folder 9.
1

2 Francis E. Cauthorn, “Families of Trenton Six Hopeful Trial Will Bring Defendants Real
Justice Now,” Philadelphia Tribune, March 10, 1951.
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2, and the remaining on Monday, February 5, the day of the beginning of the
Trenton Six retrial.3
Civil rights activists understood the deaths of the Martinsville Seven were
a major setback since so much time, organization, and effort went into trying to
save the men. According to Eric Rise the case led “Civil Rights organizations to
reassess their tactics.” The Afro-American reported that black Virginians blamed
one group—the CRC. They believed the men “would have been awarded
clemency if not for the marches on Richmond and Washington organized by the
CRC.” Some in Trenton, even civil rights advocates, collectively sighed relief
that the CRC was no longer involved in the case. The New York Amsterdam
News challenged those who were mourning the Martinsville Seven to gear up for
another monumental struggle, this time in the Trenton courtroom. The editorial
encouraged those who sought justice to now be “concerned with the Trenton Six
case . . . The eyes of the world are on this case, and it will behoove us to see it
that justice is given to the six.” 4
There was new judge, Superior Court Jurist Ralph Smalley, and the trial
was moved to a new courtroom where air-conditioning had been installed.
Carpenters had also renovated the courtroom to accommodate a large expected
audience. The jury box was adjusted so that fourteen jurors could be seated

Ralph H. Jones, “World’s Eyes Focused on Trenton 6 Trial,” Washington Afro-American,
March 6, 1951.
3

4 Eric W. Rise, The Martinsville Seven: Race, Rape, and Capital Punishment
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia, 1995), p. 149, 151; New York Amsterdam News, “The
Martinsville Seven,” February 10, 1951.
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instead of the customary twelve. Legal observers predicted the trial would be as
long as the first, or even longer. It was no surprise that Judge Smalley ordered
the jury box be adjusted to accommodate the fourteen jurors. Smalley intended
to avoid a mistrial due to potential sickness or disability among the jury. A press
section was provided for eleven newspaper and radio personnel.5

Trenton Six And Black Lawyers
The retrial of the Trenton Six reveals the advances that black lawyers
made to the cause of civil rights. During the re-trial, all the NAACP lawyers were
black. Since the first half of the twentieth century, the struggle for black lawyers
to be viewed as equal to white lawyers in successfully defending black
defendants was not a given. In the 1920s and early 1930s, when Raymond Pace
Alexander, the lead NAACP lawyer, began practicing law, he learned that a black
lawyer would not be able to compete in a profession dominated by whites.6

5 Judge Ralph Smalley graduated from Cornell University and New Jersey Law School.
He was admitted to the bar in 1920. The new lawyer entered politics as he was elected to the
Plainfield city council and later became the Republican chairman of Union County. In 1935,
Smalley was appointed a district court judge in 1935. Four years later he was selected as a
judge of the Court of Common Pleas for Somerset County. In 1946, Republican Governor Edge
nominated Smalley to the Circuit Court, which was reconstituted and emerged as the new
Superior Court following the adoption of new state constitution in 1948. Governor Driscoll named
Smalley to the Superior Court of Mercer County. State of New Jersey Constitutional Convention
of 1947. N.J. Constitutional Convention: Volume II (Bayonne, New Jersey: Jersey Printing
Company, 1951), 977; New York Times, Obituary, "Ralph Smalley, Jurist, 60, Dead,” January 22,
1956; Trentonian, “Busy Carpenters Prepare court For Horner Murder Retrial,” February 3, 1951.

6

Quote from Raymond Pace Alexander, Raymond Alexander Papers, box 36, folder 5;
Alexander was born in Philadelphia to parents who were born into slavery and following
emancipation, they migrated to Philadelphia in 1888. The Alexander family struggled financially
since the father was unskilled and relatively uneducated. Young Alexander began working at an
early age to help the family’s finances, from working on the docks unloading fish to delivering
newspapers. At age 16, when he was selling newspapers, he met the owner of the Metropolitan
Opera. After a brief conversation with the white owner, he was offered a job. Alexander credited
this experience as the beginning of seeing a new world of culture and refinement. Furthermore,
it provided the young man with the opportunity to learn the rules of the white elite and become
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W. E. B. Du Bois, in his classic work, The Philadelphia Negro, reported
that “Negro lawyers are, for the most part confined to petty criminal practice and
seldom get a chance to show their ability” due to their perceived lack of training
and the racism they would experience from the all-white dominated courtroom.
This view was generally held by both white and black professionals, as well as
the general populace. Even in the NAACP, as August Meier and Elliott Rudwick
have demonstrated, “prior to 1930 prominent white lawyers carried the principal
burden of the national office's legal activity.” This practice of hiring white lawyers
extended across the black community from Marcus Garvey and A. Philip
Randolph to businessmen and ordinary citizens. Minor matters were usually
given to black lawyers, but for serious criminal or civil right cases, they often went
to the white lawyer. 7

comfortable in maneuvering the difficult terrain of the interracial word. He learned another
valuable lesson as he watched the performers on the stage--the art of performance, something
that assisted him in the courtroom. Alexander’s biographer writes that those who watched him
perform in the courtroom wondered whether “he was acting while he was orating’ in the
courtroom. David A. Canton, Raymond Pace Alexander: A New Negro Lawyer Fights For Civil
Rights in Philadelphia (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2010), 9. In his youth,
Alexander begun attending North Philadelphia’s Zion Baptist, something that he would continue
to the end of his life. This experience brought him into contact with the black elite. Alexander
graduated from one of Philadelphia’s prestige boys’ schools, Central High School and won a
scholarship to the University of Pennsylvania. He earned a B.S. in economics and planned to
work at one of the large banks in the city. Unfortunately, he discovered racism hindered his
ambition. He was only offered a job in Brazil and he declined the offer. His advisors at the
university suggested he continue his education by earning a doctorate at Harvard. He ultimately
decided against that path and settled upon law. He graduated in 1923 and subsequently passed
the Pennsylvania Bar examination. For a full biographic background on Alexander, see David A.
Canton, Raymond Pace Alexander: A New Negro Lawyer Fights For Civil Rights in Philadelphia
(Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2010).
7 W.E.B. DuBois, The Philadelphia Negro: A Social Study (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1995), 115; August Meier and Elliott Rudwick, “Attorneys Black and White: A
Case Study of Race Relations within the NAACP,” Journal of American History 62, no. 4 (Mar.,
1976): 915.
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Even Alexander acknowledged that the “most difficult problem is to create
a greater interest on the part of the Negro himself in the Negro lawyer.” Thus, if
black attorneys were able to secure a big case, it was usually an “open and
closed” one, in which white lawyers believed it was a hopeless case and
therefore eschewed joining the defense team. Alexander referred to these type
of cases as a “lost cause” for defendants. These were hardly the ones on which
to build a solid reputation. A black lawyer’s social status, financial stability, and
reputation came from winning cases, but how could a black attorney find success
when never given the opportunity?8
Things began to change for Alexander in 1924, during one of his “lost
cause” cases. He agreed to join with a white lawyer to defend Louise Thomas, a
young black woman charged with the murder of her black police officer lover.
The white lawyer was the lead attorney, as was the norm. Thomas was found
guilty and sentenced to death. Alexander was retained to lead the appeal. He
successfully won a new trial for Thomas. Following the appeal, the white lawyer
resigned from the case. The Thomas family attempted to hire another white
lawyer, but with the bad publicity, no white attorney in the city was interested.
Reluctantly, the family turned to Alexander, who became the lead attorney by
default.
Alexander earned a reputation at this trial for his meticulous cross
examinations, his calm demeanor, and his connection to the jury. He showed
8 Carter G. Woodson, The Negro Professional Man and the Community with Special
Emphasis on the Physician and the Lawyer (New York: Negro Universities Press, 1969), 232;
Raymond Pace Alexander, “Opportunities and Problems Confronting the Negro Lawyer in the
North,” Raymond Alexander Papers, box 95, folder 20; Raymond Pace Alexander, “A Black and
the Law,” Cornell Law Forum 22, no. 3 (Spring, 1970): 8.
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that Thomas had acted in self-defense to defend herself from a violent outburst
from her lover. In his closing, he was able to bring the jury to tears as he
described the crime scene. The jury returned with a not guilty verdict. David
Canton argues the case made “Alexander a race hero.” The Pittsburgh Courier
announced Alexander “undoubtedly has established the fact that the Negro
lawyer has ability and qualities ranking with those of the most competent,
regardless of race.”9
Such successes brought Alexander additional recognition. He was
elected in 1929 as the third president of the National Bar Association, a black
professional group comprised of lawyers and other elites. Under Alexander’s
leadership, the NBA passed a resolution in 1931 that condemned black
professionals such as ministers and doctors for directing legal business from
black lawyers to white attorneys.10
For other black professionals, segregation often forced them to establish
separate institutions or organizations. But for a black lawyer, there was no
separate black courtroom. Darlene Clark Hine has argued that black attorneys
occupied a unique position to fight against the norms of segregation, for “black

9

David A. Canton, Raymond Pace Alexander: A New Negro Lawyer Fights For Civil
Rights in Philadelphia (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2010), 22; Pittsburgh Courier,
“Jury Finds Girl ‘Not Guilty’” October 24, 1925.
10 Floyd J. Calvin, “Bar Association in Uproar as Scottsboro ‘Justice’ is Discussed,”
Pittsburgh Courier, August 15, 1931.
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lawyers moved back and forth between the larger white society and parallel
institutions.”11
The key to Alexander’s success and his subsequent rise in the NBA was
due to the dynamics and importance of the courtroom for the black lawyer. The
courtroom was where black lawyers navigated the troubled waters of racism.
Outside of the courtroom, black lawyers suffered discrimination in their everyday
interaction with the white world. But as Kenneth Mack has argued, once a black
attorney entered a courtroom, he could push “back against the bounds of racial
identity and convince his white lawyer colleagues and judges that he was, as
nearly as possible, one of them.” In essence, the demand was “to be treated like
white men—even if things were different just outside the courthouse.” Since
segregation was malleable and a result of negotiations between the white
majority of the courthouse and the black lawyer, the process was accomplished
by what Mack called “social scripts” and “performances.” 12
Lawyers and judges had to conform to the expectations of the court in
the way they addressed each other and in their behavior while in the courtroom.
The black lawyer had to perform to the expectation of the white courtroom. Thus
for Mack, the key to Alexander’s success was “his ability to demand, and receive,
the scripted public courtesy that marked him as a member of a profession.”

Darlene Clark Hine, “Black Professionals and Race Consciousness: Origins of the Civil
Rights Movement, 1890-1950,” The Journal of American History 89, no. 4 (Mar., 2003): 1280.
11

12 In other words, the “whiter” one could appear or act in the courtroom, the less “black”
lawyer would seem. Kenneth W. Mack, Representing the Race: The Creation of the Civil Rights
Lawyer (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 62, 268, 64, 81.
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Additionally, Alexander spent great effort in cultivating and maintaining excellent
relationships with all members of the court staff. 13
In spite of Alexander’s success, he never had been in charge of a case as
important as the Trenton Six. All the NAACP lawyers knew how significant an
acquittal would be to further advance the idea of competent black representation
in high profile cases. Co-defense NAACP attorney, J. Mercer Burrell, confided to
Alexander how important the Trenton Six case would be in refuting the idea that
“Negro lawyers cannot successfully represent clients in important cases.” Before
the trial began James Imbrie had expressed serious reservations that the
“interest of the defendants would be prejudiced by having Negro lawyers in too
prominent a position.” The stakes were high, for both the Trenton Six and their
lawyers.14

The Re-Trial Begins
The retrial of Trenton Six was one of the biggest events in Trenton history.
The case had became a cause célèbre and court authorities expected hundreds
13

Kenneth Mack, Representing the Race: The Creation of the Civil Rights Lawyer
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 81.
14 NAACP co-defense counsel J. Mercer Burrell was born in Richmond, Virginia. He
graduated from Virginia Union University. He migrated to Newark, New Jersey and received his
law degree from New Jersey Law School, now Rutgers Law School. He was active in New
Jersey Republican politics and from 1933 to 1936 served two terms in the New Jersey Assembly.
Burrell strongly advocated for civil rights and anti-lynching legislation throughout the 1930s. After
he retired from politics, he continued his activism through an association with the NAACP. He
was a successful attorney in his own right. By the time of the retrial, he “defended 82 charged
with homicide, without losing one” to the electric chair. New York Age, “J. Mercer Burrell is
Named to Republican National Committee,” October 12, 1940; Jet Magazine, “J. Mercer Burrell,”
November 26, 1970, p. 10; Cliff Mackay, “Trenton 6 Trial Impressions,” Afro- American, March 24,
1951; “J. Mercer Burrell to Raymond Pace Alexander,” July 5, 1951, Raymond Alexander Papers,
box 36, folder 28.
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of people to be at the courthouse throughout the course of the trial. The Mercer
County Sheriff mandated a “first come, first serve" system for seating that had
some people waiting for more than two hours for a seat on the first day. The
relatives of the defendants were given a special privilege of seating in the
courtroom. Additionally, fourteen court attendants were strategically stationed
inside and outside of the courtroom. Six were assigned to the defendants, four
were positioned throughout the room, two guarded the doors, and two were in
the corridor maintaining order.15
Seventy-five people were in line waiting for the courtroom to be opened.
An additional fifty people were outside in the corridor, waiting for an opportunity
to be allowed in. The day before the trial, the Trenton Times reflected that “bitter
court battles have waged over their innocence and their guilt. Thousands of
dollars have been collected for their defense. Editors have been bombarded by
propaganda releases from left-wing organizations and by letters from sincere,
well-meaning citizens.” Now the waiting and the preparation was over. Finally,
the case could be considered.16
The fireworks began as soon as Judge Smalley gaveled the courtroom
into order. Defense lawyer George Pellettieri jumped to his feet and requested a
week’s postponement due to what he termed a “blackout” for the prosecutor’s
failure to hand over subpoenaed documents. Pellettieri was a colorful and fiery

15

Trenton Evening Times, “Attendants Stand Guard in Horner Case,” February 5, 1951.

16 Trenton Evening Times, “Trenton Six Retrial Opens in Mercer Court Tomorrow,”
February 4, 1951.
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labor and criminal defense specialist. He was often criticized for his “distinctive
courtroom manner, [in that] he would bellow, plead, and on occasion, cry while
orating before a judge.” However, his antics were highly successful. The word
around Trenton was that if one was in trouble and needed the best, “get George
Pellettieri.” It was not long before he built a profitable law firm in Trenton.
Pellettieri was born in Trenton and attended Rutgers University Law School. He
graduated in 1929 and unsuccessfully ran for New Jersey Assembly later that
year. In 1936, Democratic governor A. Harry Moore selected him as the Trenton
District Court judge. He served until 1945 when he resigned to run for Congress
as an independent. Again, he was again unsuccessful. However, his political
defeats did not prevent him from becoming a powerful figure, for he became a
power broker in New Jersey Democratic state and local circles. In spite of the
power he welded, he was described as a “man of the people.” Pellettieri quickly
developed an intense rivalry with the Republican prosecutor, Mario Volpe. The
men were involved in a constant campaign of jockeying for the important and
substantial Italian vote in Trenton.17
The defense was sending a message: everything was going to be
contested. The judge denied the motion, indicating that since it was going to
take some time to select a jury, the defense would have ample time to receive
the documents. Once the initial excitement had subsided, the process of voir
dire began. Before the day was over, one juror was selected. Unfortunately, on
17 Meyer Berger, “2nd Murder Trial of Trenton 6 Opens,” New York Times, February 6,
1951; Trenton Evening Times, “Dynamo Fits No Mold,” October 6, 1974; Jaye Scholl and John
Mintz, “Trenton Area Mourns Pellettieri Death,” Trenton Evening Times, August 30, 1980; Larry
Kramer, “George Pellettieri was the Heart of Trenton,” Trenton Evening Times, September 3,
1980.
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the morning of the second day, the assistant prosecutor arose and informed the
judge that Volpe had been stricken with appendicitis. Judge Smalley instructed
the one lone juror to leave the jury box and declared a mistrial. The third trial of
the Trenton Six was set for March 5.18

The Dynamics Of The Defense Team
The month delay enabled the defense additional time to prepare for the
retrial. Pellettieri, the last attorney to join the defense, had only a few weeks to
prepare before the February start of the trial. The general defense strategy was
formulated rather quickly and was quite similar to the first trial. It would attack
the confessions and credibility of Mrs. Horner. But the case involved several
well-known and expensive attorneys with their inflated egos, so their consensus
was fragile. Ruth Rabstein, one of the defense team, acknowledged they all
understood that “an aura of truthfulness and success emanate from the defense
and the most important of all that there be complete unity and support amongst
all the defendants.” Yet several important underlying problems lurked beneath
the surface, ready at any time to surface and disrupt the common cause.19
The first major problem was the issue of trial tactics. One of the difficulties
confronting the defense was that six separate cases were being tried as one.
The testimony of one witness potentially could help one man while hurting
another. For example, the defense heard rumors that Detectives Toft and
New York Times, “Mistrial is Called in ‘Trenton 6’ Case,” February 7, 1951; Trenton
Evening Times, “Mistrial In Trenton Six Case As Appendicitis Fells Volpe,” February 6, 1951.
18
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Stanley “had material that would have benefited four of the defendants.”
Defense attorney Moore later confided to Thurgood Marshall that the two
detectives had told him “Thorpe, McKenzie, Forrest, and Wilson had no involved
in the crime, but that Cooper and English were involved.” This situation
highlights the defense’s attempt to coordinate testimony that could help one or
hurt another.20
The competing agendas were one of the reasons McKinley Forrest’s
attorney, Frank Katzenbach, wanted to sever his case from the others. This idea
was discussed in defense strategy meeting on January 22, 1951, and at the pretrial conference on January 31, when Katzenbach informed the judge he would
move for a severance. Interestingly, Prosecutor Volpe had no objection, and
neither did Burrell on behalf of Alexander. However, Pellettieri objected, since
two of his clients happened to be Cooper and English. Of course, there were
other factors the defense considered besides the testimony of the two detectives.
Pellettieri’s clients had the weakest alibis since they relied on family members to
place them away from the Horner store. The other three defendants relied on coworkers and employees that provided stronger alibis. Ultimately, the defense

20 “Clifford Moore to Walter White, Roy Wilkins, Thurgood Marshall, and Henry Moon,”
October 25, 1951, Raymond Alexander Papers, box 36, folder 10; “Clifford Moore to Thurgood
Marshall,” March 2, 1953, Raymond Alexander Papers, box 36, folder 10. The testimony of
Detectives Stanley and Toft also raises another important question about the case and the
relationship between the Trenton detective bureau and the prosecutor. It is more than likely that
Stanley and Toft shared with Volpe their findings about the case. And yet, the prosecutor only
called them in the State’s case to establish the fact that soda bottles found at the crime scene.
Instead Volpe relied on the testimony from patrolmen and the Mercer County Chief of Detectives
Frank Naples. However, NAACP assistant counsel J. Mercer Burrell denied any such
information. According to Burrell, “At no time did any information come to my attention as
indicated [by Moore] . . . nor did I ever hear of any statements as reported therein. If Mr.
Alexander and Mr. Moore were in position of any such information they most carefully concealed
it from me, their co-counsel,” National Guardian, “Last of Trenton Six ‘Confess’; Pressure is
Charged,” February 26, 1953.
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team believed there was a better opportunity for victory if all six were tried
together.21
There were also outside pressures being brought against the
contemplated severance. Elwood Dean, New Jersey Communist Party
Educational Director, excoriated the NAACP when he learned about the possible
severance. He wrote, “This tactic is extremely dangerous. Some people—even
some Negroes (such as Clifford Moore of Trenton) are reported to take the view
that if the cases are separated, at least some will assume freedom.” But
ultimately, the defense had to make a decision. Ruth Rabstein confided that the
trial tactics “had to be carefully worked out.” George Pellettieri convincingly
argued to the defense team that the defendants had to be tried together to
prevent some of the defendants being acquitted and others being found guilty.
Although this strategy may have helped all six, Katzenbach admitted it was a
“risky policy” and “dangerous” not only for Forrest, but for Alexander’s clients,
Wilson and MacKenzie. Katzenbach informed the judge on February 2 there
would be no motion for severance. This debate was the first major strain upon
the defense’s unity. 22

21

Frank Katzenbach was the only court appointed defense lawyer to remain from the first
trial; “Conference—January 22, 1951,” Raymond Alexander Papers, box 36, folder 11; State of
New Jersey, Appellants’ Appendix, “Pre-Trial Conference, January 31, 1951, Volume 22, 8466a,
(1951);
22 Elwood Dean, The Story of the Trenton Six (New York: New Century Publishers,
1949), 22; Ruth Rabstein Manuscript, 177; ‘Frank Katzenbach to Raymond Pace Alexander,” July
12, 1951, Raymond Alexander Papers, box 36, folder 9.
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Another looming problem was the interaction among the defense team.
Their egos caused serious strains to develop, especially between Alexander and
Pellettieri. Both men had stellar reputations before this case. They were
expensive lawyers, and both appeared well-groomed and affluent, attesting to
their success. But Alexander seemed to be in a class by himself. One reporter
noted that Alexander “astounded prosecutors, judges, and fellow defense
counsel alike by showing up each morning with a different suit.” Mrs. Susanna
Thorpe, grandmother of defendant James Thorpe, commented, “That guy must
have brought three ward-robe trunks.” Since he was a “Philadelphia lawyer,”
Alexander “justified the fear in prosecutor’s hearts” according to one source.
Alexander’s success came in a much larger city than Trenton. Ruth Rabstein
noted “Raymond Pace Alexander was a showman and didn’t like anyone stealing
center stage from him. George reacted the same way.” She commented later
that “Raymond and George were both prima donnas, one was trying to outshine
the other.” The problem for Pellettieri was that Alexander was outshining him, a
major source of contention as the trial unfolded.23
A major difference between the two men was in their courtroom conduct.
Alexander’s demeanor was non-confrontational. He was meticulous in his
manners as he addressed the judge, court personnel, fellow defense attorneys,
and the prosecution. Pellettieri, possibly because he was white, had more

23 Cliff Mackay, “Trenton 6 Trial Impressions,” The Afro-American, March 24, 1951; Ruth
Rabstein Manuscript, 172.; Oral Interview conducted by Steven A. Bank and quoted in Bank’s,
The Dilemma of the NAACP: A Case study : the Trenton six 1948-1953, unpublished Senior
Thesis at University of Pennsylvania, March, 1991, 75.
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latitude. He could be combative and provocative. Katzenbach privately feared
Pellettieri’s antics would harm the defendants. He confided to Alexander that he
did not “care whether he ‘copped’ the act all the time, just as long as he wasn’t
injuring McKinley Forrest’s defense.” Even though both men were professionals,
there were several times during the trial when their simmering rivalry nearly
boiled over.24
Ideological differences further divided the Trenton Six defense team. A
fragile coalition of liberals and Progressives had joined together to save the six
men. Although the CRC was no longer in the case, the Princeton Committee in
many ways replaced it. James Imbrie’s committee represented a Left that
supported Henry Wallace and was marginalized by the Cold War. The NAACP,
by contrast, had purged itself of Communists. Within the defense team,
Alexander represented the NAACP on one side of the divide, and Pellettieri
represented the Imbrie Progressives on the other.25

The Third Trial Gets Underway
Judge Smalley gaveled the third trial to order at 11:00 a.m. on March 5.
Immediately, old controversies flared. A CRC rally was planned for later that
evening in Trenton. The speakers for the night were novelist Howard Fast,

“Frank Katzenbach to Raymond Pace Alexander,” July 12, 1951, Raymond Alexander
Papers., box 36, folder 9.
24

25 Trenton Evening Times, “Wallace and the Negro Vote,” January 11, 1948; See Carol
Anderson’s discussion of Walter White’s participation and subsequent dispute with W. E. DuBois.,
Eyes Off the Prize: The United Nations and the African American Struggle for Human Rights,
1944 – 1955 (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
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Bessie Mitchell, and Mrs. Rosalie McGee, wife of Willie McGee, a black
Mississippian who was facing electrocution on March 20 for his conviction of
raping a white woman. Throughout the day CRC supporters handed out leaflets
inviting people to attend and “help cut the lynch rope.”

NAACP co-counsel

Clifford Moore saw one of the leaflets in the hands of a reporter, and he knew the
tenuous cease-fire that had existed between the CRC and the NAACP came to
an end. He said that the rally would “inflame prospective jurors against the
defendants.”26
Within a few minutes the other defense lawyers joined the impromptu
press conference. They quickly told the press that the CRC was listed as a
subversive organization and had no connection to the trial. Alexander and
Pellettieri made a few comments objecting to the planned meeting and gave the
indication the conference was over. But Moore continued to denounce the
meeting. Finally, Arthur G. Hayes interrupted Moore and asked, “Aren’t you
exaggerating this? Haven’t these people a right to meet?” Moore replied, “They

26

The youngest of the defense team, Clifford Moore, following his graduation from
Glassboro State Teachers College began his career as a social studies teacher. In 1940, then he
became the first black to be commissioned as an officer in the New Jersey National Guard. He
entered active duty and was transferred to the European war in 1944 as an intelligence officer.
Moore earned the Purple Heart and the Bronze Star. Following his return to the United States, he
entered Temple Law School. In 1948, Moore became clerk for Phillip Forman, Federal Judge of
the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey. Although he served in that capacity during
the first trial, he also provided valuable support on a voluntary basis for the NAACP to the state
appointed defense team by researching law. The Pittsburgh Courier called him “one of the
state’s best research specialists.” In 1949, he passed the bar examination. Throughout this
period, he was active in the leadership in the NAACP New Jersey State Association and Trenton
branch. William Gardner Smith, “Defense Batters ‘Six’ Prosecution,” Pittsburgh Courier, May 5,
1951; Trenton Evening Times, “New U.S. Commissioner First Negro to Hold Post Since
Reconstruction Days,” September 24, 1952; Trenton Evening Times, “Gun Accident Kills Moore,”
July 16, 1956; Thomas P. Ronan, “2 Jurors Chosen in Trenton Trial,” New York Times, March 6,
1951.
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are raising issues that are not part of this case. We who live in Mercer County
know it won’t help.” A few minutes later Hayes told a reporter, “the Congress
was responsible for saving the defendants.” This was the first time there was
such a public display of disunity. It was also the beginning of Moore’s hostility
toward Hayes. Later that evening, nearly 300 people attended the meeting. 27
The CRC meeting brought to the surface many of the problems the
defense counsel had been trying to avoid. James Imbrie commented that the
Trenton Six case “had become a gambit in the Cold War.” Once again the Cold
War pushed its way into the trial. The defense team was concerned about the
potential prejudicial nature in terms of selecting the jury, and they feared that the
wide brush of communism might touch them. Would Judge Smalley, like
Hutchinson before him, remove them?28
The next morning the defense delayed the trial so it could decide whether
to request a mistrial. Most important was the CRC meeting, but there was
another issue as well. It occurred on Monday during jury selection. Assistant
Prosecutor Frank H. Lawton asked one of the potential jurors if they were
acquainted with Ruth Rabstein, who had been married to Emmanuel Cantor, the
secretary of the Mercer County Communist Party. Rabstein, of course, was one
of Pellettieri’s legal team. Rabstein had never used Mrs. Cantor in her
professional career. The defense immediately objected to Lawton’s tactic of

27 Arthur G. Hayes of the 1920’s Scopes “Monkey” Trial, Sacco-Vanzetti, and the
Scottsboro fame. New York Amsterdam News, “Claim CRC Rally Hurt Trenton Six,” March 10,
1951.

28

Imbrie Manuscript, 476.
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trying to taint the defense with communism. The judge ordered her professional
name be used. But Lawton’s question became the center of the news reports
that day and evening. Additionally, the morning news carried the charge made at
the CRC meeting that Alexander, Burrell, and Moore were being paid by other
groups besides the NAACP.
It was all very troubling to the defense—the CRC was back in the news,
and there were new reports of a legal associate with possible Communist ties,
and “Communist” money being used to help support the defense. It was clear to
the defense team that the re-emergence of Communist issue could prejudice the
little goodwill that they had tried to build up since the mistrial. News reports
focused on the controversy, rather than on the case. The defense was losing
control of the news cycle and was on the defensive even before the trial had
begun.
The defense opted to strike hard against the CRC and wrap themselves in
Americanism, trying to discredit any possible attacks from the anti-communist
crusaders. Once Smalley called the court to order, Katzenbach reminded the
court earlier he had contemplated seeking a severance but opted against the
tactic when he was “convinced of the Americanism of my associate counsel.”
Then he attacked the idea that other groups besides the NAACP and the
Princeton Committee were supporting the defense, “I have every confidence that
the sources backing the defenders are American sources of which we all can be
proud.” Alexander agreed there was no place for “forces that attempted to bring
inflammatory, anti-American issues into the case.” He read a statement
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prepared by James Imbrie of the Princeton Committee, which condemned the
tactics of the CRC.29
The defense successfully buried the issue. The Pittsburgh Courier
rebuked the CRC for trying to “mess this case as they did that of the ill-fated
Scottsboro boys. This is their life’s work.” It is noteworthy how the Trenton Six
case had become associated with the other great 1930s trial. Moore claimed
victory for the defense, since the firm rejection of the CRC tactics by defense
counsel “had disabused the public mind in Trenton of the harmful effects of such
tactics.” However, the sniping continued between the NAACP and the CRC.
Patterson condemned the NAACP:
Moore and some of the present defense attorneys have found
their main enemy not in the prosecutor who originally framed
these six innocent Negroes, not a state government which
has again brought them to trial to continue their persecution,
but in the CRC, whose legal efforts and organizations of national
and world wide protests brought the innocent men out of the
death house.”30

Tony Biesada, “Housewife and Ex-Wave 3d, 4th Horner Jurors,” The Trentonian,
March 7, 1951. This explanation by Katzenbach is questionable, since he knew who all the
participants in the defense would be on January 23 with the additional of Pellettieri. That did not
stop Katzenbach from informing the court on January 31 at the pre-trial conference he was going
to offer a motion of severance; Trenton Evening Times, “Trenton 6 Lawyers Hit Bid to Stir Race
Hate,” March 6, 1951; ”New York Amsterdam News, “Claim CRC Rally Hurt Trenton Six,” March
10, 1951; Thomas P. Ronan, “Leftists Scored in Trenton Trial,” New York Times, March 6, 1951;
Thomas P. Ronan, “2 Jurors Chosen in Trenton Trial,” New York Times, March 6, 1951; Trenton
Evening Times, “Trenton 6 Lawyers Hit Bid to Stir Race Hate,” March 6, 1951; Trentonian, “Civil
Rights Rally Hits Horner Retrial,” March 6, 1951; Pittsburgh Courier, “Subversion as Usual,”
Editorial, March 17, 1951.
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30 National Guardian, “Attacks on CRC Lapped up by Press,” March 14, 1951; New
Journal and Guide, “Activities of Leftists in Trenton Six Case Scorned,” March 17, 1951.
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Although the defense may have considered the episode a victory, not
everyone believed this was so. In his statement, Imbrie had included a complete
list of the Princeton Committee board members with the statement. Even though
Imbrie made it clear in the press release the Committee was not affiliated with
“directly or indirectly with any other organization,” there were fears of
recriminations. A group of Trenton businessmen approached the Episcopal
Bishop to convince Canon Robert Smith, the treasurer of the Princeton
Committee, to resign. He refused. But according to Imbrie, the businessmen
were successful in securing the “resignation of one or two Princeton professors.”
The Trentonian reported that once the release was given to the press, several of
the professors requested their names be removed from the membership.31
On Wednesday, March 14, the tedious task of selecting a jury was
completed. As with the first trial, an all-white jury of six women and eight men
was selected. Again, Volpe had successfully eliminated all blacks from the
panel. Black newspapers condemned the prosecutor since there were several
black candidates. The Washington Afro-American recounted the examination of
William Van Harler. He was the 110th black person to be examined and he was
qualified to be chosen, but Volpe used one of his peremptory challenges to
exclude him. The Washington Afro-American reported that “as far as Trenton’s
citizens of color are concerned, this marked Volpe’s political suicide.”32
“Princeton Committee for Defense of the Trenton Six News Release, March 6, 1951,”
Raymond Alexander Papers, box 36, folder 20; Imbrie Manuscript, 476; Tony Biesada, “Bar
Horner Mistrial Due to Illness,” The Trentonian, March 10, 1951.
31
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Opening statements were given on Saturday, March 17. Prosecutor Volpe
spoke in a conversational manner. He took less than one hour to present the
State’s case. He opened with an attempt to thwart an expected charge, telling
the jury, “if you believe no other statement I shall make in the course of this trial, I
want you to believe me when I say this . . . We on the part of the State are just as
anxious and desirous that these men obtain the fairest trial possible.” He
proceeded to recount the basic facts of the case. Volpe argued that “competent
witnesses” supported the confessions, which were “spontaneous” and were
“voluntary.” The prosecutor concluded by declaring, “The State contends that all
these defendants are equally guilty and there should be no distinction between
them.”

He not only asked the jury to find them guilty of murder in the first

degree based on the evidence, but to recommend death as the punishment for
all of the six. 33
The defense was allocated two hours for its opening. Alexander,
Katzenbach, and Pellettieri all spoke. The strategy employed was intended to
utilize the strengths of each attorney, while at the same time allowing the defense
to outline its case. One of the advantages of such a talented group was the
ability to craft a multi-faceted approach, reaching as many jurors as possible.
Alexander’s selection as the first attorney to speak was intended “to equalize and
destroy the prosecutor’s impact on the juror.” His use of poetry and Biblical

33 State of New Jersey, Opening Statement of Mario Volpe, Volume 1, 2a - 3a, 6a, 14a
(1951); Thomas P. Ronan, “Charges Outlined in Trenton Trial,” New York Times, March 18, 1951;
Trenton Evening Times, “Stage Set to Begin Taking Testimony in Trial Tomorrow,” March 18
1951.
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references allowed him to be the visionary and challenge the jury to view the
case as something much larger than a murder trial.34
Alexander began his opening with the use of “social scripts” and
“performances,” calling Volpe “his friend.” He told the jury that as the trial
unfolded, they would be “shocked at the uneven justice.” Then Alexander
exclaimed “not only [are] these six men are on trial, but New Jersey justice,
American justice” was as well. He portrayed the defendants, court, and the jury
as a drama that the entire world was watching. He described the elements of a
theatrical production, telling the jury that the time was the “postwar 1940s,” the
scene was a “ramshackle obscure second furniture store,” the stage was the “the
courtroom,” and the principals were “six unknown, poor, uneducated, [men] . . .
his Honor, some counsel,” and the spectators were “the world at large, that world
at large with history stalking in the wings of this theater. . . the whole world is
watching with bated breath for a fair determination.” Alexander concluded with a
Biblical reference: “I say verily unto you, verily our institutions are on trial and
there can be no justice where there is a social void.” He enjoined each one “to
stand up courageously, righteously” because “a greater Judge than all of us is
watching over this jury, this Court room, and these defendants.”35

34

The defense strategy was win an acquittal by creating reasonable doubt within the
jury’s minds and provide them with something to “hang their hat upon” when they retired to the
jury room. Failing an outright acquittal would be an attempt to reach one or two jurors to potential
hold out against the others in the jury room for a mistrial and fight another day.
35 State of New Jersey, Opening Statement of Raymond Pace Alexander, Volume 1,
19a, 20a, 27a, 28a, 36a (1951); Tony Biesada, “Volpe Slated to Lay Groundwork of State’s Case
in Horner Trial,” The Trentonian, March 19, 1951.
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Katzenbach’s calm and steady manner provided an opportunity to reach
the jury on a dispassionate level. His role was to humanize the men.
Katzenbach focused on Mrs. Horner’s testimony. He claimed the prosecutor was
so unsure of her ability to identify the men that Volpe had her sit in the courtroom
during the first trial’s jury selection, so she could “rehearse this thing” of
identifying the men. Katzenbach told the jury he was so confident of the
innocence of McKinley Forrest that he was going “to offer the man himself” as the
first exhibit, since he has no “sinfulness in his heart.” Forrest’s life was Exhibit
One; Katzenbach argued the number of people who saw and talked to him on the
day of the crime was Exhibit Two. He argued that it was only after Forrest spent
“four days of hell” that he submitted to the police pressure and admitted his
culpability. Katzenbach concluded by personalizing Forrest, recounting his
defendant’s life and by extension inviting the jury to consider the six defendants
as more than criminals.36
Finally came Pellettieri, the attack dog whose fire and brimstone antics
made him a legend in Trenton courtrooms. He permitted the defense to reach
jurors on a rawer, emotional level. He began his opening slowly and softly as he
addressed the jurors with legal pleasantries. He recalled the statement Volpe
made about wanting a fair trial. Then as if he reaching a crescendo in his
cadence, he yelled, “We intend to prove to you that Mr. Volpe did not give them a
fair trial the first time.” One reporter described the courtroom dynamic as an
“intense hatred of Prosecutor Volpe for Pellettieri [that] keeps the courtroom

36

State of New Jersey, Opening Statement of Frank Katzenbach, Volume 1, 41a (1951).
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charged like a 50,000-volt wire.” The tension was somewhat relieved when
Assistant Prosecutor Lawton jumped to his feet and objected. Judge Smalley
overruled Lawton and instructed Pellettieri to continue. The small explosion
achieved the desired effect, for now Pellettieri had the undivided attention of the
jury. He moved to deal with an important underlying issue for the defense when
he acknowledged “we have high-priced lawyers here.” It was no secret about
some of the defense team since the local newspapers had commented on these
prominent and expensive Philadelphia and New York City lawyers along with
outside organizations financing them. The defense believed it was best for them
to bring it up first and not allow Volpe to make an issue of it. Then Pellettieri
quickly pivoted and assured the jury that the defense lawyers had a monumental
responsibility of removing the blight from “New Jersey justice” due to the
mismanaged handling of the Horner murder case. The Trenton Times reported
the defense opening “ripped and tore, slashed and disparaged the investigation
that led to the arrest of the six defendants.” It was a good start for the defense. 37
The State’s Case Begins To Unravel
With a few exceptions, the prosecution and defense presented the same
case as they had for the first trial. The major difference, according to the National
Guardian, was that “the trial would be presided over from the bench, not as
before from the prosecution table.” There were four significant differences

37 State of New Jersey, Opening Statement of George Pellettieri, Volume 1, 56a, 57a
(1951); Trenton Evening Times, “Stage Set to Begin Taking Testimony in Trial Tomorrow,” March
18 1951; Cliff Mackay, “Trenton 6 Trial Impressions,” Afro-American, March 24, 1951.
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between the two trials. The first was the health of the defendants themselves.
James Thorpe and Collis English were not healthy when they were first arrested
in 1948. And while they remained in prison, their health continued to deteriorate.
The first scare occurred during jury selection. Two weeks before his 1948 arrest
Thorpe had his right arm amputated. On March 13, Pellettieri reported to
Smalley that Thorpe was “in severe pain from a chronic ailment and faced
surgery.” The judge was “visibly affected” due to the mistrial implications and
immediately ordered two physicians to examine and report back to him. The
physicians told Smalley the problems were related to the lack of health care from
the amputation. But they could hopefully treat him and would be able to get him
through the trial. On May 28 the trial was postponed due to emergency surgery
to remove a cyst at the base of Thorpe’s spine. The operation was successful
and the court resumed the following day. 38
Collis English’s heart problem was a much bigger concern. On Thursday,
April 5, during Dr. Sullivan’s testimony, Pellettieri asked the judge for a recess,
noting English was not feeling well. But during the lunch recess, the situation
became more serious and two cardiologists were summoned. Court was
recessed that day. A decision was made to transfer English that weekend to the
local hospital for a full battery of tests. On Monday, April 9, court resumed.
English’s condition continued to worsen and on Tuesday, while defense
attorneys argued for the exclusion of the signed statements, English slumped
38 National Guardian, “Prosecutor Ails; Six Back in Jail,” February 14, 1951; Ralph H.
Jones, “Second Mistrial Averted In Case of Trenton Six,” Afro-American, March 17, 1951; Trenton
Evening Times, “Defer Trial Today Due To Illness,” May 28, 1951.
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from his chair. Suddenly, Bessie Mitchell screamed, “What a terrible, unjust
courtroom. Killing innocent people while boys are dying on the battlefield. It’s a
shame.” Meanwhile, English’s mother broke down at the sight of her son falling
to the floor. Judge Smalley again recessed court. A cardiologist reported to the
judge the seizure was due “to nervousness and excitement.” Although the few
days in April seemed to spell another mistrial, English was able to finish the
trial.39
Another difference between the two trials was the number of prominent
people who attended the trial. Civil rights leaders such as NAACP notables
Walter White and Theodore Spaulding, along with Dr. Ulysses S. Wiggins,
President of the New Jersey State Branch, attended various days of the trial.
Entertainer Josephine Baker, boxing champion Ike Williams, and actor William
Marshall showed their support for the Trenton Six. And others were there who
had endured similar injustices such as Mrs. Amy Mallard of Coombs County,
Georgia. Mallard, who was driving home with her husband and family members,
encountered a group of about twenty armed and robed white men. They opened
fire and her husband was killed. When two white men were indicted for the
crime, they were acquitted within twenty five minutes. She told a reporter in

Bessie Mitchell was referring the Korean War, 1950 – 1953. Tony Biesada, “Horner
Suspect to Get Hospital Checkup Today,” Trentonian, April 7, 1951; Tony Biesada, “Collis English
Returned to Cell After Examination For Recurrent Ailment,” Trentonian, April 9, 1951; Tony
Biesada, “New English Seizure Sets Off Dramatics,” Trentonian, April 11, 1951; State of New
Jersey, Court Minutes, Volume 22, April 6, 10, 1951, 8550a, 8551a, 8554a, 8555a (1951).
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Trenton that “I didn’t know that what happened in Georgia could happen in New
Jersey too, but this proves it.”40
A third difference was Doctor J. Minor Sullivan's testimony. Sullivan, a
black physician, was called to the Trenton Police Department on the evening of
February 10, 1948, to witness the signing of the “confessions” by the defendants
and testify the men had not been mistreated. Detectives and the prosecutor
wanted “a reputable colored citizen.” It was an unusual request since the Mercer
County Physician had a staff of three doctors to assist in such requests. Sullivan
was uncomfortable with the situation and he stopped at the local NAACP
president’s home to ask him to accompany him to the police station. Sullivan
discovered Broaddus was out of town and contacted another friend, Peyton
“Scrappy” Manning, to go with him. At the first trial Dr. Sullivan testified that the
men seemed normal to him with the exception of Ralph Cooper who looked
"looked drowsy and lazy." But at the first trial, he said that he was not sure
whether this condition was drug induced or not.41
The defense always believed the men were psychologically coerced.
They wanted to break Sullivan down through cross examination into some
admission of that reality. The first defense team was unsuccessful, for Sullivan
stood firm in his testimony. But since then, Sullivan had come under attack from
“Raymond Pace Alexander to Thurgood Marshall and Walter White,” June 6, 1951,
Raymond Alexander Papers, box 36 folder 5; Ralph H. Jones, “Jo Baker ‘Stops’ Case in Trenton,
Cheers 6, Afro-American, April 7, 1951; Ralph H. Jones, “De Lawd, His Angels Visit Trenton Six,”
Afro-American, April 14, 1951; New Amsterdam News, “Ike, Baker Plead for Trenton 6,” April 21,
1951; New Amsterdam News, “Defendant in Trenton Six Trial Talks,” May 12, 1951.
40

“Statements of Dr. J. Minor Sullivan,” Raymond Alexander Papers, box 36 folder 5;
State of New Jersey, Opening Statement of Mario Volpe, Volume 1,13a (1951); State of New
Jersey, James Minor Sullivan, III Testimony, Volume 3, 1109a (1948).
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the black community, since the six were sentenced to death in large part to his
testimony. The Afro-American reported his practice “dropped by more than 50%.”
He was seen as somewhat of an opportunist and his reputation suffered as a
result. The National Guardian suggested there was a quid pro quo for his
cooperation in being appointed to a city job one week after the 1948 witnessing.
And in January 1951, just a few weeks before the second trial, he was promoted
to another position with the county. However, Dr. Sullivan was chosen for the
city position on January 30, 1948, well before the arrest of the men. It was true
that Sullivan was elevated in January 1951 to the deputy medical inspector for
Mercer County.42
Sullivan did not know any of the Trenton Six before that night in 1948 and
in his capacity as prison physician, he may have since noticed a difference in
their behavior and contrasted that with their strange conduct. So by 1951, he
might have acknowledged the possibility that the conduct exhibited in 1948 was
the result of some type of psychological coercion.
Additionally, the New Jersey Supreme Court had instructed the judge to
consider the aspect of coercion in the admissibility hearing. Consequently, the
defense utilized a new tactic—psychological compulsion. There was a small
window the defense could exploit in the testimony. In the first trial, Sullivan
asked Cooper if he had been “smoking reefers” since he was so drowsy. In this
retrial, all the defense attorney needed to do was to inquire as to how the drug

42 William A. Reuben, “Defendants Acted Drugged at ‘Confession,’ Doctor says,” National
Guardian, April 11, 1951; Trenton Evening Times, 3 Physicians Get City Posts,” January 30,
1948; Trenton Evening Times, “Dr. Sullivan Medical Aide For County Jail, Workhouse,” January
3, 1951.
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could affect an individual. And that would provide the opening they needed.
Alexander believed he could press Sullivan “sufficiently hard for the court to
assume that something was the matter with MacKenzie.” Thus, in the
admissibility hearing, Sullivan was asked to explain the effect of drugs in this
case. There were five possibilities: suggestibility, fatigue, excitability, irritability,
and mental confusion.43
Alexander had Sullivan acknowledge that MacKenzie was exhibiting
excitability. Then Alexander attempted to connect the condition to some type of
drug by asking a hypothetical question: “could that condition not be caused by a
person who has been administered or to who had been administered a drug as
long as six or eight hours before?” After Sullivan replied, “Yes,” Alexander had
Sullivan. Volpe immediately objected, claiming there was no evidence
MacKenzie had smoked or ingested any drug. The judge overruled the
prosecutor by claiming “this witness has just testified that the condition that he
found MacKenzie . . . was one that might be likened to one that had been
subjected to some form of drug.” The door was open for the defense to use any
or all of these symptoms to challenge the voluntary nature of the statements.
One reporter described it the moment as a “bombshell” that had dropped into the
hearing. The state’s case was beginning to unravel.44

State of New Jersey, Dr. James Minor Sullivan, III Testimony, Volume 5, 1878a –
1879a (1951).
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Judge Smalley allowed the defense to pursue this strategy. But Sullivan
found himself in a very different and uncomfortable situation as a witness. He
was called by the State as a fact witness and soon developed into an expert
witness. Once the court allowed him to answer as an expert witness as to the
influence of a drug upon an individual, the door swung wide open and the
defense went through it.

Now the fact-based testimony became hypothetical

questions as to “whether A could cause B.” With those type of questions, all he
could do was to respond in possibilities. For a witness, Sullivan was in a no-win
situation.
Based on this strategy, the court disregarded Thorpe, MacKenzie, and
Cooper’s signed statements. However, Smalley entered into evidence the
statements of Forrest and English, as well as Cooper's “holographic statement”
or hand-written statement. Local newspaper accounts described Smalley as
"speaking softly, with suspenseful deliberation" as he announced his decision.
The judge explained: "Tested by the rules of what is fairness . . . and with the
burden upon the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt as to the
voluntariness of these three confessions, I have referred to, I do have a doubt."
This changed the dynamics of the trial. Alexander commented, with some
hyperbole that "it was after this that first hope appeared, and then it was only
after your NAACP attorneys, and no one else broke the state's main witness." 45

45 State of New Jersey, Determination of the Court, Volume 7, 2567a (1951); “Raymond
P. Alexander to Thurgood Marshall,” June 6, 1951, Raymond Alexander Papers, box 36, folder 9.
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Doctor Sullivan further damaged the State's case after the “confession
admissibility” hearing had been concluded and the jury returned to the courtroom.
During the cross examination, defense attorney Pellettieri posed his own
hypothetical question concerning English’s state of mind due to his heart
condition at the time of the signing. Pellettieri asked Sullivan: “A person in that
condition in which you found him could not be said to have been acting if his own
free will at the time he signed the confession?” Sullivan answered, “he would not
be acting of his own free will.” By this point Sullivan testified all of the five
defendants who signed statements did so because of some form of “hysteria,
psychoneurosis or suggestibility.” Volpe was livid and sought to “neutralize” or
erase Sullivan's testimony. But the damage had already been done to the
State's case. Judge Smalley denied the motion and allowed Sullivan’s testimony
to stand.46
The last difference in the two trials was in the testimony of George
English, the father of Collis. It was clear that Sullivan had seriously damaged the
State’s case. Just before the State’s closing, Volpe called George English as a
surprise witness. English testified that on the evening of January 9, 1948, he
returned from work and went to the basement to tend to the coal furnace. His
step-daughter, Melrose Diggs, came into the house and went upstairs to visit her
mother. A few minutes later, Ralph Cooper arrived. Cooper called Diggs and
asked her to get English’s car because “he had some robbing to do up on Broad

46 The Trentonian, “Amnesia Cited in Trial ‘Confession,” April 25, 1951; State of New
Jersey, James Minor Sullivan, III Testimony, Volume 9, 3542a (1951); Tony Biesada, “Surprised
Volpe Blasts Dr. Sullivan’s Testimony,” The Trentonian, April 26, 1951. To neutralize a witness’
testimony means to wipe it from the official record.

283

Street . . . at a second-hand furniture store.” That same night George English
was arrested for carnal abuse on his ten-year-step-daughter, Myrtis Fields. He
was in jail from that night until his release on February 6, 1948. Sometime in
mid-March, 1948, while English was painting his house, he found two coats.
English testified that one coat with a torn right pocket belonged to Ralph Cooper,
since he had seen Cooper wearing it in 1947. English found inside Cooper’s
coat a bottle wrapped in a sock. Following his release from prison in August
1950, he notified his lawyer, Irving Lewis, of what he found in 1948. The
Prosecutor was notified and his statement was taken. Both the coat and the
bottle wrapped in the sock were admitted into evidence under strong defense
objection. The Afro-American reported that “Hatred flashed from the eyes of
Collis and his mother, Mrs. Emma English seated in the second row,” as George
English testified. Alexander put it succinctly when he commented the man “tried
to put the noose right around the neck of his own son and Cooper.”47
George English further claimed Horace Wilson had visited his home and
worked for him. This contradicted the testimony of Wilson and Thorpe that they
did not know each other before their arrest. Alexander motioned the entire
testimony be stricken, since it was “speculative and too dangerous.” Alexander
was livid and confided to Thurgood Marshall that this was “one of the worst and
most brazen frame-ups I have ever seen in all my twenty-seven years of

47 State of New Jersey, Testimony of George English, Volume 11, 4049a, 4052a (1951);
see Chapter 1 for events leading to George English’s arrest; Afro-American, “Judge Asked to
Dismiss All Trenton Six Cases,” May 12, 1951; “Raymond Pace Alexander to Thurgood Marshall,”
May 13, 1951, Raymond Alexander Papers, box 36, folder 8.
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experience in trying thousands of cases.” Volpe insisted the State had a
responsibility to “present the evidence” and let the jury decide the “weight and the
credibility.” The judge denied Alexander’s motion.48
George English’s testimony had to be aggressively attacked by the
defense. The story fit so perfectly into the State’s theory that the murder weapon
was a bottle in a sock. It also removed another of the State’s problems dealing
with lack of fingerprints on the bottles. James Imbrie called it a “cock-and-bullstory” and brought his Princeton Committee into full gear to impeach English.
During the vigorous cross examination it was brought out that English had not
only sexually assaulted Myrtis Fields in 1948, but was also convicted of the same
charge against Mrs. Bessie Mitchell in 1926. He also denied that he was married
to Mrs. Rubie English. Therefore it became imperative to locate Mrs. Rubie
English and Melrose Diggs. The problem was the two had left the Trenton area
when George English was released from prison in 1950. The Committee also
discovered the prosecution was searching for them as well. The hunt for the two
women began in full earnest.49
Alexander worked with Imbrie. A tip suggested they were in Savannah,
Georgia. The Princeton Committee paid for them to return to Trenton. It was a
cloak-and-dragger operation, since the defense wanted the shock to be visible

State of New Jersey, Colloquy Between Court and Counsel, Volume 11, 4066a –
4067a, 4069a (1951); “Raymond Pace Alexander to Thurgood Marshall,” June 7, 1951, Raymond
Alexander Papers, box 36, folder 9.
48

49 Imbrie Manuscript, 477; State of New Jersey, George English Testimony, Volume 11,
4080a, 4090a (1951).
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when both women stood in court and testified that English was lying. Thus
absolute secrecy had to be maintained until the surprise was unveiled.
According to Ruth Rabstein, a policeman lived across from her home and the
prosecution had set up a camera recording all movements of anyone entering
and leaving her home, so that “surprise witnesses had to be secreted in other
places.” Thus, Imbrie kept the two at his home. He picked them up at the train
station and found another surprise: Melrose Diggs was very much pregnant, due
any day.50
The tactic worked. Imbrie could not contain his pleasure when he wrote:
Surely no attorney ever got more kick out of the appearance
of a witness than I got at seeing Ruby English wheeled into
the courtroom and hearing George English again deny in her
presence that he had ever married the woman, only to have
both their marriage license and a certificate of marriage. . .
Then Ruby and Melrose tore to sheds the whole tramped-up
story of George English.51
Alexander confidently informed the NAACP that “I think we have blasted
[the attempted frame-up] by showing that George English was not only a rapist,
but that he is a perjurer of the most flagrant sort.” For James Imbrie, the drama
was far from over, for he witnessed Diggs’s face as she “twisted in agony as she
shifted from side to side in the witness chair.” She was in labor. Ruth Rabstein
asked Imbrie, the seventy-one-year-old white haired man, to rush her to the
hospital. A few hours, Diggs had triplets, two daughters and a son. The Afro-
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American reported “superstitious Trentonians are predicting . . . that three of the
six defendants will be freed. 52
The overall defense’s case was effective as well. Alexander noted when
deciding whom to call to the witness stand that it was important to know “who [to]
call and when to call him or her, and when to throw in our heaviest gun.” For
Alexander, the strongest witness and the one with the best alibi was Horace
Wilson. He wanted “to impress the jury with his innocence and made them
wonder how could any jury possibly have convicted this man and sentenced him
to the chair in the first trial.” The strategy worked magnificently, for Wilson
turned out to be an excellent witness. Alexander reported to the NAACP the “jury
was immensely impressed” and “there were few dry eyes” when he left the stand.
The Guardian reported that Wilson’s “dignity and intelligence” so moved the
press “every reporter except for the two Trenton papers, sent him word that they
considered him the most impressive witness yet heard.” Next the defense called
English and Cooper, whose cases they considered weakest, and then in order
Forrest, Thorpe, and finally MacKenzie. Using the same strategy they called the
weakest alibi witnesses for English and Cooper first, and then for Thorpe,
building to the strongest alibi witnesses for Forrest, Wilson, and MacKenzie. 53

“Raymond Pace Alexander to Thurgood Marshall,” June 7, 1951, Raymond Alexander
Papers, box 36, folder 9; Imbrie Manuscript, 479; Philadelphia Tribune, “Triplets Trial Note,” May
22, 1951; Ralph H. Jones, “Triple Births Seen as Sign Three of Six Will be Freed,” The AfroAmerican, May 26, 1951. Clifford Moore claimed the later “appointment of Lewis as assistant to
Volpe grew out of ‘coat and bottle’ fix. Lewis [George English’s attorney] rigged the entire thing.”
“Clifford Moore to Thurgood Marshall,” March 2, 1953, Raymond Alexander Papers, box 36,
folder 10.
52
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As the defense put on its case, Alexander wrote to Thurgood Marshall
pleading for the NAACP “to pick up on our public relations and press relations.”
Alexander related how the Princeton Committee hired a full time public relations
person, who was in the courtroom at all times. The spokesman was “well
provided with money to treat, dine, and wine the press weekly.” This helped
cultivate a relationship that potentially provided positive news reports about the
activities of the Committee. And of course there was another level to Alexander’s
suggestion. Pellettieri received funds from the committee to entertain the press
to a dinner weekly with “plenty of drinks, and have a few girls there as well.” He
confided to Marshall he felt “embarrassed” that he was not able to do the same.
In the world of lawyer competition, this was a little troubling. In this battle,
Alexander could not compete. Alexander suggested to Marshall he could “leave
the girls out,” but it was imperative that he be in a positon to “have them in for
dinner and have all of our men there and probably a few NAACP directors and
have a swell time.”54
Afro-American reporter Ralph Jones commented on the evolution of the
white newsmen from the start of the trial. Many of them were “contemptuously
resigned” to their assignment and even filed some “race-baiting“stories to their
newspapers. But things changed as the defense put on their case. The

1951; “Raymond Pace Alexander to Thurgood Marshall, Henry Moon, Walter White, and Dr.
Ulysses Wiggins,” June 21, 1951, Raymond Alexander Papers, box 36, folder 9; “Raymond Pace
Alexander to Thurgood Marshall,” May 13, 1951, Raymond Alexander Papers, box 36, folder 8.
54 “Raymond Pace Alexander to Thurgood Marshall,” May 13, 1951, Raymond Alexander
Papers, box 36, folder 8.
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reporters, as Alexander had informed the NAACP, attended the weekly social
events held by the Princeton Committee and Pellettieri. These “rabid antiTrenton Six” reporters were “diplomatically pressured” by other reporters who
challenged them with the “facts” that were coming out of the trial with the news
reports they were filling. By the end of the second month, their “antagonism had
been entirely broken down and they slowly warmed up to the fact that an injustice
had been practiced” upon the men. By the end of the trial, “every newsman were
pulling for the ‘boys.’” When Wilson dramatically finished his testimony, the
newsmen “anted up for a carton of cigarettes” for him.55

The Defense Team Bends But Does Not Break
The long trial began to cause serious problems for the coalition supporting
the Trenton Six. One of the ways the defense attempted to thwart any possible
problems was to “get together and thrash these things out” by having “little
cocktail sessions.” It always had been a chore, but once the defense case
began in earnest, it became impossible. As the days became longer, nerves
became frayed and tempers shortened. The relationship among the attorneys
became more strained.

The fundamental problem was that the defense

consisted of two groups, the NAACP and the Princeton Committee. Katzenbach,
the lone unaffiliated attorney, was the meditator between the lawyers, always
trying to keep peace with Pellettieri, in particular, even as Pellettieri “sought to
alienate NAACP attorneys from Katzenbach,” as Clifford Moore informed
Thurgood Marshall. Yet Katzenbach and the NAACP maintained an excellent
Ralph H. Jones, “Trenton 6 Sidelights,” Afro-American, June 22, 1951; “Raymond Pace
Alexander to Thurgood Marshall,” May 13, 1951, Raymond Alexander Papers, box 36, folder 8.
55
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working relationship. Even the mild mannered peacemaker “was so disgusted at
times with Pellettieri’s tactics that it was all he could do to sit in the courtroom.”56
Even amongst the NAACP team, the relationship between lead counsel
Alexander and J. Mercer Burrell became strained. Burrell confirmed to
Katzenbach that he believed Alexander “was slighting him” when he made in
suggestions. Alexander and Burrell were barely speaking to each other by the
end of the trial.57
The biggest potential problem was between Alexander and Pellettieri, of
course. Moore told Marshall that Alexander was “subjected to extremely shabby
treatment by Pellettieri all throughout the trial.” Moore claimed that Pellettieri
undermined the Alexander’s examinations and when Alexander confronted him,
Pellettieri “brushed the suggestions aside and went ahead on his course.” This
was most evident when Alexander successfully broke Dr. Sullivan on
Mackenzie’s statement. Once Pellettieri began cross examining Sullivan, he
began to aggressively question the doctor. Unbelievably, Pellettieri made a
motion to “expunge the entire testimony of Dr. Sullivan.” Volpe quickly
concurred. This would have been catastrophic for the defendants. Alexander
quickly rose to clarify that Pellettieri only mean the recent testimony. Pellettieri
56 “Frank Katzenbach to Raymond Pace Alexander,” July 12, 1951, Raymond Pace
Alexander Papers, box 36, folder 9; “Frank Katzenbach to Raymond Pace Alexander, July 12,
1951,” Raymond Alexander Papers, box 36, folder 9; “Clifford R. Moore to Walter White, Roy
Wilkins, and Thurgood Marshall,” October 25, 1951, Raymond Alexander Papers, ” box 36, folder
10.

57 “Frank Katzenbach to Raymond Pace Alexander,” July 12, 1951, Raymond Alexander
Papers,” box 36, folder 9; “Raymond Pace Alexander to Clifford R. Moore, June 27, 1951,”
Raymond Alexander Papers, box 36, folder 10.
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told Alexander, “I will do my own speaking. Excuse me, Mr. Alexander.” Luckily
for the defendants, Smalley denied the motion. Alexander was stunned.
In another example, Moore claimed Pellettieri “deliberately concealed
papers” from Alexander during an examination. Alexander confessed after the
trial, “I cannot stand the fellow.”58

Verdict
On June 11, 1951, closing arguments were scheduled. Three key
defense attorneys again summarized the case, each utilizing their strengths.
Katzenbach reiterated the reasons why Forrest could not have participated in the
crime, and then pleaded, “I wish with all my soul that God would give me the
powers to put across my sincere beliefs to you because in my mind nothing in
this case has occurred which would cause me in one small bit in my faith and
confidence in McKinley Forrest. And, McKinley Forrest, I do believe in you.”
Alexander suggested to the jury what a “great opportunity you have to squelch
and destroy those malicious propaganda and rumors falsely presented to the
world that America is not fair to its colored population.” Pellettieri informed the
jury, “I don’t represent defendants. I represent victims. To my mind a defendant
is one who has done something for which he deserves to be indicted and put to
trial, not the victim.” Pellettieri charged Mercer County Chief of Detectives Frank

58 “Clifford Moore to Thurgood Marshall,” March 2, 1953, Raymond Alexander Papers,
box 36, folder 10; State of New Jersey, Testimony of Dr. J, Minor Sullivan, Volume 9, pp. 3532a ,
3533a (1951); “Correspondence from Clifford R. Moore to Walter White, Roy Wilkins, and
Thurgood Marshall,” October 25, 1951, Raymond Alexander Papers, box 36, folder 10; “Raymond
Pace Alexander to Clifford R. Moore,” June 27, 1951, Raymond Alexander Papers, box 36,
Folder 10.
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A. Naples with “bungling” and bad police work that resulted in the defendants
being in the courtroom fighting for their lives.59
Volpe, in closing, initially spoke “so softly he was inaudible,” according to
news reports. But as he neared the end his demeanor changed, with “fists
clenched, his stocky frame quivering with emotion.” He exhorted the jury to “Set
an example, if you want to stop this type of crime, if you want to prevent a
recurrence, if you want to show others that we in Mercer County do not tolerate
stick-up men, highway men, murderers, then I ask you . .. to return a verdict, a
verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree.”60
The jury retired on Wednesday, June 14, at 12:46 p.m. to consider their
verdict. Under New Jersey law it remained in the jury room until a verdict was
reached or they were hopelessly deadlocked. As the hours passed, the
courthouse resembled a “fortress,” as more and more Trenton and New Jersey
State police arrived. They were stationed at the entrance, patrolling the
corridors. Twelve police and court attendants were in the courtroom itself. The
all-night vigil demonstrated the divisions within Trenton itself. The sheriff’s sixroom suite was crowded with reporters and police. As the night unfolded a few
bottles of alcohol came out. One police officer came up to the makeshift bar,
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removed his gun from its holster, slammed it down and said, “If any of these
niggers gets off, we might as well give up and turn in our badges. Since this
case, everything’s different. All you have do is put a finger on any nigger and
they start screaming about their rights.” However, at the courthouse, a court
attendant said, “I’d acquit them all. You know I’ve gotten to know all these
fellows real well in the past three months.” After Pellettieri’s humiliating crossexamination of Naples, the Chief of Mercer County Detectives passed the lawyer
in the corridor, and “cursed and spat on his pants.” Sergeant Creeden, walking
with Naples, “viciously kicked” Pellettieri as they passed.61
As the jury continued its deliberations, "more than 150 spectators
maintained a night-long vigil in the courtroom." Two busloads of CRC members
arrived in Trenton as the rain began to fall. The Trentonian reported that
between 6:45 p.m. and midnight, their switchboard operators were answering "2
inquiries every minute" as to whether a verdict had been reached. Finally after
nearly twenty hours it was announced the jury had reached a verdict. It returned
on Thursday morning at 7:25 a.m. Every seat in the courtroom was taken. The
defendants were “tense” as the jury filed in. The jury showed the exhaustion of
nearly twenty hours of continuous deliberation. Each jury member “looked tired
and worn and stared directly ahead.” Judge Smalley instructed the clerk to call

Trenton Evening Times, “Emotional Outbursts Marked Court Drama,” June 14, 1951.
William A. Reuben, “Waiting for the Jury; The All-Night Vigil in the Trenton Courtroom,” National
Guardian, June 20, 1951; Ralph Jones of the Afro-American reported in slightly different when he
reported the police officer “reached into his pocket, pulled out is gun and declared he was going
to ‘turn the God damned thing if those Niggers were freed. It’s getting so a cop can’t slam them
around anymore.” Ralph H. Jones, “Trenton 6 Sidelights,” Afro-American, June 22, 1951; Imbrie
Manuscript, 483.
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the roll of the jury and defendants. Then the clerk turned to the six and said,
“Defendants arise and face your jury.”62
The jury found Cooper and English guilty of murder in the first degree with
a recommendation of mercy, which meant life imprisonment. However, they
found Forrest, MacKenzie, Thorpe, and Wilson not guilty.63
Cooper and English did not show any emotion. However, the four others
were “plainly relieved and happy.” Alexander “broke down and sobbed” while
thanking the jury. Katzenbach was overcome and unable to stand. He sat at the
defense table with “his head bowed and tears streaming down his cheeks.” J.
Mercer Burrell stood behind Katzenbach and “gripped his shoulders consolingly.”
Pellettieri was “in tears” as he made a motion for English and Cooper. Volpe “sat
with his elbows on the table, looking straight ahead,” displaying no emotion.
After court, he sought Alexander’s permission to congratulate the four. To their
surprise, he shook their hands. Meanwhile, several relatives and friends
surrounded Mrs. Emma English, and “her shoulders shook with sobs.” They
comforted her as they led her away from the courthouse. Outside, 300 people
were awaiting to witness four of the Trenton Six leave the Mercer County
Jailhouse. A few minutes after 10:00 a.m., led by Alexander, they walked out
into the crowd “amidst tears, cheers, and a clearing sky.” As they were leaving,
Dr. Sullivan appeared and a “roar of greeting went up from the crowd” for his
William A. Reuben, “Waiting for the Jury; The All-Night Vigil in the Trenton Courtroom,”
National Guardian, June 20, 1951; Imbrie Manuscript, 483; Tony Biesada, “’Six’ Jury Deadlocked
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testimony. Mrs. Emma English invited the four men and all the defense team to
a dinner at her home.64
The jury took twenty-two ballots throughout their deliberations. The jury
was divided in the beginning with seven voting for acquittal for all, with five voting
for guilty and electric chair. At one point ten jurors voted for acquittal, with two
holding out for guilt. One juror told the press, “We wanted to free all of them, but
we were afraid of losing everything to a hung jury. We were afraid of not being
able to free any of the defendants by holding out any longer.” One juror was
adamant and refused to believe the Trenton police “tailored the charges against
the men.” “A “compromise verdict” was hard for many to understand and accept,
especially since Forrest was the one whom the State accused of killing Horner.
According to the confessions, even Cooper and English were merely observers
and not participants. Ruth Rabstein concluded the jury “convicted Collis English
and Ralph Cooper who were the blackest of the defendants, the least attractive
physically and socially, unemployed, uneducated.” Interestingly, Ralph Cooper
was the only defendant that Mrs. Horner was positive was not in the store on
January 27, 1948. 65
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The reaction to the verdict was varied. The Pittsburgh Courier called it "A
Vindication of Our System," indicating that "the American system of justice which
has shown again and again an elasticity which is at once a bulwark of our free
system and a beacon to the world." The Trentonian's editor wondered, "Whether
the verdict was a reasonable one is not a decision which should be based on
snap judgment. That there was a maze of conflicting evidence throughout the
trial cannot be denied. . . Whatever else might be said, it must be conceded that
the transition was effected though due, orderly processes." The New York Times
called it "a compromise verdict."66

NAACP And CRC Struggle For Credit And Blame
Moments after the verdict, the struggle between the NAACP and the CRC
was renewed. William Patterson assigned the blame squarely upon Alexander
and the NAACP. He charged:
It is my belief that the conduct of some of the Negroes who
participated in that trial contributed to the criminal act. Mr.
Raymond P. Alexander did not fight for the acquittal of all
these innocent men. His summation will be forever a blot
upon his record. Nor is that blot cured by remark that he
may now make about the innocence of them all.
Alexander was criticized for botching the summation by committing several
errors. The National Guardian took up the attack, arguing that since Alexander

Race and Jury Racial Composition,” University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 3
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exceeded his time allotment, it cut into Pellettieri’s time for his statement. When
the judge inquired about Alexander continuing into his time, Pellettieri responded,
“I rather he finish now. Of course, it places me within a terribly embarrassing
position.” The heart of the criticism concerned Alexander’s usual courtroom
behavior, when he told the jury that he “learned to admire a great deal and have
a good deal of affection for . . . Mr. Volpe.” But in the next sentence, he
continued:
I have never been engaged in a trial of a case which makes
me shudder more and makes me wonder why and how could
fine gentlemen of the class and quality of these two fine men
become so engaged themselves in a trial of a case which
I consider one of the most monstrous, completely erroneous
prosecutions that I have ever read or heard about affecting these
defendants.
Those who attacked Alexander never focused on this statement, thereby making
it easier to vilify Alexander and make him the “scapegoat” for the two convictions.
Alexander told Walter White: “Do not concern yourself in the slightest about
communist yelping about the verdict.” Alexander was much more critical when
he wrote to Moore, reminding him “you know what dirty digs he [Pellettieri]
passed about me and the dirty lying statements of his communist henchmen and
his other worshippers.”67
On the day of the acquittal, there was no planning among the defense
team as to what should happen after the verdict. A press conference with all the
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defense counsel and the four acquitted men would have been a good idea. The
NAACP had represented only two of the four. Walter White invited all four to
New York. Only Wilson, MacKenzie, and Forrest made the trip. To the CRC and
others, the NAACP was attempting to take all the credit by parading the
defendants on their own turf and own venues. Bessie English received word that
the men would be there. NAACP attorney Burrell reported the “CRC invaded”
and “attempted to forcibly take charge of the defendants from Cliff and myself.”
Moore described it as, “Bessie appeared with all the Commies.” She wanted to
speak to MacKenzie and Forrest. Forrest told her “bluntly not to bother him. She
began to scream and shout and talked about all the money she had collected for
them.” Wilson interrupted her and said, “I didn’t get any of the money and neither
did my lawyers.” Forrest told her, “I spent two years more in jail because of
those people you monkeyed with.” Moore confided to Alexander, “I am glad the
scene occurred because it gave the National Office an idea of the problem which
we faced during the trial.” Walter White described the meeting: “left wingers
attempted to crash the press conference and a sister of one of the convicted
defendants was most vociferous in her attacks upon those who had freed four of
the defendants.”68
All these statements need to be interpreted in view of the struggle
between the CRC and the NAACP. Bessie Mitchell was again cast as the “wild
woman” and out of control. What was more notable was the reaction of the two
68 “Clifford Moore to Raymond Pace Alexander,” June 28, 1951, Raymond Alexander
Papers, box 36, folder 21; Walter White, “Trenton 6 Trial by Walter White,” Trenton Evening
Times, June 24, 1951.
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men who had become identified with their NAACP attorneys. In January 1950,
Wilson had signed the papers requesting the CRC to represent him, stating,
“They're the lawyers who brought us out of that death house. We are going to
stick together till we're all free.”69
Throughout the next few weeks, Burrell complained to Alexander that “the
CRC has almost gained control” of the four acquitted men and “is advertising
their appearance at various public functions.” But White had asked Burrell to set
up “some type of demonstration or demonstrations featuring the defendants and
counsel.” For in Burrell’s mind, the “NAACP has not secured the maximum
publicity.” He advocated a victory celebration through New Jersey, New York,
and Pennsylvania. But the organizations needed to parade the men as live
trophies, to be seen as the victor, rewarded by the grateful followers with further
support.70
The NAACP attorney’s success certainly did much to advance the
prospects of black lawyers in sensational cases. After witnessing the legal
representation by the three black NAACP lawyers, even James Imbrie admitted
to Burrell that their presence “was one of the strongest factors in favor of the
defendants.” Burrell confided to Alexander that it was significant that English and
Cooper were represented by “100% white counsel,” while Wilson and MacKenzie
were represented by “three members of our race.” Indeed it was a great step for
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the competence of black lawyers in the Trenton Six case, since Forrest and
Thorpe were represented by the white lawyers, Katzenbach and Pellettieri.71

The Trenton Two
The defense counsel for the Trenton Two immediately began the process
for another appeal before the New Jersey Supreme Court. The Princeton
Committee announced that it would raise the $75,000 necessary for the appeal.
On July 28, 1951, the ACLU, NAACP, and the Princeton Committee announced
that they had agreed to cooperate and take the case to the Supreme Court of
New Jersey, and if necessary, to the United States Supreme Court.72
On October 20, 1952, the State Supreme Court heard the appeal. George
Pellettieri and Arthur G. Hays represented Cooper and English; Volpe and
Lawton appeared for the State. On November 24, the Court overturned the
verdict. The Court listed three errors Judge Smalley had committed during the
trial. The first involved notes that Patrolman Lichtfuhs had taken on the first night
of Collis English’s interrogation. These notes included only some of the
comments made by English that night in the form of a memorandum. English
never saw these notes, and therefore had no opportunity to either sign them or
refute them. During the retrial, Judge Smalley allowed these notes to be placed
into evidence, giving access to the jury during their deliberations to them.
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Additionally, Volpe referred to them several times during his closing. This,
according to the Supreme Court Justices, “made it prejudicial to the rights of the
defendants."73
The second error committed during the trial was the failure of the trial
judge to strike from the record or tell the jury to disregard comments by Volpe
made about English's F.B.I. file. The records were nothing more than a
preliminarily investigation on English. The Justices commented that such
remarks were "highly prejudicial."74
The last error was the admission into evidence of the “coat and sock” that
George English claimed he found. The judges argued that there was no
evidence presented at the trial showing that the coat was ever in the possession
of or belonged to any of the defendants. The Justices wrote, "Only by conjecture
and speculation could the jury conclude anything in references to the exhibits
offered. This admission was improper, prejudicial and harmful."75
NAACP dealt with the charge that it did not do all that it could to help the
two defendants. An article in the New Republic relating the activities of the
Princeton Committee rekindled tensions with the CRC. Moore had had enough.
He wrote to the NAACP leadership challenging them to respond to the latest
73 Supreme Court of New Jersey 1952, State v Cooper, Lexis-Nexis Academic Database
(Legal Records), 554 – 558.
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developments. Moore accused the article of “treating the NAACP very cavalierly”
and “giving Hays and Pellettieri a puffed up reputation for having done nothing.”
Exasperated, Moore wrote, “isn’t there anyone in the NAACP office with
sufficiency of ability to write a complete article on the case giving credit to the
people to whom it is due.” Finally, he encouraged the leadership that it “is high
time for us to stop being on the defensive.”76
A new trial was ordered, but never occurred. By 1952, English's health
had deteriorated to the point that he heard the news of the overturned verdict in
the prison hospital ward. He was so sick that he could not be moved following
the appeal from State Prison to Mercer County Jail to await the new trial. When
it was announced that English was dying, Judge Smalley sent George Pellettieri
to see English. Pellettieri told English, "Now Collis, you know that you are dying,
you are going to meet your Maker." He replied that he knew. His lawyer looked
into his client's eyes and asked, "Did you have anything to do with the Horner
case?" "No, Mr. Pellettieri, I swear to you that I had nothing to do with it." On
December 30, 1952, at 8:10 p.m. twenty-seven-year-old Collis English died after
suffering a heart attack earlier that day. His mother arrived minutes after he died.
“She wept bitterly."
Close to 800 people gathered in the Union Baptist Church for the funeral
of English. He was clothed in his Navy dress uniform. McKinley Forrest, John
MacKenzie, and James Thorpe were among the pallbearers. William Patterson

76 “Clifford Moore to Walter White, Roy Wilkins, Thurgood Marshall, and Henry Moon,”
October 25, 1951, Raymond Alexander Papers, box 36, folder 10.
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looked down from the pulpit into the open casket and proclaimed, “Collis English,
we who brought you from the death house pledge that those who murdered you
will not go unpunished. . . Volpe murdered you. Governor Alfred Driscoll let him
murder you.” Ironically, at the Greenwood Cemetery, he received a volley of rifle
fire from the Fort Dix Military Guard of Honor. As the National Guardian noted,
“In death, at last, Collis English was one of his country’s heroes.77
On January 14, 1953, English’s mother thanked the organizations and
individuals who had supported her son. She wrote, “Collis died in prison an
innocent man. This was hard for me to bear; but I do know from all of you that he
will not be forgotten—or Ralph Cooper. But Cooper was alone in more ways
than he realized. The next surprise occurred on February 20, 1953 at a pre-trial
hearing to set a new date for the trial. According to the news reports, "Cooper
pulled a surprise by asking to enter a no defense plea." He then "admitted
complicity in the slaying," as well as informing the judge that the other five men
were involved as well. Judge Conlon then sentenced him to six to ten years.
With time served, Cooper was eligible for parole within the year.78
Was this a surprise move, as the newspapers reported? Clifford Moore
wrote to Thurgood Marshall that “approximately three weeks prior to the date . . .

Elihu S. Hicks, “800, Negro and White At Rites for Collis English,” Daily Worker,
January 5, 1953; Afro-American, “Heart Attack Fatal To “Trenton Sixer,” January 10, 1953;
National Guardian, “Collis English: He Got His Freedom in Death,” January 8, 1953, Reuben
Papers, Civil Rights Congress—National Guardian, box 1, file 10.
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78 Mrs. Emma English, “Letters to the Editor, Collis English,” Trenton Evening Times,
January 14, 1953; Trenton Evening Times, “Cooper Pleads, Links All ‘6’ In Murder,” February 20,
1953; New York Times, “Last of ‘Trenton 6’ Draws 6 – 10 Years,” February 21, 1953.
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there were whispers among a few members of the Bar to the effect that some
deal was being made.” During that same period, Moore met Pellettieri and was
told that the Princeton Committee "ran out of funds and he intended to drop out
of the case." According to Ruth Rabstein, there were several reasons for the
decision for Pellettieri to withdraw from the case. He had lost thousands of
dollars due to the time that the case required. But the primary reason he
withdrew from the case was because his only son was dying and he wanted to
be near him at this point.79
Consequently, a plea agreement was arranged. Moore claimed he was
told in "an unguarded moment about a week ago that Cooper was going to make
a statement in open Court and take Volpe off the hook." Volpe was definitely in
trouble with the County because of the $200,000 that was spent in the case. The
prosecutor's office was certainly ready to make a plea agreement to avoid
another expensive and lengthy trial. The agreement called for Cooper to
implicate himself and at the same time acknowledge what Volpe had maintained
all along, the complicity of the other five in the crime.80
But why did Cooper agree to it? James Imbrie concluded “under stress of
the promise to be free, and without counsel, or a fund-raising committee,” Cooper
agreed to accept the plea. It seemed to Cooper there were no organizations
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standing in line waiting to represent him. The days of the mass support seemed
to have disappeared along, with his best friend Collis English.81
The reaction to this news created another storm of controversy. The
Trenton Times condemned the deal in an editorial entitled, "Justice Defeated":
The murder of William Horner, old and feeble, in his second-hand
on North Broad Street on January 27, 1948, was one of those
crimes whose enormity grows with the passing of the years.
Each new phrase has deepened and darkened the tragedy. . . .
This case, it is now made clear after years of litigation and
bitter controversy, was disposed of in accordance with law
and justice on August 6, 1948, when a jury in Mercer County
returned a verdict of guilty and had a judge sentenced the six
men to death in the electric chair. . . Now facing a third trial
granted by the Supreme Court and being without financial
resources, the one remaining prisoner reveals that all six
men were involved in the brutal murder. 82
Assistant Prosecutor Frank Lawton told the press the four defendants
“could be indicted for perjury” based on their testimony in the earlier trial. Even
the shock of Cooper’s plea deal and the possible implications for the four
acquitted men were not enough to prevent the simmering feud that had
developed during the 1951 retrial from exploding into the public arena. Two of
the three original NAACP attorneys, Moore and Alexander, were outraged at the
actions of Pellettieri. Alexander was livid. "Cooper is one mammoth, huge,
vicious LIAR. It is a sad ending, however, to a glorious case in which you and I
gave much blood, sweat and tears." The plea agreement, which had been
crafted by Pellettieri, made the NAACP look bad. Moore lashed out at Pellettieri,
81
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writing to Marshall, “He has ‘rooked’ us proper as an organization.” Moore
released a letter he wrote to Judge Joseph Conlon requesting that the judge
“hold a conference” with the four acquitted men, defense lawyers, and Volpe.
Then the four would have who had been implicated publicly an opportunity to
respond to Cooper’s admissions.83
The remaining NAACP attorney, J. Mercer Burrell, had aligned himself
during the 1951 trial with Princeton Committee’s Pellettieri. They remained in a
working relationship, preparing for the new upcoming trial for the two remaining
defendants. Burrell was furious when he learned of Moore’s letter to Conlon. In
that correspondence, Moore referred to the decision made by the defense early
in the 1951 trial not to call Detectives Stanley and Toft to testify in what
Alexander and Moore believed “would have reacted unfavorable to the defense
of Collis English and Ralph Cooper.” Burrell and Pellettieri called a National
Guardian reporter to respond to Moore’s allegations. Burrell categorically denied
there was any such statement from Stanley and Toft, by insisting that “At no time
did any information come to my attention as indicated [by Moore] . . . nor did I
ever hear of any statements as reported therein. If Mr. Alexander and Mr. Moore
were in position of any such information they most carefully concealed it from
me, their co-counsel.” Even Thurgood Marshall was somewhat surprised by
Moore’s decision to release the letter to Conlon. Rebuking Moore, Marshal

83 “Raymond Pace Alexander to Clifford Moore,” February 25, 1953, Raymond Alexander
Papers, box 36, folder 10; “Last of Trenton Six ‘Confesses’; Pressure is Charged,” National
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wrote, “I am certain that it is improper for lawyers to divulge information given to
them by a client without the express permission of a client.” Moore reminded
Marshall that Cooper had never been his client.84
Burrell and Pellettieri suggested Cooper had been pressured by Volpe
because the prosecutor had kept Cooper isolated since the death of English by
barring visitors or friends. Cooper was alone, since he had no family in New
Jersey. Burrell insisted Cooper’s only visits were from Volpe’s office.
Additionally, Burrell further charged there was some questionable activity on the
prosecutor’s part since he was never told of the February 20 hearing nor was he
informed of it when he had spoken to officials at the prosecutor’s office two days
earlier. Pellettieri agreed something dubious was going on, since had received
“scant notice“ about the hearing as well.85
During the February 20 hearing, Pellettieri told the Judge Joseph Conlon
that Cooper “divulged certain information to me” that morning when Pellettieri
came to court.

Quite possibly, both Burrell and Pellettieri believed Volpe

isolated Cooper as a means to convince Cooper to take the deal. Additionally,
the Princeton Committee issued a statement on February 25 offering their
explanation for Cooper’s decision. The committee confirmed that Cooper “had
been recently denied the right to see friends . . . His confused and troubled state

National Guardian, “Last of Trenton Six ‘Confesses’; Pressure is Charged,” February
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box 36, folder 10.
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of mind, can be easily envisioned when he was told by the court that he had to
answer two questions . . . To ‘please’ the court was the only way in which he
could gain his freedom.”86
The fallout from Cooper’s actions continued for several days. Defense
attorneys Frank Katzenbach, Clifford Moore, and Robert Queen met with New
Jersey Attorney General Theodore Parsons on February 25 seeking Parsons to
“investigate the circumstances of the plea made by Cooper.” They wanted to
know the circumstances surrounding Cooper’s decision and to explain why he
opted to “implicate persons who were acquitted.” A black activist in Trenton,
Rev. S. Howard Woodson, wrote to the Trenton Times about the furor:
It is difficult to understand how the Trenton police or the
Prosecutor’s office can get satisfaction out of what, at best,
Smells like the fish left, overly long out of the ice-box . . . While
we are in the era of ‘investigations’ as being the popular order
of the day, how about a little in the Mercer Prosecutor’s office?
This latest fiasco shapes up to no more than a desperate move
on the part of the prosecution to gain some kind of victory, no
matter how sordid.87

“Transcript of Court Hearing, February 20, 1953,” NAACP Papers, Part 26: Selected
Branch Files, 1940–1955, Series B: The Northeast, Group II, Box C-114 Reel 4, New Jersey
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Horner at the time he was robbed and killed? Cooper: Yes, sir. Court: And my second question
to you is: who was with you there in the store?” Cooper then listed English, Forrest, Wilson,
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There was one participant in the Horner case who remained aloof from the
controversy surrounding the Cooper plea. The Trenton Times reported Volpe
“for the first time in five years” was taking a vacation “without being haunted by
some phase of the Horner murder case.”88
There was no record that Attorney General Theodore Parsons, Judge
Conlon, or Volpe ever responded to any of the charges. It seems the matter
quietly died. Ralph Cooper was paroled in November, therein closing the
criminal aspect of the Horner cases. The Trenton Six case then slowly faded into
history much as it had begun—amidst many questions.89
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CONCLUSION
The Trenton Six criminal cases ended in 1953 with Ralph Cooper’s plea of
no contest. That did not end the legal saga of the Trenton Six, however. There
was one more protracted struggle. As a result of his testimony in the second
trial, Dr. J. Minor Sullivan was indicted and charged with perjury in December
1952. The prosecutor claimed Sullivan determined before the second trial to “set
a sail a course to free the murderers of William Horner” by deliberately and
willfully giving false testimony when he described the conditions of the six men as
they signed their statements. Sullivan vehemently denied the charges, arguing
that the questions were much different in the two trials. In the first trial, the
questions were fundamentally fact based, asking what he observed. In the
second one, however, the trial judge allowed the attorneys to pose hypothetical
questions as to whether A could cause B. No longer a fact witness, Sullivan
provided opinions to explain how something might have happened. His opinions
changed over time, which explained how his testimony was different in the two
trials.1
Throughout the next few years, Sullivan’s lawyers tried to throw out the
indictment by appealing to the New Jersey courts and then to the United States
Supreme Court. Sullivan lost all the appeals, and on January 16, 1956, the trial
commenced. The defense opted not to empanel a jury, but rather to permit the

1 Trenton Evening Times, “Charge Perjury By Dr. Sullivan,” December 24, 1952; Atlanta
Daily World, “’Trenton Six’ Doctor Refused Case Review,” October 17, 1957.
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trial judge to decide the case. After a hard fought twelve day trial, on February 9,
1956, Sullivan was found guilty of seven of the eight counts.2
Sullivan received a remarkable amount of support from his family, friends,
and the medical community. Many viewed Sullivan’s indictment and Cooper’s
surprise no contest plea as part of Volpe’s strategy of “face-saving.” The re-trial
Trenton Six verdict was “one of the worst defeats” suffered by Volpe and his
reputation suffered as a result. Additionally, Volpe had been “on the spot” since
the second trial to justify the nearly $200,000 in trial costs the county incurred.
Thus many saw the Sullivan trial as nothing more than an opportunity for Volpe
to reclaim some of his luster, since it was clear that he had higher aspirations
than Mercer County prosecutor.3
Sullivan faced seven years in prison, as well as the possibility that he
could lose his license to practice medicine and be forced to resign his city and
county posts. The conviction set shock waves through the medical community.
2 Trenton Evening Times, "Dr. Sullivan Loses Motion of Dismissal,” February 6, 1953;
Trenton Evening Times, “Appeal is Filed by Dr. Sullivan,” February 27, 1953; Trenton Evening
Times, “Court Agrees to Hear Dr. Sullivan Appeal,” March 16, 1953; Trenton Evening Times, “Dr.
Sullivan Asks Court Kill Charge,” April 20, 1953; Trenton Evening Times, “Dr. Sullivan May Carry
Plea Higher, May 12, 1953; Trenton Evening Times, “Court to Get Sullivan Plea,” May 22 1953;
Trenton Evening Times, “Court Denies Sullivan Plea,” September 14, 1953; Trenton Evening
Times, “Sullivan Must Stand Trial,” September 27, 1953; Trenton Evening Times, “Dr. Sullivan
Loses US Court Plea,” February 2, 1954; Trenton Evening Times, “Dr. Sullivan Wins Appeal,”
May 17 1954; Trenton Evening Times, “Dr. Sullivan Trial is Set,” September 7, 1955; New Jersey
Superior Court, State v. Sullivan, 96 A.2d 680 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1953), Argued April 20,
1953, Decided May 11, 1953; Supreme Court of the United States, No. 492. Sullivan v New
Jersey, 347 U.S. 903; 74 S. Ct. 428; 98 L. Ed. 1063; 1954; New Jersey Superior Court, State v.
Sullivan, 109 A.2d 430 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1954), Argued October 25, 1954, Decided
November 10, 1954; Trenton Evening Times, “Dr. Sullivan Goes to Trial in Trenton Six
Aftermath,” January 16, 1954; Trenton Evening Times, “Dr. Sullivan Guilty on 7 of 8 Counts,”
February 9, 1956; Trenton Evening Times, “Dr. Sullivan is Given Probation, $1500 Fine,” April 20,
1956.
3 “Clifford Moore to Thurgood Marshall,” March 2, 1953, Raymond Alexander Papers, box
36, folder 10; Samuel A. Haynes, “Dr. Sullivan’s Trial Reeks with Politics,” Afro-American,
January 28, 1956; Samuel A. Haynes, “Decision Could Be Like Ghost,” Afro-American, May 11,
1957.
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The National Medical Association reported on the implications of Sullivan’s
struggle in its monthly journal. The reports recalled how other physicians had
been found guilty of crimes such as being involved in the narcotics trade or
falsifying records. But, “the extenuating circumstances” of Sullivan’s case made
it very alarming and different for the medical community.
As a result, the report indicated, “our association has studied the matter in
detail and has lent moral support to the Doctor. Time has now come that
financial aid is needed to assist the physician in making an appeal.” What
troubled the National Medical Association about Sullivan’s conviction was that his
testimony was based on “professional opinion” which “established not only a
precedent but also a condition in which any physician on trial in the future may be
liable to perjury charges when giving his medical opinion thus erasing the latitude
of medical authoritativeness.” As a result of the Sullivan judgment, the Medical
Society of New Jersey, at its annual meeting, conducted seminars such as
“Medical and Legal Testimony” to instruct physicians about the potential dangers
when giving testimony. It presented the recently released film, The Medical
Witness, by the American Medical Association.4
Sullivan was sentenced to two years of probation and a $2000 fine. He
spent the next nine years fighting the conviction. In January 1957 he appealed to
the New Jersey Supreme Court. In May, the state high court upheld the
conviction, four votes to three. He then spent the next eight years appealing to
the United States Supreme Court and back again to New Jersey courts, all to no
Journal of the National Medical Association, Editorial, “A Doctor on Trial,” Journal of the
National Medical Association 48, no. 5 (September 1956): 362; Samuel A. Haynes, “Decision
Could Be Like Ghost,” Afro-American, May 11, 1957.
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avail. Finally, in April 1965, when he lost his third appeal to the United States
Supreme Court, the saga was over. Now all the legal battles associated with the
Trenton Six were finally concluded.5
The New Jersey Board of Examiners never revoked Sullivan’s license, but
he remained bitter throughout the rest of his life. As far as Sullivan was
concerned, Volpe “became very vengeful and decided to take out his vengeance
on me. He let Cooper plead to clear the case up.” Sullivan saw the charge both
as a “pay-back” for his testimony and as political retaliation by the Republican
Volpe. Indeed, Volpe never moved to indict George English for perjury when he
lied under oath that he was never married to Rubie English. Sullivan continued
to be involved in local and state Democratic politics, and he kept practicing
medicine in the city. He died at the age of 91 on January 18, 2003, as a result of
injuries he received in a house fire. He had been confined to his bed and unable
to escape the fire.6
More recriminations followed. After the verdict, the investigator for the
defense in both trials, Joseph Burtchaell, was denied access by New Jersey
Attorney General Parsons to “any and all information from public records” from
the New Jersey Division of Motor Vehicles. Checking this type of information is

Trenton Evening Times, “Dr. Sullivan Guilty on 7 of 8 Counts,” February 9, 1956;
Trenton Evening Times, “Dr. Sullivan is Given Probation, $1500 Fine,” April 20, 1956.
5

Trenton Evening Times, “Dr. Sullivan Case Before High Court,” January 28, 1957;
Trenton Evening Times, “Dr. Sullivan Guilty Verdict is Upheld,” April 1, 1957; Trenton Evening
Times, “Doctor Loses Plea Another Round Due,” April 22, 1965; Trenton Evening Times, “Trenton
6: An Agony Unhealed,” January 28, 1973; Trentonian, Obituary, “Dr. Sullivan, a City Legend,
Dies in Fire,” January 20, 2003.
6

313

an absolute necessity for any investigator. As an accredited business with the
state, he was entitled to inquire at the department for such information. By
withholding permission, Burtchaell believed Parsons was “penalizing him for his
participation inn the defense of the ‘Trenton Six.’” James Imbrie wrote that he
was “troubled at the obvious bitterness from top to bottom of the law enforcement
agencies against the whole defense setup, including our Princeton Committee.7
Precious little information remains about three members of the Trenton
Six, After his release from prison, James Thorpe remained in Trenton. Early in
the morning on Sunday, March 20, 1955, Thorpe was travelling with his brother
Raymond and a man named Lee Hightower. Hightower drove through a stop
sign and collided with a tractor trailer. Thorpe’s brother and Hightower were not
hurt, but James suffered a serious brain injury. He died a few days later on
Friday, March 25, from his injuries. Ironically, it was Thorpe who had lost his
right arm after an automobile accident a few weeks before his arrest in January
of 1948.8
Throughout the long ordeal of the trials, Robert Forrest, brother to
McKinley Forrest and uncle to John Mackenzie, became an important anchor for
the family. He assumed the responsibilities of father for McKinley’s daughter,
7 “Viola C. DuPault to Thurgood Marshall,” August 27, 1952, Raymond Alexander Papers,
box 36, folder 10. DePault on Burtchaell’s behalf wrote requesting help from the national
NACCP. In a letter to Clifford Moore, Burtchaell was “deeply chagrined at the indifference of the
NAACP . . . I wouldn’t want to ever be associated with this organization again.” “Joseph
Burtchaell to Clifford Moore,” May 20, 1952, Raymond Alexander Papers, box 36, folder 10;
Imbrie Manuscript, 483.

8 Trenton Evening Times, “’Trenton Six’ Figure Dead of Injuries,” March 27, 1955; New
York Amsterdam News, “Trenton Six Victim Dies in Auto Mishap,” April 2, 1955.
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Jean. She stayed in Newark and attended school while her father was in prison.
Following the second trial, Forrest offered John a job in his contracting business.
Forrest told a reporter that he was “taking Mackenzie home for a few days where
Volpe couldn’t bother him.” Mackenzie had a few minor altercations with the
Newark Police Department in the immediate years after his release. But after
these clashes, Mackenzie disappeared from the historical record. In a 1973
interview, McKinley Forrest indicated that Mackenzie had died.9
After his release, Forrest transferred his daughter back to Trenton schools
and returned to his old job as a butcher in the kosher markets of Trenton. He
soon married a Trenton woman, Maxine, and settled down. Twenty-five years
after his arrest, in 1973, he gave his first interview to the Trenton Times about his
harrowing experiences as a member of the Trenton Six. “The people I’m bitter
about are dead now and I’d rather not talk about it,“ he reflected. Forrest died at
age sixty-nine on December 26, 1982.10
Horace Wilson returned to the Hutchinson farms in Robbinsville,
attempting to put his life back together. He then disappeared from the pages of
history. Ralph Cooper was paroled in November of 1953. There was
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speculation that he left New Jersey as quickly as he could, but there is no clear
evidence whether he left the state or not.11
There were no further news reports concerning Bessie Mitchell. There is
no record left of what she thought about Cooper’s plea, which earned his
freedom while implicating all of the others. As hard as she fought for Collis
English and the others, she must have been livid at the idea that the last word
about her brother was “guilty.”
Collis English’s mother, Emma English, stayed in Trenton and died at age
seventy-eight on July 21, 1970. English’s father, George English, who had
testified against his own son, continued to have problems with the police. In
1952, he was charged in the shooting death of a Brooklyn man who had given
English a ride from Brooklyn to Trenton. According to the police, English shot the
victim when he demanded more than the nine dollars that English was willing to
pay for the trip. Ever resilient, English was back on the streets. In 1955 he was
arrested, yet again, for possession and distribution of illegal alcohol from his
home. When the police raided the English home, they found “44 cans of beer
and 95 pints of wine.” English pleaded guilty and was fined $400.12
Mercer County Judge Charles P. Hutchinson, who had presided over the
first trial and removed the CRC attorneys in 1949, had his life altered by the
case. In 1950, the Committee to Free the Trenton Six, a fund raising arm of the
11
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Civil Rights Congress, called upon Republican New Jersey Governor Alfred E.
Driscoll to withdraw his reappointment of Hutchinson due to his controversial
actions. Driscoll refused and Hutchinson was reappointed. By 1955, however,
more groups joined the anti-Hutchinson campaign; Governor Meyner declined to
renominate him for his third appointment. The judge returned to private practice.
He suffered a heart attack in 1957 and died from complications of pneumonia.13
Judge Ralph J. Smalley’s reputation was enhanced by his conduct during
the re-trial. He was subsequently reappointed to the bench by Governor Meyner
in 1955. He, too, suffered a heart attack while working in his office and died a
few weeks later in January 1956.14
Prosecutor Volpe paid a political cost for the Trenton Six case. He
continued to insist the charges against the men were legitimate and the acquittal
of the four was a “miscarriage of justice.” In a 1973 interview, he again reiterated
his belief all six were guilty. Volpe claimed the accusation that Cooper plead no
contest in return for an early release “just doesn’t hold water.” He claimed that if
Cooper and English had gone to trial, he had new “evidence—a prayer book
allegedly passed between the two men while they were in the death house that
would have made the case against Cooper even stronger.” Such grasping at
straws recalled his earlier unsavory prosecutorial tactics, which the New Jersey
Trenton Evening Times, “Judge Hutchinson Reappointment Hit,” March 16, 1950;
Trenton Evening Times, “Ex-Judge Hutchinson's Condition Still Serious,” December 13, 1957;
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Supreme Court had offered as one justification for the reversal of both
convictions.15
During the 1951 retrial, the Washington Afro-American warned Volpe that
that he was committing political suicide because of his attempt to exclude blacks
from jury selection. The Afro-American argued Volpe’s decision was the final act
in a long string of outrages committed against Trenton’s black community. They
cautioned there would be repercussions to his actions. In 1955, Volpe was
nominated by Democratic Governor Robert B. Meyner to become the new
Mercer County judge to replace Hutchinson.16
Once the governor announced Volpe’s selection, the Cumberland County
and Mercer County NAACP chapters announced their opposition and began to
organize resistance to the nomination. A few weeks later, the Civil Rights
Congress announced its disapproval of Volpe, as well. The governor attempted
to defend his nominee, claiming that there was no evidence of racism in Volpe’s
actions as a prosecutor and in the manner he conducted both trials. Meyner
recalled the prosecutor had appointed a black to his staff in 1951 and was an
active member of the Trenton Interracial Unity Committee. The Republican
leadership initially rallied behind the governor for Volpe’s nomination. In a news
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conference, Republican Senate Majority Leader Wayne Dumont dismissed the
protests from the NAACP and others, claiming that even Robert Queen, who had
served as a defense attorney in the first trial, “was on record favoring Volpe for
the judgeship.”
But as the weeks progressed, Mercer County Republican officials felt the
pressure and started opposing the nomination. The nomination was in trouble.
The governor and leadership could not save it. By mid-September, even Dumont
acknowledged that “it was personal objections to Volpe not political ones” that
were holding up the confirmation process. With mounting criticism and
questions, the Republican majority in the New Jersey Senate tabled his
nomination until after the November elections. Ultimately, the nomination died in
committee, as the leadership refused to bring it to the full Senate as the old
session concluded. 17
In 1956, Volpe asked Meyner to withdraw his name from consideration. It
was clear that the new Senate would not confirm him either. Instead the
governor appointed Volpe’s third-assistant, Arthur S. Lane, to the post. Volpe’s
term as Mercer County prosecutor ended in 1957. His political career and
gubernatorial aspirations shattered, Volpe returned to private and corporate
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practice. It seemed the Afro-American’s prediction had come true. In 1975,
Volpe suffered a heart attack and died at age sixty-four.18
Robert Queen, one of the early and significant activists in Trenton,
returned to his practice after he was replaced by CRC lawyers in 1949. In April
1959, he was forced to reduce his practice when he underwent several serious
major surgeries. He was able to resume some of his activity, but in August 1960,
he once again was plagued with medical problems. Queen collapsed at home
following his return from the doctor’s office and died.19
The talented Clifford R. Moore, who began his career by researching law
during the first trial and serving on the second defense team, continued his rise in
legal circles. In 1952, he became the first black appointed U.S. Commissioner
since Reconstruction. He remained active in the New Jersey State and national
NAACP organization. On July 15, 1956, while cleaning one of his guns in his
collection, he accidentally killed himself.20
Raymond Pace Alexander continued his illustrious legal career. Even
while participating in the second trial, Alexander was eying a run for a
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Philadelphia City Council seat. In July 1951, Alexander entered the Democratic
primary. The ward leaders refused to support Alexander, since he was perceived
as against political patronage. He easily won the primary. In the general election
campaign, he criticized the Philadelphia police’s tactics against black citizens and
called for the hiring of more blacks in the city. Alexander became the first black
elected to city council in over sixty-seven years. In 1959, Alexander became the
first black judge in Philadelphia’s Court of Common Pleas. Alexander’s
biographer labelled him as “judicial activist who addressed poverty, juvenile
delinquency, and free legal aid for the poor.” Alexander continued to be active
through the 1960s and early 1970s as he witnessed the ideological divide grow
between black moderates and militants. In November 1974, his wife called the
police when failed to return home that night. They went to his office and found
him dead at his desk.21
George Pellettieri, the fiery defense counsel during the second trial
remained active in Trenton’s legal arena and New Jersey Democratic politics.
The fundamental objective for Pellettieri after the trial was to rebuild his practice.
Pellettieri’s reputation had been boosted by his involvement in the re-trial. Ruth
Rabstein recounted the post-trial time as “exciting. We were known. Times were
better. There was more employment. We had received world wide renown.” In

21 David A. Canton. Raymond Pace Alexander: A New Negro Lawyer Fights For Civil
Rights in Philadelphia (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2010), 118 – 119,127, 184 –
185.
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1962, Pellettieri married Rabstein. He stayed in Trenton the remainder of his life.
He suffered a major heart attack and died in 1980. Ruth died in 2005.22
The war horse of New Jersey Progressive Party politics and civil liberties,
James Imbrie, continued to protest the growing attack upon individual freedoms
by HUAC and the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee (SISS). In 1951, he
helped establish the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee (ECLC), which
included notables such as journalist I. F. Stone and E. Franklin Frazier, Chair of
the Howard University Sociology Department. The organization was dedicated to
help the ACLU in the struggle. Imbrie was particularly concerned about
declining academic freedom, as more university and college academics across
the nation were being investigated. He was principally concerned with the case
of Simon W. Heimlich, Rutgers University Associate Professor of Physics and
Mathematics, College of Pharmacy. Heimlich had been subpoenaed before
HUAC about possible Communist affiliation or party membership. He invoked his
Fifth Amendment privilege. As a result, he was investigated by Rutgers
University. A few members of the ECLC appeared before the Rutgers Trustees
to support Heimlich. It was of no avail, however, for the university fired Heimlich
on December 31, 1952.23
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The last struggle for Imbrie was his criticism of President Lyndon
Johnson’s military escalation in Vietnam in 1965 and 1966. By 1968, ill health
again plagued Imbrie. He and his wife moved permanently to their winter home
in Chapala, Mexico. On July 3, 1973, James Imbrie died and was buried in
Chapala. He was ninety-three.24
Finally, the fiery crusader William L. Patterson, who organized the
disregarded local Trenton Six case and transformed it into a world-wide cause
célèbre in a few short months, continued, his crusade for racial justice and
equality long after his involvement in the case. In December 1951, Patterson
and the Civil Rights Congress presented the United Nations with a petition
accusing the United States government of genocide against its black citizens. In
1954, Patterson spent time in Danbury Federal Prison for refusing to give
government investigators the names of CRC contributors. When in his
seventies, he helped defend members of the Black Panther Party and later
participated in the defense of Angela Davis. Davis had been accused of
assisting a planned courtroom in an attempt to free the defendants. Patterson
died in 1980 at the age of eighty-nine.25
The Trenton Six case is more than a long-forgotten legal case. It provides
us with a lens into the complex post war world, in the emerging Cold War era,
with the intersecting and disputed worlds of race and ideology colliding. It was
24
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one city’s story, but it enveloped the entire nation, as Americans attempted to
make sense of their chaotic and complicated world. The case also allows us to
center this struggle in the midst of the long civil rights movement.
The case sheds light on the reality of northern cities after World War II.
Trentonians found themselves in the midst of a growing crisis of
deindustrialization, suburbanization, and racial tension. Trenton needed to
address its pressing problems of competition for the available resources. These
problems of employment, housing, public spaces, and in policing were all
identified with increased black migration, a phenomenon similar to other northern
cities. However, Trenton had its own unique set of issues. The city, just 7.2
square miles, was one of the most density populated cities in the United States,
had a declining population and financial base, and served as the state capital
and county seat. Since the state and county contributed nothing for city services,
the burden fell upon the declining number of the city’s property owners. As the
population of whites declined, the number of blacks escalated with the
accompanying tax increases to pay for all of it.
Additionally, the long simmering feud between Public Safety
Commissioner Andrew Duch and Chief of Police William Dooling contributed to
the inability of law enforcement to deal with the crime wave that broke out after
the war. This ineffectiveness merely added to the fear of crime by whites as they
read the clarion calls by the newspapers for increased police presence and
control.
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As more and more Trenton whites viewed their officials as increasingly
unable to find explanations to the problems, they developed a “siege mentality” in
an effort to remain in control of their city and their neighborhoods. This mindset
would be the driving force by which they played out their relationships with
African Americans, as the “Trenton Six” case vividly portrayed. The siege
mentality further entrenched and reaffirmed the second reaction: the continual
use of racism and discrimination to remain in control. It was then in this
environment that the murder of William Horner occurred and the pursuit of his
killers commenced.
The Trenton Six case also reveals the problem with race in the criminal
justice system. Even as racial attitudes were liberalizing in New Jersey, race still
pervaded criminal justice proceedings in subtle and not so subtle ways,
profoundly changing the narrative of what happened, first in the interrogation
room, and still later in the courtroom. Unconscious ideas about race and racial
difference, alongside interrogation techniques that magnified the inequalities
between white police officers and black defendants, created a version of events
that left the six men with little recourse to challenge their arrests. In the
courtroom, racism tainted the proceedings, from the deliberate use of peremptory
challenges in securing an all-white jury to Volpe’s use of direct and indirect
attempts to reinforce the jurors’ perceptions of black criminality.
W.E.B. DuBois had stated that the “problem of the Twentieth Century is
the problem of the color-line,” and the Trenton Six exposed that notion in a
northern urban context. The case was called a “legal lynching” and a “northern
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Scottsboro.” For white northerners who viewed themselves as different from
southerners, the case placed them in a very awkward and contradictory position.
James Baldwin summarized this problem well:
Northerners indulge in an extremely dangerous luxury. They
seem to feel that because they fought on the right side during
the Civil War, and won, they have earned the right to deplore
what is going in the South, without taking any responsibility for it; .
and that they can ignore what is happening in Northern cities,
because what is happening in Little Rock or Birmingham is worse.
Jason Sokol’s argues “there is in the North a mystique about the past” and that
“during and after World War Two, this regional mystique held its greatest
strength.” The 1951 re-trial exposed these ideas. During the admissibility
hearing, the defense attempted to introduce into evidence media coverage and
the editorials that were racially inflammatory in nature, thereby meeting the
standards set by the US Supreme Court for the presiding judge to discard the
confessions.26
Volpe’s response encapsulated the contradictory nature of the North’s
racial dilemma. He denied “an element which never existed in this case, and
that is the questions of the color to the defendants.” He continued, “Now
because some of the Courts must take judicial cognizance of the fact that in
some of the states as to what condition exists, in some of the southern states . . .
we are in New Jersey.” Volpe, in his mind, just needed to prove that he was not
what southerners happened to be. Throughout the entire case, most white
26 W.E.B. Dubois, The Souls of Black Folk (Mineola, New York: Dover Publications,
1993), 3; James Baldwin, Nobody Knows My Name (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), p 69;
Jason Sokol, All Eyes Are Upon Us: Race and Politics from Boston to Brooklyn (New York: Basic
Books, 2014), xvi.
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Trentonians did not believe they were racists. They were angry at the outside
media portrayal of their city. But at the same time, they were blind to the
complex levels of racism that manifested in their city, especially during the trial.27
As Defense attorney Arthur Garfield Hayes insisted, “You can’t keep color
out of this case.”

He countered Volpe’s argument: “That is just want we want to

show, that in many respects conditions aren’t different.”28
The historical themes from the Trenton Six continue to resonate. The
headlines continue to divide Americans, whether it be the acquittal of George
Zimmerman in the death of Trayvon Martin, or the refusal of a jury to indict a
white police officer in the death of Michael Brown. The Washington Post reported
in December 2014 that the question of policing and fairness continued to divide
America. According to its survey, one in ten blacks believe they receive equal
treatment by police, while nearly half of white Americans believe the races are
treated equally. This continual racial disconnect, the narrative of race and
policing, and the recurring attack on the value of black life reveal a lack of
progress, in many ways, since the time of Trenton Six.29
The Trenton Six further sheds light on the contribution made by black
women in the struggle against Jim Crow, in criminal defense cases, and the
larger freedom struggle. The Trenton Six case radicalized Bessie Mitchell, who
27
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emerged from the margins. She witnessed the events that led to the conviction
of her brother, and believed it was a travesty of justice. She transitioned from a
nonpolitical woman to one who became closely identified with the Radical Left
and the Civil Rights Congress. As she matured into a civil rights activist, Mitchell
traveled across the country to speak, becoming identified with the larger issues in
the struggle for equality. Class perception factored into Mitchel’s mistrust of the
defense counsel and the local NAACP. She rejected the advice and methods of
the NAACP and was subsequently the most responsible for the appearance of
the Civil Rights Congress into the case. She was demonized as a result.
However, her contribution propelled the case into a cause célèbre, galvanizing
support as she traveled across the United States
The Trenton Six case also vividly illustrates the importance of the Left in
the battle for racial justice in the late 1940s. It allows us an opportunity to
consider a relatively unknown civil rights organization that deserves additional
research from scholars. The CRC took an obscure, localized, legal case and
changed the dynamics and trajectory of it within a short few months. Patterson
used his longtime political connections in the United States and Europe, his
organizational skills to mobilize supporters, and his shrewdness in generating
publicity for the case. It was extraordinary in its effectiveness and simplicity. The
CRC orchestrated and brought forth a movement of people across political and
ideological lines in demanding justice for the Trenton Six before the days of mass
communication and social media. It could be argued the CRC’s major
contribution was the pressure it placed on public officials. Patterson repeatedly
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accused the state of racism. Once the charge was in the public domain and at
least some people considered the validity of the claim, it ratcheted up the
pressure on state officials not to be seen as racist by the public. New Jersey
Governor Driscoll felt the weight and accordingly arranged the replacement of
Judge Hutchinson.
Once the CRC gained control over the case, it was successfully able to
develop a narrative of how the NAACP and ACLU were indifferent to the plight of
poor blacks in the hands of the criminal justice system. This account clearly put
the two groups on the defense, forcing them to publicly join in the defense of the
Six. Over time, however, the tremendous success of the CRC ultimately brought
about its own demise. Since the Trenton Six case occurred during the darkest
days of the Cold War, it provides another lens for us to view the anti-communist
movement. Although its supporters were united on what they were against, there
were various strategies designed to rid the country of communists or fellow
travelers. One such way was to rid the justice system of lawyers deemed to be
assisting communists on trial. The participants who waged this war were the
members of the court themselves, from judges to state and national attorney
generals. Once the CRC was labeled by the Justice Department as subversive,
it was only a matter of time before the association with communism was
damaging them. Within the year of entering the case, Judge Hutchinson
removed the CRC lawyers, thrusting the issue of anti-Communist hysteria into
the mix. After a long and protracted struggle, the CRC withdrew from the case
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leaving an opportunity for the NNACP to reestablish itself as the prominent civil
rights organization in the United States.
The Trenton Six case also enriches the narrative of the Progressive
Movement of 1948. The case allows us to re-center those who were not “Harry
Truman liberals” those who rejected his strident attitude toward the Soviet Union,
believed it was in the best interest of world peace to try to co-exist with them, and
were committed to racial equality since they were not restricted by southerners in
their own party. The case highlights James Imbrie and the role of his Princeton
Committee. Although the Cold War continued to destroy the fragile Popular
Front-type organizations, the Committee was one way activists attempted to
pursue their goals of justice and equality despite the political limitations of the
1950s Cold War. Imbrie’s reputation and his commitment to justice allowed him
to bring a wide ranging coalition together in seeking a fair outcome for the six.
His committee drew support from across the ideological spectrum, ranging from
progressive activists to conservatives. Dr. Corwin, a constitutional scholar and a
conservative, selected as president of the committee. For Corwin it was about
securing justice, not about ideology. Even though Imbrie bristled at the NAACP’s
repression of communism within their ranks, he united with them and formed a
partnership to assist the six men. These individuals who have been identified
many times as “dreamers” and unrealistic deserve for their stories to re-emerge.
Lastly, the Trenton Six case is a major and forgotten northern civil rights
legal battle that has never been examined, even though scholars have examined
southern legal cases such as those of the Scottsboro Boys, Willie McGee, and
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the Martinsville Seven. The case sheds light on the importance of black
attorneys in the 1950s in the northern civil rights movement. The Trenton Six
case was one of the first significant high profile victories for lead black attorneys
in criminal cases. And for that reason alone this case was crucial in the
establishment of black attorneys as equal to whites in the courtroom. There was
still a considerable doubt at the beginning of the 1951 retrial as to whether black
lawyers could be placed in prominent positions in a defense team. The trial
reflected the conflict and challenges for the NAACP lawyers as they struggled
both within the defense team and against the opposition. Alexander’s
experience, trial strategy, and demeanor contributed to the success in seeing his
clients acquitted. In the process, he answered a larger question of the
competency of black attorneys.
But the 1951 retrial also exposed the fragile coalition between the NAACP
and the Princeton Committee. The difficult relationship that arose during the trial
among the lawyers was representative of the larger tension and stress that was
playing out amongst liberals trying to engage in the struggle for civil rights.
The climate that produced the Trenton Six has not abated, unfortunately.
Through decisions such as Shelby County v Holder, the Supreme Court
dismantled key pieces of Great Society legislation such as the Voting Rights Act.
In Ferguson, Missouri; Baltimore, Maryland; Waller County, Texas; and in too
many other locations across the United States, we hear the chants of protest that
“Black Lives Matter,” as demonstrators demand accountability in the ever
growing number of police killings of unarmed Americans. And the debate rages
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concerning the prosecution of the war on terror, as the demand is made for a
delicate balance between the government’s need to protect and a respect for civil
liberties. What remains crystal clear is that the struggle over the issues in
Trenton Six case continues to be the struggle for us today. Just as those in the
past challenged, resisted, and demanded change, we likewise, must join in that
tradition in our day. We can look past the negativity and see the ideals worth
championing and struggling for as we work to make America a better place.
In spite of the current political and racial situation, the Trenton Six can
offer us an example of the activism that is required to fight injustice today, since
the weapons in the struggle must be similar to theirs: courage, persistence, and
determination. We can hear the voices of ordinary men and women in the
Stories of the Trenton Six as they were caught up in this mighty crusade for
justice. And although a few of the participants may have come across as heroic,
their decisions and actions nevertheless also remind us they were mere humans,
and as such were flawed. As with so many things in life, the Trenton Six leaves
us wishing for a happier ending. And as with any mystery story, we are left with
more questions to ponder than answers.
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